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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis uses laboratory experiments to explore representation in social 
organizations. In our experimental design, we argue that the effectiveness of the 
representative’s decision on group payoffs depends on the extent to which agency is 
provided by the group. In this thesis, we report three studies on representation from a 
behavioural perspective.  
In the second chapter, we introduce a modified public good game that have the 
representative complementing the outcome of a collective action. The game is p layed 
sequentially, and groups members may contribute to the collective action, knowing 
there is a representative adjusting the benefits (multiplier) for contributions. The 
experiment involved participation of Sarawak’s Kayan villagers and incorporated the 
subjects’ pre-existing social status and social relationship closeness to examine the 
role of social status in representation. We found that social status acts as an amplifier 
to representative’s efforts and group members’ contributions.  
In the third chapter, we introduced a modified sender-receiver game to examine 
another function of representative; that is to channel benefits to the group. An agency 
relationship is established between representative (sender) and group members 
(receivers) when a recommendation (message) from the representative is accepted by 
group members.  As in the second chapter, we explore whether social status and 
relationship play any role in predicting representative’s willingness to recommend 
public-spirited outcomes and group members’ willingness to accept the 
representative’s recommendation. We found that social status plays no role in 
representative’s public-spiritedness, but the closeness of relationship between 
representative and group members legitimized the representative’s recommendations. 
The final chapter uses the modified public good game developed in Chapter 2 to 
examine representation relationship in the long run and determine whether the order 
of a representative’s decisions have an impact on social welfare.  We found higher 
incidences of efficiency in the simultaneous decision treatment in a pattern which is 
stable across time.  We also found that there are reciprocal tendencies between 
representative and group members, resulting in the groups’ decisions bifurcating 
towards socially efficient or no representation relationship.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
The presence of a representative within groups is ubiquitous in many social 
organizations. The main role of a representative is to act on behalf of the group 
members by advocating for the group’s interest. However, most work on 
representation have been concentrated in the fields of political economy and political 
science. Buchanan & Tullock (1962) initiated the formalisation representation in 
terms of economic and political exchange by introducing the basis of representation 
and the bargaining process by a representative on behalf of voters in constitutional 
democracies. Their line of inquiries started with a group of individuals performing 
collective actions aligned with their interests, and this would then be extended to how 
political institutions can be shaped to maximise voters’ interest or curtailed 
representative’s public office abuses.  On the other hand, studies on representation 
by Besley (2005, 2006) and Besley & Coate (1997) stress the importance of political 
selection and the qualities of representation. This strand of work on representation 
examined: i) the role of representative’s quality,  and especially her/his honesty and 
competencies and characteristics; ii) representative’s method of selection, whether it 
happens at random, by heredity or through voting; and iii) the incentive structure for 
a citizen to propel her/himself to stand for election and become a representative.    
This thesis has proposed an exploratory framework on representation using economic 
games. Examining representation in economic experimental games allowed the act 
of representation to be analysed in multiple social organizations, from grassroots and 
corporate organizations to labour unions. The actors in this framework consisted of: 
i) a representative, whose decisions affected the payoffs of the group as well as 
her/his payoff; and ii) the group members that provided agency or legitimacy for the 
representative’s decision. These games would then be implemented as lab -in-the-
field experiments and a laboratory experiment with student subjects. The field setting 
enabled this framework to examine the effects of representation (in a community with 
pre-existing rules and traditions) on representative’s selection.  
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In this framework, we argue that the effectiveness of the representative depends on 
the extent of the agency provided by the group. Typically, the relationship between 
representative and group members involves conflict of interest and mutual trust.  A 
relationship shaped by mutual trust will produce efficient group outcomes when a 
representative’s effectiveness is matched by the group members’ collective actions.  
On the other hand, a shirking representative will harm the cooperative group outcome 
for personal gain, while uncooperative group members will cause a disservice to a 
responsible representative.  Using two new experimental games, this thesis 
investigates: i) representatives’ trustworthiness in advocating group interests; ii) the 
degree to which group members trust representatives to do this; and iii) the effects of 
underlying social norms and social hierarchies on shaping representation and its 
outcomes.   
This thesis reports three experiments on representation and leadership. Two 
experiments involved lab-in-the-field settings in which subjects were recruited from 
the tight-knit Kayan tribe villages in Sarawak (Borneo), Malaysia.  
In Chapter 2, we explore the role of social status in representative leadership.  Within 
a three-person group, one person was selected at random to act as the representative 
leader.  The group played a modified public good game.  In this game, the effort of 
the leader is complementary with the total contributions of the others.  The two group 
members decide on contribution levels towards a public good.  Before the 
representative decides, he/she receives information on total contribution.  The 
representative’s effort complements group members’ contributions by affecting the 
value of the public good multiplier.  This experiment involved participation of Kayan 
villages, and before the game was executed, villagers reported their judgements on 
one another’s relative status dimensions and social relationship closeness.  We found 
that villagers assigned as the group’s representative behave prosocially, often at 
personal cost, to improve group outcomes. Although representatives were informed 
about group members’ contributions before deciding on their effort level, we found 
that there was no correlation between the members’ contributions and the 
representative’s effort.  Social status acts as an amplifier to the representative’s effort 
and group members’ contributions, as the most effective representation is carried out 
by those with high social status, while the most efficient collective action originates 
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from higher status group members.  The findings for this chapter indicate that there 
is a representation norm linked to social status in the Kayan tribe.    
The experiment in Chapter 3 explores representatives’ agency in deciding on behalf 
of group members.  We introduced a sender-receiver agency game in which an 
agency relationship is established between representative and group members when 
the recommendation of the representative is accepted by group members.  At the start 
of the game, every player is informed of each other’s potential payoffs. Group 
members (receivers) are aware of the possible conflict of interest faced by the 
randomly appointed representative (sender), i.e. the recommendation made might be 
skewed in favour of the representative, and concurrently a representative knows the 
risk that his/her public-spirited recommendation might be rejected by suspicious 
group members. Similar to the experiment in Chapter 2, we incorporate Kayan 
villagers’ judgements on each other’s social status and explore whether social status 
differences play any role in predicting representatives’ willingness to recommend 
public-spirited outcomes and group members’ willingness to accept the 
representative’s recommendation.  We found there are more representatives were 
willing to engage in public-spirited representation than behaved self-interestedly. 
Belonging to an aristocrat family is the only social status characteristics that could 
explained public-spirited representations. On the other hand, closeness of 
relationship with the representative predicts the likelihood of group members to 
accept a representative’s agency. The findings from this experiment contrast with the 
earlier experiment’s findings.   We argue that in the sender-receiver game, the role 
of the representative is similar to that of a modern representative (e.g. a village leader 
who negotiates with outsiders and then reports back).  In the modified public good 
game, this role is similar to traditional forms of leadership (e.g. noblesse oblige 
improves collective action).  
Chapter 4 examines the role of  representative leader using the framework that has 
been set in the field in Chapter 2 but using the standard laboratory experimental 
methods.  Using the modified public good game above, we varied the order of the 
representative’s decision with respect to group members’ contribution in three 
different treatments.  Subjects decided for 20 rounds and feedback was provided after 
the conclusion of each round.  The objective of this experiment was to examine 
whether the order of the representative’s decision affects the social efficiency of 
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public good provision.  We found higher incidences of social efficiency in treatments 
in which the representative and group members decided simultaneously; this pattern 
remained stable across time. When the representative and group members chose 
sequentially, groups performed better when the representative chose first.  There was 
a strong tendency for groups to converge either to maximum contribution by all 
individuals (both group members and the representative) or to zero contribution by 
all, indicating reciprocity. The complementarity nature of the representative’s efforts 
to group members’ collective action introduces a new mechanism for enhancing 
group level efficiency, despite declining average contribution and effort over time.  
This thesis makes two important contributions. First, we use laboratory experiments 
to investigate two core functions of a representative, namely i) improving the 
outcome of a collection action; and ii) channelling benefits to those that she/he 
presented. Both frameworks recognize the representative as a type of leader that 
motivates group members to act as a collective, while acknowledging the role of 
group members’ cooperativeness and trust towards the representative as integral in 
shaping social outcomes. Our framework has provided an approach towards how 
representation could be investigated in a social organization. We also extend on 
literature exploring the issue of responsibility and deciding on behalf of others in 
experimental and behavioural economics. Second, the implementation of two lab-in-
the-field experiments in Sarawak enabled this thesis to address research questions 
that have implications for development policies of developing countries. This further 
enabled us to tie cultural and norms to the representative’s selection and its 
relationship with group level outcome.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Representative Leadership, Trust and Social Status: Experimental 
Evidence from Borneo 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The presence of a representative acting on behalf of a group is ubiquitous in multiple 
social organizations – for example: elected representatives negotiating benefits for 
their constituents, heads securing funding for their departments, lobbyists influencing 
regulators on behalf of their clients, and in developing countries, village heads 
lobbying for development projects, from the government and NGOs, on behalf of the 
villagers.  
The concept of representative leadership introduced in this chapter stems from the 
context that there is a group of team-producers, who might be villagers, citizens or 
trade union members, that requires the service of a representative to act as an 
intermediary in an exchange with a third party to increase group-level benefits. Here, 
representation is a function of leadership, in which the representative jointly interacts 
with the ‘represented’ in provision of a public good despite differences in function, 
status, characteristics, personality or motivation among them. At any level o f team 
production, a representative is able to influence the public good provision and derive 
personal benefit from it. This form of leadership has three distinguishing features: (i) 
the representative and group members perform differentiated tasks – external 
bargaining and collective action, (ii) the representative has an opportunity to extract 
rent from the group while the group members have opportunities to free ride from the 
collective action, and (iii) the relationship requires mutual trust – the group members 
need to trust their representative to secure the best outcomes f or the group and the 
representative needs to trust her/his group members to produce the collective action.  
But to what extent can the mutual trust between the representative and the represented 
emerge in public good provision? We propose that inter-individual differences within 
a group, specifically in social status and relationship closeness, are relevant for the 
effectiveness of representative leadership. As the narrative behind the selection process 
of representation in multiple contexts, from democratic electoral processes to within-
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group succession planning, relies on the prior status of the potential leader, inclusion 
of social status in an investigation of representative leadership is a good starting point. 
Furthermore, evidence from the leadership literature shows that leadership is often 
more effective under a leader who has a high prior status – both in current modern 
societies (Hogg, 2010; Jack & Recalde, 2015) and in small-scale and egalitarian 
societies (von Reuden & van Vugt, 2015; von Rueden et al., 2014).   
We explore the mutual trust between representative and non-representative group 
members within a pre-existing social group that has a delineate rule in appointing 
official representation. The study population are made of Kayan tribe members from 
rural Sarawak, Borneo. Village leaders, an inherited position through traditional strata, 
performed the role of an intermediary between villagers and outsiders even before the 
presence of the modern state. Defined as a stratified and agriculturalist society by 
Rosseau (1990), the presence of modern state and market institutions in these villages 
enables villagers - even individuals from former slave strata - to acquire modern status 
goods, such as modern education and positions in civil services, political parties or 
commercial entities. The economic development experienced by tribe members in 
these villages also links this work to the changing nature of social status, opening up 
the question of whether representation would still be effective if the role of 
representative was taken by villagers who lack high status as defined by traditional 
rules. Given the geographical isolation of these tribal villages and a recent policy shock 
- several villages being resettled from hydroelectric dam construction – effective 
representation is an integral element of the development process.  
Experimental investigations of leadership tend to focus on testing mechanisms to 
improve leaders’ effects on group outcomes. A commonly investigated mechanism 
involves leaders acting as coordinators, using signalling and/or communication within 
a group to move the group’s outcome closer to the social optimum (Brandts, et 
al.,2016; Van der Heijden & Moxnes, 2012; Loerakker, & van Winden, 2017; Potters, 
et al. 2007). Another mechanism works through within-group incentive structures, e.g. 
punishment or rewards administered by the leader towards followers (Gurerk, et al. 
2009), and provision of monetary or electoral incentives to the leader by the followers 
(Cappelen et al. 2016; Markussen & Tyran, 2017).  Lab-in-the-field experiments on 
leadership, particularly in developing countries, often incorporate prior status of 
leaders in shaping the group’s outcome (Jack & Recalde 2015; d’Adda 2017; Kosfeld 
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& Rustagi, 2015). Our work makes a new contribution to the leadership literature by 
proposing representation as a type of leadership, in which the representative’s task is 
to improve on the collective action of the group members.  
The role of representation in group-decision-making has previously been examined in 
relation to the hypothesis that, in games between groups, there is a discontinuity in 
individual decision-making between when the individual acts on his/her own behalf 
and when he/she acts on behalf of the group. Experimental investigations include: 
responsibility or risk taking on behalf of group members in a stag-hunt game (Charness 
& Jackson, 2009); deciding on behalf of a group of trustors (trustees) in an interaction 
with a group of trustees (trustors) (Song, 2008), allocation decisions on behalf of 
passive group members in a dictator game (Song et al., 2004), and contribution 
decisions on behalf of group members in an inter-group public good game (Hauge & 
Rogeberg, 2015). The focus of previous representation experiments was on the 
behaviour of the representative and not the group that they represented. Our research 
expands the understanding of representation-based decision-making processes by 
investigating mechanisms by which group members’ decisions can shape 
representatives’ decisions.  
The model of representative leadership outlined below describes the complementary 
relationship between representative and group members. There is a public good that 
can be produced only through contributions from group members, but for it to generate 
the maximum benefit for them as a group, it requires an input from the representative. 
In a society like the Kayan of Sarawak, representation to advocate villagers’ interests 
was traditionally done by those from aristocracy strata. The prestige held by these 
aristocrats facilitated collective action from the non-representative group members and 
with the complementary effort from the representative, everyone benefited. Village 
aristocrats have played the role of representation for a very long time in Sarawak, from 
halting the expansion of Bruneian Empire in the 15 th century to advocating villages’ 
demand for development funds in the present day. 
We explore the role of social status in driving efficiency in representation by asking 
villagers to rank each other privately before playing a modified public good game. In 
the public good game, the roles of the representative and group members are randomly 
assigned, enabling those from the non-aristocrat strata to act as a representative for 
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their respective group. Irrespective of who was assigned as the representative, we 
found most representatives used their input to increase group-level benefits while most 
group members made contributions to the public good. Some representatives chose to 
incur some cost to increase group-level benefits despite sub-optimal contributions from 
the group members.  Social status acts as an amplifier to the representative’s input and 
group members’ contributions; as representatives with higher status made greater 
effort and high-status group members made larger contributions to the public good.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we link the literatu res on 
representation and public good provision and formally model the concept of 
representative leadership through a novel modification of the public good game. 
Section 3 connects representative leadership with the literature on social status and 
trust by proposing hypotheses about the effect of status in the modified public good 
game.  Section 4 describes the experimental procedure.  This procedure introduces a 
novel methodology of incorporating real-world social status into a lab-in-the-field 
experiment. Section 5 describes the findings at group and individual levels. We 
conclude in Section 6.  
2.2 Representation and Public Good Game 
An individual’s role as a representative of a group or another individual has been 
examined in the context of other-regarding behaviour and responsibility. Works by 
Charness and Jackson (2009), Hauge & Rogeberg (2015), Song (2008) and Song et 
al. (2004) define representation as a process in which an individual makes binding 
decisions on behalf of others. This work looks for within-person discontinuity 
effects, contrasting decisions made by individuals in a self-interest framework with 
decisions made when acting as a representative of a group or of another person. 
Subjects typically make two decisions in a between-treatment set-up. In the control 
treatment, subjects’ decisions only affect their payoff directly .  For example, if she/he 
is a trustee in a trust game, the amount of money returned will affect the trustor and 
affect the subject as the trustee. In the representative treatment, if a subject plays the 
role of trustee, her/his decisions also have direct implications for a passive 
trustee(s)’s payoff. Here, the representative-trustee has agency to decide the passive 
trustee(s)’ payoff, her/his own payoff and the payoff of the trustor.  
9 
 
In Song et al.(2004), a group representative is provided with an opportunity to make 
an allocation decision for her/his group of two, playing a dictator game with another 
group. In the group representative treatment, a representative-dictator represents a 
passive dictator who needs to divide a pot of money with a group of recipients 
consisting of a representative-recipient and a passive-recipient. Both representative-
dictator and passive-dictator will receive the same payoff at the end of the 
experiment. By incorporating the role of gender differences, the study found that 
male subjects were less other-regarding when they decided as a group representative 
in contrast to when they were acting on behalf of themselves. They found no such 
differences among the female participants. In a follow-up work, Song (2008) 
examined the within-person discontinuity effect using a trust game. Subjects were 
assigned as either a trustor or a trustee. In the first stage they decided as an individual, 
then decided as a group-representative in three-person trustor or three-person trustee 
groups. When deciding as an individual-trustor or individual-trustee, subjects 
decided based on the expectations and the actual decisions of the counterpart. 
However, the experimenter found that for a representative-trustor or representative-
trustee, their decisions were also affected by their expectations about other group 
members’ levels of trust or reciprocity. The experimenter found that subjects in the 
representative mode were more likely to underestimate other group members’ levels 
of trust and reciprocity, and ended up trusting less as a representative-trustor and 
reciprocating less as a representative-trustee. Results from Song (2008) &  Song et 
al. (2004) show that when subjects made decisions as a representative, they were 
more likely to be self-interested, i.e. transferring less as the representative-dictator, 
trusting less as the representative-trustor and returning less as the representative-
trustee, and this was motivated by a desire to preserve the payoffs of other members 
of their group. Hauge & Rogeberg (2015) extend the analysis of representation and 
cooperation by examining it in a public good game setting. Here contributions by 
individuals within a group are compared with contributions made on behalf of a 
three-person group with each group playing an inter-group public good game with 
another two three-person groups. This work found that, for males, there were no 
statistically significant differences between contributions made as individuals and 
contributions made as representatives, but female subjects contributed more as 
representatives than as individuals.  
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Another strand of literature that relates to deciding on behalf of others revolves 
around responsibility in risk-taking.  In a work by Charness & Jackson (2009), 
subjects play a Stag Hunt game as an individual and as an agent in a pair. Subjects 
could choose Hare, the low risk option, or Stag, the risky option. Picking Stag when 
the other player decided on Hare would reduce the subjects’ payoff.  The 
experimenters found that when subjects were told that their decisions would affect 
the payoff of a passive group member, they were more likely to choose the safer 
option, Hare. This has been interpreted as responsibility in risk taking. Works by 
Pahlke et al. (2012, 2015) extend the investigation of the relationship between group-
representation and responsibility under risk taking by looking at it in the framework 
of prospect theory. In the gain domain, subjects who bear responsibility are found to 
be more cautious or to exhibit greater risk aversion, while in the loss domain the 
effect of responsibility on behalf of others disappears. In Pahlke et al. (2012), instead 
of asking the representative-decision maker to make two separate decisions, one as 
an individual and the other as the representative of a passive recipient with same 
incentive structure, the experimenters required representative-decision makers to 
justify their decisions to the passive recipients after they had made a choice between 
prospects. They found that accountability produced no effect on subjects’ individual 
choices in either loss or gain domains but found evidence that representative-decision 
makers opted for less risky prospects when the stakes were increased.  
The concept of representation studied in this chapter is different from that used in the 
works listed above. We made two distinctive contributions in this aspect. First, our 
group members were not passive, and their decisions formed a collective action that 
could benefit from an involvement of the representative. Second, the representative’s 
role was to complement group members’ gain from their collective action.  
Representation in this chapter is examined through a variant of the public good game 
(PGG). The public good (PG) provision is jointly produced by the representative and 
the ordinary group members. The role of the representative is to improve the groups’ 
outcome by complementing group members’ input to the PG account by adjusting 
the value of marginal per capita return (MPCR). At the same time, ordinary group 
members have the option to contribute to the PG and benefits from the leader’s 
action.  
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Our experimental design also contributed to the PG literature that examined risk and 
uncertainty in the determination of the MPCR and subsequently its effects on the 
public good contribution. Our experiment has elements from Levati & Morone 
(2013), Stoddard (2015) and Boulu-Reshef et al. (2017) in which there is a 
probabilistic element involved in the determination of group-level MPCR. Levati & 
Morone (2013) examines contribution levels under the condition that the minimum 
value from probable MPCR values allows for efficiency gain and found the stochastic 
determination of MPCR value does not affect public good contribution. Similar work 
by Boulu-Reshef et al. (2017) found that uncertainty, in terms of contributors’ 
personal MPCR and probabilistic MPCR, is not detrimental to PGG contribution.   
On the other hand, Stoddard (2015), using a within-subjects design, exposed subjects 
to PGGs with uncertain and certain MPCR values between rounds. The experiment 
found effects on contribution levels depending on the order of the uncertainty 
treatment relative to treatment that have fixed MPCR value.1   
Group members in the experiment described below faced uncertainty in ascertaining 
the actual MPCR value attached to their public good contribution and they needed to 
trust their representative to maximize their MPCR.  On the other hand, the 
representative has to take a risky decision if she/he chooses to act as the group’s 
representative since her/his input produces a probabilistic MPCR value in our set-up 
below. The PGG described below positions the representatives and group members 
as suppliers of complementary inputs (contributions by group members and effort by 
the representative). This provides the leader with a distinct function within the group. 
We employ an experimental design that clearly distinguishes representation as a 
function of leadership. Instead of positioning the leader to move first and be followed 
by others in contributing to the PG, as investigated by Gächter & Renner (2014), 
Gächter et al. (2012) and Arbak & Villeval (2013), the sequence of our public good 
game happened in the following manner:  
i) Ordinary group members decide simultaneously and in private their 
contribution to the PG; 
 
1 Another category of PGG experiments that have stochastic determination of MPCR values vary its 
values among group members, i.e. heterogeneous MPCR’s values for each subject in a group. For 
example, Fischbacher et al. (2014) and Gangadharan & Nemes (2009) found contributions are 
affected when the uncertainty involved differences of MPCR values within a group.     
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ii) information about the group members’ total contribution is conveyed to the 
representative; and 
iii) the representative decides how much of his/her endowment to allocate to 
effort; the greater this effort, the higher the multiplier attached to the group 
members’ contributions.  
This PGG design incorporates the possibility of the representative extracting rent from 
the ordinary group members’ contributions. As provision of the PG is only possible if 
there are non-zero contributions by ordinary members, the representative is presented 
with a choice between representing the group by increasing the value of the public 
good and free-riding on the group members’ contributions. In the experiment reported 
by Cox et al. (2013), group earnings are significantly higher in a treatment in which 
everyone contributes simultaneously than in a treatment in which there is a ‘boss’ who  
makes his/her contribution after everyone else has decided on theirs. This finding is 
attributed to first movers’ expectation that the second mover/boss will free ride and the 
second mover fulfilling this expectation by exploiting cooperative decisions by first 
movers. The main interest of this game is whether knowing that the representative can 
affect the return on contribution may motivate group members to contribute. 
2.2.1 A Model of Representative Leadership  
In a group of n players there are two types of players: group members (i) and a 
representative (j). Within a group of n players, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2, 3 … , 𝑛 − 1}, and j is the nth 
player.   
Regardless of their type, everyone receives the same endowment, a= 1. i chooses a 
contribution  to the public good (0 ≤ xi ≤ 1), keeping the remaining 1 – xi for private 
return. j decides as a representative on behalf of the group by choosing a level of effort 
ej (0 ≤ ej ≤ 1) to influence the probability distribution of the public good’s possible 
multiplier values 𝑀𝐿 and  𝑀𝐻 where,  𝑀𝐻 >  𝑀𝐿. j keeps the remaining 1 – ej for 
private return. The implemented PG multiplier 𝑀∗ is  𝑀𝐿or  𝑀𝐻. The higher is ei, the 
higher is the probability of   𝑀𝐻 being 𝑀
∗. 
Since this PG will be implemented in small villages with non-anonymised subjects, 
there is no deterministic relationship between ej and 𝑀∗ to allow for credible 
deniability and prevent experimental spill over into the real world. The stochastic 
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implementation of  𝑀𝐿 or  𝑀𝐻 also provides player j with a wiggle room to shirk from 
representing the group.  
Information on the values of  𝑀𝐿 and  𝑀𝐻, and the role of ej in determining the 
probability of  𝑀𝐿 and  𝑀𝐻 occurrence is common knowledge. The probabilities of 𝑀𝐿 
and  𝑀𝐻 are determined by positive parameters  and ej. For 𝑀
∗to be 𝑀𝐿 : 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝐿) =  𝜆 + (1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝑒𝑗) ;    0 <  < 1 
Simultaneously for 𝑀∗ to be  𝑀𝐻:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝐻) = (1 − 𝜆)𝑒𝑗;    0 <  < 1 
Thus, the expected value of the multiplier 𝐸[𝑀∗ ] in this PG is: 
𝐸[𝑀∗ ] =  𝑒𝑗(1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿) +  𝑀𝐿 
The payoff function for each player i is: 
𝜋𝑖 = (1 − 𝑥𝑖) +
(∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 )(𝑒𝑗(1−𝜆)(𝑀𝐻−𝑀𝐿)+ 𝑀𝐿)
𝑛
    (1) 
where ∑i  sums over all players i. 
And player j’s payoff function is: 
𝜋𝑗 = (1 − 𝑒𝑗) +
(∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 )(𝑒𝑗(1−𝜆)(𝑀𝐻−𝑀𝐿)+ 𝑀𝐿)
𝑛
     
 (2) 
The summation of the payoffs for players i and a player j in a group form the 
following group payoff, 
𝜋𝐺 = (𝑛 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑗) + (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 )(𝑒𝑗(1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿) +  𝑀𝐿)  
 (3) 
The PGG is implemented in a group of three individuals (i.e. n=3) with one player 
being randomly assigned the role of player j and the others the roles of players i. The 
game is played in one-shot form with a sequential move; both players i make 
contribution decisions simultaneously and the sum of the contributions ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖  is 
reported to player j before he/she makes his/her effort decision. The public good is 
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shared equally amongst the three players, but (as we will show) there are differences 
in marginal private returns on contribution for each type.   
Under certain conditions on parameter values, this public good game has social 
dilemma properties.  Due to asymmetry of payoff functions between player j and 
players i, there may be an additional collective dilemma faced by players i. Multiplier 
values will be set under conditions that ensure social and collective dilemmas.  
In the section below, we outline how these conditions are derived when n =3.  
2.2.1.1 Marginal private returns 
We partially differentiate equations (1) and (2) to arrive at the marginal private return 
for each player type. From (1); 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
=  −1 + (
1
3
)(𝑀𝐿 + 𝑒𝑗(1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿))  
 (4) 
The marginal private return for player i is independent of 𝑥𝑖  but has an increasing 
relationship with 𝑒𝑗. This is a departure from the standard PGG, as effort from player 
j influences the marginal private return each player i receives.  For a player i, non-
contribution (𝑥𝑖 = 0) is a  best response strategy when 𝑒𝑗 = 1 under Condition A:  
−1 + (
1
3
) [𝜆𝑀𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑀𝐻] < 0, hence 𝜆𝑀𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑀𝐻 < 3.   
From (2), the marginal private return for player j is: 
𝜕𝜋𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗
=  −1 + (
1
3
)(∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 )(1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿)  
 (5) 
For player j, the marginal private return on exerting effort is increasing with 𝑥𝑖 but 
independent of 𝑒𝑗. Player j receives positive marginal private return on effort if  
(
1
3
)( ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 )(1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿) > 1. If both players i have made maximum 
contributions, i.e. ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 2, return on effort is negative if ( 1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿) <
3/2. The best response strategy for player j is to exert no effort if this condition 
(Condition B) is satisfied.  
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Under Conditions A and B, both types of players maximise personal payoff by 
refraining from contributing or exerting effort towards the PG. 
2.2.1.2 Marginal social returns 
Using (3) above, we derive the marginal social return for the contributions of players 
i and player j’s effort. For each player i, her/his marginal social return on contribution 
when 𝑒𝑗 = 1 is; 
  
𝜕𝜋𝐺
𝜕𝑥𝑖
=  −1 + 𝑀𝐿 + 𝑒𝑗(1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿)    
 (6) 
The marginal social return for player j when 𝑥𝑖 = 1 is; 
  
𝜕𝜋𝐺
𝜕𝑒𝑗
=  −1 + (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 )(1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿)   
 (7) 
From  (6), a contribution of 𝑥𝑖 = 1 by both players i is socially optimal when 𝑒𝑗 = 1, 
if the  𝜆𝑀𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿) > 1 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶) From (7), effort of 𝑒𝑗 = 1 will 
be socially optimal when ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 2 if  2(1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿) > 1 (Condition D). If 
Conditions C and D are satisfied, social return is maximised when 𝑒𝑗 = 1 and xi = 1 
for both players i.  
2.2.1.3 Marginal collective returns on contribution 
Another layer of this public good game is for the two players i to cooperate with one 
another while treating the effort of player j as given.  Using  to denote the sum of 
the payoffs of players i, we sum the individual payoff functions (1) into: 
 = (2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) + [(
2
3
)(∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) [𝑀𝐿 + 𝑒𝑗(1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿)]  
 (8) 
We partially differentiate (8) to derive the marginal collective return from 
contribution;  
𝜕 ∏𝑖
𝜕 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖
=  −1 + (
2
3
)[ 𝑀𝐿 + 𝑒𝑗(1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿)]   
 (9) 
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Equation (9) shows that the marginal collective return on contribution for both 
players i is a positive function of player j’s effort, indicating the complementarity of 
players i and player j’s decisions in this PGG.  If both players as a collective expect 
that player j will not exert any effort (𝑒𝑗 = 0), it is in the collective interest of players 
i not to contribute if 𝑀𝐿 < 3/2 (Condition E) On the other hand, if both players i 
expect that player j will exert maximum effort (𝑒𝑗 = 1), it is in their collective interest 
to contribute if 𝑀𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆)( 𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿) > 3/2 (Condition F). Hence, under 
Condition F, it is in the collective interest of players i not only that they show 
collective trust to a trustworthy player j (i.e. a player j who will exert maximum effort) 
but also that each of them trusts the other to contribute to the public good.  
2.2.1.4 Conditions for multiplier values selection 
The conditions that need to be satisfied concerning marginal private and social returns 
set out the social dilemma properties in the PGG. The multipliers selected as 𝑀𝐻 and 
𝑀𝐿 in experiment must fulfil the following conditions: 
• 𝜆𝑀𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑀𝐻 < 3;    (Condition A) 
• (1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿) < 3/2;    (Condition B) 
• 𝜆𝑀𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿) > 1; and   (Condition C) 
• 2(1 − 𝜆)(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿) > 1.    (Condition D) 
For the collective dilemma of players i, selection of 𝑀𝐻 and 𝑀𝐿must satisfies the 
following conditions: 
• 𝑀𝐿 <
3
2
     (Condition E) 
• 𝑀𝐿 + (1 − 𝜆)( 𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿) >
3
2
  (Condition F) 
The selected positive  parameter is 0.30.2 The probability of  𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝐿 is: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝐿) =  0.30 + (1 − 0.30)(1 − 𝑒𝑗) ;    0 <  < 1 
If player j does not allocate effort for the group, i.e. 𝑒𝑗 = 0, the probability of the 
implemented multiplier, 𝑀∗ being  𝑀𝐿 is 1. If player j allocates maximum effort on 
the group behalf, i.e. ei = 1, the probability of  𝑀𝐿happening is 0.3 implying that effort 
 
2 0.30 or 30% is selected as the value of  parameter to ease illustration during the lab-in-the-field 
experiment implementation that will be elaborated in Section 4.3 later.   
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from player j could still yield sub-optimal returns for the group. The probability that 
𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝐻 is determined by the following function: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝑀∗ = 𝑀𝐻) = (1 − 0.3)𝑒𝑗;    0 <  < 1 
By refusing to allocate effort for the group 𝑒𝑗 = 0, the probability of  𝑀𝐻being 
implemented as 𝑀∗ is 0. When 𝑒𝑗 = 1, the probability of 𝑀
∗= 𝑀𝐻is 0.7.  
For  𝑀𝐻, the selected value for the implementation of lab-in-the-field experiment is 
2.5 and for 𝑀𝐿, it is 1.25. The values of 𝑀𝐻, 𝑀𝐿, and   selected satisfiy conditions 
(A) to (F) above.  We assume risk neutrality among subjects as the conditions A to F 
above are applied to monetary payoffs and not just utilities.  
 
2.2.2 Differences between Player j and Players i 
The conditions A to F for social and collective player is’ dilemmas show asymmetries 
between player j and players i.  
Consider the case where 𝑥1 =  𝑥2 =  𝑒𝑗. From (4), if 𝑒𝑗 = 0, the marginal private 
return for each player i is −1 + (
1
3
)𝑀𝐿.  The marginal private return for player j from 
(5) if 𝑥1 =  𝑥2 = 0 is -1. Comparing (4) and (5) when 𝑥1 =  𝑥2 =  𝑒𝑗 = 0, the 
marginal private return is higher from (4);  (
1
3
) 𝑀𝐿 > 0. This indicates that the 
marginal private return for a player i is higher than the marginal private return for the 
player j when  𝑒𝑗 = 0. 
Consider now that 𝑥1 =  𝑥2 = 1 or both players i contribute fully to the PGG. The 
marginal private return for a player i from (4) is now −1 + (
1
3
)[𝑀𝐿 +
(1 − )(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿)]. For player j, the marginal private return from (5) when 𝑥1 =
 𝑥2 = 1 is   −1 + (
1
3
)(2)(1 − )(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿). Comparing the marginal private returns 
of (4) and (5) when there are maximum contributions and effort by others, 
(
1
3
) [𝑀𝐿 + (1 − )(𝑀𝐻)] > 0, that player i’s marginal private return on contribution 
is higher than player j’s when 𝑒𝑗 = 1.  
The marginal social return for a player i is  3 ∗ [−1 + (
1
3
) [𝑀𝐿 + (1 − )(𝑀𝐻 −
𝑀𝐿)]] > 3. This will result in (
1
6
) [𝑀𝐿 + (1 − )(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿)] > 0. The marginal social 
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return for player j is 3 ∗ [−1 + (
1
3
) (2)(1 − )(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿)] > 3 and this  results in 
1
3
∗ (1 − )(𝑀𝐻 − 𝑀𝐿)>0. Substituting the values of the values of 𝑀𝐻, 𝑀𝐿, and   
would yield a bigger marginal social return for a player i compared to the player j.  
Figure 2.1 gives a graphical representation of the possible returns to players i and j 
relative to the Nash-equilibrium strategy benchmark in which their respective payoff 
equals 1, π =1, at zero contribution and zero effort by all players. To interpret Figure 
2.1, we use the expected multiplier value that player j’s effort produces and derive 
payoffs for the group and everyone from these values. The probability element in 
multiplier determination will be incorporated in the experiment’s implementation in 
Sarawak.  
The space of the figure shows all possible combinations of effort by player j and 
average contributions by players i. This space is divided into regions according to the 
benefits received by the two types of players. A player’s benefit is defined as the 
actual payoff they receive minus the Nash-equilibrium payoff of 1. The vertical axis 
refers to the effort space available to player j while the average contribution of players 
i is shown on the horizontal axis, i.e.( 𝑥1 + 𝑥2)/2.  When discussing the figure, we 
will assume that both players i are contributing equally given their contribution space. 
Figure 2.1. Possible benefits from public good based on combinations of effort and 
average contribution to public good 
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The dotted 45-degree line in Figure 2.1 represents the equality between, i) average 
payoff to the two players i, i.e. ( 𝜋𝑖1 + 𝜋𝑖2)/2, and ii) the payoff to player j, i.e. 𝜋𝑗. 
The origin point of the graph is the non-interaction or Nash-equilibrium benchmark, 
in which both effort and contribution is zero. The solid black curve shows the 
combination of effort and contributions that result in 𝜋𝑗 = 1, i.e player j’s payoff is 
equal to what she/he would have got in Nash-equilibrium. Player j’s payoff from 
maximum effort, 𝜋𝑗 is 1 when average contribution, ( 𝑥1 + 𝑥2)/2, is 0.706. It is the 
same payoff she/he would have made if she/he made zero effort and both players i 
had made zero contributions. On the other hand, the grey line represents the 
combination of decisions by both types of players that result in 𝜋𝑖  = 1, i.e. the average 
payoff to players i is equal to to what they would have got in Nash equilibrium. When 
player j’s effort is 0.285, an average player i’s payoff 𝜋𝑖  is 1, independent of their 
average contributions.  
The point where the grey line and solid black curve cross marks the point at which 
positive effort and positive contributions produce an average payoff of the two 
players i, ( 𝜋𝑖1 + 𝜋𝑖2)/2 and a payoff of player j, 𝜋𝑗, both of which are equal to 1, i.e. 
the payoff from exerting effort and contributing is equal to the payoff of zero effort 
and zero contribution. Here, player j must allocate 28.5% of her/his endowment as 
effort and both players i must contribute 28.5% of her/his endowment to the public 
good for everyone to receive a payoff that equals the Nash-equilibrium benchmark 
payoff.  
Regions I, II, III and IV are defined by the solid black curve and grey horizontal line. 
If combinations of effort and average contribution fall in Region I, the payoffs for all 
players are less than 1. Region I is identified as a region of mutual losses, indicating 
that everyone is better off not engaging with the public good. For example, the 
average player i contribution is 0.1 and the effort from player j is 0.1. Combinations 
of decisions in Region II benefit an average player i at a cost to player j. An average 
player i receives a payoff more than 1, 
 𝜋𝑖1+𝜋𝑖2
2
> 1 , while player j’ payoff is less than 
1, 𝜋𝑗 < 1. In this region, player j is engaging in leading-by-sacrifice or is acting 
prosocially. Region III produces a mutually beneficial outcome for everyone and 
encompasses the area below the solid black curve and above the horizontal grey line. 
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On the other hand, combinations of decisions in Region IV benefit player j, 𝜋𝑗 > 1 
but at a cost for an average player i, 
 𝜋𝑖1+𝜋𝑖2
2
< 1.  
Decision in Region III is characterised with combinations of effort and contributions 
benefitting both types of players beyond the Nash-equilibrium benchmark value. At 
the northeast point of the 45-degree dotted line is the socially optimal point.  
Within Region III combinations of decisions could also result in one player type 
receiving bigger benefits than the other type.  If decisions end up in between the 45-
degree line and the horizontal grey line, the share of benefit is larger for player j 
compared to the average player i. On the other hand, share of benefits from the PGG 
is larger for the average player i than for player j if the combination of effort and 
contributions settles somewhere in between the solid black curve and the 45-degree 
line.  
If the representative can be trusted to play her/his part by exerting effort at any point 
above the grey horizontal line, players i collectively will receive a positive return 
from their contributions. This covers Regions II and III. On the other hand, a 
representative benefits from effort as long as her/his effort corresponds with an 
average contribution value that is on the right side of the solid black curve. This refers 
to Regions III and IV. If her/his effort falls in Region III, the representative has played 
her/his role in the game and enhanced benefits for the group members. If her/his effort 
falls in Region IV, then the representative is free riding on the collective action by 
the group members.  In the situation where players i and j match each others’ 
decisions, their combination of decisions will end up on the 45-degree line and 
everyone will receive equal payoff from the public good, 𝜋𝑗 = 𝜋𝑖1 = 𝜋𝑖2. 
2.3 Social status, trust and leadership 
Social status that stems from social asymmetries acts as an information good. High-
quality information that sets individuals apart from each other, like skills and expertise, 
are culturally transmitted over time, producing deference towards individuals that 
possess these qualities. These qualities provide individuals with privileges within their 
community (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Social status, therefore provides social 
information in leadership selection in traditional and small-scale societies as examined 
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by von Rueden & van Vugt (2015) and in modern societies (Fiske, 2010). In modern 
societies, individuals perceived as high-status, exhibited by possession of prestigious 
jobs and economic success, are deemed to be highly competent, skillful and possessing 
more agency than the general population (Fiske, 2010).  Within small-scale and 
traditional societies, the relationship between status and leadership is even clearer; 
individuals who possess advantages in verbal skill, religious knowledge, physical 
fitness, dense social networks, and prosocial behaviours, by themselves or by their 
forefathers, are found to be in leadership positions (von Rueden & van Vugt, 2015; 
Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Geertz, 1963; van Vugt, 2006). Nonetheless, there are 
other individual characteristics, such as age, experience, gender and lineage, that can 
be important in determining social status, and these may be orthogonal to the 
possession of information and skills.  
There is a link between prosocial behaviour, leadership and social status. Henrich et 
al. (2015) proposes a theory in which prestige promotes evolution of cooperation 
within a population. Individuals with high status or prestige are expected to take the 
lead on collective actions due to their advantageous abilities. This in turn enables high 
status individuals to sustain costly cooperation within a population through prosocial 
behaviour. Similarly, von Rueden & van Vugt (2015) hypothesise that the prosocial 
behaviour of high-status individuals informs leadership selection process in traditional 
societies. von Rueden et al. (2014) are able to confirm the link between prosocial 
behaviour and leadership through collective action experiments conducted among 
societies of forager-horticulturalists in Bolivia that are identified as small-scale, 
homogenous and relatively egalitarian. Leaders are found to be collaborative with 
followers in performing group tasks while they are also motivated to maintain their 
altruistic reputation by not over-rewarding themselves from the group’s outcome. 
Leaders that possess physical dominance, have wide kin support and are deemed 
trustworthy are found to improve group-level performance.  
The cooperative outcome that emerges from groups that have high status individuals 
as leaders could be attributed to norms internalized by high-status individuals and/or 
the social preferences of low status individuals to interact with high-status individuals. 
Anthropological and development works by Scott (1976) and Geertz (1963) in 
Southeast Asia elaborate on the duty of local-level elites, usually a landlord or an 
aristocrat, in providing the right to subsistence to the peasants. Scott (1976) particularly 
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stresses the norm of reciprocity that formerly existed between the elites and the 
peasants. Peasants provided labour, grain and most importantly social standing to the 
landlords and in return the landlords had obligations to assist and protect the 
subsistence rights of the peasants. Local elites were found to adjust tenancy agreements 
during bad seasons or provide financial support for peasants for social ceremonies like 
births, weddings or funerals. Both works pointed to the sense of noblesse oblige 
possessed by local-level elites in ensuring that those in the lower class were able to 
meet basic subsistence, particularly before the presence of modern government and its 
related institutions. Status differences here provided moral norms guiding high status 
individuals’ interactions with individuals of lower status. Within experimental settings, 
norms behind noblesse oblige have been explored by Fiddick & Cummins (2007) and 
Fiddick et al. (2013). In both works, individuals that have been artificially assigned 
and identified to possess high rank are found to be more tolerant to free-riding or non-
reciprocation committed by low-ranking group members. In a related study using a 
public good game, Gong & Sanfey (2017) also found that highest-ranked individuals 
are more likely to be cooperative even when they have been partnered with individuals 
outside their social ranking.  
Research that focuses on societal-wide status differences has also found that 
individuals belonging to high-status segments in a society have different preferences 
compared to non-high-status individuals. In an experiment by LeVeck et al. (2014), 
individuals characterised as policy elites in United States are found to be more 
demanding in bargaining decisions compared to student subjects. They are also found 
to favour more equitable outcomes by initiating high offers as a first movers and 
rejecting low offers as second movers in an ultimatum game. Subsequently, in an 
experiment investigating distributive preferences, Fisman et al. (2015) found the elites 
in the United States, sampled from Yale Law School students, are more likely to prefer 
efficiency over equality, and self -interest over fair-mindedness compared to subjects 
drawn from the more representative American Life Panel. With respect to 
redistributive preferences, Barr et al. (2015) found that subjects who are economically 
employed and students who classified themselves coming from high- or middle-
income economic background were more likely to acknowledge entitlements 
originating from effort and productivity than those from lower income backgrounds. 
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These researches indicate that even in modern society, high status individuals behave 
differently than individuals with lower status.  
High-status individuals are expected to justify their positions in the society by being 
generous to others, indicated by noblesse oblige found in contexts where there is clear 
identification of individuals in high and low ranks. At the same time, the socialization 
of high-status individuals with each other is shown to promote certain types of 
preference. It is expected that high-status villagers that have been randomly assigned 
to the role of representative leader will show different behaviour than representatives 
originating from lower status groups. For example, since the role of representation in 
our sampled population has always been conducted by members of aristocrat families, 
it is expected that there will be differences in representative leadership when it is 
conducted by individuals from non-aristocrat background.  
HYPOTHESIS 1: Effort has a positive relationship with a representative’s status. High 
level of effort is expected to be exerted by representatives with high social standing 
and privileged positions.  
On the other hand, high-status individuals are commonly observed by group members, 
including their prosocial behaviour. Henrich & Gil-White (2001) describe this as 
infocopying, a process where groups acquire information from high-status individuals 
through imitation, influence or emulation. Qualities possessed by high-status 
individuals from expertise, wisdom or even wealth produce freely conferred deference 
from those of lower status. The role of imitation from high status subjects has been 
investigated by Kumru & Vesterlund (2010), d’Adda (2017) and Eckel et al. (2010). 
Kumru & Vesterlund (2010) found that artificially generated high-status subjects’ 
contributions were likely to be mimicked by low-status followers. This resulted in 
higher payoffs for groups that had high-status players contributing first since the 
subsequent low-status followers mimicked the high-status leader. d’Adda (2017), 
through a public good game, provides further evidence on mimicking by recruiting 
villagers in Colombia as experimental subjects. High-ranked subjects contributed more 
to the public good than lower ranked subjects and over several rounds, lower ranked 
subjects mimicked high-status subjects’ contribution levels. This resulted in high and 
stable cooperation. On the contrary, Eckel et al. (2010), using PGG, found no evidence 
of differences in average contributions across status. The authors pointed that ordinary 
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subjects did take cues from high status subjects’ initial decisions; but this did not 
translate to mimicry or influence since the high-status subjects did not do enough.   
Mimicking real-world representation by high-status villagers could provide a potential 
explanation of a representative’s exerting effort. This effect would be even stronger if 
a representative is matched with group members with higher status than the 
representative. By exerting effort when faced with one or two high-status group 
members, the representative would mimic decisions made by the real-world 
representative as a way to reinforce the norms of reciprocity between high and low 
status villagers. Under the norm of deference, a high level of effort from the randomly 
assigned representative could possibly serve as a way to confer status to the high-status 
group members as she/he would feel that this is the expected decision to be made if the 
high-status individuals were making it.   
HYPOTHESIS 2: Effort has a positive relationship with contributors’ status. High 
level of effort is expected from a representative leader assigned with high-status group 
members.  
Contribution to the public good in the model above signifies an act of trust from the 
group members or players i towards the representative with the aim of generating 
social benefits.  Trust is involved because the representative could free ride from the 
contributions by not exerting effort. Social position within a community could play a 
role in trusting behaviour. Barr et al. (2009) investigate individuals’ willingness to 
risk trusting in order to facilitate benefits from trustworthy behaviours, taking account 
of subjects’ standings in their social network. Orma villagers from Kenya were asked 
the following questions, “Who do you usually talk to about any kind of problem in 
this village?” A social network is then constructed based on the villagers’ responses 
in relation to individuals that live in the village or other neighbouring villages. The 
ability to maintain reputation as a trustworthy individual in the society increases the 
likelihood that a person occupies a critical network position, e.g. as a social and 
political entrepreneur. Using a trust game, the authors are able to link trust and 
trustworthiness behaviours with subjects’ positions in social networks, in which high 
levels of trust and trustworthy are positively correlated with network centrality. The 
trust and trustworthiness behaviours of individuals in privileged positions (through 
network centrality or belonging to high-status demographics) are the results of 
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repeated willingness to risk vulnerability for higher return. In a related study that did 
not prime status differences, Hong & Bohnet (2007) documented trusting decision 
using demographic characteristics. Here, trust is framed as subjects’ willingness to 
accept vulnerability, via i) willingness to accept the risk of being worse off than if 
one had not trusted, ii) willingness to accept being worse off than the trusted partners, 
and iii) willingness to accept the risk of being betrayed by the trusted party. In their 
experiment, subjects from demographic backgrounds that are associated with high 
status - men, Caucasians, Protestants, middle-aged - are found to not trust others, just 
like subjects from low-status backgrounds. However, the motives of distrust by high-
status individuals stemmed from fear of being betrayed and not from concern about 
payoff differences.   
Trusting behaviour by high-status individuals is expected to be driven by their drive 
to maintain their reputation in the community. At the same time, fear that a second 
mover might betray them, by not exerting effort, might make high-status individuals 
not contribute to the PG. The context of the experiment becomes integral here when 
examining the behaviour of the contributors as the first-movers. In small communities 
like the Kayan, the desire to maintain reputation as a trusting and/or prosocial 
individual in the community might offset the fear of betrayal.  
HYPOTHESIS 3: Contributions have a positive relationship with contributors’ status. 
High contribution level is expected from contributors with high social standing and 
privileged position.  
Other things being equal, it is possible that group members make higher contributions 
when they are assigned to a high-status representative. On the part of the first mover, 
high contribution signals trust towards the representative. If there is an established 
norm in a village that ordinary villagers should trust their village leaders to represent 
their interests when dealing with outsiders, contribution levels might reflect this norm. 
A high-status representative is trusted and expected to exert effort, and contributors are 
expected to contribute in deference to the leader’s status. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Contributions have a positive relationship with the representative’s 
status. A high contribution level is expected when a group member is assigned to a 
high-status representative.  
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This PGG is implemented in small, rural and isolated villages in Sarawak. Within these 
villages, coordination and cooperation on collective actions are common among the 
villagers in non-anonymous settings, especially since houses in a village are arranged 
closed to each other. A picture of a typical housing arrangement among Kayan tribes 
is shown in Figure 2.18A of the Appendix. Naturally in these types of villages, there 
are variations in social relationships among its populace. Layered with stratification of 
social status and proximity of housing arrangement, social closeness is an ingredient 
that facilitates communal activities and solidarity among the villagers during hard 
times. Perceived social closeness has been examined as a mediator in facilitating 
cooperation and altruism in modern and traditional societies by Booysen, et. al (2018), 
Curry et. al (2013), Gächter et.al (2017),  and Hackman et al. (2017). Booysen et al., 
(2018) investigate whether there are kinship and friendship premia among South 
African students as subjects. Subjects were told to list the 100 people closest to them 
in their world with the person occupying number 1 as the dearest friend or relative and 
the person at number 100 as a mere acquaintance. Using the social discounting task, 
subjects need to select an option from each of the ten choice tasks given to him. In each 
choice task, a subject could send money to an individual listed in the previous task or 
keep the money for her/himself. Altruism was measured as the amount of money the 
subject was willing to forego to give a fixed amount to a targeted person. This 
experiment found that there are altruism premia linked to kinship and friendship. The 
strongest effect was found among listed individuals categorised as partner, parent, 
siblings and friends. One way to elicit the closeness relationship within a social context 
is by using the Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale (IOS Scale) developed by Aron et 
al. (1992) and later evaluated by Gächter et al.(2015). Other things being equal, the 
perceived closeness of relationship among villagers would translate into experimental 
results.  
HYPOTHESIS 5: Effort levels a have positive relationship with the representative’s 
social closeness to the group members. A high effort level is expected when a 
representative leader assigns a high social closeness score to one or both group 
members. 
HYPOTHESIS 6: Contribution levels have a positive relationship with a group 
member’s social closeness to the representative leader. A high contribution level is 
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expected when a group member assigns a high social closeness score to the 
representative.   
HYPOTHESIS 7: Contribution levels have a positive relationship with a group 
member’s social closeness to her/his co-group member. A high contribution level is 
expected when a group member assigned a high social closeness score to his/her co-
group member.  
A representative can choose how much of his/her endowment to keep and how much 
to use to improve the probability distribution of the implemented multiplier. Since this 
is a sequential PGG in which group members move first, it is possible that a 
representative exerts effort as a way to reciprocate contributions made previously. For 
example, if the representative finds that on average both group members have allocated 
four tokens to the Group Project, she/he might also allocate four tokens as effort. More 
generally, representatives might be willing to make more effort when total 
contributions are greater. Because of the marginal private and social returns of effort 
increase with contribution from group members, a representative’s preference for 
reciprocity is not the only possible explanation for exerting effort. An increase in 
marginal social return to effort would also increase representative willingness to exert 
effort even if the representative was altruistic.  
HYPOTHESIS 8: Effort has a positive relationship with contributions.  
2.4 Experimental Design, Procedures and Field Settings 
Our experimental session design reflected our research question. Sessions were 
conducted in seventeen close-knit rural villages in Sarawak. Each session required nine 
participants. Recruitment was done with the assistance of the village’s community 
council, with the aim of ensuring a representative mix of participants3. Experimental 
sessions were conducted in each village in a closed venue4. Each session lasted 
approximately two hours.  
 
3 Councils were asked to ensure that in each session: i) there was at least one  member from 
aristocrat strata, ii) there was balanced participation of female and male, iii) every subject had the 
ability to comprehend the local Malay dialect (the market language) and frequently made financial 
decisions, iv) no two or more subjects came from the same household, v) there were representative 
subjects from every communal block, and vi) recruited subjects were above 18 years old. Councils in 
most villagers could deliver on this but there were several exceptions, e.g. sessions that coincided 
with a death of an aristocrat in a neighbouring village and a funeral preparation in the village. 
4Locations used included village meeting rooms, village homestays and chiefs’ residences. 
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Before a session started, the experimenter was required to obtain written consent from 
the nine participants. After that, each participant was randomly assigned to a numbered 
chair that served as her/his identification (ID) number during the session. The 
participants were positioned in full view of each other during the session (see Figures 
2.19A and 2.20A in the Appendix). They were then told that this was a group activity 
for a research project, and they needed to respond on cue to the instructions provided 
by the experimenter.  
Sessions were structured into four parts. In Activities 1 and 2, participants were told 
they needed to provide responses to the experimenter’s questions by writing on sheets 
of papers provided5. Activities 3 was devoted to the implementation of the modified 
public good game described in Section 2. In Activities 4, villagers answered questions 
about themselves in private with an enumerator. At the start of every part, villagers 
were reminded that their actions and decisions were private and would not be revealed 
to other villagers6. Table 1 below provides an overview of the session structure. 
Table 2.1. Overview of experimental design 
Activity 1 Social Closeness & Social Status 
Elicitation  
(randomized order) 
Activity 2 
Activity 3 One-shot Public Good Game with 
Disclosure of villagers’ roles and 
identities  
Activity 4 Socio-economic Survey 
 
Anonymity was not implemented in this experiment, as participants’ perceptions of 
each other’s actual social status was integral to the design. Un-incentivized social 
elicitation exercises were implemented in Activities 1 and 2, in which subjects reported 
their relative perceptions about themselves and each other. This experimental design 
 
5 Participants received pencil and eraser to conduct the elicitation tasks. 
6 Participants’ names were only used in recruitment process, consent form and payment receipts. 
The documents with participants’ names were not linked to participants’ numerical identifiers in the 
session.  
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incorporates the villagers’ perception of status defined by modern and market 
standards, as they have information on each other’s status-relevant behaviours. 
The elicitations were designed to measure; i) subjects’ social status in a form of group-
level positional ranking, and ii) social closeness.  Participants’ answers on the social 
elicitation sheets were private and they were told not to share their answers with other 
participants7. The elicitations were un-incentivized as this paper is interested in local 
hierarchy and closeness levels constructed based on participants’ perceptions. The 
constructions of the local hierarchy happened under full disclosure of participants’ 
identities based on Frank (1985) & Heffetz & Frank’s (2011) requirement that social 
status needs to be socially visible.  Our approach is similar with Barr et al. (2009) in 
which the social metrics of the subjects in the experiment were reported before the 
decision stage and the information was not used to design treatments in the experiment. 
This approach contrasts with that used in many experimental investigations of status 
by focusing on general characteristics of actual (i.e. outside the lab) social status as 
reported by subjects in private within a session, rather than by constructing a 
commonly observable status for experimental purposes within a specific context8. In 
our experiment, subjects have no information on their relative status perceived by other 
subjects and whether their perceptions about status are shared by others.  
The PGG experiment in Activity 3 was also implemented in a non-anonymous setting, 
i.e. subjects were aware of who was in their three persons group, and who the 
representative was. This was an integral part of  the design, since we wanted to 
investigate how participants’ behaviour was influenced by the actual social status of 
other participants in the group. There may be some methodological concerns about this 
feature of the experiment. First, there is the risk of retaliation if a subject feels that 
her/his payoff from the experiment is lower than expected. Second, the experimental 
 
7 Participants could communicate to the research assistants and experimenter if they had any 
questions and weren’t sure how to complete the sheets. The experimenter and research assistants 
examined the first elicitation sheet for every participant to ensure they understand the task.  
8 Examples of experimental investigations that used artificially constructed status include: Eckel & 
Ball (1996), which examines the role of status in negotiation, Ball et al. (2001) which looks at the 
market interactions between high and low status agents, Eckel et al. (2010) which explores 
contribution and punishment in public good provisions, and Falk (2017) which studies status 
inequality in moral disengagement. Within lab-in-the-field setting, d’Adda (2017) used subjects’ 
constructed rankings, where subjects knew they were playing with individuals that villagers had 
clearly identified as high status.  This strand of literature employed an additional task before the 
decision stage and subjects were then grouped into low or high-status groups.  
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data could be picking up a specific joint history among villagers in a group that is 
unobservable to the experimenter.  
With respect to the risk of retaliation, there is an element of credible deniability built 
into the PGG through i) the stochastic determination of the multiplier value, and ii) the 
fact that only the sum of tokens contributed by the group members was communicated 
to their respective representative. Subjects were informed about these two elements of 
credible deniability in the experiment’s instructions. Demonstrations using tokens and 
the randomization device were done twice during the instructions and two control 
questions were asked to ensure that subjects understood that individuals’ decisions 
could not be easily inferred by others, unless they decided to truthfully report their 
personal decision to others outside and after the experiment. The experimental data are 
unable to determine whether the experiment picked up specific joint historical 
activities among subjects.  However, with the incorporation of the IOS measures, some 
effects of the activities can be picked up. For example, if two members of the the group 
of three have history of friendship (enmity), their IOS scores will be high (low).  
Statistically the group-of-three specific feature are a source of random noise, in the 
case there is a history of enmity between two individuals within a group of three. These 
do invalidate statistical tests.   
The villages involved are relatively small and houses shared common corridors, 
therefore these villagers have strong communal experiences with each other prior this 
experiment. The majority of villagers also participated in collective action activities 
organised by their village councils like cleaning up, preparing for festivities and fixing 
the village’s public goods.9 Some subjects recruited to the experiments treated the 
experimental session as a communal experience.  
This experimental design received ethical approval from the University of East 
Anglia’s ECO Ethics Committee. Permission to conduct this research has been granted 
by the Sarawak’s Economic Planning Unit.  
 
 
 
9 The average number of households in villages visited is 103. The largest village has 196 
households and the smallest village has 41 households. See Figure A?? in the Appendix for an 
example of a village’s set-up.  
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2.4.1 Social status elicitation 
Participants received a booklet of five pages. On each page, there was a diagram of a 
ladder. Participants were told that the ladder represented a positional rank of every 
villager in the session. Every page represented a different status dimension. On the first 
page participants ranked each other based on extraversion levels. Extraversion was 
described as having an ‘outgoing personality’ in the instructions.  Participants were told 
to write the ID numbers of the other participants on the ladder and to write their own 
ID as ‘X’. The top rung of the ladder was reserved for the participant perceived to be 
the most extravert in the session while the lowest rung was to be allocated to the least 
extravert participant. No rung should be left empty as each rung should have an ID and 
no ID should be repeated. After the experimenter had established that every participant 
in the session had completed the task on the first page correctly, the experimenter 
instructed participants to open the second page. Participants repeated the same 
procedure with a different dimension on each page. The subsequent status dimensions 
elicited were; i) physical fitness, ii) educational attainment, iii) wealth, and iv) 
success10. Each ladder was designed to provide a participant’s perception of social 
hierarchy by comparing him/herself with other participants in the session. Participants’ 
booklets were collected once this Part had concluded.  
As this elicitation was based on participants’ self-perception, there was no penalty if a 
participant’s rankings were not in agreement with the rankings of other participants in 
the session, and there was no reward for agreement. This self-perceived assignment of 
subjective social status elicitation is adapted from Singh-Manoux et al. (2003). 
Instructions read for this task are in Appendix C.  
2.4.2 Relationship closeness elicitation 
The second type of elicitation task used is the Inclusion of the Other in the Self (IOS) 
Scale (Aron et al., 1992; Gächter et al., 2015). Information from this elicitation task 
is used as a control variable to link decisions made in the PGG with the extent of pre-
existing social ties among participants. Each participant received a booklet with nine 
pages. One page was left blank.  Each of the other pages contained seven diagrams 
and a question with its possible answers. Participants were instructed only to open 
 
10 The word ‘success’ is being employed as a placeholder for prestige given that there is no direct 
translation of the word prestige from English to Malay. 
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each page based on cues from the experimenter. The first page was designated to 
participant with ID 1 (participant with ID1 received a blank Page 1). Participants with 
ID2 to ID9 were told to look at participant ID1. Then they need to select one diagram 
from the seven options. Each diagram hads a score, the minimum was 1 and the 
maximum was 7. If a participant felt that she/he never had a social relationship with 
participant ID1, she/he should select 1, and if there was a very close social 
relationship outside the session setting, the participant should  select 7. If the 
relationship was not characterised by either extreme case, participants could select 
any score between 2 to 6. After marking a diagram using the pencil, each participant 
needed to indicate the type of relationship he/she had with participant ID1. A 
participant could establish participant ID1 as a close family member, a neighbour, a 
co-worker, a close friend, a friend or just a co-villager. There was no limit on the 
numbers of ties a participant could report. After Page 1 had been completed by 
participants, everyone was asked to turn to Page 2 and based their decision on 
participant with ID 2. The routine was repeated until the page referring to participant 
with ID9 had been completed. The instructions of this task is under Appendix D of 
this chapter.   
2.4.3 Public Good Game  
After the completion of the social status and relationship closeness tasks, every 
participant was randomly assigned to a group of three. Each received an endowment 
of seven blue tokens in an envelope, regardless of their role within their group. For a 
representative, this translates to an action space of (0 ≤ 𝑒𝑗 ≤ 7); and for group 
member, it is (0 ≤ 𝑥𝑖 ≤ 7).  
Those assigned as group members were informed that their endowment could be 
divided between a ‘Group Project’ and his/her ‘Individual Account’. For each token 
kept in the Individual Account, the participant would receive Malaysian Ringgit 2 
(MYR 2 = £0.36). They were told that each token placed in the Group Project (GP) 
had two possible values. Each token could be worth MYR 2.50 or MYR 5.00. The 
actual value would be determined after the representative had made his/her decision 
and would be applied to tokens contributed by both players i. The value of tokens in 
the GP would be shared equally among the 3 players.  
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Subjects were also told that endowment tokens received by representative could be 
divided between a Group Investment Account (GIA) and the representative’s 
individual account. If the representative allocated no blue tokens to the GIA ( 𝑒𝑗 =
0), the value of each token in the GP would be MYR 2.50.   The representative’s 
decision influenced the probability that a token in GP would be worth MYR 5. We 
illustrated the implication of the representative’s decision with the use of 10 white 
tokens and a black bag. Before the representative made his/her decision, there were 
10 white tokens in the black bag. For every 1 blue token the representative allocated 
to the GIA, the experimenter removed 1 white token from the bag. For example, if 
the representative placed all his 7 blue tokens into the black bag, the contents of the 
bag would be adjusted so that it contained 7 blue tokens and 3 white tokens. 
At the beginning of the decision stage, each group member was provided with a small 
black box at their decision console. They were told that any token placed in that box 
would be designated for the GP and the remaining tokens in the envelope will be 
designated for their Individual Account (IA). After both players i had decided, the 
tokens in their boxes would be accumulated. The representative would be informed 
of the number of accumulated tokens, but not the number of tokens in each black box.  
After the representative had decided, the experimenter adjusted the content of the bag 
in front of the representative but out of sight of the group members.  After the 
representative had left their decision console, the experimenter shook the bag and 
drew one token from the bag at random. If a white token was drawn, each token in 
the Group Project was worth MYR 2.50 or ML =1.25. If a blue token was drawn, each 
token in the Group Project was worth MYR 5.00 or MH = 2.5). The colour of the 
drawn token would not be revealed to the subjects. A representative would be able to 
work out the value of multiplier based on his effort and the total contribution from 
group members, but  group members would not be  able to gauge the effectiveness of 
the representative’s effort, or to work out the other group member’s contribution.  
Essentially a representative’s role is to influence the distribution of blue tokens in the 
black bag and this affects the probability of higher valued MPCR to be implemented. 
A full contribution of 7 tokens from a representative would not have directly resulted 
in MH as there are still 30% chances that a group received the lower valued MPCR, 
ML. 
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Every subject was aware of the decision-making sequences, the identity of villagers 
assigned the roles of representative and group members, and the implications of their 
actions for group and individual payoffs. Villagers randomly assigned the role of 
group members are identified as ‘Member A1’ or ‘Member A2’ while villagers in the 
representative role is ‘Member B’. The verbal instructions in Malay language and its 
English translation, along with graphical illustrations that every player received can 
be found in under Appendix B on page 80. 
After they had completed the session, villagers were handed cash payments in opaque 
envelopes at the entrance of the room. Villagers were paid MYR 10 (£1.82) as 
participation fee and on average earned MYR 16.50 (£3.00) from the PGG11.  
2.4.4 Experimental Subjects and Institutional Settings 
Subjects for this experiment were recruited from the Kayan tribe that lives in rural 
Sarawak (Borneo), Federation of Malaysia. Its current population is concentrated 
along the Baram River and a dam resettlement area in Sungai Asap12. The tribe is a 
stratified society as one’s position in life is inherited from birth. While distribution 
of strata is inconsistent between villages, a typical traditional village will have 
aristocrats (maren), commoners (panyin), and former slaves (dipen). Leaders in this 
tribe are selected from aristocrats’ families, acting as the king/queen of their 
respective chiefdoms (now villages).  
Before the banning of headhunting, Kayan tribal leaders used this practice to 
strengthen their position in the region by leading raids and enslaving captives 
(Rousseau, 1990). Another way that the tribe improved their survival was through 
alliances between neighbouring villages brokered by their leaders (Rousseau, 1990). 
In this context, leaders have the ability to i) act as a representative that seeks mutually 
beneficial outcomes for the villagers when dealing with friendly outsiders, and ii) act 
as a focal point in coordinating actions (attack or defence) against enemies.  Despite 
the need to provide corvée or tribute to their tribe leader, villagers in general benefited 
 
11 Average earnings plus participation fee worked out to 90% of the daily wage in the region. The 
average earning is also slightly above the return fare from a small village to the nearest small town 
by local 4WD transportations services. The incentive made available is slightly below the daily wage 
as a compromise with the permission granting body to keep the nature of this experiment as a 
research project.  
12 The Bakun dam construction caused around 5,000 Kayan population that lived along the Rajang 
river and its tributaries to be relocated to a new resettlement area between 1998-2000.  
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from this feudalistic setting due to constant threats from the other warring and 
headhunting tribes. This institutional setting also perpetuated inequality within 
villages over time due to lack of social mobility and restrictive migration 
opportunities for the non-aristocrats (Rousseau ,1990).  
Mass conversion to Christianity that started to take place in 1950s for Kayan of 
Baram and in 1970s for Kayan of Rajang resulted in the emancipation of slaves and 
the abolishment of its strata. Exposure to market and nation-state institutions along 
with greater personal autonomy experienced by common villagers resulted in 
migration and accumulation of human capital and wealth.  
The aristocrats responded to increasing exposure to modern institutions in multiple 
ways. Some urged their family members to seek education and economic opportunities 
outside their villages. Several chiefs also established a primary school in their 
respective villages and urged villagers to send their kids to their school (in a visited 
village, a chief established a school and ended up being the only teacher there, despite 
having only two years of primary education, due to difficulty in sourcing funding and 
human resource to run the school). Some chiefs asserted their influence by 
participating in policy-making at district levels, and over time, all the way to the 
national levels. The formal representation of tribal chiefs in State decision-making was 
formalized with the establishment of the Sarawak Native Customs Council in 197413. 
The Council is unique to Sarawak as no other States in Malaysia have engaged local 
leadership in the policy process. A direct result from this engagement is the codified 
customary law, Adet Kayan-Kenyah 1994, administered under the Native Courts of 
Sarawak14. Members of the Council known as Paramount Chiefs also act in an advisory 
role to the State legislation process to ensure that no State law is detrimental to the 
progress of any native community in Sarawak. Therefore, the role of lobbying or 
representing the tribe members’ interest is still crucial in modern institutions.  
The role of local leaders has also been investigated in developing countries using lab-
in-the-field experiments. Local leaders’ importance in the production of local level 
collective actions and public goods have been documented in by Jack & Recalde 
 
13 Council’s membership also includes representatives from other tribes in Sarawak.  
14 The Native Court of Sarawak was established in 1870 under the administration of Rajah Charles 
Brooke to handle personal matters (marriage rights, divorce, and division of property from death 
or divorce).  
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(2015), d’Adda (2017), and Grossman & Baldassari (2012) by pointing out the role of 
legitimacy, reputational concerns and social capital in village-level collective actions. 
Kosfeld & Rustagi (2015) extended the investigation on local leadership by looking at 
the leaders’ punishment patterns and relates it to village-level commons management 
outcomes. Trust in local leadership also shaped willingness to cooperate within a 
community; Beekman et al. (2014), for example, managed to link villagers’ behaviour 
in public good game with their leaders’ corrupt behaviours.  
The isolation and rural location of the tribe villages make the delivery of basic 
amenities challenging. Of the seventeen villages visited, seven villages that were 
under the dam resettlement program now have direct access to electricity and water 
supplies. Other villages rely on gasoline as the main source of energy and harvested 
rainwater for water supply. Eight villages are still connected only by logging dirt 
roads and one village could only be accessed by river. Five villages visited don’t have 
telecommunication connectivity. The average number of households per village is 
147. The biggest Kayan village visited have 196 households while the smallest have 
41 households. Houses in these villages are still in its traditional form, in which 
houses are build next to each other and everyone sharing a communal corridor (see 
Figure 2.18A in the Appendix). 
We recruited 324 villagers, 216 of whom participated as group members and 108 as 
representatives. 36 experimental sessions were conducted from December 2016 to 
February 2017. Table 2.2 below contains the summary statistics of villagers that 
participated as subjects in this experiment.  
Table 2.2. Summary statistics of subjects’ characteristics 
Personal Characteristics Mean Min Max 
Age (years) 44.4 18 86 
Male  0.33   
Years in Education (years) 7.71 0 16 
Engaged in cash crop 0.87   
Aristocracy strata  0.10   
Former slave strata  0.16   
Village council  0.29   
Observations 324   
Note: Variables in Table 2.2 were elicited in Part 4 of the experiment after the public 
good game was concluded. Age refers to the age of the subjects. Variable male takes a 
value of 1 if the subject is a male, if the subject is a female that variable will take a value 
of 0. Years in education is the number of years a subject received formal schooling. 
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Prior to 2015, the compulsory years of schooling in Malaysia was 6. Variable cash crop 
takes a value of 1 if the output from subjects’ agricultural activities are commodities 
like palm oil or rubber. Aristocracy strata takes a value of 1 if a subject reported she/he 
is a maren (a member of aristocracy households), non-maren subjects are identified as 
0 in aristocracy strata. Variable village council takes a value of 1 if the subject is a 
member of village community council. Those in the slave strata were prevented from 
migrating in the past. Migration to a village only happened with the permission from 
the village’s head. If a villager is an adult migrant, variable migrant to the village takes 
a value of 1, otherwise it is 0. Only variable ‘former slave strata’ was not elicited 
directly from the subjects. The mean for variables male, cash crops, aristocracy strata, 
former slave strata, village council, and migrant to the village reports the share of the 
subjects that reports they have the variable’s characteristics. For example, the share of 
aristocracy in sampled subjects are 0.10.   
 
The heterogeneity in education levels among recruited subjects may raise a 
concern about subjects’ comprehension during the experiment, particularly 
during the public good game. To mitigate this factor while ensuring variability 
in subjects’ education level, subjects were required to answer control questions 
before they made their decisions. Control questions posed to subjects and their 
translations can be found in Appendix A3 to A6. Each subject was required to 
answer two questions. 70% of the subjects managed to answer both questions 
on their first try. The experimenters had to explain the game in its entirety to 
only four subjects, i.e. 1.2% of the total subjects. Subjects typically asked for 
additional explanation of the calculation of individual payoffs. Further 
breakdown of subjects’ responses to the control questions can be found in Table 
2.1A in the Appendix section.   
 
2.5 Results and findings  
2.5.1 Social elicitation data and measures 
We focus on the role of social status, agreed implicitly by villagers within a session, 
as a motivating factor in representative leadership. Social status is conferred 
implicitly through villagers’ assignment on a positional rank; i.e. if a targeted villager 
has 8 co-villagers in a session assigning her on the highest rung, the targeted villager 
has the highest possible social status in the group of 9. Hence, a villager’s social status 
is identified by other co-villagers’ assignments based on the social status elicitation 
task in a session. We believe that villagers reported their self -perception on their 
position and the positions of others accurately, particularly since the participants 
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weren’t aware that the subsequent part of the experiment was incentivized15. Each 
villager has a group-level positional rank constructed by the other 8 co-villagers. 
Ladder ranking by one villager is not dominant over the others. For example,  one 
villager might assess land ownership of other villagers as the dominant measure of 
wealth ranking while another villager in the same session might make the assessment 
based on perceived wealth of family members. 
A social index is constructed for each status dimension elicited in the experiment; 
success, wealth, education, physical fitness, and extraversion. Within a session, a 
villager assigned at the top rung by another villager received a score of 9. Villagers 
that have been ranked in subsequent lower rungs (Rung 2 to Rung 9) will be assigned 
a score between 8 and 1. A villager received a score from eight other villagers in a 
session and the accumulated value of the eight scores is denoted by X. The maximum 
score that can be attained is 72 and the lowest is 816.  A social status index, Z-index, 
is then calculated based on the following formula; 
𝑍 =
𝑋 − 8
72 − 8
 
Receiving a Z-index of 1 indicates a villager is conferred with the highest possible 
status as every co-villager in the same session agreed that this targeted villager 
belongs to the highest rung. In most sessions, the value of Z-index received by the 
highest status villager is closer to 1. Similarly, Z-index values that are closer to 0 
means a villager is perceived by others to have low status in the session. We pooled 
the social status index from every session and the summary statistics in Table 2.3.   
 
 
15 Anderson, et al. (2006) ran several self-assessed status experiments in face-to-face settings and 
concluded that individuals are more likely to accurately guess or self-efface their positions in their 
reference group for social acceptance. The results from the Singh-Manoux et al.(2003), where this 
ladder tool was adapted from, also concluded that individuals have the ability to identify their 
position in their society with respect to their socioeconomic status. Recent findings by Xie et 
al.(2017) found that in an incentivised task, their subjects across multiple spectrum of societies 
(WEIRD, nomadic herders in Tibet, and children subjects) have an aversion to reverse the other 
subjects’ prior rank. Preserving pre-existing social status during ceremonies in villages were observed 
in several ceremonies in several villages. It is expected that this norm of preserving pre-existing rank 
would be reflected in the social status elicitation task. The social norm of preserving social rank 
within a society has been discussed by Charness & Villeval (2017). 
16 In the case that a Villager #1 made a mistake by forgetting to rank a Villager #7 in a session, the 
formula for local status index will be adjusted for Villager #7 to be Z = (X-7)/ (63-7). 125 mistakes 
were detected from 14,580 elicitations done, bring the rate of mistakes to 0.9%.  
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Table 2.3. Summary statistics on social status index, Z-index and its correlations 
 Summary Statistics Correlation 
Z - Index Mean SD Min Max Success Wealth Edu Fitness Extra 
Success  0.51 0.23 0.015 0.984      
Wealth  0.52 0.24 0.016 1 0.80***     
Education  0.50 0.26 0 1 0.34*** 0.21***    
Fitness  0.50 0.21 0.016 1 0.17*** 0.12** 0.44***   
Extraversion  0.49 0.17 0.078 0.953 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.27*** 0.35***  
Composite 
Status  
0.50 0.15 0.11 0.95 0.79*** 0.74*** 0.67*** 0.56*** 0.64*** 
Note: Z-index takes a value from 0 to 1. SD stands for standard deviation. Figures in 
correlation columns report the correlation between one status dimension with another. *** 
Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
 In some sessions there was unanimous agreement on which villagers belong in the 
highest rung in wealth, education and fitness dimensions. Similarly, unanimous 
agreement could be found in the lowest rung of education dimension. The means in 
Table 2.3 also serves as an indirect measure of villagers’ tendencies to self -enhance 
or self-efface themselves when completing the social status elicitation sheet. Since 
the mean for success and wealth is above 0.5, this would mean that in general 
villagers tended to self-efface themselves by ranking themselves at a lower rung than 
the rung assigned by other villagers. Since the means for extraversion status is less 
than 0.5, it indicates that villagers tended to self-enhance their position on the ladder.  
We tested the correlation of the Z-index for each status dimension and found they are 
positively correlated, i.e. a person that has been conferred high rank in one dimension 
is more likely to be conferred high rank in another dimension. The strongest 
correlation can be found between success and wealth, i.e. if a villager is deemed to 
be successful by villagers in a session that same villager is more likely to be deemed 
wealthy by others. To circumvent the multicollinearity issue in regression analysis 
using highly correlated dimensions, a composite social status index has been 
constructed by taking an average from the five social status indexes. The last row in 
Table 2.3 indicates that the composite status index is highly correlated to the five 
dimensions of status, particularly for success and wealth.   
We controlled for each villager’s self-perception in each dimension as it might affect 
their decision-making process. Some villagers might use their elicitation sheets to 
show dominance by exaggerating their position while some might self-efface their 
positional rank in their sheets.  Table 2.3A in the Appendix contains the Wilcoxon 
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signed rank test that compared a villager’s self-perceived ranking in one status 
dimension with another.  
A self-perceived index is constructed for each subject. When a subject places ‘X’ on 
the highest rung for a dimension, that subject will receive a self -perceived index of 1 
for that dimension. The lowest rung is worth 0 for this index. The summary statistics 
for self-perceived status index is in Table 2.4. The results from this table indicate that 
villagers tend to place themselves towards the middle rung with clear self -effacement 
happening in the wealth dimension and self -enhancement in the extraversion 
dimension. Success and wealth dimensions are strongly correlated, suggesting 
villagers that rank themselves in a certain rung in a dimension will place themselves 
in similar positioned rung in the other dimension. Scatter plots of the relationship 
between self-perceived status and status assigned by other villagers can be found in 
Figures 2.1A to 2.5A in the Appendix section. We found that there is positive 
correlation between self-perceived status index with the index from group assignment 
for all dimensions.  
Table 2.4. Summary statistics on self-perceived index and its correlations across 
dimensions 
Self-
perceived 
index 
Summary 
Statistics 
Correlations across dimensions 
 Mean SD Success Wealth Edu Fit Extra 
Success  0.459 0.33      
Wealth  0.340 0.32 0.639***     
Education  0.419 0.29 0.308*** 0.211***    
Fitness  0.517 0.35 0.278*** 0.161*** 0.360***   
Extraversion  0.615 0.33 0.239*** 0.164*** 0.205*** 0.381***  
Composite 0.470 0.22 0.750*** 0.656*** 0.609*** 0.675*** 0.610*** 
Note: Self-perceived index takes a value from 0 to 1. SD stands for standard deviation. 
Figures in correlation columns report the correlation between one status dimension with 
another. *** Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
We control for villagers’ self-perception by incorporating the gap between status as 
perceived by self and status as perceived by the group. The gap in status perception 
indicates whether a villager self-enhanced him/herself (a positive gap) or self-effaced 
him/herself (a negative gap) when they completed the social status elicitation task. 
When the gap is zero between a villager’s self -perceived and status perceived by the 
group, then a villager’s self-perceived social status is in agreement with the status 
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assigned by the other villagers. Table 2.5 reports the summary statistics of the gap in 
self-perceived status index with the social status index, Z-index.  
Table 2.5.  Summary statistics on gap between Z-index and self-perceived  
Group – Self 
Status Gap 
Summary 
Statistics 
 Mean SD 
Success  0.047 0.34 
Wealth  0.181 0.31 
Education  0.077 0.26 
Fitness  -0.02 0.32 
Extraversion  -0.13 0.35 
Composite 0.032 0.20 
Note: Group-self status gap takes a value from -1 to 1. SD stands for standard deviation.  
The summary statistics in Table 2.5 show that on average villagers tend to self-efface 
their own success, wealth and education standing in comparison to social status 
assigned by other villagers. On the other hand, an average villager would be more 
likely to self-enhance their social standing in the physical fitness and extraversion 
dimensions. The status gap averages for success, education and physical fitness are 
very close to zero, meaning that in general villagers’ self-perceived status for these 
three dimensions are on average close to the status assigned by their co-villagers. 
Status gap averages for wealth and extraversion dimensions are larger than the rest 
as villagers tend to self-efface and self-enhance their social status in comparison to 
the social status that their co-villagers assigned them to. The composite status gap is 
derived by taking an average from the status gaps in the five dimensions. A positive 
status gap indicates an overall tendency to self -efface; a negative status gap indicates 
an overall tendency to self-enhance.  The composite status gap has strong positive 
correlation with all status gap dimension constructed.  
To validate the social status elicitation task with traditional status, we correlate the 
social status Z-index with villagers’ strata. Table 2.6 below shows the correlations 
between traditional strata and social status, Z-index. There are positive correlations, 
although weak, between professing to belong in aristocrat strata and occupying the 
highest status in the success, wealth and education dimensions.  
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Table 2.6.  Correlations between traditional strata and Z-index, by dimensions 
 Success Wealth Educatio
n 
Fitness Extraversio
n 
Composite 
Aristocrat
s 
0.11** 0.13** 0.13** -0.04 0.09 0.12** 
Proxy 
Slaves 
0.05 0.09* -0.81 -0.09 0.07 0.0289 
Notes: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 
percent level. 
The weak correlation between aristocratic status and the Z-index may be due to the 
fact that the proportion of aristocrats in our experiment was quite low (10 per cent).  
It could also be due to the presence of more than one aristocrat within a session17. 
Another type of data elicited before the public good game is the social relationship 
closeness, elicited using the IOS scale. The lowest score that could be awarded to 
another villager within the same session is 1 and the highest is 7. A villager could 
receive a total score of 56 if every co-villager in the same session assigned the highest 
IOS score to her/him. The lowest possible total score a villager could receive is 8. An 
average villager received a total score of 36.2; the extremes were 19 and 53. Among 
the 36 groups of nine villagers, the lowest average score a villager received in a 
session was 3.36 and the highest average score was 5.4, implying that villagers 
recruited within each group identified closely with each other and had pre-existing 
social relationships.  Are perceptions of closeness related to social status indexes and 
belonging to traditional strata? To answer this question, we correlated every villager’s 
IOS score with their social status index in each dimension as shown in Table 2.7. 
There are positive but minor correlations between social status index and social 
relationship closeness. The stronger correlations between highly close relationship 
and high-status index could be found in the extraversion and education status 
dimensions, indicating that villagers on average perceived social closeness with co-
villagers that had high education and extraversion social status. As the IOS scale 
measures social relationships, higher correlation with perceived extraversion is 
 
17 The recruiter with villager’s council assistance tried their best to ensure there is a member of 
aristocrat strata present in a session, but there are sessions void participation of a member of 
aristocrat strata due to their small population share in the village.  Rousseau (1990) reported that 
the share of aristocrat in a typical Kayan villagers are between 15-20% during his anthropological 
fieldwork in 1970s. Members of aristocrat strata are reportedly to be more  socially mobile (at 
national-level) and are the first ones that left their villagers in order to seek economic opportunities 
outside their own village. An interview with an aristocrat researcher in a major city in Sarawak 
confirms the shrinking share of aristocrat in the villagers and we did in fact visited a village devoid of 
an aristocrat, but the village administration is still handled by them through a proxy. 
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consistent with the notion that more extraverted villagers had more active social 
relations.   
Table 2.7. Correlation between awarded IOS and Z- index across dimension 
 Success Wealth Education Fitness Extraversion Composite 
Total 
score 
0.11** 0.09* 0.19*** 0.12** 0.21*** 0.1954*** 
 Notes: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 
percent level. 
Among those that self-identified to be in aristocrat strata, the average IOS score 
received is 4.69, while those from formerly slave strata received an average score of 
4.67. There is no statistically significant difference in average IOS score received by 
those belonging to aristocrat or former slave strata in comparison to ordinary 
villagers, showing that strata differences are not the basis for relationship closeness 
among these villagers(Mann-Whitney(M-W) statistics for aristocracy = 1.120, p-
value = 0.2628; M-W stats former slave = 1.301, p-value = 0.1932). There are two 
main explanations of why no statistical differences can be detected between the 
average IOS scores received by  members of aristocrat and former slave strata. First, 
the villages’ sizes and physical arrangement promote tight and strong social 
relationship among villagers. Second, the emancipation of slaves happened 50 years 
ago and there is a possibility that the marks of strata no longer govern social 
relationships in these villages. While anthropological literature have painted this 
society to be highly stratified, data from IOS scores indicates that the society is  not 
highly fragmented.  
In the subsequent sections, player j is labelled as the representative while player i is 
labelled as a group member. The accurate label for player i is the non-representative 
group member but for sake of brevity, the label used is the group member. Table 2.8 
shows the summary statistics of subjects based on the roles assigned to them. Results 
from this table shows that with the exception of belonging to the aristocracy , the 
process of randomization in assignment of roles produced no statistically significant 
differences in characteristics between representatives and group members.  
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Table 2.8. Balance: Demographic, social and economic background of 
representatives and group members 
 Representative Group Members Difference 
(p-value) Personal Characteristics Mean Mean 
Age (years) 45.5 43.9 0.9535 
(0.3411) 
Male  0.33 0.34 -0.1654 
(0.8687) 
Years in Education 
(years) 
7.45 7.84 -0.7960 
(0.4266) 
Engaged in cash crop 0.89 0.86 0.5256 
(0.5996) 
Aristocracy strata  0.06 0.13 -0.2058** 
(0.0404) 
Former slave strata  0.17 0.16 0.2134 
(0.8312) 
Village council  0.23 0.32 -0.1580 
(0.1151) 
Observations 108 216  
Note:  Age refers to the age of the subjects. Variable male takes a value of 1 if the subject is a  
male, if the subject is a  female that variable will take a value of 0. Years in education is the 
number of years a subject received formal schooling. Before 2015, the compulsory years of 
schooling in Malaysia is 6. Variable cash crop takes a value of 1 if the output from subjects’ 
agricultural activities are commodities like palm oil or rubber. Aristocracy strata takes a value 
of 1 if a  subject reported she/he is a maren (a member of aristocracy households), non-maren 
subjects are identified as 0 in aristocracy strata. Variable village council takes a value of 1 if the 
subject is a  member of village community council. Only variable ‘former slave strata’ was not 
elicited directly from the subjects. The mean for variables male, cash crops, aristocracy strata, 
former slave strata, and village council reports the share of the subjects that reports they have 
the variable’s characteristics. For example, the share of aristocracy in sampled subjects assigned 
as representatives are 0.06. Difference is calculated using two independent sample t-test to detect 
differences in variables’ averages between representatives and group members. *** significant 
at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level. 
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Table 2.9.  Balance: Elicited indices and IOS of representatives and group 
members 
 Representative Group Members Difference  
Mean Mean 
Z-Index    
Success 0.506 0.506 0.0013 
[0.9989] 
Wealth 0.514 0.525 - 0.3805 
(0.7038) 
Education 0.461 0.513 - 0.17358* 
(0.0835) 
Physical Fitness 0.476 0.512 - 1. 4642 
(0.1441) 
Extraversion 0.477 0.489 - 0.5932 
(0.5535) 
Composite 0.487 0.509 - 1.2214 
(0.2228) 
Self-Perceived Index    
Success 0.469 0.454 0.3576 
(0.7209) 
Wealth 0.390 0.315 2.0048** 
(0.0458) 
Education 0.395 0.431 - 1.0709 
(0.2850) 
Physical Fitness 0.464 0.544 -1.9429* 
(0.0529) 
Extraversion 0.593 0.626 - 0.8607 
(0.3900) 
Composite 0.462 0.474 - 0.4871 
(0.6265) 
IOS     
Total score received 35.58 36.5 -1.1659 
(0.2445) 
Observation 108 216  
Difference is calculated using two independent sample t-test to detect differences in variables’ 
averages between representatives and group members*** significant at 1 percent level, ** 
significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
 
Table 2.9 reports the average scores received by representatives and group members 
through the elicitation exercises. These data show that, except in a few cases, there 
are no statistically significant differences between subjects assigned as 
representatives and subjects assigned as group members.  
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2.5.2 Investing Effort as a Representative 
There are variations in effort by representatives. Figure 2 .2 below shows the 
distributions of tokens used as effort to increase the probability of the high multiplier 
value, MH. 32.4% of representatives decided to exert full effort on behalf of their 
group. The second most frequent choice was of 5 tokens. This effort level was salient 
because it produced a 50-50 chance of of MH or ML implementation. In general, those 
in the representative role made effort to improve the probability of their group getting 
MH.  The average effort of a representative is 5.3 tokens Only two representatives 
decided to exert no effort and to free ride from the GP.  
Figure 2.2 Representatives’ efforts (tokens) 
 
 
Hypotheses 1, 2, 5 and 8 explore the relationship between representative’s effort and 
her/his status, the status of the contributors, social closeness with the contributors and 
the contributions made by the respective group members.  
Hypothesis 1 states that representative’s effort is positively related to her/his status. 
Table 2.10 below reports the correlation between the number of tokens exerted as 
effort by a representative and his/her status, as indicated by his/her Z-index and the 
strata to which he/she belongs. The Z-index for a subject used in the analysis is 
relative to the other 8 subjects in the same session, i.e. this is the session-level status.  
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Table 2.10. Relationship between number of effort tokens and social status  
Social status indicator Observation Z-Index 
Spearman 
correlation 
[p-value] 
Self-Rank 
Spearman 
in group of 
9 
correlation 
[p-value] 
Ladder 
Elicitation 
Success 108 0.1607* 
[0.0966] 
-0.1000 
[0.3031] 
Wealth 108 0.0836 
[0.3899] 
-0.1683* 
[0.0817] 
Education 108 0.1087 
[0.2627] 
-0.1278 
[0.1874] 
Physical fitness 108 0.0393 
[0.6862] 
-0.0144 
[0.8825] 
Outgoingness 108 0.0267 
[0.7838] 
0.1568 
[0.1051] 
Composite 108 0.1345 
[0.1651] 
 
Traditional 
strata 
Aristocrat 108 0.1708* 
[0.0771] 
Proxy slave 108 0.0696 
[0.4742] 
Notes: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 
percent level. 
Table 2.10 shows weak or non-existent correlations between representative’s effort 
and social status elicited before and after the experiment, when social status is based 
on elicitation in a group of nine villagers. These results are consistent in the three 
types of measures used, i) the Z-index that captures the implicit ranking of villagers 
in the session, ii) the position on the ladder that the representatives placed themselves 
in the ladder elicitation and iii) the traditional strata data asked in the socio-economic 
survey. Even constraining the unit of analysis of a group of 3, no relationship could 
be established between effort made to the GIA and representative’s social status.  
Hypothesis 2 stated each representative’s decision has relationship with the social 
status of the respective group members, i.e. the high-status group member elicited 
high effort level from the representative. Table 2.11 shows the correlations of 
representatives’ decisions with group members’ status.  
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Table 2.11. Relationship between number of effort tokens and group members’ social 
status  
Z-index Observation Correlation 
to highest 
status 
contributor 
[p-value] 
Correlation to 
contributor’s 
average 
status 
[p-value] 
Success 108 0.1132 
[0.2434] 
0.1222 
[0.2075] 
Wealth 108 0.0625 
[0.5206] 
0.1188 
[0.2208] 
Education 108 0.0916 
[0.3456] 
0.1001 
[0.3027] 
Physical 
fitness 
108 0.0504 
[0.6048] 
0.0045 
[0.9630] 
Outgoingness 108 0.0839 
[0.3878] 
0.1016 
[0.2956] 
Composite 108 0.0936 
[0.3353] 
0.1230 
[0.2046] 
Notes: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 
percent level. 
Table 2.11 shows no statistical relationship can be established between 
representatives’ decisions and group members’ status elicited  from the ladder 
measures. With respect  to the membership of one or more group members in the 
traditional upper and lower strata, I found that effort from representative has no 
relationship with her/his respective group members belonging to, i) aristocrat strata 
(Spearman correlation = 0.0181, p-value = 0.8526), ii) former slave strata (Spearman 
correlation = -0.0035, p-value = 0.9713).   
According to Hypothesis 5, representatives’ closeness to group members has a 
postive effect on her/his effort to GIA. Here, we will use the accumulated IOS score 
assigned to both group members, for which the lowest possible value is 0 and the 
highest is 14. The average IOS score for a pair of group members is 9.29 with a 
standard deviation of 3.29. There is a positive but weak statistically significant 
relationship between representative’s effort and the accumulated IOS of the two 
group members, 0.2527*** (Spearman p-value = 0.0086). This means that 
representatives that have assigned high IOS score to the two group members in the 
elicitation stage, exerted more tokens to the GIA.  
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Before exerting effort, every representative receives information on the total number 
of tokens contributed by group members. The lowest possible value of tokens is 0 
while the highest is 14. Hypothesis 8 predicts that the number of tokens contributed 
has a positive influence on representatives’ effort.  A Spearman correlation test on 
effort by representative and information on contribution found no statistically 
significant effect (Spearman correlation = 0.0915, p-value = 0.3461).  
Empirical Strategy and Econometric Results  
Given that the experiment took place in a non-anonymous setting and most of the 
relationship data were elicited before the decisions, the variables used could be 
interacting with each other, making it hard to establish direct a relationship with any 
specific variable. It is also very likely that characteristics of representatives, the 
respective group members and village-level heterogeneity affect representatives’ 
effort to GIA. A notable variable that is usually expected to have a strong positive 
relationship with effort is information on the group members’ contributions; usually 
driven by the representatives’ desire to reciprocate group members’ contributions.  
Therefore, subsequent analysis will be analysed using econometrics to provide 
explanation to representatives’ decisions.  
We estimate the econometric equations below using cross-sectional ordinary least 
squares (OLS). First, the type of regression estimation used focuses on the status of 
representatives’ data on her/his social status and the information on group members’ 
contributions. The subsequent estimation will incorporate leaders’ control variables 
followed by village-level effects and control variables for the group members.  
This the specification of the first regression model:  
𝑒𝑗 =  𝛼1𝐺𝑆𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑆𝑗 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑃𝒋 + 𝜀𝑗 
ej represents the number of blue tokens used as effort, GSj is the group status z-index 
given by participants in a session to the representative, TSj is the representative’s 
traditional status, either as a member of aristocrat or former slave strata,  and 𝐺𝑃𝑗 
represents the information on total contribution made by both group members to the 
public group. Regression based on representative’s status is presented in Model (1) 
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of Table 2.8. GSj will use the value of composite z-index constructed using the five 
z-index from the status dimension elicited in the experiment.  
Model (2) tests for relationships between the representative’s effort level and social 
properties of, and contributions by, their respective group members. The model 
incorporates the following new terms; GS𝑖 ̅which is the average of the status indexes 
of the group members in the same group, 𝐺𝑃𝐼is the total contribution to the Group 
Project by group members, 𝐼𝑂𝑆𝑖 ̅ is the dispersion in IOS scores given by the 
representative to both group members, and TSi is the group members’ traditional 
status.  
𝑒𝑗 =  𝛼1𝐺𝑆𝑗 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑆𝑗 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑃𝑗 + 𝛼4𝐺𝑆𝑖̅ + 𝛼5𝑇𝑆𝑖̅ + 𝛼6𝐼𝑂𝑆𝑖̅ + 𝜀𝑗 
The subsequent Model (3) is a replication of Model (2) but with the inclusion of 
village-level effect. This is to control for possibility of village-level heterogeneity in 
our data.  Subsequent regression models that seek to establish determinants of 
representatives’ effort included more control variables. In Model (4), control 
variables like gender, age, membership of representatives into the village council and 
villager’s status as a migrant are incorporated. Model (5) included control variables 
for the group members.   
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Table 2.12. Determinants of representatives’ efforts 
 No controls GM’s 
status 
Village 
level effect 
Rep’s 
control 
GM’s 
control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Composite z-index 1.371 1.563 2.205* 2.121* 2.060* 
 (1.070) (1.126) (1.197) (1.171) (1.203) 
Aristocrat 1.026** 1.076** 0.836 0.834 0.517 
 (0.512) (0.515) (0.689) (0.732) (0.713) 
Proxy slave  0.425 0.462 0.319 0.232 0.272 
 (0.346) (0.365) (0.377) (0.426) (0.463) 
Total tokens from group members 0.0661 0.0544 0.0511 0.0640 0.0626 
 (0.0598) (0.0631) (0.0657) (0.0694) (0.0717) 
Status index control 
(self-perceived index) 
 
Group members’ status 
   0.0261 
(0.810) 
0.772 
(0.879) 
 
Group members’ z -index  1.695 1.541 1.131 1.805 
  (1.413) (1.277) (1.415) (1.575) 
Aristocrat  -0.320 -0.906 -0.877 -1.104* 
  (0.407) (0.555) (0.587) (0.611) 
Proxy slave  0.00676 -0.368 -0.267 -0.0829 
  (0.402) (0.581) (0.623) (0.635) 
Dispersion in IOS score  -0.0267 -0.0574 -0.00834 -0.0796 
  (0.114) (0.118) (0.132) (0.141) 
Constant 3.885*** 3.134*** 3.400*** 3.946*** 3.435* 
 (0.866) (1.122) (1.215) (1.372) (1.834) 
Representative’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Group members’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 108 108 107 103 
R-squared 0.065 0.083 0.299 0.309 0.371 
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Notes: Linear regression. Dependent variable is the number of effort tokens located by the 
representative to the Group Investment Account. The table reports coefficient with clustered 
standard errors on session in parentheses.  Variables derived from indices take any value for 0 
to 1. Composite z-index of Group Member (GM) takes a value from 0 to 1 and is the average of 
the status indexes of the group members in the same group. Total tokens from group members 
takes a value from 0 to 14 and derived by the sum of contributions by group members in the 
same group. Dispersion of IOS is the difference in the IOS scores assigned by the representative 
to the two group members. The aristocrat variable takes a value of 1 if the representative reports 
that she/he a member of aristocrat family at the end of the experiment, and 0 otherwise. Former 
slave strata take the value of 1 if the representative is inferred to belong formerly in the slave 
strata, and 0 otherwise. Control variables used in regression models above are age, membership 
in village council, gender, and identification as a migrant to the village. Age is a continuous 
variable and only the eldest group member is considered. Village council takes a value of 1 if 
the representative reported that she/he belong to their village’s committee council, and 0 
otherwise. Male takes a value of 1 if the representative is a male, and 0 if a female. Migrant takes 
a value of 1 if the representative reported that she/he is a migrant to the village, and 0 otherwise. 
*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent 
level. (d) is dummy variable 
 
Estimations in Models (1) and (2) showed that representatives without social status 
would have contributed tokens to the GIA. Belonging to an aristocrat family increases 
the contributions by more than 1 token in comparison to non-aristocrat. However, the 
positive effect of aristocracy disappears once village level effect is incorporated in 
the subsequent estimations in Models (3) to (5). Instead the positive effect of status 
on effort is shown to be coming from the elicited success status and this result is 
consistent across models and after including controls despite its weak statistical 
power. The switch of significant in aristocracy to social status index implies there is 
an interaction effect among representatives that have been identified to possess high 
success status in the session and have self -identified themselves to be a member of 
the aristocrat family. Robustness test using different dimensions of z-index can be 
found in Table 2.3A to Table 2.7A in the Appendix section.  
Result 1: Social status as assigned by co-villagers has a positive relationship with 
effort level in the public good game. Representatives deemed to possess high status 
by other villagers and belonging to the highest traditional strata exerted more effort 
to improve their respective group’s multiplier outcome.  
In all estimations from Models (1) to (5), information on total contributions from 
group members did not affect representative’s desire to invest in group investment 
account (GIA). This is consistent with the non-parametric test above in which we 
found no correlation between effort and contributions’ informa tion. Both findings 
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indicate that direct reciprocity is not the main channel in prompting the representative 
to exert effort on behalf of the group.  
Result 2: Representatives’ effort has no relationship with her/his group members’ 
contributions as effort level is not conditional to contributions made by group 
members.  
Another variable that showed statistically significant results is the status of group 
members. In Model (5) after village-level effect has been incorporated, the aristocrat 
status of any group member has negative effect on representative’s investment. In 
this regression, representatives exerted almost one less token than representatives that 
weren’t assigned to a group that had at least one aristocrat. However, in the non-
parametric test, this relationship can’t be detected. The control variables related to 
group members like age, gender, membership in village council and their identity as 
a migrant did not influence effort since none of the variables produce statistically 
significant results.  
Result 3: There is a possibility that aristocracy status of group members has negative 
effect on their representative’s effort. However, other social status indicators 
possessed by group members did not influence representatives’ decisions.  
In the non-parametric test, accumulation of IOS score awarded to the respective 
group members produced weak positive statistical relationship with her/his effort to 
GIA. Estimations in Models (2), (3), (4), and (5) did not use the accumulation of IOS 
score as a control variable on group members’ status. Instead, it uses the dispersion 
in the IOS score awarded by the representative. It measures social closeness distances 
of the 2 group members as judged by the representative., i.e. whether representative 
values one relationship over the other, and indirectly perceived equality in 
relationship status between representative and their respective two group members. 
Estimation of the social closeness distance did not affect representatives’ effort18.  
Result 4: Social relationship closeness with group members did not affect 
representative’s decision to exert effort on behalf of the group.  
 
18 Spearman coefficient for effort and dispersion on IOS assigned to group members is -0.0103 (p-
value = 0.9160). Not statistically significant but the negative correlation value indicates should a 
representative’s valuation of a group member relationship is more intense than the other, it 
adversely affected representative’s effort.  
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To recap, the average representative’s effort is 5.3 tokens and limited free-riding is 
taking place. The results related to social status and suggests that full effort is a 
possibility once the representative is a villager with high social status, either by being 
conferred by the villagers or by birth. 
2.5.3 Trusting the representative to lead 
Figure 2.3 below shows the contributions to public good made by group members. 
The mean contribution by a group member is 4.6 tokens. 25.5% of group members 
decided to allocate all endowed tokens to the Group Project (GP). 4 group members 
(1.85%) decided to free-ride completely, while the contribution mode is at 4 tokens.  
Figure 2.3. Group members’ contributions(tokens) 
 
The relevant hypotheses that are expected to explain group members’ willingness to 
trust their respective representatives are Hypotheses 3, 4, 6 and 7.  Hypothesis 3 
predicts that higher-status group members make larger contributions to the GP. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that the status of the representative has a positive influence on 
group members’ contributions. Hypotheses 6 and 7 predict that group members make 
higher contributions, the closer their relationship with the representative (Hypothesis 
6) and their fellow group member (Hypothesis 7). The non-parametric tests on these 
hypotheses can be found in Tables 2.13 and 2.14.  
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Table 2.13: Relationship between number of contribution tokens and social status  
Social status indicator Observation Z-Index 
Spearman 
correlation 
[p-value] 
Self-Rank 
Spearman 
in group of 
9 
correlation 
[p-value] 
Ladder 
Elicitation 
Success 216 0.1694** 
[0.0126] 
0.1619** 
[0.0178] 
Wealth 216 0.0844 
[0.2169] 
0.1209* 
[0.0762] 
Education 216 0.1147* 
[0.0926] 
0.0785 
[0.2509] 
Physical fitness 216 0.1472** 
[0.0305] 
0.0329 
[0.6320] 
Outgoingness 216 0.0885 
[0.1949] 
-0.0023 
[0.9736] 
Composite 216 0.1795*** 
[0.0082] 
0.1127* 
[0.0720] 
 
  Spearman 
correlation 
[p-value] 
 
Traditional 
strata 
Aristocrat 216 0.0101 
[0.8829] 
 
Proxy slave 216 -0.0382 
[0.5762] 
 
Notes: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 
percent level. 
Table 2.13 aims to address Hypothesis 3, in which the higher the status of the group 
members, the more she/he contributes to the public good. This relationship is 
examined based on three aspects, i) the z-index value received by each group member 
during the social status elicitation exercise, ii) the positional rank each group member 
placed themselves on each ladder, and iii) belonging to the aristocrat or slave strata. 
Weak positive and statistically significant correlations between contributions and 
status perceived by others can be found in success, education, physical fitness and 
the composite status.  Similarly, weak positive and statistically significant 
correlations can be found between contribution and group members’ self -perceived 
status in success, wealth and the overall composite of the five status dimensions. This 
means that how a group member perceived themselves in the ladder elicitation task 
influenced their contribution levels. On the other hand, no correlations can be found 
between traditional strata and tokens contributed to the public good.  
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Hypothesis 4 considered the possibility that group members’ contributions are 
influenced by the status of their matched representatives. The results of the non-
parametric test are in Table 2.14. 
Table 2.14: Relationship between number of contribution tokens and 
representative’s social status  
Z-index Observation Spearman correlations with 
representative’s z-index 
[p-value] 
Success 216 0.0204 
[0.7652] 
Wealth 216 0.0244 
[0.7215] 
Education 216 0.0634 
[0.3541] 
Physical fitness 216 0.1095 
[0.1084] 
Outgoingness 216 0.0191 
[0.7800] 
Composite 216 0.0693 
[0.3104] 
Notes: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 
percent level. 
There are no correlations between group members’ contribution and representative’s 
z-index, and this is applicable for all the status dimension elicited prior to the 
experiment. Simultaneously, traditional status of the representative, be it a member 
of an aristocrat or a former slave strata did not have relationship with group members’ 
contributions to PG (Spearman’s rho for aristocrat = 0.0384, p-value = 0.5749; 
Spearman’s rho for former slave = -0.1035, p-value = -0.1035).  
Group members are hypothesised to contribute more if they have strong relationship 
closeness with the representative under Hypothesis 6. However, the non-parametric 
test found there is no correlation between contribution and IOS score assigned to the 
representative (Spearman’s rho = -0.0540, p-value = 0.4311). Social relationship 
closeness towards co-group members is the focus for Hypothesis 7 and similar to 
Hypothesis 6, we found no statistical relationship between contribution and 
relationship closeness with co-group member (Spearman’s rho = -0.0150, p-value 
=0.8269).  
 
57 
 
 
Empirical Strategy and Econometric Results  
Both representative and group members’ decisions happened under the same settings, 
i.e. non-anonymised status elicitation and decision-stage. Unlike the representative, 
a group member decides simultaneously with an identifiable co-group member along 
with her/his beliefs about the co-group member’s cooperativeness. Similar to the 
representative, the co-group member’s social status might have effect on a group 
member’s contribution. As with the analysis of representative, there is the possibility 
of unobservable factors like village fixed effects in influencing group members’ 
decision-making, especially since non-parametric test only established weak 
relationship between contribution and group members elicited social status. 
Therefore, the following econometric analysis incorporate the necessary controls in 
explaining group members’ contributions.  
Similar to the econometric analysis of representatives, we will use cross-sectional 
ordinary least squares (OLS). The estimation (1) focuses on variables relevant to 
group members’ status only. Variables that are relevant to the group members’ 
decisions and control variables are incorporated in the subsequent estimations (2) to 
(6).  
Model (1) is specified in the following manner;  
𝑥𝑖 =  𝑎1𝐺𝑆𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
xi is the number of tokens a representative placed in the public good, GSi is the 
constructed composite group status index given by villagers in a session to a group 
member and TSi is the traditional status of the group members. Robustness tests on 
other z-index dimensions elicited from the experiment can be found in Tables 2.8A 
to 2.12A of the Appendix.  
Model (2) maintains the variables of interest from Model (1) and incorporates 
representatives’ z-index on success dimension, their traditional strata and the IOS 
score that the group members assigned to their representatives. This is the 
specification for Model (2);  
𝑥𝑖 =  𝑎1𝐺𝑆𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
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 Model (3) estimated the same variables in Model (2) with the incorporation of 
village-level effect to the estimation. This is to control for unobserved village level 
characteristics that can affect estimation of the status variables with group members’ 
decisions to contribute.  
Models (4), (5) and (6) incorporated more control variables to the variables of interest 
in Model (1) and (2). In Model (4), group members’ decisions are controlled by other 
relevant variables that could have influenced decisions to contribute. They are; i) age, 
ii) gender, iii) membership in village council and iv) having migrated to the village. 
Model (5) considers the control variables of the respective representative matched 
with the group member while Model (6) controlled the same variables for the 
assigned co-group member.    
Estimation results for Models (1) to (6) are in the Table 2.15.  
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Table 2.15. Determinants of group members’ contributions 
 No controls Rep’s 
status 
Village 
level effect 
GM’s 
control 
Rep’s 
control 
Co-GM’s 
control 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Composite z-index  1.775** 1.744** 1.690** 2.354** 2.290** 2.303** 
 (0.770) (0.785) (0.810) (0.981) (0.979) (1.024) 
Aristocrat -0.0783 -0.153 0.113 0.109 0.126 0.118 
 (0.376) (0.407) (0.440) (0.464) (0.467) (0.481) 
Proxy Slave -0.147 -0.178 -0.0404 -0.0512 0.00210 0.0235 
 (0.294) (0.294) (0.381) (0.383) (0.396) (0.415) 
Status index control    1.255* 1.300* 1.265* 
(self-perceived index)    (0.673) (0.674) (0.696) 
 
Representative’s status 
      
Representative’s z-index  0.711 0.525 0.430 0.444 0.339 
  (0.827) (0.865) (0.889) (0.910) (0.916) 
Aristocrat  0.236 0.534 0.445 0.658 0.481 
  (0.485) (0.504) (0.530) (0.569) (0.580) 
Proxy slave  -0.445 -0.527 -0.599* -0.642* -0.637 
  (0.330) (0.363) (0.358) (0.384) (0.399) 
IOS score to rep  -0.0447 -0.0683 -0.0560 -0.0685 -0.0738 
  (0.0691) (0.0668) (0.0655) (0.0657) (0.0781) 
Constant 3.731*** 3.667*** 4.209*** 3.550*** 3.185*** 3.422** 
 (0.400) (0.586) (0.857) (1.028) (1.156) (1.526) 
Group member’s control No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Representative’s control No  No No No  Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 215 215 215 213 212 
R-squared 0.025 0.043 0.104 0.134 0.141 0.148 
Notes: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level.  
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Notes: Linear regression. Dependent variable is the number of tokens allocated as contribution 
by each group member to the Group Project. The table reports coefficient with clustered standard 
errors on session in parentheses.  Variables derived from indices take any value for 0 to 1. 
Composite group status index of representative in the same group takes a value from 0 to 1. 
Perceived closeness to representative takes a value from 1 to 7. Perceived closeness to co-group 
member takes a value from 1 to 7 and directed to the co-group member in a group of three. The 
aristocrat variable takes a value of 1 if the group member reports that she/he a member of 
aristocrat family at the end of the experiment, and 0 otherwise. Former slave strata take the value 
of 1 if the group member is inferred to belong formerly in the slave strata, and 0 otherwise. The 
control variables, i) village council takes a value of 1 if the group member reported that she/he 
belong to their village’s committee council, and 0 otherwise; ii) gender takes a value of 1 if the 
group member is a male, and 0 if a  female, iii) migrant takes a value of 1 if the group member 
reported that she/he is a migrant to the village, and 0 otherwise, and iv) is age in years is a 
discrete variable. *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant 
at 10 percent level.  
 
In the basic Model (1), a group member with the lowest composite status contributes 
4 tokens to the public good. This result is consistent in all estimation for Models (1) 
to (6), i.e. without incorporating social status and other controls, an average group 
member contributed around 4 tokens to the public good.  
Group members’ status or z-index constructed from the elicited social status ranking 
before the public good game is found to be the strongest variable in increasing group 
members’ contribution to the GP. This relates to Hypothesis 3 that predicts group 
members with high social status and privileged positions are more willing to 
contribute to the GP.  Consistent with the results from the non-parametric statistics 
in Table 2.13, contribution to GP is a function of social status conferred by villagers 
in the session, implicitly. However, kinds of traditional status that are clearly visible 
to everyone do not affect group members’ contributions. Our estimation of the most 
comprehensive model, Model (6) implies that after controlling for other social status 
characteristics and socio-economic variables, a group member who has been regarded 
by co-villagers to have z-index of 1 in status dimension would contributed 2.3 more 
tokens than group members perceived by everyone to have the lowest possible status 
in the community. Concurrently, when group members’ status is controlled for self-
perception of status on the ladder, group members that have self -enhanced their 
position on the ladder in relation to where other 8 villagers have placed them are 
found to contribute more tokens to the PG. Self -enhancement is indicated by the 
positive sign in the self-perceived index estimation for results in Models (4) to (6). In 
an extreme case of self-enhancement of status, a group member would have 
contributed 1.3 more tokens than an average group member if she/he have placed 
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her/himself at top of the ladder while every co-villager place her/him at the bottom 
of the ladder. Hence the decision to trust the representative could also be explained 
by how a group member sees her/himself in the ranking and this translated to more 
contribution as a way for them to self-signal their perceived position in the village.  
Result 5: Group members’ social status as conferred by other villagers has a positive 
relationship with their contributions to the Group Project. A group member with high 
conferred status contributes more than a group member with lower status. Group 
members that self-perceived themselves to be high status when they are not, 
contributed more than group members that accurately perceived their position or did 
not self-enhance their position in the village. 
Consistent with the results in the non-parametric test, variables that are relevant to 
Hypotheses 4, 6, and 7 in the regression analysis do not produce statistically 
significant results and are unable to explain group members’ contribution behaviour. 
The only status of representative that matters is their belonging to the former slave 
strata. However, this variable is only statistically significant under Models (4) and 
(5). On the other hand, this variable is not statistiscally significant in the non-
parametric test. Social relationship closeness towards the representative, and social 
relationship closeness towards the co-group member are unable to explain 
contribution decisions. None of the control variables in Models (4) to (6) reported 
statistically significant results.  
Result 6: The representative’s social status as a former slave might have negatively 
influenced group members’ contributions but other social status markers of 
representatives   and relationship closeness with group members do not explain 
group members’ contribution to the Group Project.   
Additional regressions that use the directly elicited dimension-specific social status 
from the session can be found in Tables 2.8A to 2.12A of the Appendix. 
2.5.4 Complementarity of representative and group members in public good 
game 
To interpret this section, we used the expected value of the multiplier attached to 
representative’s effort, as a representative’s actual  task in the implemented game is 
to influence the  probability that the high-valued multiplier will occur Each token in 
the GIA increases the expected value of the multiplier by 0.143. As such, full effort 
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would result in certainty that the group will enjoy the multiplier valued at 2.5 while 
zero effort yields a multiplier value of 1.25.  
Provision of the public good is socially optimal when; i) total tokens contributed by 
the two group members is 14, and ii) the representative exerted full effort to improve 
the probability of high value multiplier by allocating 7 blue tokens to the Group 
Investment Account. According to Figure 2.1 in Section 2.2, a representative would 
benefit from allocating effort to GIA if her/his decision corresponded to average 
contribution in Regions III and IV. If a representative plays her/his part by 
maximising effort, i.e. allocating 7 tokens to the GIA, the representative will receive 
benefit from public good when the average contribution is more than 70% of average 
endowment or 4.9 tokens. If the representative exerted effort and the average 
contribution to GP is less than 4.9 tokens, representative’s payoff from interacting 
with the game is less than the zero effort and zero contribution Nash-equilibrium 
benchmark.  On the other hand, the Nash-equilibrium of strategy of both 
representative and group members is to place no token to the public good.  
Figure 2.4. Group members’ collective contributions (tokens) 
 
Figure 2.4 shows that in every group at least one group member is willing to 
cooperate and trust their representative. Groups members in 7 groups contribute all 
their endowment to the public good. Total contributions by group members ranged 
from 4 to 14 tokens with a mean of 9.19 tokens.  However, only 2 out of 108 groups 
socially maximised the public good.    
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Figure 2.5. Combinations of effort and contributions for each group 
 
Figure 2.5 plots the combinations of effort and contributions made by representative 
and group members collectively. The layout of Figure 2.5 is the same as that of Figure 
2.1 above, except that contributions and effort are measured in units of tokens. Recall 
the game, both group members made contribution to the GP and the total contribution 
is then communicated to the representative. A representative performed her/his 
function by increasing the multiplier or benefit from group members’ contribution by 
allocating 2 tokens to the GIA, as long as any group member has placed a positive 
contribution to the GP. Assuming that group members have contributed, effort that is 
below 2 tokens indicates rent-seeking by the representative. This is represented by 
Region IV in the Figure 2.5. 
No group made any decision that ended up in Region I. Groups that ended in Region 
II have a prosocial representative as she/he is willing to utilise more tokens as effort 
than the average contribution to increase the probability of a higher multiplier. These 
representatives knowingly accept disadvantageous inequality by sacrificing personal 
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payoff to improve group members’ payoff. In Region II, the representative’s personal 
payoff is lower than the Nash-equilibrium benchmark. 32.4% or 35 representatives 
have knowingly accepted lower personal payoff to increase group members’ payoff.  
Decisions by a majority of groups are in Region III, i.e. the representative and the 
group members both benefit from interaction by receiving payoffs that are higher 
than the Nash-equilibrium benchmark. 63.9% or 70 representatives are willing to 
exert effort to complement group members’ contributions. In Region III, 8 groups 
engaged in pure reciprocation as effort is equal to average contribution. There are 
representatives in Region III that accepted lower payoff than the average group 
member, as well as representatives that received more payoff that the average group 
member. In the area between the solid black line and the 45-degree line, everyone in 
the group benefits from the public good but the payoff is lower for the representative. 
Representatives here also willingly accept disadvantageous inequality but unlike the 
representatives in Region II, their effort produces benefit for them, not a cost to them. 
32 or 29.6% representatives benefited from her/his effort, but their payoff is lower 
than the average group member. On the other hand, there are 30 or 27.8% 
representatives that benefited from public good and received a bigger share of benefit 
than the average group member. Their decisions can be found in Region III’s area 
between the 45-degree line and the grey horizontal line. Rather than rent-seeking, 
these representative still perform their role while profiteering on group members’ 
contributions.  
Because a majority of representatives accept disadvantageous inequality, the average 
earning of representatives was MYR15.16 while the average earning of groups 
members was 16.91.  A non-parametric test found that this difference is significant 
(M-W test: z = 2.431, p = 0.015). Hence, being assigned as a representative made 
villagers willing to accept disadvantageous inequality on behalf of the group.  
Overall, effort from 64 or 59.3% of representatives resulted in MH being 
implemented, while remaining 44 PGG multiplier were ML. 
Result 7: In most groups, contribution and effort levels were such that the 
representative and the group members benefited from the provision of the public 
good. A majority of representatives knowingly and willingly accepted lower 
individual payoff compared to the average group member.  
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Effective leadership by the representative is crucial for a successful collective action. 
Here, we have introduced the concept of representative leadership using a variant of 
the standard public good game framework. As the role of representative in the real 
world is often occupied by individuals who possess higher status or better skills than 
the rest of the group, we incorporate social status and relationship closeness in our 
investigation of representative leadership. We implemented a novel experimental 
design among Kayan villagers in rural Sarawak using face-to-face elicitation tasks to 
elicit social features internalised by these villagers in their daily interactions. The 
elicitation exercise allowed the identification of villagers’ social status position and 
their relationship closeness with each other. We found some evidence that the 
traditional strata mapped on to the social status data elicited. However, no link could 
be established between strength of social relationship and traditional strata.  Villagers 
were assigned in a group of 3 in a non-anonymous experiment after the elicitation 
exercise. The experimental design and villagers’ responses to social status and social 
relationship questions, and individual’s decisions were not revealed to them. Our 
primary aim was to examine whether social status plays a role in the effectiveness of 
representative leadership. Social status could affect villagers through two main 
channels, i) the norm of noblesse obligee that originates from high-status to low-status 
villagers, and ii) the norm of deference from the low-status to high-status villagers.  
In general, these Kayan villagers exhibited high level of mutual trust with each other. 
Most group members exhibited high level of trust to their representative to complement 
their contribution and their respective representatives did return her/his group’s trust 
by exerting effort to increase the probability of high value multiplier to occur.  
The general finding of this chapter is that those who were assigned randomly as their 
group’s representative behaved prosocially and exerted effort to complement 
contributions from the group members. The complementarity between representative 
and group members did not happen through the channel of direct reciprocation, i.e. 
effort level being conditional to contribution level, but it came from the 
representative’s willingness to play her/his part to improve the social outcome. This 
resulted in a substantial share of representatives accepting disadvantageous inequality 
by willingly accepting lower individual payoffs relative to the rest of the group.  These 
results are consistent with findings from experiments that have examined other modes 
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of representation and have found that individuals do not behave in a self-interested 
manner when they are making decisions on behalf of other group members (Hauge & 
Roberg, 2015; Song et al., 2004; Charness & Jackson, 2009).  
With respect to social status, the primary finding is that representatives’ decisions have 
positive relationships with their social status in relation to the status of the group 
members. The norm of noblesse oblige is found among these representatives and have 
influenced their decision-making. Representatives who are perceived by fellow-
villagers as having high status, and those belonging to aristocrat strata, tend to exert 
higher levels of effort compared to representatives with lower status. We found weak 
evidence that representatives matched with higher status group members reduced their 
effort level. It can be interpreted that noblesse oblige produces the intended effect; high 
status representatives being compelled to maximize the PG’s potential while low status 
representatives don’t feel this responsibility. 
A unique feature of the PGG introduced above is that effort by the representative has 
a positive effect on the amount of the public good produced only if there are 
contributions from the group members. A substantial share of group members 
contributed to the public good and these contributions are positively correlated with 
the how the group member perceived their status and how they perceived their social 
status position. Noting that only 4 out of 216 group members contributed nothing to 
the public good, we acknowledge that conducting this experiment in a face-to-face 
setting might have reduced the tendency of villagers to fully free ride as a group 
member. However, we feel the face-to-face design strengthens our results, as villagers 
in small-scale settings have more incentive to maintain their reputation as non-free 
riders in their community, particularly those that perceive themselves to be high status. 
Even among group members, the norm of noblesse oblige obligated those with high 
status, as determined by their own perceptions or by those of other villages, to 
contribute at a higher level than an average group member.   
Previous works on leadership typically provide followers with a prior signal on how to 
act as an efficient group. This work suggests that ordinary group members have the 
incentive and motivation to initiate a collective action by trusting their representative 
leader to reciprocate their actions by increasing the group-level benefit. This work also 
teases out an important political economy context relevant to developing countries, 
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whereby individuals who are deemed to be high status in their community are the ones 
able to contribute to high valued public good provision, regardless of their roles as a 
group member or as a representative.  
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Appendix A: Robustness checks and further testing 
 
Table 2.1A. Breakdown on control questions comprehension by subjects 
(percentage of total subjects) 
 Number of trials on Question 2  
Number of 
trials on 
Question 
1 
1 2 3 4 5 Total 
1 226 33 18 3 2 282 
2 10 6 1 3 0 20 
3 5 0 2 0 0 7 
4 1 0 0 3 2 6 
5 1 0 0 0 4 5 
Total 243 39 21 9 8 320 
Observations from 4 subjects are missing.  If a  subject failed to correctly answer a control question in 
five tries, the research assistant assigned to them will explain the entire game. Research assistance 
only provided guidance in solving the control questions when subjects are wrong in the first place. A 
few mistakes in the first trial could be attributed to the small print on the materials used as reference. 
 
Table 2.2A. Wilcoxon signed rank test on self-perceived status dimension 
Dimensions Signed ranks test 
Success = Wealth 7.332*** 
Success = Education 1.854* 
Success = Fitness -3.102*** 
Success = Extraversion -6.017*** 
Wealth = Education -4.000*** 
Wealth = Fitness -7.480*** 
Wealth = Extraversion -10.104*** 
Education = Fitness -4.4925*** 
Education = Extraversion -7.990*** 
Fitness = Extraversion -4.274*** 
Correlations * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Interpretation for Table 2.2A: Positive test values indicate that the self-perceived status 
dimension on the left are ranked higher than the self-perceived status dimension on the right. 
Negative test values indicate the self-perceived status dimension on the left is ranked lower 
than the self-perceived status dimension on the right. For example, success = wealth yields 
a value of 7.332, meaning that in general villagers tend to perceive their own success at 
higher rank than their own wealth. Similarly, in education = extraversion that yields a value 
of -7.990 indicates that in general villagers tend to perceive their own education at lower 
rank than their extraversion rank.  
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Figure 2.1A. Success dimension dispersion: Self-rank vs, group rank 
 
Correlation: 0.35***, z = -2.369** 
Interpretation of Figure 2.1A: The fitted line indicates that there is low positive correlation 
between self-perceived rank in success dimension with the success status assigned by the 8 
villagers in a session. The scatter points at the bottom of the graph indicate that there are 
villagers the perceived themselves as the least successful villager among the 9 villagers, but 
the other 8 villagers place this villager at higher status ranking. The scatter points at the top 
of the graph shows the villagers that perceived themselves as the most successful villagers 
among the 9 villagers.  
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Figure 2.2A. Wealth dimension dispersion: Self-rank vs. group rank 
 
Correlation: 0.41*** z= -9.52*** 
Interpretation of Figure 2.2A: The fitted line indicates that there is low positive correlation 
between self-perceived rank in wealth with the wealth status assigned by the 8 villagers in a 
session. The scatter points at the bottom of the graph indicate that there are villagers the 
perceived themselves as the least wealthy villager among the 9 villagers, but the other 8 
villagers place this villager at higher status ranking. The scatter points at the top of the graph 
shows the villagers that perceived themselves as the wealthiest villagers among the 9 
villagers. The scatter points tend to populate the bottom half of the fitted line indicating that 
villagers are more likely to self-efface the status of their wealth.  
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Figure 2.3A. Education dimension dispersion: Self-rank vs. group rank 
 
Correlation: 0.51*** z = -5.70*** 
Interpretation of Figure 2.3A: The fitted line indicates that there is moderately positive 
correlation between self-perceived rank in education with the education status assigned by 
the 8 villagers in a session. The scatter points at the bottom of the graph indicate that there 
are villagers the perceived themselves as the least educated villager among the 9 villagers, 
but the other 8 villagers place this villager at higher status ranking. The scatter points at the 
top of the graph shows the villagers that perceived themselves as the most educated villagers 
among the 9 villagers.  
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Figure 2.4A. Physical fitness dimension dispersion: Self-rank vs. group rank 
 
Correlation: 0.44*** z= 0.941 
Interpretation of Figure 2.4A: The fitted line indicates that there is low positive correlation 
between self-perceived rank in physical fitness with the physical fitness status assigned by 
the 8 villagers in a session. The scatter points at the bottom of the graph indicate that there 
are villagers the perceived themselves as the least physically fit villager among the 9 
villagers, but the other 8 villagers place this villager at higher status ranking. The scatter 
points at the top of the graph shows the villagers that perceived themselves as the most 
physically villagers among the 9 villagers.  
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Figure 2.5A. Extraversion dimension dispersion: Self-rank vs. group rank 
 
Correlation: 0.13**; z = 6.2*** 
Interpretation of Figure 2.5A: The fitted line indicates that there is very low positive 
correlation between self-perceived rank in extraversion with the extraversion status assigned 
by the 8 villagers in a session. The scatter points at the bottom of the graph indicate that there 
are villagers the perceived themselves as the least extravert villager among the 9 villagers, 
but the other 8 villagers place this villager at higher status ranking. The scatter points at the 
top of the graph shows the villagers that perceived themselves as the most extravert villagers 
among the 9 villagers.  
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Table 2.3A. Robustness check for success dimension (representative) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No controls GM’s status Village level 
effect 
Rep’s 
control 
GM’s control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Success z-index 0.983 1.086 1.512** 1.777** 1.720** 
 (0.639) (0.708) (0.727) (0.867) (0.843) 
Aristocrat 1.032** 1.121** 0.885 0.876 0.624 
 (0.496) (0.505) (0.662) (0.693) (0.689) 
Proxy slave  0.337 0.372 0.201 0.193 0.254 
 (0.350) (0.374) (0.400) (0.435) (0.486) 
Total tokens from group members 0.0691 0.0603 0.0552 0.0683 0.0771 
 (0.0610) (0.0644) (0.0670) (0.0697) (0.0745) 
Status index control (self-perceived index) 
 
Group members’ status 
   -0.118 
(0.425) 
0.261 
(0.486) 
 
Group members’ z -index  1.035 0.929 0.559 0.541 
  (1.030) (0.958) (1.051) (1.142) 
Aristocrat  -0.322 -0.897* -0.875 -1.038* 
  (0.403) (0.536) (0.557) (0.583) 
Proxy slave  0.0760 -0.226 -0.153 0.00424 
  (0.408) (0.597) (0.636) (0.659) 
Dispersion in IOS score  -0.0440 -0.0907 -0.0421 -0.0987 
  (0.115) (0.121) (0.132) (0.142) 
      
Constant 4.041*** 3.650*** 4.106*** 4.938*** 4.992*** 
 (0.711) (0.901) (1.040) (1.160) (1.501) 
Representative’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Group members’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 108 108 107 103 
R-squared 0.070 0.087 0.302 0.319 0.372 
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Table 2.4A. Robustness check for wealth dimension (representative) 
 No controls GM’s 
status 
Village 
level effect 
Rep’s 
control 
GM’s 
control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Wealth z-index 0.367 0.650 1.119 1.497* 1.508* 
 (0.611) (0.642) (0.680) (0.854) (0.906) 
Aristocrat 1.094** 1.268** 1.020 0.990 0.693 
 (0.521) (0.535) (0.737) (0.765) (0.773) 
Proxy slave  0.400 0.425 0.202 0.172 0.221 
 (0.357) (0.368) (0.393) (0.434) (0.479) 
Total tokens from group members 0.0709 0.0620 0.0543 0.0752 0.0759 
 (0.0608) (0.0616) (0.0644) (0.0661) (0.0703) 
Status index control 
(self-perceived index) 
 
Group members’ status 
   0.512 
(0.514) 
0.193 
(0.593) 
 
Group members’ z -index  1.540 1.446 1.171 1.244 
  (0.992) (0.958) (0.960) (1.211) 
Aristocrat  -0.303 -0.896 -0.875 -0.984 
  (0.406) (0.579) (0.608) (0.619) 
Proxy slave  0.0565 -0.312 -0.285 -0.108 
  (0.420) (0.628) (0.669) (0.710) 
Dispersion in IOS score  -0.0235 -0.0628 -0.0191 -0.0691 
  (0.116) (0.121) (0.131) (0.143) 
      
Constant 4.319*** 3.520*** 3.887*** 4.586*** 4.782*** 
 (0.699) (1.016) (1.135) (1.224) (1.585) 
Representative’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Group members’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 108 108 107 103 
R-squared 0.070 0.087 0.302 0.319 0.372 
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Table 2.5A. Robustness check for education dimension (representative) 
 No controls GM’s 
status 
Village 
level effect 
Rep’s 
control 
GM’s 
control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Education z-index 0.757 0.905 1.291* 1.753** 1.347 
 (0.664) (0.667) (0.704) (0.787) (0.857) 
Aristocrat 1.010* 0.990* 0.709 0.651 0.228 
 (0.517) (0.516) (0.714) (0.802) (0.763) 
Proxy slave  0.531 0.557 0.478 0.287 0.240 
 (0.361) (0.382) (0.430) (0.450) (0.501) 
Total tokens from group members 0.0729 0.0639 0.0611 0.0789 0.0605 
 (0.0601) (0.0675) (0.0713) (0.0738) (0.0785) 
Status index control 
(self-perceived index) 
 
Group members’ status 
   0.675 
(0.679) 
0.0710 
(0.748) 
 
Group members’ z -index  0.624 0.820 0.690 1.923* 
  (0.849) (0.839) (0.896) (1.079) 
Aristocrat  -0.274 -0.851 -0.884 -1.104* 
  (0.409) (0.570) (0.601) (0.616) 
Proxy slave  -0.0548 -0.522 -0.374 -0.437 
  (0.413) (0.620) (0.690) (0.674) 
Dispersion in IOS score  -0.00494 -0.0336 0.00927 -0.0736 
  (0.116) (0.117) (0.133) (0.138) 
      
Constant 4.124*** 3.897*** 4.092*** 3.440** 2.735 
 (0.743) (0.877) (1.018) (1.364) (2.013) 
Representative’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Group members’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 108 108 107 103 
R-squared 0.061 0.069 0.286 0.309 0.363 
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Table 2.6A. Robustness check for physical fitness dimension (representative) 
 No controls GM’s 
status 
Village 
level effect 
Rep’s 
control 
GM’s 
control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Physical z-index 0.623 0.614 0.678 0.788 1.091 
 (0.745) (0.782) (0.813) (0.852) (0.954) 
Aristocrat 1.147** 1.163** 1.009 1.041 0.816 
 (0.507) (0.508) (0.732) (0.786) (0.816) 
Proxy slave  0.552 0.569 0.457 0.278 0.401 
 (0.395) (0.407) (0.452) (0.443) (0.501) 
Total tokens from group members 0.0670 0.0663 0.0683 0.0813 0.0730 
 (0.0579) (0.0625) (0.0686) (0.0726) (0.0755) 
Status index control 
(self-perceived index) 
 
Group members’ status 
   0.0759 
(0.498) 
0.0371 
(0.565) 
 
Group members’ z -index  -0.147 -0.568 -0.805 -0.0715 
  (1.112) (1.057) (1.129) (1.248) 
Aristocrat  -0.181 -0.677 -0.664 -0.788 
  (0.411) (0.552) (0.595) (0.639) 
Proxy slave  -0.0588 -0.492 -0.345 -0.245 
  (0.408) (0.616) (0.665) (0.682) 
Dispersion in IOS score  0.0170 0.00141 0.0544 0.00679 
  (0.119) (0.121) (0.133) (0.145) 
      
Constant 4.219*** 4.333*** 4.930*** 5.042*** 4.597** 
 (0.775) (1.022) (1.161) (1.384) (1.869) 
Representative’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Group members’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 108 108 107 103 
R-squared 0.055 0.058 0.263 0.284 0.328 
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Table 2.7A. Robustness check for outgoingness dimension (representative) 
 No controls GM’s 
status 
Village 
level effect 
Rep’s 
control 
GM’s 
control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Outgoing z-index 0.377 0.609 0.723 0.128 0.105 
 (0.785) (0.828) (0.819) (0.896) (0.909) 
Aristocrat 1.134** 1.127* 0.981 0.903 0.522 
 (0.520) (0.577) (0.781) (0.799) (0.797) 
Proxy slave  0.459 0.450 0.269 0.318 0.351 
 (0.350) (0.366) (0.362) (0.417) (0.458) 
Total tokens from group members 0.0731 0.0730 0.0645 0.0696 0.0790 
 (0.0608) (0.0626) (0.0662) (0.0689) (0.0736) 
Status index control 
(self-perceived index) 
 
Group members’ status 
   0.824 
(0.532) 
0.931* 
(0.521) 
 
Group members’ z -index  2.053 2.423 1.585 1.680 
  (1.653) (1.488) (1.566) (1.771) 
Aristocrat  -0.215 -0.751 -0.825 -0.963 
  (0.422) (0.598) (0.618) (0.650) 
Proxy slave  -0.0638 -0.642 -0.491 -0.365 
  (0.385) (0.564) (0.569) (0.567) 
Dispersion in IOS score  -0.00835 -0.0334 0.0210 -0.0301 
  (0.119) (0.122) (0.133) (0.140) 
      
Constant 4.296*** 3.260** 3.417** 4.709*** 4.406** 
 (0.782) (1.312) (1.440) (1.479) (2.017) 
Representative’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Group members’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 108 108 107 103 
R-squared 0.051 0.073 0.280 0.314 0.361 
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Table 2.8A. Robustness check for success dimension (group members) 
 No controls Rep’s 
status 
Village 
level effect 
GM’s 
control 
Rep’s 
control 
Co-GM’s 
control 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Success z-index  1.222** 1.126** 0.946* 1.474** 1.518** 1.553** 
 (0.529) (0.549) (0.560) (0.612) (0.620) (0.677) 
Aristocrat -0.0713 -0.116 0.143 0.123 0.151 0.152 
 (0.373) (0.402) (0.437) (0.457) (0.460) (0.473) 
Proxy Slave -0.114 -0.159 0.00829 -0.0140 0.0309 0.0744 
 (0.290) (0.293) (0.389) (0.379) (0.389) (0.403) 
Status index control    0.875* 0.899** 0.894** 
(self-perceived index)    (0.444) (0.438) (0.443) 
 
Representative’s status 
      
Representative’s z-index  0.113 0.248 0.253 0.123 0.0935 
  (0.575) (0.557) (0.542) (0.585) (0.586) 
Aristocrat  0.297 0.565 0.500 0.731 0.527 
  (0.486) (0.515) (0.534) (0.576) (0.614) 
Proxy slave  -0.428 -0.533 -0.522 -0.565 -0.566 
  (0.357) (0.385) (0.365) (0.357) (0.377) 
IOS score to rep  -0.0429 -0.0702 -0.0710 -0.0894 -0.105 
  (0.0675) (0.0643) (0.0644) (0.0641) (0.0710) 
Constant 4.010*** 4.253*** 4.763*** 4.122*** 3.556*** 3.902*** 
 (0.293) (0.465) (0.722) (0.949) (1.074) (1.483) 
Group member’s control No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Representative’s control No  No No No  Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 215 215 213 211 210 
R-squared 0.025 0.037 0.097 0.137 0.149 0.161 
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Table 2.9A. Robustness check for wealth dimension (group members) 
 No controls Rep’s 
status 
Village 
level effect 
GM’s 
control 
Rep’s 
control 
Co-GM’s 
control 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Wealth z-index  0.543 0.490 0.358 1.013 1.035 0.972 
 (0.527) (0.546) (0.563) (0.644) (0.644) (0.667) 
Aristocrat -0.0316 -0.104 0.177 0.122 0.135 0.143 
 (0.375) (0.408) (0.434) (0.453) (0.454) (0.470) 
Proxy Slave -0.119 -0.138 0.0259 -0.0120 0.0301 0.0719 
 (0.290) (0.290) (0.374) (0.352) (0.364) (0.379) 
Status index control    0.829* 0.902* 0.916* 
(self-perceived index)    (0.458) (0.474) (0.490) 
 
Representative’s status 
      
Representative’s z-index  0.479 0.592 0.511 0.488 0.438 
  (0.486) (0.479) (0.487) (0.577) (0.597) 
Aristocrat  0.269 0.578 0.506 0.759 0.585 
  (0.482) (0.483) (0.492) (0.526) (0.550) 
Proxy slave  -0.533 -0.647* -0.639* -0.655* -0.641 
  (0.352) (0.388) (0.382) (0.383) (0.394) 
IOS score to rep  -0.0434 -0.0706 -0.0529 -0.0666 -0.0666 
  (0.0666) (0.0641) (0.0669) (0.0682) (0.0790) 
Constant 4.339*** 4.393*** 4.902*** 4.552*** 4.286*** 4.704*** 
 (0.297) (0.499) (0.783) (0.926) (1.066) (1.462) 
Group member’s control No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Representative’s control No  No No No  Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 215 215 215 213 212 
R-squared 0.006 0.023 0.088 0.119 0.128 0.135 
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Table 2.10A. Robustness check for education dimension (group members) 
 No controls Rep’s 
status 
Village 
level effect 
GM’s 
control 
Rep’s 
control 
Co-GM’s 
control 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Education z-index  0.734* 0.779* 0.772* 1.091 1.049 1.203 
 (0.439) (0.443) (0.462) (0.689) (0.696) (0.739) 
Aristocrat -0.0410 -0.0885 0.197 0.135 0.142 0.109 
 (0.368) (0.393) (0.420) (0.469) (0.470) (0.495) 
Proxy Slave -0.158 -0.215 -0.0653 -0.0886 -0.0323 -0.0136 
 (0.293) (0.291) (0.369) (0.377) (0.392) (0.412) 
Status index control    -0.655 -0.674 -0.775 
(self-perceived index)    (0.447) (0.487) (0.517) 
 
Representative’s status 
      
Representative’s z-index  0.205 -0.130 -0.190 -0.0996 -0.162 
  (0.521) (0.545) (0.559) (0.703) (0.692) 
Aristocrat  0.197 0.534 0.428 0.618 0.400 
  (0.478) (0.509) (0.497) (0.533) (0.543) 
Proxy slave  -0.450 -0.550 -0.602* -0.638 -0.650 
  (0.318) (0.357) (0.361) (0.388) (0.403) 
IOS score to rep  -0.0318 -0.0482 -0.0386 -0.0507 -0.0550 
  (0.0694) (0.0684) (0.0671) (0.0680) (0.0804) 
Constant 4.255*** 4.348*** 4.913*** 4.328*** 3.975*** 4.194*** 
 (0.252) (0.477) (0.704) (0.975) (1.201) (1.543) 
Group member’s control No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Representative’s control No  No No No  Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 215 215 215 213 212 
R-squared 0.013 0.030 0.094 0.113 0.119 0.131 
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Table 2.11A. Robustness check for physical fitness dimension (group members) 
 No controls Rep’s 
status 
Village 
level effect 
GM’s 
control 
Rep’s 
control 
Co-GM’s 
control 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Physical z-index  1.093* 1.294** 1.431** 1.847** 1.753** 1.766** 
 (0.591) (0.590) (0.595) (0.721) (0.733) (0.723) 
Aristocrat 0.0721 0.0557 0.390 0.402 0.397 0.403 
 (0.368) (0.406) (0.436) (0.462) (0.470) (0.479) 
Proxy Slave -0.0993 -0.176 -6.79e-05 0.0148 0.0713 0.0876 
 (0.302) (0.294) (0.370) (0.379) (0.396) (0.409) 
Status index control    0.0298 -0.0407 -0.104 
(self-perceived index)    (0.398) (0.397) (0.415) 
 
Representative’s status 
      
Representative’s z-index  0.896 0.636 0.644 1.023 0.968 
  (0.554) (0.591) (0.615) (0.733) (0.747) 
Aristocrat  0.204 0.500 0.282 0.482 0.275 
  (0.544) (0.535) (0.491) (0.546) (0.584) 
Proxy slave  -0.311 -0.406 -0.425 -0.471 -0.497 
  (0.331) (0.369) (0.364) (0.376) (0.392) 
IOS score to rep  -0.0534 -0.0778 -0.0685 -0.0822 -0.0891 
  (0.0656) (0.0624) (0.0624) (0.0629) (0.0754) 
Constant 4.048*** 3.803*** 4.302*** 3.167*** 2.296* 2.797 
 (0.329) (0.575) (0.829) (1.114) (1.378) (1.687) 
Group member’s control No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Representative’s control No  No No No  Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 215 215 213 211 210 
R-squared 0.017 0.045 0.109 0.133 0.142 0.150 
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Table 2.12A. Robustness check for outgoingness dimension (group members) 
 No controls Rep’s 
status 
Village 
level effect 
GM’s 
control 
Rep’s 
control 
Co-GM’s 
control 
VARIABLES 1 2  4 5 6 
Outgoing z-index  0.919 1.145 1.209 1.343 1.192 1.169 
 (0.725) (0.726) (0.800) (0.910) (0.931) (0.948) 
Aristocrat -0.0284 -0.0949 0.183 0.257 0.296 0.298 
 (0.374) (0.406) (0.431) (0.441) (0.447) (0.462) 
Proxy Slave -0.158 -0.224 -0.109 -0.0193 0.0473 0.0910 
 (0.294) (0.289) (0.385) (0.393) (0.408) (0.420) 
Status index control    0.259 0.270 0.215 
(self-perceived index)    (0.365) (0.383) (0.394) 
 
Representative’s status 
      
Representative’s z-index  0.354 0.208 0.145 0.0306 0.0103 
  (0.617) (0.630) (0.652) (0.686) (0.697) 
Aristocrat  0.260 0.592 0.390 0.583 0.360 
  (0.448) (0.462) (0.471) (0.511) (0.545) 
Proxy slave  -0.476 -0.578 -0.568 -0.604 -0.623 
  (0.324) (0.360) (0.350) (0.376) (0.388) 
IOS score to rep  -0.0587 -0.0844 -0.0672 -0.0790 -0.0937 
  (0.0678) (0.0644) (0.0638) (0.0641) (0.0764) 
Constant 4.181*** 4.238*** 4.700*** 4.384*** 4.035*** 4.379*** 
 (0.382) (0.543) (0.864) (1.009) (1.171) (1.538) 
Group member’s control No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Representative’s control No  No No No  Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 215 215 214 212 211 
R-squared 0.008 0.028 0.093 0.109 0.117 0.129 
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Appendix B: Instructions for the Public Good Game 
B1. English Instructions Script 
This Activity C. You have the chance to increase your earnings in this Activity.  
You will make a decision as a member of a group. You are a member of one of the 
following group of 3 individuals: Circle, Triangle, or Square.    
<Point to the tag and desks> 
The identities of the members of your group are known to you but the information 
about your personal/individual decisions in this activity will be kept private from the 
other members of your group.  
Your turn to decide and your task will be determined by the role assigned to you. Your 
role is one of the following; MEMBER A1, MEMBER A2 or MEMBER B. MEMBER 
A1 and MEMBER A2 will make their decisions first.  MEMBER B will make his/her 
decision after MEMBER A1 and MEMBER A2. 
After I have read the instructions for this activity, you will be told your role. 
Regardless of your turn and role, you will receive an endowment of 7 blue tokens. 
Task of Member A1 and Member A2  
The task for MEMBER A1 and MEMBER A2 is to decide how many tokens each of 
them would like to allocate to a Group Project and how many to keep in an Individual 
Account. Member A1 will have A1 Individual Account; Member A2 will have A2 
Individual Account. Both Member A1 and Member A2 can allocate any number of blue 
tokens from 0 to 7; it can be 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7 to the Group Project. The tokens 
not allocated to the Group Project will be allocated to their respective Individual 
Accounts. 
Only MEMBER A1 or A2 can allocate tokens to the Group Project. 
Members A1 and A2 will make their decisions privately at their Group Desk. Member 
A1 and A2 will place the blue tokens that she/he wants to allocate to the Group Project 
in the box labelled with his/her role on the desk. For example this is a box for Member 
A1. <Session Leader (SL) shows a box labelled A1 to the subjects>Tokens left in 
envelope by Member A1 and Member A2 will be automatically allocated to his/her 
Individual Account.  
The decision of Member A1 will not be revealed to Member A2, or vice versa. 
The decisions of Members A1 and A2 will never be revealed to Member B.   
After both A1 and A2 have placed tokens in their respective boxes, the tokens in the 
two boxes will be added up. The total can be any of the following; 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 or 14.  
Turn to page PG1. 
Any question on the task and role of Member A1 and A2? 
<Pause> 
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Task of Member B  
Member B will make his/her decision after Members A1 and A2 have made their 
decisions.  
Before making a decision, Member B will be informed of the total number of tokens 
allocated to the Group Project by Members A1 and A2. Member B will only be 
informed of the total, and not the individual allocations made by Member A1 or A2.  
Member B’s task is to decide how many tokens she/he would like to allocate to a 
Group Investment Account and how many to keep for her/himself in an Individual 
Account. Member B can allocate any number of tokens from 0 to 7; it can be 0, 1, 2, 
3..., or 7, to the Group Investment Account. The tokens not allocated to the Group 
Investment Account will be allocated to his/her Individual Account.  
Note that the Group Investment Account is different from the Group Project. Only 
Member  B can allocate tokens to the Group Investment Account. 
Member B will make his/her decision privately at his/her Group Desk. Member B will 
place the tokens she/he wants to allocate to the Group Investment Account on top of 
a black bag on the table. <SL shows the black bag to the subjects>.Tokens left in the  
envelope will be automatically allocated to his/her Individual Account.  
Member A1 and MemberA2 will never be informed of Member B’s decision. 
Turn to PG2.  
Any question on the task and role of Member B? 
<Pause> 
Earnings 
You will receive earnings from your Individual Account, AND from the value of tokens 
in the Group Project.  
Earnings from your Individual Account: Regardless of whether you are assigned as 
Member A1, A2 or B, you will receive RM 2.00 for each blue token you allocate to 
your Individual Account.  
Earnings from the Group Project: The value of the Group Project will be divided 
equally among all three members of your group (Members A1, A2 and B). The value 
of the Group Project depends on two things:  
 (i) the total number of blue tokens allocated to the Group Project by Members A1 and 
A2.  
This is determined by the decisions of Members A1 and A2 as explained. 
 (ii) the value of each token in the Group Project, which will be determined by the 
number of tokens allocated to the Group Investment Account by Member B and 
chance.  
Your earnings in this Activity = Earnings from your Individual Account  
    + Earnings from the Group Project 
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Turn to PG3.  
Do you have any question on the earnings for this Activity? 
<Pause> 
Let’s see about how the value of tokens in Group Project will be determined. 
The Group Investment Account bag will contain 10 tokens at all times, regardless of 
the colour of the tokens. In its original state, this bag has 10 white tokens.<SL pause 
for a while an RA counts from 1 to 10 and progressively adding 1 white token to the 
bag until 10 tokens are in the bag.>  For every blue token that is placed on top of this 
bag by Member B, 1 white token will be removed and will be replaced with 1 blue 
token. For instance, if Member B allocated 3 tokens to the Group Investment Account, 
we will add the 3 blue tokens to the bag and remove 3 white tokens from the bag.  
The bag will then contain 3 blue tokens and 7 white tokens. Note that there can be a 
maximum of 7 blue tokens in the bag, i.e., there will always be a minimum of 3 white 
tokens in the bag. 
We will then draw one token at random from the bag.  
If the token drawn is blue, the Group Project is ‘successful’, and each token in the 
Group Project will be worth RM 5.00. The value of the Group Project is then the total 
number of tokens in the Group Project (allocated by Members A1 and A2) multiplied 
by RM 5.00. 
If the token drawn is white, the Group Project is ‘unsuccessful’, and each token in the 
Group Project will be worth RM 2.50. The value of the Group Project is then the total 
number of tokens in the Group Project (allocated by Members A1 and A2) multiplied 
by RM 2.50. 
Note: The minimum chance of ‘success’ is 0% - this occurs when Member B allocates 
0 tokens to the Group Investment Account. The maximum chance of ‘success’ is 70% 
- this occurs when Member B allocates 7 tokens to the Group Investment Account. 
Thus, even if Member B allocates all 7 blue tokens to the Group Investment Account, 
there is still a 30% chance that the Project is ‘unsuccessful’.  
Each member of your group (Members A1, A2 and B) will receive an equal share 
(one-third) of the value of the Group Project. Each member of your group (A1, A2 and 
B) will receive the same earnings from the Group Project, regardless of their individual 
allocation decisions.  
Note that:  
 (a) The greater the number of blue tokens allocated to the Group Project by Members 
A1 and A2, the greater the value of the Group Project, whether or not the Project 
is ‘successful’.  
 (b) The greater the number of blue tokens allocated to the Group Investment Account 
by Member B, the greater the chance that the tokens in the Group Project will be 
worth RM 5.00 each (i.e., the Project is ‘successful’). 
Turn to PG4. 
87 
 
Any question on the determination of earnings from Group Project? 
<Pause> 
We will go through two examples.  
Example 1: Suppose Member A1 allocates 3 blue tokens to the Group Project and 
Member A2 allocates 6 blue tokens to the Group Project. The total number of blue 
tokens in the Group Project is 9. Suppose Member B allocates 4 blue tokens to the 
Group Investment Account. The chance that the Group Project is ‘successful’ is 40%.  
If a blue token is drawn from the bag, the value of the Group Project is RM 5.00 × 9 
= RM 45.00. Each member of your group will receive RM 15.00 from the Group 
Project. If a white token is drawn from the bag, the value of the Group Project is RM 
2.50 × 9 = RM 22.50. Each member of your group will receive RM 7.50 from the Group 
Project. 
In either case, each member also receives RM 2.00 × the number of blue tokens 
allocated to their Individual Accounts.  
Example 2: Suppose Member A1 allocates 0 blue tokens to the Group Project and 
Member A2 allocates 0 blue tokens to the Group Project. The total number of blue 
tokens in the Group Project is 0. In this case, it does not matter how many blue tokens 
Member B allocates to the Group Investment Account. Even if the project is 
successful, the value of the Group Project will be RM 5.00 × 0 tokens = RM 0. In this 
case, each member only receives RM 2.00 × the number of blue tokens allocated to 
their Individual Accounts. 
Turn to PG5 to see few more examples on earnings from Group Project.  
The draw from the Group Investment Account bag will be done after this Activity. We 
will not inform you whether the draw resulted in a blue or white token. You will be paid 
accordingly. 
Are there any questions? 
<Pause> 
Role Assignment 
 
RA1, RA2, and RA3 will approach you with a bag filled with envelopes. Pick an 
envelope from the bag. In each envelope you will find 7 blue tokens as your 
endowment and a card labelled one of the following; A1, A2 or B. This is your role in 
this activity. You will make your decision at your Group Desk when it is your turn. 
<All RAs will approach each subject to pick an envelope from the bag in their hands> 
Open your envelope. Check that you have 7 blue tokens and take out the card. Place 
this card in the card holder. Observe your group members and their roles.  
<RAs will place A4-label that identif ies subjects’ role in front of each subject’s desk.  
SL will record subjects’ role assignment> 
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Subjects’ Decision Stage 
I will call you in turn. When it is your turn, please come to your Group Desk. Come 
along with your envelope and tokens. There will be an RA at your Group Desk. This 
RA will ask you several questions to ensure that you understand the instructions. You 
are provided with the pages from the booklet C so you can refer to it when you are 
answering the questions. Once it is clear that you have understood the instructions, 
the RA will leave you at the desk to make your decision.  Signal to your RA once you 
have competed your task. The RA will ask you several short questions. Then, he/she 
will dismiss you. 
MEMBER A1/A2, please approach the Group desk. 
<RA1, RA2 and RA3 will check for Member A1/A2 comprehension. Leave the subject 
when they make their decisions. Wait for the signal from Member A1/A2.Verbally ask 
the Additional Member A1 & A2 Questions and record their responses. Dismiss 
Member A1/A2 > 
<RA1, RA2, and RA3 will collect Member A1 & A2 box from the Group Desk. RA1, 
RA2 and RA3 will open Member A1 and Member A2 boxes, mentally summed the 
content of the box. RA1, RA2, and RA3 will circle the number on PG6 that correspond 
with summation of allocation from Member A1 and Member A2 > 
Member B, please approach your Group Desk. 
<RA1, RA2, and RA3 will place a black bag on the table and 10 white tokens. RAs 
will check for Member B comprehension on the instructions. RAs will show PG6 with 
a number circled. RAs will set up the bag for investment draw in front of Member B. 
Verbally ask the Additional Member A2 Question and record their responses. Dismiss 
Member B.  > 
-End of Instructions- 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------- 
B2. Malay-language Instructions Script 
Ini Aktiviti C. Anda ada peluang untuk tambah pendapatan anda dengan Activiti ini.  
Anda akan buat satu keputusan sebagai seorang ahli kumpulan. Anda adalah ahli 
kepada salah satu kumpulan yang ada 3 ahli, iaitu Kumpulan Bulat, Segitiga atau 
Segieempat. 
<Point to the tag and desks> 
Anda tahu identity ahli kumpulan anda tetapi maklumat tentang keputusan anda akan 
dirahsiakan dari ahli kumpulan anda. 
Giliran dan tugas anda akan ditentukan dengan peranan yang diberi. Peranan anda 
adalah; AHLI A1, AHLI A2 atau AHLI B. Ahli A1 dan Ahli A2 akan buat keputusan 
mereka dulu. Ahli B akan buat keputusan dia lepas Ahli A1 dan Ahli A2.  
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Lepas saya baca aturan aktiviti ini, peranan anda akan diberitahu.  
Tak kira giliran dan tugas, anda akan terima 7 token biru sebagai anugerah. 
Tugas Ahli A1 dan Ahli A2 
Ahli A1 dan A2 kena putuskan sendirian berapa token mahu diletakkan pada Projek 
Kumpulan dan berapa mahu diletakkan pada Akaun Sendiri. Ahli A1 ada Akaun 
Sendiri A1. Ahli A2 ada Akaun Sendiri A2. Ahli A1 dan Ahli A2 boleh letak seberapa 
banyak token biru dari 0 ke 7; boleh jadi 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, atau 7. Token yang tak di 
letakkan pada Projek Kumpulan akan di letakkan kepada Akaun Sendiri masing-
masing. 
Hanya Ahli A1 dan A2 boleh letak token pada Projek Kumpulan. 
Ahli A1 dan A2 akan buat keputusan dengan rahsia di Meja Kumpulan masing-
masing. Ahli A1 dan A2 akan letak token biru yang di mahu letak pada Projek 
Kumpulan dalam kotak yang dilabel dengan peranan mereka. Contoh, ini kotak Ahli 
A1. SL shows a box labelled A1 to the subjects> Token yang tinggal dalam sampul 
Ahli A1 dan Ahli A2 akan masukkan dalam Akaun Sendiri masing-masing. 
Keputusan Ahli A1 takkan diberitahu kepada Ahli A2, dan sebaliknya. 
Keputusan Ahli A1 dan Ahli A2 takkan diberitahu kepada Ahli B. 
Lepas Ahli A1 dan A2 dah letak token dalam kotak masing-masing, token dalam dua 
kotak ini akan kami tambah. Jumlah hasil tambahan boleh jadi salah satu; 0, 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 or 14. 
Buka muka surat PG1. 
Ada soalan tentang tugas dan peranan Ahli A1 dan A2? 
<Pause> 
Tugas Ahli B 
Ahli B akan buka keputusan dia lepas Ahli A1 dan A2 buat keputusan mereka. 
Sebelum Ahli B buat keputusan, dia akan diberitahu hasil campuran token dalam 
Projek Kumpulan yang Ahli A1 dan A2 dah letak. Hanya hasil campuran akan 
diberitahu, bukan keputusan Ahli A1 dan A2 sorang-sorang. 
Ahli B perlu tentukan berapa token dia mahu letak dalam Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan 
dan berapa dia mahu simpan untuk diri sendiri dalam Akaun Sendiri. Ahli B boleh 
letak seberapa banyak token dari 0 ke 7; boleh jadi 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, atau 7 ke Akaun 
Pelaburan Kumpulan. Token yang lebih akan di letak dalam Akaun Sendiri Ahli B.  
Ambik perhatian yang Akaun Pelaburan Sendiri lain dari Projek Kumpulan. Hanya 
Ahli B boleh letak token dalam Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan.  
Ahli B akan buat keputusan dengan rahsia di Meja Kumpulan masing-masing. Ahli B 
akan letak token yang di mahu letak dalam Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan atas beg 
hitam atas meja. <SL shows the black bag to the subjects>.Token yang tinggal dalam 
sampul akan di letak dalam Akaun Sendiri Ahli B.  
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Keputusan Ahli B tak kan di beritahu kepada Ahli A1 dan A2. 
Buka PG2. 
Ada soalan pasal tugas dan peranan Ahli B? 
<Pause> 
Pendapatan 
Anda akan terima pendapatan dari Akaun Sendiri anda, DAN dari nilai token dalam 
Projek Kumpulan. 
Pendapatan dari Akaun Sendiri anda: Tak kira anda peranan anda Ahli A1, A2 atau 
B, anda terima RM2.00 untuk tiap-tiap token biru yang anda letak dalam Akaun 
Sendiri anda. 
Pendapatan dari Projek Kumpulan: Nilai Projek Kumpulan  akan di pecah sama rata 
untuk semua ahli kumpulan anda (Ahli A1, A2 dan B). Nilai Projek Kumpalan 
bergantung pada 2 benda; 
(i) jumlah token biru dalam Projek Kumpulan yang Ahli A1 dan A2 dah letak 
Ini di tentukan dengan keputusan Ahli A1 dan A2.  
(ii) nilai setiap token dalam Projek Kumpulan, yang akan ditentu oleh nombor token 
yang Ahli B dah letak dalam Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan dan nasib. 
Pendapatan Anda dalam Aktiviti ini = Pendapatan dari Akaun Sendiri anda  
    + Pendapatan dari Projek Kumpulan 
Buka muka PG3. 
Anda ada apa-apa soalan pasal pendaptan dari Aktiviti ini? 
<Pause> 
Mari kita tengok macam mana nilai token dalam Projek Kumpulan akan ditentukan. 
Bag Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan mesti ada 10 token dalam di untuk setiap masa, tak 
kira token tu warna apa. Mula-mula bag ini ada 10 token putih. .<SL pause for a while 
an RA counts from 1 to 10 and progressively adding 1 white token to the bag until 10 
tokens are in the bag.>  Tiap token biru yang Ahli B letak atas bag ini, 1 token putih 
akan di buang dan diganti dengan 1 token biru. Contoh, kalua Ahli B letak 3 token 
biru atas bag Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan, kami akan buang 3 token putih dan ganti 
dengan 3 token biru – bag ini sekarang ada 3 token biru dan 7 token putih. Ambik 
perhatian, token biru paling banyak boleh ada dalam bag ini; 7, pada waktu yang 
sama token putih yang paling sikit boleh ada dalam bag ini; 3.  
Lepas tu kami akan buat cabutan satu token dari bag.  
Kalau token cabutan itu warna biru, Projek Kumpulan berjaya dan tiap-tiap token 
dalam Projek Kumpulan akan bernilai RM5.00. Nilai Projek Kumpulan adalah jumlah 
token dalam Projek Kumpulan yang Ahli A1 dan A2 dah letak kali RM5.00. 
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Kalau token cabutan itu warna putih, Projek Kumpulan tak berjaya, dah t iap-tiap token 
dalam Projek Kumpulan akan bernilai RM2.50. Nilai Projek Kumpulan adalah jumlah 
token dalam Projek Kumpulan yang Ahli A1 dan A2 dah letak kali RM2.50. 
Perhatian: Nasib paling rendah untuk Projek Kumpulan berjaya adalah 0% - ini boleh 
jadi bila Ahli B letak 0 token pada Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan. Nasib paling tinggi 
untuk berjaya adalah 70% - ini boleh jadi  bila Ahli B letak 7 token pada Akaun 
Pelaburan Kumpulan. Jadi, kalua Ahli B letak semua 7 token biru dia pada Akaun 
Pelaburan Kumpula, ada 30% lagi nasib yang Projek Kumpulan tak berjaya. 
Tiap ahli kumpulan (Ahli A1, A2 dan B) akan terima bahagian yang sama rata dari 
nilai Projek Kumpulan. Tiap ahli kumpulan (Ahli A1, A2 dan B) akan terima 
pendapatan yang sama dari Projek Kumpulan, tak kira keputusan yang dia dah buat. 
Perhatian:  
(a) Lagi banyak token biru diletak dalam Projek Kumpulan oleh Ahli A1 dan A2, lagi 
tinggi nilai Projek Kumpulan, tak kira Projek tu ‘berjaya’.  
(b) Lagi banyak token biru di letak dalam Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan oleh Ahli B, 
lagi tinggi nasib untuk tiap token biru Projek Kumpulan bernilai RM5. Ini maksudnya 
Projek Biru berjaya. 
Buka muka PG4  
Ada soalan tentang macam mana pendapatan Projek Kumpulan terjadi? 
<Pause> 
Kita akan lihat 2 contoh. 
Contoh 1: Anggap Ahli A letak 3 token biru pada Projek Kumpulan dan Ahli B letak 6 
token pada Projek Kumpulan. Jumlah token biru dalam Projek Kumpulan, 9. Aggap 
Ahli B letak 4 token biru dalam Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan. Nasib untuk Projek 
Kumpulan berjaya, 40%.  
Kalau dalam cabutan token biru di cabut, nilai Projek Kumpulan adalah RM5.00 X 9 
= RM45.00. Tiap ahli kumpulan akan dapat RM15.00 dari Projek Kumpulan. Kalau 
dalam cabutan, token putih dicabut,  nilai Projek Kumpulan adalah RM2.50 X 9 = 
RM22.50. Tiap ahli kumpulan akan dapat RM7.50 dari Projek Kumpulan.  
Dalam mana-mana keadaan, tiap ahli kumpulan akan juga dapat RM2.00 X token 
yang dia letak dalam Akaun Sendiri masing-masing. 
Contoh 2: Anggap Ahli A1 letak 0 token biru pada Projek Kumpulan dan Ahli A2 letak 
0 token biru pada Projek Kumpulan. Jumlah token biru pada Projek Kumpulan adalah 
0. Dalam contoh ini, token biru Ahli B letak pada Projek Pelaburan Kumpulan tak ada 
makna. Kalau Projek berjaya, nilai Projek adalah RM5.00 X 0 token = RM0. Dalam 
contoh ini, tiap ahli kumpulan akan dapat RM2.00 X token yang dia tinggalkan dalam 
Akaun Sendiri masing-masing.  
Buka muka PG5 untuk tengok contoh pendapatan lain dari Projek Kumpulan. 
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Cabutan dari bag Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan akan dibuat lepas Aktiviti ini. Kami tak 
akan bagi tahu sama ada cabutan jadi token biru atau token putih. Anda akan dibayar 
dengan sewajarnya. 
Ada apa-apa soalan? 
<Pause> 
Pembahagian Peranan 
 
RA1, RA2 dan RA3 sedang pegang satu beg yang ada 3 sampul. Ambil satu sampul 
dari beg tersebut. Dalam tiap sampul, ada 7 token biru sebagai anugerah anda dan 
satu kad yang dilabel dengan salah satu; Ahli A1, Ahli A2 atau Ahli B. Ini peranan 
anda dalam Aktiviti ini. Anda akan buat keputusan di Meja Kumpulan bila tiba giliran 
anda.  
<All RAs will approach each subject to pick an envelope from the bag in their hands> 
Buka sampul anda. ‘Check’ anda ada 7 token biru dan keluarkan kad. Masuk kad ini 
pada tag nama. Tengok ahli kumpulan anda yang lain.  
<RAs will place A4-label that identif ies subjects’ role in front of each subject’s desk.  
SL will record subjects’ role assignment> 
 
Peringkat Keputusan Subjek 
Saya akan panggil anda ikut giliran. Bila tiba giliran anda, sila datang ke Meja 
Kumpulan dengan sampul dan 3 token biru anda. Seorang RA akan berada di meja 
Kumpulan. RA ini akan mengemukan beberapa soalan secara lisan untuk 
memastikan anda faham peraturan aktiviti. Anda akan diberikan muka surat dari 
risalah {C/D} untuk rujukan. Bila ianya jelas yang anda faham peraturan diatas, RA 
akan tinggalkan anda di meja kumpulan untuk membuat keputusan. Beri isyarat pada 
RA bila anda selesai tugas anda.RA akan tanya beberapa soalan. Lepas tu anda 
boleh pulang ke tempat duduk anda. 
Ahli A1/A2, sila datang ke meja kumpulan. 
<RA1, RA2 and RA3 will check for Member A1/A2 comprehension. Leave the subject 
when they make their decisions. Wait for the signal from Member A1/A2.Verbally ask 
the Additional Member A1 & A2 Questions and record their responses. Dismiss 
Member A1/A2 > 
<RA1, RA2, and RA3 will collect Member A1 & A2 box from the Group Desk. RA1, 
RA2 and RA3 will open Member A1 and Member A2 boxes, mentally summed the 
content of the box. RA1, RA2, and RA3 will circle the number on PG6 that correspond 
with summation of allocation from Member A1 and Member A2 > 
Ahli B sila datang ke Meja Kumpulan anda. 
<RA1, RA2, and RA3 will place a black bag on the table and 10 white tokens. RAs 
will check for Member B comprehension on the instructions. RAs will show PG6 with 
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a number circled. RAs will set up the bag for investment draw in front of Member B. 
Verbally ask the Additional Member A2 Question and record their responses. Dismiss 
Member B.  > 
-Peraturan Tamat-  
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Figure 2.6A Page 1 of Subjects’ Reference (English) 
Member A1 and Member A2 Task 
 
Endowment A1       Endowment 
A2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Group Project 
A1 A2 0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
A1 Individual Account A2 Individual Account 
A1 + A2  
PG1 
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Figure 2.7A. Page 1 of Subjects’ Reference (Malay translation) 
 
Tugas Ahli A1 dan Ahli A2 
 
Anugerah A1                       Anugerah A2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  PG1 
Projek Kumpulan 
A1 A2 0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
Akaun Sendiri A1 Akaun Sendiri A2 
A1 + A2  
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Figure 2.8A. Page 2 of Subjects’ Reference (English) 
 
Member B Task 
 
Member B Endowment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B Individual Account Group Investment Account 
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6 
7 PG2 
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Figure 2.9A. Page 2 of Subjects’ Reference (Malay translation) 
Tugas Ahli B 
 
Anugerah Ahli B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PG2 
Akaun Sendiri B Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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Figure 2.10. Page 3 of Subjects’ Reference (English) 
Earnings 
 
A1      A2     B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
1/3 →  A1 
A1 Individual Account A2 Individual Account B Individual Account 
+ + + 
Value Group Project 
A1 A2 
X 1/3 →  A2 
1/3 →  B 
1 token = RM2.00 1 token = RM2.00 1 token = RM2.00 
PG3 
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Figure 2.11A. Page 3 of Subjects’ Reference (Malay translation) 
 
Pendapatan 
A1      A2     B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
PG3 
Akaun Sendiri A1 Akaun Sendiri A2 Akaun Sendiri B 
+ + + 
Nilai Projek Kumpulan 
A1 A2 
X 
1/3 →  A1 
1/3 →  A2 
1/3 →  B 
1 token = RM2.00 1 token = RM2.00 1 token = RM2.00 
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Figure 2.12A. Page 4 of Subjects’ Reference (English) 
 
Group Investment Account 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endowment B 
Examples  or 
1 token = RM5.00 
1 token Draw 
1 token = RM2.50 
Group  
Project 
PG4 
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Figure 2.13A Page 4 of Subjects’ Reference (Malay translation) 
 
Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PG4 
Anugerah B 
Contoh  atau 
1 token = RM5.00 
Cabutan 1 token  
1 token = RM2.50 
Projek 
Kumpulan 
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7 
14 
Figure 2.14A Page 4 of Subjects’ Reference (English) 
Value of Group Project and Earnings -Example 
Token in Group Project  Draw Value of Group Project  Earnings 
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RM 2.50 
 
 
 
 
RM0.83 
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RM 17.50 
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RM 35 
RM 70 
0 
PG5 
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7 
14 
Figure 2.15A Page 5 of Subjects’ Reference (Malay translation) 
Nilai Projek Kumpulan dan Pendapatan - Contoh 
Token Projek 
Kumpulan  
Cabutan Nilai Projek Kumpulan Pendapatan 
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RM 35.00 
 
RM11.67 
 
 
 
RM 17.50 
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RM23.33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RM11.67 
PG5 
RM 35 
RM 70 
0 
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B3: Control questions for representative (English instructions) 
 
Before you make any decision, please answer the following questions to ensure you 
comprehend the rules of this activity; 
• If you allocated 5 blue tokens to the Group Investment Account, this Bag 
would then contain ___ white tokens. 
• If there are 14 blue tokens in the Group Project and your investment is 
unsuccessful, the Group Project is worth _________.  
<When subjects answer both questions above correctly> 
Congratulations, you’ve answered correctly. You will now make your decision now.  
<When subjects answer any one or both questions above incorrectly> 
Sorry, they are wrong. Please indicate to me the part that require more explanation; 
your role, the roles of other group members or how the earnings will be derived. I will 
explain it to you until you understand. Then you will attempt the questions above 
again. 
<RAs will explain to the subjects matters that require attention. RAs will record the 
number of attempts made by each subject in Public Good Control Questions 
Comprehension Observation Form > 
<RA shows PG6 with total number of tokens in the Group Project circled> 
You have seen the sum of tokens allocated to the Group Project. You will make your 
decision now. 
Please make your decision by placing the tokens you wish to allocate to the Group 
Investment Account on top of this bag. Retain the tokens that you wish to allocate in 
Individual Account in the envelope. Leave your envelope on the table.  
Now you will see me adjust the tokens and place them in the bag.  
<RA swaps the same amount of white token(s) with the blue tokens that Member B 
placed on the bag. Make no noise for this task>  
I will ask you a few questions, please point your answer on this piece of paper.  
<RA asks the Additional Member B questions> 
You have completed the task. Please return to your desk. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
B4: Control questions for representative (Malay-language instructions) 
 
Sebelum anda membuat apa-apa keputusan, sila jawab soalan berikut untuk 
pastikan anda faham peraturan aktiviti ini. 
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• Kalau anda letakkan 5 token biru kepada Akaun Pelaburan Kumpulan, Bag 
Kumpulan akan ada____ token putih. 
• Kalau ada 10 token biru dalam Projek Kumpulan dan pelaburan anda tidak 
Berjaya, nilai Projek Kumpulan adalah ______. 
<When subjects answer both questions above correctly> 
Tahniah, jawapan anda betul. Anda boleh membuat keputusan sekarang.  
<When subjects answer any one or both questions above incorrectly> 
Maaf,jawapan salah. Sila beritahu saya bahagian yang anda perlukan penerangan 
lebih; tugas anda, tugas Ahli-ahli lain atau macam mana pendapatan dikira. Saya 
akan terangkan pada anda sampai anda faham. Lepas tu anda akan cuba jawab 
soalan diatas lag.  
<RAs will explain to the subjects matters that require attention. RAs will record the 
number of attempts made by each subject in Public Good Control Questions 
Comprehension Observation Form > 
< RA shows PG6 with total number of tokens in the Group Project circled> 
Anda telah lihat jumlah token biru yang telah diletakkan kepada Projek Kumpulan. 
Anda akan buat keputusan sekarang.  
Sila buat keputusan dengan letakkan token yang anda mahu letakkan pada Akaun 
Pelaburan Kumpulan atas bag ini. Simpan token yang anda mahu letak dalam Akaun 
Individu Anda dalam sampul. Letak sampul ini atas meja. 
Sekarang tengok saya ‘adjust’ token biru dan putih dan letakkan dalam bag.  
<RA swaps the same amount of white token(s) with the blue tokens that Member B 
placed on the bag. Make no noise for this task>  
Saya akan tanya beberapa soalan, sila tunjuk jawapan anda atas kertas ini.  
<RA asks the Additional Member B questions> 
Tugas anda sudah selesai. Sila pulang ke meja anda   
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
B5: Control questions for group members (English instructions) 
Before you make any decision, please answer the following questions to ensure you 
comprehend the rules of this activity. 
• If you decide to allocate 4 blue tokens to the Group Project and your co-
member A2 (A1) allocates 3, Member B will be informed that there are ______ 
blue tokens in the Group Project. 
• If there are 14 blue tokens in the Group Project and Member B’s investment 
is unsuccessful, the Group Project is worth ________ (refer to sheets 
provided) 
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<When subjects answer both questions above correctly> 
Congratulations, you’ve answered correctly. You will now make your decision now.  
<When subjects answer any one or both questions above incorrectly> 
Sorry, they are wrong. Please indicate to me the part that require more explanation; 
your role, the roles of other group members or how the earnings will be derived. I will 
explain it to you until you understand. Then you will attempt the questions above 
again. 
<RAs will explain to the subjects matters that require attention. RAs will record the 
number of attempts made by each subject in Public Good Control Questions 
Comprehension Observation Form > 
Please make your decision by placing the tokens you wish to allocate to the Group 
Project in the box labelled Member A1/A2. Retain the tokens that you wish to allocate 
to your Individual Account in the envelope. Leave your envelope on the table. 
<RAs leave Member A1/A2 to make decision> 
After you have placed the token(s) in the box, signal me. I will ask you a few questions, 
please point your answer on this piece of paper.  
<RAs ask the Additional Member A1 & A2 questions> 
You have completed the task. Please return to your desk. 
 
B6: Control questions for group members (Malay-language instructions) 
Sebelum anda membuat apa-apa keputusan, sila jawab soalan berikut untuk pastikan 
anda faham peraturan aktiviti ini.  
• Kalau anda letak 4 token biru ke dalam Projek Kumpulan dan ahli Kumpulan 
A1/A2 letak 3, kami akan bagi tahu ahli B ada ____token biru dalam Projek 
Kumpulan. 
• Kalau ada 14 token biru dalam Projek Kumpulan dan pelaburan Ahli B tidak 
berjaya, nilai Projek Kumpulan adalah _____ (rujuk risalah) 
<When subjects answer both questions above correctly> 
Tahniah, jawapan anda betul. Anda boleh membuat keputusan sekarang.  
<When subjects answer any one or both questions above incorrectly> 
Maaf,jawapan salah. Sila beritahu saya bahagian yang anda perlukan penerangan 
lebih; tugas anda, tugas Ahli-ahli lain atau macam mana pendapatan dikira. Saya 
akan terangkan pada anda sampai anda faham. Lepas tu anda akan cuba jawab 
soalan diatas lag.  
<RAs will explain to the subjects matters that require attention. RAs will record the 
number of attempts made by each subject in Public Good Control Questions 
Comprehension Observation Form > 
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Sila buat keputusan anda dengan letakkan token yang anda mahu letakkan kepada 
Projek Kumpulan ke dalam kotak berlabel Ahli A1/A2. Simpan token yang anda mahu 
letakkan ke dalam Akaun Sendiri di dalam sampul. Tinggalkan sampul ini di atas 
meja.  
<RAs leave Member A1/A2 to make decision> 
Lepas anda letak token biru dalam kotak, panggil saya. Saya akan tanya beberapa 
soalan, sila tunjuk jawapan anda atas kertas ni.  
<RA will ask the Additional Members A1 a& A2 questions> 
Tugas anda sudah selesai. Sila pulang ke meja anda.  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix C: Instructions for Social Status Elicitation 
C1: English instructions scripts 
 
Activity {A/B} will commence now.  
 
In this activity, you will make decisions by referring to participants’ ID number. To 
protect your anonymity from the researcher’s perspective, your decisions can’t be 
linked to your name, but only to your ID number.  <Introduce ID number to the 
subjects> 
 
On your desk, there is a booklet {A/B}. Check that this booklet has 5 pages.  You will 
find that each page has a picture of a ladder. You are required to mark these pictures 
of ladders with a pencil. 
 
If you have any question regarding the rules of this activity at any time, please raised 
your hands. The RAs will assist you.  
Open the first page. This is page RE1. 
I will explain to you how to mark this picture of a ladder. I will read a statement and 
you will respond to the statement by marking the ladder. There is no correct or wrong 
order of number to be placed on each rung.  
This is the first statement; 
Think of the ladder in front of you as representing where participants 
seated in this room stand in this group. At the top of the ladder is the 
participant with the most outgoing personality in this group. At the 
bottom is the participant with the least outgoing personality in this 
group. All participants in the room should be placed on the ladder. 
Place X on the rung you think you stand on. For each other participants 
put their ID on the rung you think they stand on in terms of how outgoing 
they are.  
Your answer should reflect your opinion and this will never been shared with other 
participants in the room. A rung should have only ONE number. After you are done, 
RA1, RA2 or RA3 will look at your sheet to ensure you understand this task.  
<RA1 will look at sheets from ID1-ID3, RA2 will look at sheets from ID4 – ID6, and 
RA3 will look at sheets from ID7 to ID9. Wait for signals from the RAs to ensure that 
subjects understand the task> 
You have completed the first sheet successfully. Well done. You will fill in the 
subsequent pages in the same manner. I will read a statement and you will mark the 
page based on it. The RAs will not see your answers from this point on.  
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Turn to page RE2. 
Think of the ladder in front of you as representing where participants 
seated in this room stand in this group. At the top of the ladder is the 
participant that is most physically active in this group. At the 
bottom is the participant that is least physically active in this group. 
All participants in the room should be placed on the ladder. Place X on 
the rung you think you stand on. For each other participants put their 
ID on the rung you think they stand on in terms of how physical active 
they are.  
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
Turn to page RE3. 
Think of the ladder in front of you as representing where participants 
seated in this room stand in this group. At the top of the ladder is the  
most-educated participant in this group. At the bottom is the least-
educated participant in this group. All participants in the room should 
be placed on the ladder. Place X on the rung you think you stand on. 
For each other participants put their ID on the rung you think they stand 
on in terms of how well educated they are. 
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
Turn to page RE4. 
Think of the ladder in front of you as representing where participants 
seated in this room stand in this group. At the top of the ladder is the 
participant with the most wealth in this group. At the bottom is the 
participant with the least wealth in this group. All participants in the 
room should be placed on the ladder. Place X on the rung you think 
you stand on. For each other participants put their ID on the rung you 
think they stand on in terms of wealth. 
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
Turn to page RE5. 
Think of the ladder in front of you as representing where participants 
seated in this room stand in this group. At the top of the ladder is the 
participant who is the most successful in this group. At the bottom is 
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the participant who is the least successful in this group. All 
participants in the room should be placed on the ladder. Place X on the 
rung you think you stand on. For each other participants put their ID on 
the rung you think they stand on in terms of success. 
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
We have finished Activity A/B. Please wait for a few minutes while the RAs collect 
Booklet A/B from you.  
<RA1 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID1 –ID3, RA2 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID4-
ID6, RA3 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID7-ID9> 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--- End of Instruction -- 
C2: Malay-language instruction scripts 
Aktiviti {A/B} akan mula sekarang. 
 
Dalam aktiviti ini, anda akan membuat keputusan dengan merujuk kepada ID peserta 
lain. Untuk menjaga maklumat peribadi anda dari pengetahuan penyelidik, keputusan 
anda tak akan di kaitkan dengan nama anda, tapi akan dikaitkan dengan nombor ID 
anda. <Introduce ID number to the subjects> 
  
Di atas meja anda, ada risalah {A/B}. ‘Check’ risalah ini ada 5 muka surat dan anda 
tengok yang setiap muka surat ada gambar satu tangga. Anda perlu menanda 
gambar-gambar tangga dengan pensel.  
Kalau anda ada apa-apa soalan mengenai peraturan aktiviti ini pada bila-bila masa, 
sila angkat tangan. RA akan membantu anda.  
Buka muka surat pertama. Ini adalah muka surat RE1. 
Saya akan terangkan macam mana untuk tanda gambar tangga ini. Saya akan baca 
satu kenyataan (ayat) dan anda akan memberi respons kepada kenyataan (ayat) 
tersebut dan tanda tangga ini. Tak ada jawapan yang betul atau salah untuk meletak 
nombor pada anak tangga.  
Ini adalah kenyataan(ayat) pertama; 
Anggap tangga ini mewakili susun atur 9 peserta di dalam bilik ini. Anak 
tangga teratas adalah peserta yang paling peramah dalam kumpulan 
ini. Anak tangga terbawah adalah peserta yang paling tidak ramah 
dalam kumpulan ini. Semua peserta patut di letakkan pada tangga 
ini. Tanda X untuk anak tangga yang anda gambarkan anda berada. 
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Untuk peserta lain letakkan ID mereka pada anak tangga yang anda 
rasa mereka berada dari segi keramahan.  
Jawapan anda patut tunjukkan pendapat anda dan ianya tidak akan dikongsi dengan 
peserta lain. Setiap anak tangga patut ada SATU nombor. Selepas anda selesai 
dengan tugas ini, RA1, RA2 or RA3 akan tengok muka surat RE1 untuk pastikan anda 
faham tugas ini. 
<RA1 will look at sheets from ID1-ID3, RA2 will look at sheets from ID4 – ID6, and 
RA3 will look at sheets from ID7 to ID9. Wait for signals from the RAs to ensure that 
subjects understand the task> 
Anda telah selesaikan muka surat pertama dengan jayanya. Tahniah. Anda isi muka 
surat seterusnya dengan cara yang sama.Saya akan baca satu kenyataan (ayat) dan 
anda akan tanda muka surat berdasarkan kenyataan. RA tak akan tengok jawapan 
anda lepas ini. 
Buka muka surat RE2.  
Anggap tangga ini mewakili susun atur 9 peserta di dalam bilik ini. Anak 
tangga teratas adalah peserta yang mempunyai kecergasan fizikal 
yang terbaik dalam kumpulan ini. Anak tangga terbawah adalah 
peserta yang mempunyai kecergasan fizikal yang paling tidak baik 
dalam kumpulan ini. Semua peserta patut di letakkan pada tangga 
ini. Tanda X untuk anak tangga yang anda gambarkan anda berada. 
Untuk peserta lain letakkan ID mereka pada anak tangga yang anda 
rasa mereka berada dari segi kecergasan fizikal mereka.  
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
Buka mukasurat RE3. 
Anggap tangga ini mewakili susun atur 9 peserta di dalam bilik ini. Anak 
tangga teratas adalah peserta yang paling terpelajar dalam 
kumpulan ini. Anak tangga terbawah adalah peserta yang paling tak 
terpelajar dalam kumpulan ini. Semua peserta patut di letakkan pada 
tangga ini. Tanda X untuk anak tangga yang anda gambarkan anda 
berada. Untuk peserta lain letakkan ID mereka pada anak tangga yang 
anda rasa mereka berada dari segi pelajaran mereka. 
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
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Buka muka surat RE4. 
Anggap tangga ini mewakili susun atur 9 peserta di dalam bilik ini. Anak 
tangga teratas adalah peserta yang paling kaya dalam kumpulan 
ini. Anak tangga terbawah adalah peserta yang paling tidak kaya 
dalam kumpulan ini. Semua peserta patut di letakkan pada tangga 
ini. Tanda X untuk anak tangga yang anda gambarkan anda berada. 
Untuk peserta lain letakkan ID mereka  
pada anak tangga yang anda rasa mereka berada dari segi kekayaan.  
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
Buka muka surat RE5. 
Anggap tangga ini mewakili susun atur 9 peserta di dalam bilik ini. Anak 
tangga teratas adalah peserta yang paling berjaya dalam kumpulan 
ini. Anak tangga terbawah adalah peserta yang paling tidak berjaya 
dalam kumpulan ini. Semua peserta patut di letakkan pada tangga ini. 
Tanda X untuk anak tangga yang anda gambarkan anda berada. Untuk 
peserta lain letakkan ID mereka pada anak tangga yang anda rasa 
mereka berada dari segi kejayaan.  
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
Kita dah habiskan Aktiviti {A/B}. Sila tunggu beberapa minit untuk RA kutip risalah 
{A/B} dari anda.  
<RA1 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID1 –ID3, RA2 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID4-
ID6, RA3 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID7-ID9> 
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Figure 2.6A Sample of a ladder used for the social status elicitation task
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Appendix D: Instructions for social relationship closeness elicitation 
D1: English instructions script 
Activity A/B will commence now. 
In this activity, you will make decisions by referring to participants’ ID number. To 
protect your anonymity from the researcher’s perspective, your decisions can’t be 
linked to your name, but only to your ID number.  <Introduce ID number to the 
subjects> 
 
On your desk, there is a booklet {A/B}. Check that this booklet has 9 sheets.  You will 
find that 8 pages will have diagrams of double circles and 1 page will be empty. You 
are required to mark on a number on each page with a pencil.  
If you have any question regarding the rules of this activity at any time or feel that you 
are not able to complete this task, please raised your hands. The Ras will assist you.  
Open the first page of Booklet {A/B}. The first page is RC1. Participants with ID2 to 
ID9 will find there are sets of circles. Participant ID1 will find that his/her RC1 page is 
empty. 
As every page corresponds to a person’s ID number, a page on your Booklet {A/B} 
will be empty. Participant with ID 1 will find that the page RC1 in his/her booklet is 
empty. Do not worry as this has been designed for a purpose. When I read the 
statement below, everyone will understand why page RC1 of participant ID1 is empty. 
Participant ID1, just relax for now. Every time that I ask you to turn a page and you 
find that a page is empty, it will mean that you don’t have to do anything.  
 
I will explain to you how to mark this set of circles. I will read a statement and you will 
respond to the statement by marking ‘X’ on a number, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 on each 
sheet. There is no correct number to mark on each sheet. This is based on your 
opinion. 
 
After that you need to indicate your relationship with the participants in this room. 
Mark X on any that you think relevant to describe your relationship with a certain 
participant. A if that participant is your 
aunt/uncle/brother/sister/parent/cousin/grandfather/grandmother or other close 
family member. B if that participant is your block neighbour. C if that participant is 
working with you in the same field/business/office. D if that participant is your close 
friend. E if that participant is a casual friend. F if you know that participant only as a 
resident of this village. You can mark more than 1 answer if it is true. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
This is the statement for page RC1; 
 
In front of you, there are 7 diagrams of circles. Consider which of these 
pairs of circles best describes your relationship with participant ID1. 
Please indicate the extent that you and participant ID1 are connected. 
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Then mark the relationship that you have with participant ID1 in the space 
below. 
 
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
Turn to page RC2.  
In front of you, there are 7 diagrams of circles. Consider which of these 
pairs of circles best describes your relationship with participant ID2. 
Please indicate the extent that you and participant ID2 are connected. 
Then mark the relationship that you have with participant ID2 in the space 
below. 
 
 
 
Turn to page RC3.  
 
In front of you, there are 7 diagrams of circles. Consider which of these 
pairs of circles best describes your relationship with participant ID3. 
Please indicate the extent that you and participant ID3 are connected. 
Then mark the relationship that you have with participant ID3 in the space 
below. 
 
Turn to page RC4. 
In front of you, there are 7 diagrams of circles. Consider which of these 
pairs of circles best describes your relationship with participant ID4. 
Please indicate the extent that you and participant ID4 are connected. 
Then mark the relationship that you have with participant ID4 in the space 
below. 
Turn to page RC5. 
In front of you, there are 7 diagrams of circles. Consider which of these 
pairs of circles best describes your relationship with participant ID5. 
Please indicate the extent that you and participant ID5 are connected. 
Then mark the relationship that you have with participant ID5 in the space 
below. 
 
Turn to page RC6. 
In front of you, there are 7 diagrams of circles. Consider which of these 
pairs of circles best describes your relationship with participant ID6. 
Please indicate the extent that you and participant ID6 are connected. 
Then mark the relationship that you have with participant ID6 in the space 
below. 
 
 
Turn to page RC7. 
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In front of you, there are 7 diagrams of circles. Consider which of these 
pairs of circles best describes your relationship with participant ID7. 
Please indicate the extent that you and participant ID7 are connected. 
Then mark the relationship that you have with participant ID7 in the space 
below. 
 
Turn to page RC8. 
In front of you, there are 7 diagrams of circles. Consider which of these 
pairs of circles best describes your relationship with participant ID8. 
Please indicate the extent that you and participant ID8 are connected. 
Then mark the relationship that you have with participant ID8 in the space 
below. 
 
Turn to page RC9. 
 
In front of you, there are 7 diagrams of circles. Consider which of these 
pairs of circles best describes your relationship with participant ID9. 
Please indicate the extent that you and participant ID9 are connected. 
Then mark the relationship that you have with participant ID9 in the space 
below. 
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
We have finished Activity {A/B}. Please wait for a few minutes while the Ras collect 
Booklet {A/B} from you.  
<RA1 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID1 –ID3, RA2 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID4-
ID6, RA3 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID7-ID9> 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--- End of Instruction – 
D2: Malay-language instructions scripts 
Aktiviti A/B akan bermula sekarang.  
Dalam aktiviti ini, anda akan membuat keputusan dengan merujuk kepada ID peserta 
lain. Untuk menjaga maklumat peribadi anda dari pengetahuan penyelidik, keputusan 
anda tak akan di kaitkan dengan nama anda, tapi akan dikaitkan dengan nombor ID 
anda. <Introduce ID number to the subjects> 
 
Di atas meja anda, ada Risalah {A/B}. Sila semak risalah ini mengandungi 9 muka 
surat. Anda akan lihat yang 8 muka surat ada diagram bulatan dan satu muka surat 
akan kosong. Anda perlu tanda gambar tangga dengan pensel.  
Buka mukasurat pertama Risalah {A/B}. Muka surat pertama adalah RC1. Peserta 
dengan ID2 hingga ID9 akan tengok 7 set bulatan. Peserta ID1 akan mendapati muka 
surat RC1 adalah kosong. 
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Kalau anda ada apa-apa soalan mengenai aturan aktiviti ini atau rasakan anda tidak 
dapat buat aktiviti ini, sila angkat tangan. RA akan tolong anda. 
Kerana setiap muka surat ‘matching’ dengan number ID peserta, satu muka surat 
dalam Risalah {A/B} akan kosong.  Peserta dengan ID 1 akan tengok muka surat 
RC1 dalam risalahnya kosong. Jangan bimbang kerana ini telah diatur. Bila saya 
membaca kenyataan, setiap peserta akan faham kenapa RC1 untuk peserta ID 1 
kosong. Peserta ID 1, boleh ‘relax’ sebentar. Tiap kali saya minta anda membuka 
muka surat baru dan apabila anda mendapat muka surat tersebut kosong, ianya 
bermaksud anda tak payah membuat apa-apa.  
 
Saya akan terangkan kepada anda macam mana untuk tanda set gambar ini. Saya 
akan membaca satu kenyataan dan anda akan respons dengan tanda ‘X’ pada salah 
satu nombor 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 atau 7 pada setiap helaian. Tak da nombor yang betul 
untuk di tanda. Ini ikut pendapat anda. 
 
Lepas tu anda kena tandakan hubungan anda dengan peserta dalam bilik ni. Tanda 
X di mana yang anda rasa hubungan anda dengan peserta ID1. A 117alua peserta 
itu ibubapa/makcik/pakcik/sepupu/atuk/nenek atau mana-mana saudara terdekat. B 
117alua peserta itu jiran blok anda. C 117alua peserta itu bekerja sama-sama dengan 
anda di kebun /’business’/ pejabat yang sama. D 117alua peserta tu kawan rapat 
anda. E 117alua peserta itu kawan biasa anda. F 117alua anda hanya tahu dia orang 
kampong anda. Anda boleh tanda lebih dari satu jawapan 117alua anda rasa jawapan 
anda betul. 
 
Anda apa-apa soalan? 
 
Ini adalah kenyataan untuk muka surat RC1.  
Dihadapan anda ada 7 pasang bulatan. Anggap salah satu pasangan 
bulatan paling sesuai untuk merujuk hubungan anda dengan Peserta ID1. 
Sila tandakan bagaimana anda dan Peserta ID1 berkait. Kemudian 
tandakan jenis perhubungan anda dengan Peserta ID1 di ruang dibawah.  
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
Buka muka surat RC2. 
Dihadapan anda ada 7 pasang bulatan. Anggap salah satu pasangan 
bulatan paling sesuai untuk merujuk hubungan anda dengan Peserta ID2. 
Sila tandakan bagaimana anda dan Peserta ID2 berkait. Kemudian 
tandakan jenis perhubungan anda dengan Peserta ID2 di ruang dibawah..  
Buka muka surat RC3. 
 
Dihadapan anda ada 7 pasang bulatan. Anggap salah satu pasangan 
bulatan paling sesuai untuk merujuk hubungan anda dengan Peserta ID3. 
Sila tandakan bagaimana anda dan Peserta ID3 berkait. Kemudian 
tandakan jenis perhubungan anda dengan Peserta ID3 di ruang dibawah..  
Buka muka surat RC4. 
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Dihadapan anda ada 7 pasang bulatan. Anggap salah satu pasangan 
bulatan paling sesuai untuk merujuk hubungan anda dengan Peserta ID4. 
Sila tandakan bagaimana anda dan Peserta ID4 berkait. Kemudian 
tandakan jenis perhubungan anda dengan Peserta ID4 di ruang dibawah.   
Buka muka surat RC5. 
 
Dihadapan anda ada 7 pasang bulatan. Anggap salah satu pasangan 
bulatan paling sesuai untuk merujuk hubungan anda dengan Peserta ID5. 
Sila tandakan bagaimana anda dan Peserta ID5 berkait. Kemudian 
tandakan jenis perhubungan anda dengan Peserta ID5 di ruang dibawah..  
Buka muka surat RC6. 
Dihadapan anda ada 7 pasang bulatan. Anggap salah satu pasangan 
bulatan paling sesuai untuk merujuk hubungan anda dengan Peserta ID6. 
Sila tandakan bagaimana anda dan Peserta ID6 berkait. Kemudian 
tandakan jenis perhubungan anda dengan Peserta ID6 di ruang dibawah. 
 
Buka muka surat RC7. 
Dihadapan anda ada 7 pasang bulatan. Anggap salah satu pasangan 
bulatan paling sesuai untuk merujuk hubungan anda dengan Peserta ID7. 
Sila tandakan bagaimana anda dan Peserta ID7 berkait. Kemudian 
tandakan jenis perhubungan anda dengan Peserta ID7 di ruang dibawah..  
Buka muka surat RC8. 
Dihadapan anda ada 7 pasang bulatan. Anggap salah satu pasangan 
bulatan paling sesuai untuk merujuk hubungan anda dengan Peserta ID8. 
Sila tandakan bagaimana anda dan Peserta ID8 berkait. Kemudian 
tandakan jenis perhubungan anda dengan Peserta ID8 di ruang dibawah.   
Buka muka surat RC9 
Dihadapan anda ada 7 pasang bulatan. Anggap salah satu pasangan 
bulatan paling sesuai untuk merujuk hubungan anda dengan Peserta ID9. 
Sila tandakan bagaimana anda dan Peserta ID9 berkait.  Kemudian 
tandakan jenis perhubungan anda dengan Peserta ID9 di ruang dibawah..  
<Wait for 2 minutes or after everyone stops writing> 
Kita dah habiskan Aktiviti {A/B}. Sila tunggu beberapa minit untuk RA kutip risalah 
{A/B} dari anda.  
<RA1 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID1 –ID3, RA2 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID4-
ID6, RA3 will collect Booklet {A/B} from ID7-ID9> 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
--- End of Instruction --- 
119 
 
Figure 2.17A. Sample of IoS sheet for social closeness elicitation task (from 
Villager ID1 to Villager ID2) 
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Figure 2.18A. Example of a village’s architecture  
  
 
Figure 2.19A. Set-up for a session 
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Figure 2.20A. A session in motion 
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Chapter 3 
 
Social Status and Public Spiritedness in Representation: 
Experimental Evidence from Borneo 
 
3.1 Introduction 
A representative exists within a group to improve its social outcome. A common 
function of a representative, be it a policymaker, a head of an academic department, or 
a village leader, is to make a recommendation to their respective group members. 
Typically, the representative possesses private information on the implications of 
her/his recommendation even though the implementation process is carried out by the 
group members. A trusted representative possesses agency or recognition to have 
her/his recommendation implemented by the group members. For example, a trade 
union leader has held a meeting with the employer to settle an industrial dispute. A 
trusted trade union leader would return from the meeting with a recommendation that 
protects the group members’ interest. A recommendation from a trusted trade union 
leader will be accepted and implemented by the union members.   
In this chapter, we explore the context in which the representative and her/his group 
members are aware of the conflict of interest in the recommendation’s outcome. The 
representative-group members’ relationship here features a principal-agent problem 
modelled using a sender-receiver game mechanism. A representative acts as an agent 
for the group members, whose action increases or reduces the group members’ payoffs 
through her/his recommendation. The conflict of interest arises due to the nature of the 
content of the recommendation. A representative is presented with two types of 
content. The first type is welfare-maximising for the group at a cost to the 
representative while the second type only maximises the representative’s payoff. The 
decision-making rights belong to the group members as the content of the 
representative’s recommendation is cheap talk. Group members could choose to 
implement the representative’s recommendation or opt for an outside option. By 
implementing the recommendation, group members recognize the agency of the 
representative.   
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During the decision-making process, we place no requirement for the representative 
and the group members to decide as a group. A social welfare-maximizing 
representative acts in the interest of the group and, conditional on her/him being trusted 
by the group members, her/his recommendation is implemented by the group 
members. Group members’ expectations about the representative are crucial in 
recognizing the representative’s agency. It is possible that a representative who is 
expected to be trustworthy by group members may make a recommendation based on 
self-interest.  
The modified sender-receiver game in this Chapter deviates from the original sender-
receiver game of Gneezy (2005) and Sutter (2009) in two ways. First, the payoff 
vectors of the two conflicting parties, sender and receiver, are common knowledge, 
while their conflict of interests are preserved. Second, there are two receivers that will 
have to decide whether the sender’s recommendation improves group welfare. The 
requirement of two receivers deciding together in this version of sender-receiver is 
designed to reflect how most representation and agency happens in groups. As 
representation has traditionally been carried out by higher status individuals in feudal 
and pre-modern societies, we investigate the relationship between social status and 
representation. The norm of noblesse oblige prescribed that it was the moral obligation 
of the nobles/elites to show responsibility to those of less privilege. Scott (1976) 
described that it was through this norm that the peasants obtained their right to 
subsistence, in which the landowners provided assistance in cash and kind to the 
peasant during bad seasons. The main objective of this chapter is to investigate whether 
the norm of noblesse oblige is translated into representation by high status individuals. 
To achieve this, we recruited Kayan villagers in Sarawak (Borneo), Malaysia. It is an 
accepted norm for village leaders, usually selected from aristocracy strata, to represent 
the interest of villagers when interacting with relevant parties outside the village, for 
example, government officers, companies and non-governmental organizations.  
We implemented a lab-in-the-field experiment in villages that have pre-existing social 
hierarchies. Villagers played a modified version of the sender-receiver game designed 
to tease out public-spirited and trusted representation. Before villagers were assigned 
into their roles as sender or receiver, we elicited the social status and social closeness 
characteristics of the villagers. The roles of sender and receiver were assigned 
randomly, and subjects were aware of the identity of their matched sender/receivers. 
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We incorporated social status measures to answer the following questions: i) whether 
higher status villagers were more likely to act as public-spirited senders and ii) whether 
receivers were more likely to trust recommendations made by higher status senders.  
Our experimental design would be able to address local-level representation issues in 
developing countries. Many development interventions happen with the presence of a 
middleman between villagers and outside parties. Examples of villagers’ concerns that 
a village’s representative could help address include: which development project 
should be prioritized, which political party/candidate to vote for, which produce buyer 
is trusted to give a fair price or which company should be trusted to harvest logs from 
the communal land. Apart from streamlining villagers’ policy options, a representative 
also aids villagers who have constraints in time and expertise in comprehending their 
decisions.  
The presence of a representative creates opportunity for rent-seeking, especially when 
the right to represent is attached to institutional status. Consider a context where a 
village head decides on the outcome of a development project that the village will 
receive. She/he could recommend a socially sub-optimal proposal to the villagers to 
rent-seek from her/his position. For example, a village head proposes to the villagers 
to accept a proposal made by a plantation company to utilise the communal land. The 
village head could in private collude with the company to recommend a project that 
benefited the head at the cost of the villagers.  
With the exposure of traditional villages, in Sarawak and other parts of the world, to 
modern institutions, social status in these villages has become more fluid and 
individuals coming from lower strata are able to obtain social status through wealth 
and human and social capital accumulation. In some villages, individuals self -appoint 
themselves to speak on behalf of the village over issues like vote-buying or channelling 
group-level benefits from NGOs or other interested parties to the village. This creates 
tensions within the village as the pre-existing leaders see the self-appointed 
representative as a leadership challenge. While the competition between institutional 
leader and self-appointed representatives could promote effective representation, it is 
also a concern to the policymakers that the actions by these representatives are 
recognized as agency. For example, a low-status individual might able to provide 
representation but the lack of recognition from group members could affect the policy 
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implementation process.  By understanding who best provide representation within a 
community, our findings appeal to policymakers who seek to reduce rent-seeking 
behaviour by incorporating status differences within a community.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature on strategic interactions in sender-receiver games. In Section 3, we formally 
describe the sender-receiver agency game. Section 4 connects representation with 
social status by outlining a number of hypotheses about the effects of status. Section 5 
contains the description of experimental procedure on how social status is integrated  
in our experimental design. Findings for this experiment can be found in Section 6. 
We conclude in Section 7.  
3.2 Related Literature 
3.2.1 Sender-Receiver Game  
Crawford & Sobel (1982) introduced a model of strategic information transmission in 
which a Sender transmits a message to a Receiver and the Receiver’s reaction to that 
message dictates the consequences for both players. As the interests of Sender and 
Receiver are not fully aligned, the information content of the message is under the 
strategic consideration of the Sender. A rational and strategic Sender will bundle a 
noisy signal within the transmitted message, hence obscuring the true state of the world 
to the Receiver. The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the Sender-Receiver game consists 
of the strategic action of the Sender transmitting a message with noisy signal and the 
Receiver’s belief function that the probability of Sender’s message is true.  
The earliest attempt to use Crawford & Sobel (1982) in behavioural economics, 
specifically in exploring issues on deception, lying and truth-telling behaviour, was 
done by Gneezy (2005), through the Sender-Receiver deception game. Here, a Sender 
that has private information on the state of the world could send a deceptive message 
about an action the Receiver should take. The consequences of the Receiver’s action 
will affect the Sender and Receiver’s payoffs, in which an accepted deceptive message 
will result in the Sender profiting at the expense of the Receiver. The Sender would 
receive a relatively smaller payoff in comparison to the Receiver should she/he decide 
to tell the truth and the Receiver accepts the message. The experiment varied the gains 
from deceptive behaviour between treatments to examine deception sensitivity to price 
changes.  Results from this experiment showed that the fraction of Senders that deceive 
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the Receiver increases when the gain from deception increases. When the gain from 
deception is small, i.e. US$1, the rate of deception is 17%. On the other hand, when  
the gain from deception is high, i.e. US$10, the rate of deception increases to 52%. 
Subsequent replication by Leibbrandt et al. (2018) among villagers in Bangladesh also 
found similar pattern, i.e. when the stake from deceiving increases, rate of the 
deception increases, in this case from 34% to 47%. The same pattern could also be 
observed in treatments by Sutter (2009).  
 A consistent finding from the studies above is that a high number of Senders 
knowingly convey the true message and do not lie to the Receiver despite the economic 
cost to them. Gneezy (2005) concluded that these Senders exhibit aversion to lying for 
personal economic gain. While works by Gneezy (2005), Leibbrant et al. (2018) and 
Sutter (2009) seemed to indicate that the deception rate has a positive relationship with 
gains from deception, this might not be true for all deception games. In a game that 
examined white lies, Erat & Gneezy (2012) found that a substantial proportion of 
Senders were willing to deceive Receivers in treatments where lying produced the 
highest return to Receivers, even if lying was slightly costly to the Sender. The 
evidence from Sender-Receiver deception literature indicates that social preferences 
towards the Receiver, preferences for truth-telling or aversion to lying are present 
among Senders who choose to send truthful messages to Receivers. In order to remove 
strategic considerations and social preferences towards the Receiver, Fischbacher & 
Follmi-Heusi (2013) introduced a die-rolling experiment to measure preferences for 
truth-telling or aversion to lying. In a meta-study of experimental model testing on 
non-strategic honest reporting, Abeler et al. (2019) shows that are indeed preferences 
for truth-telling.  
Another consistent finding from sender-receiver deception games is the high rate of 
message acceptance by Receivers, i.e. a Receiver trusts the Sender’s message despite 
being unaware of the payoff distribution and consequences from accepting or rejecting 
the Sender’s recommendation19. Essentially, the Receiver has no reason to suspect that 
the Sender is deceptive. In Gneezy (2005), on average 80% of Receivers choose to 
 
19 In Gneezy (2005), the message options for the Sender are: a) Message 1: “Option A will earn you 
more money than option B”, and b) Message 2: “Option B will earn you more money than option A.” 
The Receiver is aware of both massages but not the real state of Option A and Option B. The Receiver 
has to make a choice between Option A and Option B.  
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accept the Sender’s recommendation. Among subjects in Sutter (2009), the average 
rate of message acceptance is 72%. Similarly, in van de Ven & Villeval (2015), the 
average rate of accepting the Sender’s message is 76.54%.  The exception to high rate 
of message acceptance is a replication in Bangladesh villages, where there was a 56% 
acceptance rate for a medium-stake treatment and 43% for a high-stake treatment 
(Leibbrandt, et al., 2018). Works by Irlenbusch & Meer (2013) and Bond & DePaulo 
(2008) seek to provide explanation on Receiver’s trust in Sender’s honesty. Irlenbusch 
& Meer (2013) incorporated a cheap talk element into a public good game and 
conclude that credulity among subjects can be explained by a false consensus effect, 
in which subjects who have made true reports believe the reported contributions as 
they believe that other group members would be reporting their actual contribution 
values, as they have done. In a review of deception judging in psychological literature, 
Bond & DePaulo (2008) find that the success of  a liar’s deceptiveness is due to the 
liar’s credibility rather than to individual differences between Receivers. Therefore, 
Receivers’ characteristics are not reliable indicators of their ability to detect lies.  
This chapter also contribute to the literature on strategic information decisions and 
group identity. The only work that have linked induced identity with deception in is 
by Rong et al. (2016). Treatments in this study involved players telling the truth to 
those in different group and trusting message from the out-group. In these treatments, 
asymmetric identity reduces the rate of transmission of true messages and the rate of 
subjects’ trust in the messages they received.  
Focusing solely on the mechanics of strategic information transmission, Farrell & 
Gibbons(1989) expanded the Sender-Receiver game by increasing the number of 
Receivers and allowing the Sender to adopt different communication strategies to 
address the Receivers. Battaglini & Makarov (2014) produce the first study that 
empirically tests the communication between one Sender and multiple Receivers as 
proposed by Farrell & Gibbons (1989). Here Sender varies her/his public 
communication strategies when there is an additional Receiver in the game. For each 
Receiver, her/his individual payoff depends on the state of the world and their own 
decision, while the Sender’s payoff is determined by the summation of outcomes from 
both Receivers’ decisions. Similarly, Agranov & Schotter (2013) incorporate more 
than one Receiver in their Sender-Receiver game. Here, the Sender announces a value 
from a continous state space to the Receivers.  This design creates an additional 
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dilemma for the Receivers in trying to coordinate with each other after receiving the 
Sender’s message. We contribute to this literature by changing the strategic 
consideration of our Sender while increasing the number of Receivers in each group.  
3.2.2  Social Status and Representation  
This chapter continues the discussion of social status in representation that began in 
the previous chapter. Here the discussion will focus more on the relationship of 
individuals with social status and their function as a trusted representative to the rest.   
The notion that a group of selected people representing and guiding the masses towards 
socially optimal outcomes has been discussed and examined by moral philosophers 
and academicians. Jefferson (1813) for example, stressed the role of a natural 
aristocracy, grounded in virtues and talents, to provide instructions, trust and 
governance to a society. He added that aristrocracy that stemmed only from wealth 
and birth, but without virtue or talent, was artificial. Effort must be made to find worthy 
and smart individuals and educate them to sideline the artificial aristocracts in the 
battle for public trust. The selection of a group of representatives to determine citizens’ 
policy interest has been traditionally examined in political economy. Apart from 
selecting a representative to implement the citizens’ preferred policies, citizens also 
are found to care about the representative’s good character and principles since this 
signals accountability in the future (Besley, 2006; Besley & Coate, 1997). It is well 
documented that, in most societies,  those with influence over the policy -making 
process possess privileged status. They have more wealth and higher educational 
attainment, are better-connected to influential and reliable social networks, and receive 
more exposure in mass media (DiCaprio, 2012; Carnes, 2018). These groups of people 
are not restricted to parliamentarians and cabinet members but also include civil 
servants, grassroot leaders and academics (DiCaprio, 2012). 
In modern and democratic societies, the public has the ability to legitimately select the 
elites to represent their interest; but there are contexts where the emergence of 
representation is highly influenced by cultural, social and institutional norms and ‘the 
represented/citizens’ are not able to signal their preferences. For example, a paramount 
chief in Sierra Leone needs to be elected by votes of the members of the Tribal Authority 
rather than those of the people he serves (Acemoglu, et al., 2014); the appointment of a 
village chief in Sarawak requires state approval; the appointment of an academic 
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department head is often done by the dean’s office. In these contexts, leaders a re not 
explicitly selected by group members to represent their interest.  
 
Within traditional communities like the Kayan of Sarawak, protecting the interest of 
villagers is treated as a moral obligation. The nobility ethos of noblesse oblige 
documented by Geertz (1963),  Scott (1976) and Fontaine (2014) in pre-modern 
Southeast Asia and Europe shows that local-level elites provided assistance to the low-
status peasants to meet their subsistence level of livelihood. In Scott (1976), the moral 
idea of reciprocity, mutual benefits and obligations between peasants and local elites in 
Southeast Asia saw the peasants providing social standing to the elites and in return the 
elites have obligations to protect the subsistence rights of the peasants. In Fontaine 
(2014), these subsistence rights includes credit extension for the peasants. In the context 
of pre-modern rural Borneo, a village leader protected her/his tribe members by being a 
skillful warrior and forming strategic alliances with neighbouring villages or co lonial 
powers. Hence, high status individuals provided the villagers and vassals with the rights 
of subsistence and representation and in return received privileged positions in the 
economy. This is consistent with Fontaine’s (2014) conclusion that in an a ristocractic 
economy, all exchanges have to bear the mark of nobility, i.e. the high-status individuals 
are doing a favor for the low status groups.  
 
However with colonization, the rise of modern governance structures, and increasing 
migration to the cities, the bond between local-level elites and the peasants weakened, 
and these elites increasingly relied on state governance structures to maintain their 
privilege in their locality. With modern states and their development policies, 
particularly after World War II, the role of elites in ensuring subsistence rights have 
diminished and eventually these elites took an  administrative role, being the middle-
person that connects the government programmes/interventions to the villagers. 
Essentially, the elites now deliver the rights of representation, rather than ensuring the 
basic subsistences  to the lower status groups. 
 
The right to represent the lower status groups enabled the high status individuals/elites 
to maintain their positions in their locality. At times, this happens at the cost of the 
group. There are some ways in which maintaining the link between high status and 
representation produces negative impacts on the welfare of the lower status group. First, 
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this is through local-level elite capture that is pervasive in rural development. Here, local 
elites use their local knowledge to promote development projects that match their 
preferences rather than the preferences of the villagers. For example, a local elite could 
arrange for a development intervention/programme to be implemented using their 
resources on their own terms. Platteau, et al., (2014) modelled this behavior theoretically 
through the relationships of donors (NGOs) and local elites in community -driven 
development projects where the elites distort information about the preferences of the 
grassroots to receive aid from donor agencies. The assumption here is that local elites 
have power over the grassroots to enable rent-seeking behavior. Anectdocal rent-
seeking behaviour is documented in Platteau & Gaspart (2003), in which rent-seeking 
is tolerated by the grassroots and it is treated as a way to compensate the village’s elites 
for their  involvement in a project. Second, maintaining representation by high status 
individuals has effects on legislation and policy outcomes. For example, the policies 
drafted are used to reinforce status positions in the society  (Carnes, 2018). Using 13 
pieces of legislation bills from 2010 to 2012 sponsored by members of the United States 
House of Representatives, Kraus & Callaghan (2014) found that high status members 
of Congress, classified by average wealth, gender and race, are more likely to sponsor 
bills that support economic inequality in the US. This work used bills that promoted or 
reduced economic inequality and linked it to Congress members’ support for the elite’s 
status quo position in the society. For example, bills that grant tax holidays on profits or 
eliminate estate tax are classified as legistlations that support inequality, while bills 
categorised as inequality reducing included increasing tax rates for individuals with 
excess earnings, or increasing protection of the rights of tenants facing foreclosure. The 
evidence from local-level elite capture and promotion of inequality-endorsing policies 
in the highest decision-making process, shows that lower-status groups’ rights of 
representation by the elites do not necessarily translate to welfare enchancement for 
low-status groups. 
 
A way to improve the quality of representation by the elite and to benefit the lower status 
groups is to introduce political competition among the elites. Acemoglu et al. (2014)  
uses evidence from tribal chiefs in Sierra Leone to examine political competition where 
representation is embedded with cultural norms, i.e. ruling tribal chiefs are appointed 
but not selected by the general public. They hypothesised that political competition 
among the ruling families will constrain the power of a ruling chief as he needs to satisfy 
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many interest groups, hence discipling the chief to govern better by restraining them 
from distorting economic activities, for example through control of land or taxation. The 
research found evidence that citizens from areas that have less political competition 
among the ruling families experienced worse development outcomes compared to those 
coming from areas with greater political competition.  
 
This chapter contributes to the discussion on whether representation done by those with 
higher status provides welfare enhancement for other members of the  group. The 
acquisition of human, social and political capital among the general population of Kayan 
over the last decades enables certain individuals to compete for the rights to represent 
the group. The noblesse oblige norm, as documented in Chapter 2, suggests that higher-
status individuals might supply a higher quality of representation.  Our experiment tests 
this hypothesis. This chapter differs from the previous chapter as the function of 
representative here is to decide in private on a proposal for the distribution of payoffs  
within her/his group; this decision is effective only if the group members accept it 
without knowing the content. In contrast, the representative in Chapter 2 only performs 
her/his role after seeing the extent to which the rest of the group have committed their 
resources to the public good; the  role of the representation is then  to increase the return 
on the public good investment made by group members.  
 
3.3 Sender-Receiver Agency Game 
Following an example from Section 1, a village head proposes to the villagers to accept 
a proposal made by a plantation company to utilise the village’s communal land.  Let’s 
assume the profit-sharing ratio between the village and the company is contingent on 
the village’s head prior agreement with the company and that the outcome of this 
agreement is private information for the village’s head. The village head could, i) 
request monetary compensation for her/himself as a compensation for convincing the 
villagers to accept her/his proposal, which would result in lower profit for the village, 
or ii) propose the company to the villagers while refraining from rent-seeking so the 
village would receive higher profit. On the other hand, villagers have the right to reject 
the village head’s proposal and choose to organize themselves to work on the 
communal land. The villagers are aware that if they decide on this option, the return 
from this would be lower since they don’t have the capital and manpower to scale the 
132 
 
operation. The best option for the village is to accept the village head’s proposal, 
conditional on the village head not having engaged in rent-seeking.  However, if 
village head had engaged in rent-seeking, the best option for the village would be for 
the villagers to work on the land themselves.  
The sender-receiver agency game described below is intended to represent a stylized 
description of representation in which there is a conflict of interest between the 
representative and group members and the conflict of interest is common knowledge. 
As we seek to understand the role of real social status in the representative relationship, 
the game described below maintains credible deniability even if the experiment is 
implemented in a non-anonymous setting. This element enables a Sender to choose a 
bad outcome for the group without being singled out as a ‘bad’ Sender by Receivers 
and at the same time prevents ‘untrusting’ Receivers from being exposed to the Sender.  
A feature of this game is the presence of outside option for the Receivers. In the 
Sender-Receiver deception game designed by Gneezy (2005), the Sender is presented 
with two messages about two potential payoffs and chooses one message which is 
communicated to the Receiver. Should the Receiver choose not to follow the message 
from the Sender, both players receive payoffs based on the Receiver’s choice, i.e. the 
message that the Sender did not communicate.  The presence of an outside option 
indirectly allows us to address the concern raised in Sutter (2009) about the definition 
of deception used by Gneezy(2005). Deception is not only purposely sending a 
recommendation that is costly to the Receiver, but it must include the intention to 
deceive. In the case discussed by Sutter (2009), a Sender or sophisticated truth-teller 
transmits a true message with the expectation that it will be disregarded by the 
Receiver, with the result that the Sender receives a higher payoff than the Receiver 
The designs used by both  Gneezy (2005) and Sutter (2009) incentivizes sophisticated 
truth-telling, as the Sender’s unwanted message is still a part of both parties’ payoff in 
the case that the Receiver does not believe the truth of the message transmitted to  
her/him.  In our design, the unwanted outcome is no longer present as group’s potential 
outcome should the Receivers choose to reject the Sender’s recommendation, i.e. the 
effect of disbelief in the Sender’s message is the same whether the Sender recommends 
the socially optimal or self-interested outcomes, therefore recommending the self-
interested outcome is the dominant strategy for Sender. Another feature of this game 
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is the incorporation of an additional Receiver, so that the decision-making process 
emulates similar processes in villages and other organizational units.  
We begin the game with three players, the Sender (S) and two Receivers, 𝑅𝑖(𝑖 ∈
{1,2}). The outcome from this game is presented as a vector consisting of payoffs for 
the Sender and the two Receivers. The summation of payoffs within each vector is the 
social welfare value. The payoff values in every vector and the corresponding social 
welfare value are common knowledge to all players.  
The Sender controls the nature of her/his recommendation and it can take form of 
either of two vectors, X or Y, in which:   
 𝑋 = (𝑥𝑠, 𝑥𝑅1, 𝑥𝑅2), and 
𝑌 = (𝑦𝑠, 𝑦𝑅1, 𝑦𝑅2).  
For the Sender, 𝑦𝑠 > 𝑥𝑠, while for any Receiver, 𝑅𝑖, 𝑥𝑅𝑖 > 𝑦𝑅𝑖 , where 𝑥𝑅𝑖 = 𝑥𝑅1 =
𝑥𝑅2 and 𝑦𝑅𝑖 = 𝑦𝑅1 = 𝑦𝑅2.  
The social welfare values for the two vectors are: 
𝑣(𝑋) = 𝑥𝑠 + 𝑥𝑅1 + 𝑥𝑅2 , and 
𝑣(𝑌) = 𝑦𝑠 + 𝑦𝑅1 + 𝑦𝑅2 
In which:  
𝑥𝑠 + 𝑥𝑅1 + 𝑥𝑅2 > 𝑦𝑠 + 𝑦𝑅1 + 𝑦𝑅2 ; or 𝑣(𝑋) > 𝑣(𝑌) 
We incorporated conflict of interest between the Sender and individual Receiver, 
where 𝑥𝑠 < 𝑦𝑆 for Sender and 𝑥𝑅𝑖 > 𝑦𝑅𝑖for Receiver and this was made salient to both 
parties. X will generate the higher social welfare since v(X) > v(Y), but in X the Sender 
receives a smaller personal payoff than an individual Receiver as 𝑥𝑠 < 𝑥𝑅𝑖. On the 
other hand, Y is sub-optimal for the group but produces a higher personal payoff for 
the Sender compared to an individual Receiver as 𝑦𝑆 > 𝑦𝑅𝑖 . The value of v(Y) has been 
set to create a principal-agent problem.  There is a conflict of interest between Sender 
and Receivers as, if Y is chosen, the Sender is able to earn higher payoff at the expense 
of the group and its members. At the same time, the value of v(X) represents a social 
optimal outcome for the group at the expense of the Sender.  
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The Sender’s recommendation will be presented as a group project, GP_S, to the 
Receivers. The Sender privately chooses one of two vectors available, X or Y, to be the 
most probable state of GP_S. There is a probability of p that any outcome chosen as a 
recommendation will be affected by noise and the GP_S will yield the non-
recommended outcome, i.e. if the Sender recommended X as GP_S, the non-
recommended outcome is Y, and vice versa. The probability p can be used to transform 
the vectors X and Y into vectors of expected payoff values.  Thus, X is transformed 
into the corresponding noisy vector X, where 𝑋′ = (𝑥′𝑠,𝑥
′
𝑅1, 𝑥
′
𝑅2), and Y is 
transformed into the noisy vector 𝑌′ = (𝑦′𝑠, 𝑦
′
𝑅1, 𝑦
′
𝑅2).  After incorporating the 
probability, the payoffs from noisy vector X̍ʹ are as follow; 
𝑥′𝑠 = (1 − 𝑝)𝑥𝑠 + 𝑝𝑦𝑠  for Sender, and 
𝑥′𝑅𝑖 = (1 − 𝑝)𝑥𝑅𝑖 + 𝑝𝑦𝑅𝑖  for a Receiver. 
For payoffs in vector Yʹ,  
𝑦′𝑠 = (1 − 𝑝)𝑦𝑠 + 𝑝𝑥𝑠 for Sender, and 
𝑦′𝑅𝑖 = (1 − 𝑝)𝑦𝑅𝑖 + 𝑝𝑥𝑅𝑖 for a Receiver. 
In terms of the social welfare value, incorporating the noise p transforms 𝑣(𝑋) to 
𝑣(𝑋′), in which 𝑣(𝑋′) = (1 − 𝑝)𝑣(𝑋) + 𝑝𝑣(𝑌). For 𝑣(𝑌) it is now 𝑣(𝑌′), in which 
𝑣(𝑌′) = (1 − 𝑝)𝑣(𝑌) + 𝑝𝑣(𝑋). We assume p < 0.5 to maintain the conditions that yS 
> xS, xRi > yRi and  𝑣(𝑋′) > 𝑣(𝑌′). The probability value of p is common knowledge 
to all players.  
Getting Y over X is personally beneficial for the Sender since pxS + (1 – p)yS   > pys 
+ (1 – p)xS.   If Receivers did not know the Sender’s decision but were willing to trust 
the Sender, recommending Y rather than X would be privately optimal for the Sender.  
The role of Receivers in this game is to implement a group project, and it can be in a 
form of GP_S, recommended by the Sender, or the GP_O.  GP_O is a group project 
set as an outside option to GP_S and the Sender has no control over its nature. 
Individual Receivers’ decision preferences were recorded in the experiment but only 
the consensus decision of both Receivers was incentivized.   In the absence of noise 
(explained later) GP_O will produce a vector Z to players on condition it is jointly 
picked by both Receivers. The content of Z is: 
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𝑍 = (𝑧𝑠, 𝑧𝑅1, 𝑧𝑅2) 
In relation to v(X) and v(Y),  
𝑣(𝑋) > 𝑣(𝑍) > 𝑣(𝑌) 
In relation to Sender’s payoff: 
𝑦𝑠 > 𝑧𝑠 = 𝑥𝑠 
In relation to an individual Receiver’s payoff: 
𝑥𝑅𝑖 > 𝑧𝑅𝑖 > 𝑦𝑅𝑖 
Implementation of GP_O is also affected by noise with probability of p. The value of 
p is the same as the value used in GP_S. There is probability p that the GP_O will 
produce vector Y. Therefore, the content of GP_O is transformed to Z with  𝑍′ =
(𝑧′𝑠, 𝑧
′
𝑅1, 𝑧
′
𝑅2) and the social welfare of Z is transformed to v(Z). For the Sender, 
vector Z will produce a payoff of 𝑧′𝑠 = (1 − 𝑝)𝑧𝑠 + 𝑝𝑦𝑠  and for a Receiver it will 
produce 𝑧′𝑅𝑖 = (1 − 𝑝)𝑧𝑅𝑖 + 𝑝𝑦𝑅𝑖 . The social welfare of the noisy vector Z is given 
by 𝑣(𝑍′) = (1 − 𝑝)𝑣(𝑍) + 𝑝𝑣(𝑌). 
The social welfare values 𝑣(𝑋′) > 𝑣(𝑍 ′) ensure that the greatest social gain from the 
Sender’s and Receivers’ relationship comes from the Sender being trustworthy and 
public-spirited as the group’s representative and from the Receivers trusting her/him 
to behave in this way. Concurrently the social welfare value of 𝑣(𝑍) > 𝑣(𝑌) provides 
Receivers with an option to avoid a Sender that has been suspected to recommend Y 
as GP_S behind the Receivers’ backs. Receivers are not able to maximize social 
welfare if: i) they decide to trust and untrustworthy Sender, expecting she/he has 
recommended X when she/he has recommended Y, or ii) they decide to not trust a 
trustworthy Sender.  
Z served 3 purposes in this game. From the Receivers’ viewpoint, collectively 
choosing GP_O allows them to avoid GP_S endorsed by the Sender. If either of the 
Receivers suspects that Y is the recommended outcome in GP_S, selecting GP_O in 
the presence of a self-interested Sender reduces individual losses for both Receivers 
as 𝑧′𝑅𝑖 > 𝑦′𝑅𝑖 and ‘punishes’ the Sender since  𝑦′𝑠 > 𝑧′𝑠. Another purpose of Z is to 
protect ‘good’ or public-spirited Senders who have recommended X from any 
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‘untrusting’ Receiver, as 𝑧𝑠 = 𝑥𝑠. Since 𝑥′𝑅𝑖 > 𝑧′𝑅𝑖, it is salient to a Receiver that 
‘trusting’ the Sender is a rewarding action if the Sender is trustworthy. The final 
purpose of Z is to provide credible deniability for both Receivers when they have 
selected GP_O over GP_S. At the end of the experiment, every player will only learn 
about her/his own payoff. Whether GP_S or GP_O has been selected by Receivers as 
a consensus was not revealed to the Sender.  Therefore, a Sender cannot infer the 
Receivers decision.  
Table 3.1 shows the possible actual outcomes that the two types of players can receive 
from their actions in this game. It shows that by choosing the Sender’s 
recommendation in GP_S, a Receiver could only receive 𝑥𝑅𝑖 or 𝑦𝑅𝑖  but opting for 
GP_O could result in 𝑧𝑅𝑖  or 𝑥𝑅𝑖. Because xRi and yRi are possible outcomes of GP_S 
irrespective of the Sender’s recommendation, Receivers cannot infer the Sender’s 
decision.  On the other hand, a Sender could only receive 𝑥𝑠 or 𝑦𝑠 as payoff regardless 
of Receivers’ decisions since 𝑧𝑠 = 𝑥𝑠.  
Table 3.1. Possible actual outcomes available to the Sender and both Receivers 
Sender 
recommends to 
GP_S 
Receivers choose Sender’s Payoff Receiver’s Payoff 
X 
GP_S 𝑥𝑠 or 𝑦𝑠 𝑥𝑅𝑖 or 𝑦𝑅𝑖  
GP_O  𝑧𝑠 = 𝑥𝑠 or 𝑦𝑠 𝑧𝑅𝑖  or 𝑥𝑅𝑖 
Y 
GP_S 𝑦𝑠 or 𝑥𝑠 𝑦𝑅𝑖  or 𝑥𝑅𝑖 
GP_O 𝑧𝑠 = 𝑥𝑠 or 𝑦𝑠 𝑧𝑅𝑖  or 𝑥𝑅𝑖 
 
Table 3.2 expands on Table 1 by showing the expected payoffs to the Sender 
conditional on the Receivers’ consensus decision.  If the Sender expects that the 
Receivers will not form a consensus on GP_S and opt for GP_O, the Sender is 
indifferent as the payoff from recommending X or Y is the same. On the other hand, 
should a Sender expect the Receivers to accept GP_S, the presence of noise p provides 
plausible deniability for ‘self-interested’ Senders if they intentionally choose Y over 
X. It is a rent-seeking opportunity that can’t be detected by the Receivers as each 
Receiver only receives her/his payment but will never learn the Sender’s decision.  
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Table 3.2. Expected payoffs available to the Sender 
 Consensus select GP_O Consensus select GP_S 
Sender recommends X to 
GP_S  
(𝑧𝑠, 1 − 𝑝; 𝑦𝑠, 𝑝) (𝑥𝑠, 1 − 𝑝; 𝑦𝑠, 𝑝) 
Sender recommends Y to 
GP_S 
(𝑧𝑠, 1 − 𝑝; 𝑦𝑠, 𝑝) (𝑦𝑠 , 1 − 𝑝; 𝑥𝑠, 𝑝) 
 
Table 3.3 shows the expected payoffs a Receiver could receive after forming a 
consensus with the co-Receiver and conditional on the Sender’s recommendation to 
GP_S.  
Table 3.3. Expected payoffs available to a Receiver as an individual 
 Consensus select GP_O Consensus select GP_S 
Sender recommends X to 
GP_S  
(𝑧𝑅𝑖 , 1 − 𝑝; 𝑦𝑅𝑖 , 𝑝) (𝑥𝑅𝑖 , 1 − 𝑝; 𝑦𝑅𝑖 , 𝑝) 
Sender recommends Y to 
GP_S 
(𝑧𝑅𝑖 , 1 − 𝑝; 𝑦𝑅𝑖 , 𝑝) (𝑦𝑅𝑖 , 1 − 𝑝; 𝑥𝑅𝑖, 𝑝) 
 
Whether Receivers select GP_S (accept Sender’s recommendation) or select GP_O 
(reject Sender’s recommendation) depends on their beliefs about the Sender’s action. 
If both Receivers believe that the Sender is public-spirited, they are more likely to form 
a consensus on GP_S. GP_O is more likely to be selected if both Receivers believe the 
Sender is self-interested. In order to determine the likelihood of Receivers selecting 
GP_S over GP_O, a critical value of r is used. r is the probability that a Sender will 
recommend vector X over vector Y to GP_S. Its critical value is derived by equalizing 
a Receiver’s expected payoff from accepting GP_S and the expected payoff from 
rejecting GP_S (or selecting GP_O):  
𝑟[(1 − 𝑝)𝑥𝑅𝑖 + 𝑝𝑦𝑅𝑖] + (1 − 𝑟)[(1 − 𝑝)𝑦𝑅𝑖 + 𝑝𝑥𝑅𝑖] = (1 − 𝑝)𝑧𝑅𝑖 + 𝑝𝑦𝑅𝑖 
The critical value of r is defined by the following condition;  
𝑟 =
(1 − 𝑝)(𝑧𝑅𝑖 − 𝑦𝑅𝑖) + 𝑝(𝑦𝑅𝑖 − 𝑥𝑅𝑖)
(1 − 𝑝)(𝑥𝑅𝑖 − 𝑦𝑅𝑖) + 𝑝(𝑦𝑅𝑖 − 𝑥𝑅𝑖)
 
Since p < 0.5, the denominator is strictly positive, and strictly greater than the 
numerator, so r < 1.  For the critical value to be meaningful (i.e. for there to be an 
interior solution), it is necessary that r > 0, which holds if p < (zRi – yRi)/(xRi + yRi – 
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2yRi).  If this condition is satisfied, a Receiver who believes that the Sender is public-
spirited with a probability of r or above, will select GP_S. We assume that the Receiver 
is risk neutral.   
Whether a Sender should recommend vector X or Y for GP_S depends on her/his belief 
probability, b, that both Receivers will jointly select GP_S. If b = 0, the Sender is 
indifferent between X and Y content in GP_S. When b > 0 and p < 0.5, it is optimal for 
the Sender to place vector Y in GP_S. Thus, it is a weakly dominant strategy for Sender 
to choose vector Y over X. If the Sender selects the weakly dominant strategy, it is best 
for the Receivers to implement GP_O. Under Nash-Bayesian equilibrium, the Sender 
will not expect Receivers to implement his project, GP_S, and there is no reason for 
the Sender to be trustworthy or public-spirited. Since there is no conflict of interest 
among the two Receivers, their decisions to coordinate on a consensus reflect their 
beliefs on what the Sender will recommend.  
Table 3.4. Potential payoffs for a group of three 
 Receivers Consensus 
GP-S GP-O 
Vector selected by 
Sender for GP-S 
X  (𝑣(𝑋),1 − 𝑝; 𝑣(𝑌), 𝑝) (𝑣(𝑍),1 − 𝑝; 𝑣(𝑌), 𝑝) 
Y (𝑣(𝑌),1 − 𝑝; 𝑣(𝑋), 𝑝) (𝑣(𝑍),1 − 𝑝; 𝑣(𝑌), 𝑝) 
 
In summary: 
a) Since the social welfare value of 𝑣(𝑋′) > 𝑣(𝑍′) > 𝑣(𝑌′), it is best for everyone 
to act as a group. However, to achieve v(X), it is necessary for the Sender to 
recommend X rather than Y in GP_S and for the Receivers to form a consensus 
on GP_S over GP_O. 
b) It is best for the Sender to set GP_S content to be Y rather than X since this is 
a weakly dominant strategy for her/him. A public-spirited Sender would 
recommend X and her/his payoff would be independent of Receivers’ decision 
since 𝑧′𝑠 = 𝑥′𝑠. Should the Sender believe that the Receivers will implement 
GP_S with a non-zero probability, he/she would receive 𝑥′𝑠 as payoff. If the 
Receivers opted for GP_O, Sender’s decision is irrelevan t, and she/he will 
receive 𝑧′𝑠. Since 𝑧′𝑠 = 𝑥′𝑠, a public-spirited Sender payoff is maintained but 
a self-interested Sender will be punished since 𝑦′𝑠 > 𝑧′𝑠.  
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c) What is best for an individual Receiver depends on her/his belief about the 
Sender’s action. If the Receiver believes that the Sender has recommended X 
in GP_S with a probability greater than r, it is strictly optimal to accept GP_S. 
On the other hand, if the probability of the Sender recommending X is lower 
than r, it is strictly optimal for a Receiver to select GP_O.  Trusting is optimal 
when Sender is public-spirited while not trusting is optimal when Sender is 
self-interested.  
d) The presence of probability p in both GP_S and GP_O establishes credible 
deniability for Sender and Receivers.  
In relation to the Sender-Receiver deception game discussed by Gneezy (2005) and 
Sutter (2009), our design focuses on the agency role of the Sender. Here, because of 
the outside option, what it is rational for the Sender to do depends only on what 
happens if her/his recommendation is accepted. There is no need for the Sender to 
think strategically about whether her/his recommendation will be accepted. Credible 
deniability by the Sender in the agency role requires that, conditional on her/his 
recommendation being accepted, the outcome for Receivers could be X when Y has 
been recommended and vice versa. Provided that p < 0.5, it is still the case that the 
Sender’s best strategy is Y, irrespective of what Receivers will do.  
The payoff values in this game are parameterized according to Malaysian Ringgit 
(MYR). The social welfare value of v(X) is set at MYR70, v(Y) is MYR55 and v(Z) is 
MYR5620; to maintain 𝑣(𝑋) > 𝑣(𝑍) > 𝑣(𝑌). The payoff content of each vector 
without noise is shown in Table 3.5.  
Table 3.5. Potential payoffs for Sender, Receivers and the group  
Vector Payoffs (in Malaysian Ringgit) Social Value 
(S + R1 +R2) Sender (S) Receiver 1 
(R1) 
Receiver 2 
(R2) 
X 20 25 25 v(X) 70 
Y 30 12.50 12.50 v(Y) 55 
Z 20 18 18 v(Z) 56 
 
 
20 MYR70 is equivalent to £13.10, MYR55 is equivalent to £10.30, and MYR56 is equivalent to £10.50.  
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During the experiment, the value of p is 1/6 for it to align with the outcome of a dice 
roll, an instrument used to facilitate illustration of probability p to the subjects. Figure 
3.1 shows the game tree along with the possible payments that every player will 
receive. 
Figure 3.1. Game Tree of the Sender-Receiver agency game 
 
From the parameterized values selected, the calculated critical value r is 0.3. This 
indicates that as long as a Receiver trusts the Sender to be public-spirited with a 
probability of 0.3 or above, a Receiver should implement GP_S.  
3.4 Hypotheses  
Since the emancipation of slaves in 1950s and growing connection of the Kayan tribe 
to modern institutions (Ibuh, 2014), modern forms of status, such as education 
attainment and wealth, are as important as hereditary status. Outside of the formal 
administration of villages, development programs and local enterprises are increasingly 
being spearheaded by individuals coming from the non-ruling families. In some villages, 
individuals armed with education qualifications, political connections and wealth from 
non-ruling aristocrat and non-aristocrat families are challenging the traditional structure 
of ruling and administration. With this new environment, there is the possibility that the 
norm of noblesse oblige that shaped representation in the villages in the past could 
change. Members of the aristoracy might  no longer be expected to represent the village 
better than non-aristocrat villagers.  
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Under Hypothesis 1, high-status villagers that have been assigned as the Sender will be 
more  likely than the low-status villagers  to select vector X as the content of GP_S. One  
interest of this research is to examine whether public-spirited behaviour is more 
characteristic of high-status Senders when status is as defined by the cultural norms, i.e. 
belonging to an aristocracy family, or when it is defined by the esteem held by villagers. 
Noblesse oblige possessed by Senders’ in higher status will make them feel stronger 
obligation to behave pro-socially, and in this case public-spiritedly.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: High-status villagers assigned as Sender will be more likely to select 
X as the content of GP_S .  
 
Payoff differences in each vector makes conflict of interest between Sender and 
Receivers salient and a self -interested Receiver who expects the Sender to be self-
interested will not trust the Sender to place X as the content of GP_S. Evidence from 
Kuang, et al.(2007) pointed out that advice and recommendation from an interested 
party will not be effective compared to a third party recommendation. However, with 
the presence of noblesse oblige norms, Receivers may be more likely to trust a high-
status Sender.  There is the possibility that Receivers are more likely to reinforce the 
noblesse oblige norms by relying on a high-status Sender to provide representation to 
them by selecting X as the content of GP_S. This is expected since the traditional norm 
prescribed that high-status individuals have the duty and the ability to provide 
protection, subsistence and representation to lower status villagers. We hypothesised 
that Receivers will be more likely to ignore the conflict of interest and trust the high-
status Sender to willingly accept lower personal payoff or be public-spirited to increase 
the payoff of Receivers. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: A Receiver will be more likely to select GP_S when it is recommended 
by a high-status Sender. 
 
(Mis)trust towards the Sender is a component that could influence the outcome of this 
game. Another important component that could determine the game’s outcome is the 
formation of consensus between the Receivers. Enforcement of a norm like noblesse 
oblige carries the expectation that it will be followed by every group member. So even 
if a Receiver personally does not believe that the Sender is trustworthy, if she/he expects 
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the co-Receiver will enforce the norm that high-status individuals are expected to be 
public-spirited, then there is a possibility that the consensus will favour trusting a high-
status Sender.  
 
The role of high-status individuals in setting a norm for effective coordination has been 
documented in laboratory and lab-in-the-field experiments. In a public good game 
experiment involving subjects with real world status, d’Adda (2017) found that lower 
status individuals will conform to the donation levels set by higher status individuals. 
Concurrently, individuals with high status will donate more by not conforming with the  
donation level made by lower status partners. A similar study in Bolivia found that status 
along with legitimate leadership status enabled the leader to set a better example in 
public good contribution (Jack & Recalde, 2015). In a laboratory experiment involving 
coordinating between payoff or risk dominant equlibria, Eckel & Wilson (2007) 
observed that high status players facilitate coordination towards efficient equilibrium as 
low-status players learn from the signal of high-status players. When the two Receivers 
meet to form a consensus, we hypothesise that the Receiver with higher status will be 
more influential in determining the direction of the consensus.  
HYPOTHESIS 3: The consensus is positively biased towards the private preference of 
the higher status Receiver. 
Based on the high level of message acceptance in Sender-Receiver deception and 
communication games, we hypothesise that there are Receivers who form consensus 
towards accepting GP_S without being affected by social status differences among 
group members. Given the non-anonymous setting of the experiment, the consensus 
decisions may reveal another social norm. If there is a social norm of not being 
untrusting towards co-villagers, the consensus decision will gravitate towards accepting 
GP_S as selecting GP_O is violating a norm by mistrusting another villager. A Receiver 
could as an individual state her/his private decision to select GP_O, i.e. not trusting the 
Sender, but the same Receiver with the co-Receiver could form consensus on GP_S.  
HYPOTHESIS 4: Relative to individual decisions, the consensus decision is positively 
biased towards GP_S. 
The noblesse oblige norm hypothesised in this Chapter is driven from the conjecture 
that higher-status individuals feel a stronger obligation to behave pro-socially since they 
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possessed the rights to represent the interest of individuals with lower status. While 
anthropological work by Geertz (1963) and  Scott (1976) discussed the reciprocal 
relationship between high and low status individuals in a traditional economy, all the 
hypotheses stated above only discussed pro-social behaviours originating from the norm 
of noblesse oblige. Here, noblesse oblige is a general hypothesis about positive 
correlation between social status and pro-sociality. It does not discriminate between 
alternative explanations of pro-social behaviour; whether it is because of altruism, 
reciprocity or guilt aversion. We acknowledge the possiblity that these explanations are 
present among the subjects during the experiment and in their daily life.   
3.5 Experimental Design  
The experimental sessions were conducted in 17 close-knit rural Kayan villages in 
Sarawak. The experiments reported in Chapters 2 and 3 were implemented in the same 
villages but a villager could only participate in one session. A villager that had 
participated in a session of the experiment reported in Chapter 2 was prevented from 
participating in this experiment. Members of the same household may participate in 
different sessions but not in the same one. The order of this chapter and Chapter 2’s 
experimental sessions was randomized, i.e. subjects that were scheduled for a session in 
the afternoon have no idea whether the session she/he participated is the same with the 
morning session. However due to practical reason, there is no restriction on 
communication between sessions, especially when sessions have to be conducted on the 
second day in a particular village21.  
Each session required the involvement of 9 villagers. Experimental sessions lasted 
approximately two hours and were conducted in each village in a closed venue 22. The 
description of the Kayan tribe and their social stratification nature was discussed in 
Chapter 2.   
Each session consisted of 4 parts. Activities 1 and 2 are for social status and social 
closeness elicitations. Social status is elicited by asking villagers to privately rank others 
in the session and it is based on 5 status dimensions: success, wealth, education, physical 
 
21 To mitigate the possibility that information and solution on this particular experiment from being 
discussed by subjects that participated a day before, I randomized the color of the GP_S. On some 
day, it is red and on some it is blue. A village at most hold 3 experimental sessions for both 
experiment and there are villages with just 1 session for both experiments. Research team tried their 
best to wrap all experimental session within a day, but it is impossible for some villages.  
22 Locations used included village’s meeting rooms, village homestay and chief’s residences. 
144 
 
fitness and extraversion (outgoingness).  In the social closeness elicitation task, each 
subject picked one of seven diagrams that best described her/his social closeness with 
each of the other 8 subjects in the session. Details on the implementation methodology 
is in Chapter 2 as Activities 1 and 2 of this chapter’s experimental design are identical 
to its Activities 1 and 2. The Sender-Receiver Agency Game was implemented as 
Activity 3.  In Activity 4, villagers answered questions about themselves in private with 
an enumerator. Participants were consistently reminded that their actions, decisions and 
answers would be private and would not be disclosed to other villagers23.  
Table 3.6 below provides an overview of the session structure. 
Table 3.6. Overview of experimental design 
Activity 1 Social closeness & social status 
elicitation  
(randomized order) 
Activity 2 
Activity 3 One-shot Sender-Receiver agency game 
with disclosure of villagers’ roles and 
identities  
Activity 4 Socio-economic survey 
 
After completing Activities 1 and 2, participants were randomly allocated in a group 
of three. Within each group, they received their role assignment at random. Each group 
consisted of a Sender and two Receivers. Instructions for Activities 1 and 2 are 
identical to instructions of Activities 1 and 2 for Chapter 2.  Instruction for social 
closeness can be found on page 103 under Chapter 2’s Appendix C while instructions 
for social relationship closeness is in Appendix D of Chapter 2 on page 109.  
Subjects were then told that the villager in the role of the Sender will receive two cards, 
one showing the parameterized value of ‘X’ above and the other one showing the value 
of ‘Y’. The Sender will be told to pick X or Y for a ‘Blue Project’, i.e. GP_S from above 
is labelled as ‘Blue Project’ during implementation.  The relevant materials for the 
Sender can be found in the Appendix as Figures 3.8 to 3.17. Bef ore the Sender decides, 
 
23 Participants’ names were only used in recruitment process, consent form and payment receipts. 
The documents with participants names were not linked to participants numerical identifier in the 
session.  
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both Sender and Receivers were informed that the Sender’s decisions would be 
processed and there is a probability p that the Sender’s selection could be swapped 
with the other option when the Blue Project is being processed.  
Behind a private partition, the Sender is provided with two opaque envelopes. Each 
card needs to be placed in an envelope. Once the Sender is ready, the experimenter 
will approach the Sender with two large envelopes. One large envelope will have a big 
blue star on it and the other envelope will have a big blue pentagon on it. The Sender 
is then requested to place the opaque envelope containing the outcome that she/he 
wants for the group into the envelope with the large blue star. The envelope with the 
unwanted outcome is going to be placed in the envelope with the large blue pentagon. 
After that, both big envelopes were handed to the experimenter. Before the Sender 
leaves the partition, he/she answers questions related to her/his expectations on the 
Receivers’ actions. He/she is asked which project the Receivers will pick as a 
consensus and which one will be preferred by Receiver 1 and by Receiver 2.  
Standing in front of all subjects in the session, the experimenter sets the ‘Red Project’. 
Red Project is the label used for GP_O during the experiment’s implementation. First, 
the experimenter takes a card that represents the parameterized value of vector Z and 
places it in an opaque envelope. Second, the envelope is then placed into a big envelope 
that has a big red star on it. Then the same procedure is repeated but a card that 
represents the parameterized value of Y goes into a big envelope with a big red 
pentagon. The payoff from vector Z is illustrated in the booklet and it is Figure 3.12. 
X or Y selected by the Sender is in the blue star envelope while Z is in the red star 
envelope. Subjects had already been told that both Blue and Red Projects need to be 
processed; from the game description, this is where the noise was incorporated. 
Processing will happen through a dice roll. A random receiver from each group was 
asked to throw a dice and then inform everyone of the roll’s outcome. The 
experimenter then will roll a dice in private. If the outcome from the experimenter’s 
roll is the same as the receiver’s roll, then the content in the blue star envelope will be 
swapped with the content of the blue pentagon envelope. On the other hand, if the 
outcome from experimenter’s roll is different from the receiver’s roll, the content of 
the blue star envelope will remain as it was. The same procedure is repeated for the 
red project. From this randomization process, there is 1/6 chance that the contents of 
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the envelope with the blue star will be swapped with the contents of the envelope with 
the blue pentagon. There is also 1/6 chance that the content of the envelope with the 
red star will be swapped with the content of the envelope with the red pentagon. 
Subjects will be told that Receivers have an option of selecting the blue star or the red 
star envelope24. The blue star envelope contained the X or Y while the red star 
enveloped contained Z. 
Individual Receivers, in turn, will be asked to go to the private partition to indicate 
their preferences to implement GP_S or GP_O. At the decision partition, each Receiver 
states the Group Project she/he prefers to be implemented. After that each Receiver 
will be asked to state her/his belief with respect to the content of the envelope with the 
blue star, i.e. their belief whether the Sender recommends vector X or Y to GP_S. The 
Receiver will also be asked to state her/his expectation about the co-Receiver’s 
preference. After the preferences and expectations of both Receivers have been elicited 
separately, both Receivers were called to the private partition. Here they were told to 
form a consensus on either the Blue Project or the Red Project. Subjects’ payoffs 
depended on the content of the envelope selected. The instruction, its local language 
translation and illustration given to the villagers in the experiment can  be found in 
Appendix B.  
Both Receivers held discussion to reach a joint decision or a consensus.  All pairs of 
Receivers arrived at a consensus after a few minutes of discussion. Eliciting 
expectations from each Receiver during their individual decision-making stage helped 
to make a pair of Receivers arrive at their consensus decisions quickly 25. Making a 
pair of Receivers agree on a decision did not cause any problem as all of them arrived 
at their decision quickly. There is the possibility that the non-anonymous setting 
facilitates this process.  
We recruited 324 villagers at random consisting of 108 as Senders and 216 as 
Receivers. An average Sender earned MYR23.10 (£ 4.43) while an average Receiver 
earned MYR18.92 (£3.63). 36 experimental sessions were conducted from December 
 
24 We randomized the GP-S and GP-O labelling of blue and red according to session. For example, in 
some sessions, GP-S is identified as the red project. This is to rule out any possibility that one colour 
is systematically preferred over the other. A statistical test found that Receivers selected blue or red 
projects based on the possible content, and not colour.   
25 We did not time the duration of discussion by a pair of Receivers given the logistics of handling 
three different timers for three different groups at the same time.  
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2016 to February 2017. Table 7 below contains the summary statistics of villagers that 
participated as subjects in this experiment.  
Table 3.7. Summary statistics of subjects’ characteristics 
Personal Characteristics Mean Min Max 
Age (years) 44.12 18 90 
Male  0.413   
Years in Education (years) 7.53 0 17 
Cash crop  0.546   
Aristocracy strata  0.101   
Former slave strata  0.157   
Village council  0.241   
Migrant to the village  0.247   
Observations 324   
Note: Variables in Table 3.7 were elicited in Part 4 after the sender-receiver agency game 
was concluded. Age refers to the age of the subjects. Variable male takes a value of 1 if 
the subject is a male, if the subject is a female that variable will take a value of 0. Years 
in education is the number of years a subject received formal schooling. Before 2015, the 
compulsory years of schooling in Malaysia was 6. Variable cash crop takes a value of 1 
if the output from subjects’ agricultural activities are commodities like palm oil or rubber. 
Aristocracy strata takes a value of 1 if a subject reported she/he is a maren (a member of 
aristocracy households), non-maren subjects are identified as 0 in aristocracy strata. 
Variable village council takes a value of 1 if the subject is a member of village 
community council. Those in the slave strata were prevented from migrating in the past. 
Migration to a village only happened with permission from the village’s head. If a 
villager is an adult migrant, variable migrant to the village takes a value of 1, otherwise 
it is 0. Only variable ‘former slave strata’ was not elicited directly from the subjects. The 
mean for variables male, cash crops, aristocracy strata, former slave strata, village 
council, and migrant to the village reports the share of the subjects that reports they have 
the variable’s characteristics. For example, the share of aristocracy in sampled subjects 
are 0.101.   
 
As such, there is similar concern on subjects’ education levels in enabling them 
to understand this experiment’s instructions. Table 3.7 shows that villagers 
recruited for the experiment had an average of 7.53 years of education. This is 
above minimum years of schooling of 6 years under the Malaysian education 
policy. Regardless, there are subjects recruited that did not finished a year of 
school. To mitigate this heterogeneity in subjects’ education levels, everyone had 
to answer two control questions before deciding. Control questions posed to the 
villagers playing in the role of Sender can be found in Appendix B3 and Appendix 
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B4, while Appendices B5 and B6 have the control questions for those in the 
Receivers’ role. Scripts for control questions start on page 212. Subjects were 
allowed three trials and could ask clarifying questions before deciding. 65% of 
the subjects answered the control questions correctly in the first try while the 
instructions for the game had to be explained in full for 28 subjects (8.7% of the 
total)26.  Full explanation was be given to subjects who failed to answer the 
control questions three times in a row or if the subjects asked for it, even in their 
first try. The ratio of default against requested explanations is 9:5. The breakdown 
of subjects’ responses to the control questions is in Table 3.1A of th is chapter’s 
Appendix. 
 
3.6 Results and Findings  
3.6.1 Social status and closeness elicitation behaviour 
Descriptions of social status index, Z-index, the gap between self-perceived index and 
social status index have been discussed in detail in Chapter 2 under Section 2.5.1 on 
page 35. The results in this section only cover the villagers that took part in the 
experiment reported in this chapter.  
Table 3.8 below contains the summary statistics on social status index, Z-index, by 
dimension obtained before the Sender-Receiver game was implemented27.  
Table 3.8. Summary statistics on social status index, Z-index and its correlations 
 Summary Statistics Correlation 
Z-index Mean SD Min Max Success Wealth Edu Fitness Extra 
Success  0.50 0.21 0.016 0.969      
Wealth  0.52 0.23 0.031 1 0.79***     
Education  0.50 0.24 0 1 0.26*** 0.18***    
Fitness  0.50 0.20 0 0.984 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.54***   
Extraversion  0.49 0.18 0.031 0.984 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.17*** 0.39***  
Composite 
Status  
0.50 0.15 0.063 0.968 0.79*** 0.76*** 0.62*** 0.68*** 0.65*** 
Note: Z-index takes a value from 0 to 1. SD stands for standard deviation. Correlation columns 
report the correlation between one status dimension with another. *** Significant at 1 percent; 
** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
 
26 Observations for 4 subjects are missing.  
27 Similar to villagers in Chapter 2, some villagers did make mistakes in the social status elicitation 
task. The adjustment for the formula for social status index is the same as in Chapter 2. 119 mistakes 
were detected from 14,580 elicitations, making the rate of mistake to be 0.8%.  
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In wealth and education status, there are some groups of 9 in which everyone has 
privately ranked a villager in their group as the wealthiest or the most educated. On 
the other hand, the zero value in the minimum column shows that in at least one group, 
everyone privately acknowledged that a person belonged to the bottom of the 
education or physical fitness ranking. The mean columns in Table 3.8 serve as an 
indirect measure of villagers’ tendency to self -enhance or self-efface themselves in the 
elicitation task. A mean of 0.5 would indicate that an average villager receives the 
average value of the Z-index, i.e. 0.5. However, for wealth and extraversion, the mean 
of Z-index is either more or less than 0.5. For wealth status there is an indication that 
most villagers self-efface themselves but placed their position lower on the ladder 
since the mean is above 0.5, while villagers tend to self -enhance themselves in 
extraversion status.  
The correlation test of Z-index for each status dimension shows that there are 
correlations between dimensions. Villagers that have been conferred by others to be 
high-status in one social dimension are more likely to be of high-status in another 
dimension. The strongest correlation can be found between success and wealth 
dimensions. As with Chapter 2, the main social status indicator that will be used in 
here is the composite social status index, that is derived by taking an average from the 
five status dimensions index. The last row of Table 3.8 shows that the composite status 
index in general is highly correlated with the status index from the five dimensions 
elicited.  
The villagers’ perceptions of their own status are also measured in the same way as in 
Chapter 2. We first calculate the self-perceived index in each dimension. The graphical 
illustration that established the relationship between self -perceived status and social 
status assigned by others can be found in Figures 3.3A to 3.7A of this chapter’s 
Appendix. Further statistical tests comparing self -perceived status and social status 
conferred by co-villagers can be found in Table 3.2A of Appendix.  
To control the effect on self -perceived status on decision-making, we incorporated 
differences between conferred social status and self -perceived status. The 
interpretation of this gap is the same as in Chapter 2. When the gap is zero, this 
indicates that there are agreements between social status conferred by villagers and 
self-perceived position. When the gap yields a negative value, it means that the villager 
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self-effaced her/himself by perceiving she/he belonged in a lower status that other 
villagers perceived they should be. Conversely, a positive gap indicates that a group 
member self-enhanced their position by ranking themselves higher than the status 
conferred by other villagers.   
Table 3.9. Summary statistics on self-perceived status index and its correlation across 
dimensions 
 Summary 
Statistics 
Correlations across self-perceived dimensions 
 Mean SD Success Wealth Edu Fit Extra 
Success  0.488 0.33      
Wealth  0.374 0.33 0.43***     
Education  0.522 0.35 0.32*** 0.20***    
Fitness  0.524 0.34 0.29*** 0.27*** 0.31***   
Extraversion  0.579 0.34 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.34***  
Composite 0.497 0.23 0.69*** 0.62*** 0.57*** 0.69*** 0.62**** 
Note: Self-perceived index takes a value from 0 to 1. SD stands for standard deviation. Figures 
in correlation columns report the correlation between one status dimension with another. *** 
Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
Table 3.9 shows the summary statistics on self -perceived status. A villager that 
assigned her/himself in the middle rung would have earned a score of 0.55. The mean 
in Table 3.9 shows the tendency of villagers’ self -perception. Mean values that are 
below 0.55 indicate the tendencies that villagers in general self -effaced themselves by 
ranking themselves at the lower rungs in the elicitation sheet. Subjects self -effaced 
themselves mainly in wealth and success. On the other hand, subjects have tendencies 
to self-enhance themselves in the extraversion dimension.  Self- perceived dimensions 
are weakly correlated to each other as villagers did not place themselves in the same 
rungs in every dimension. This indicates that villagers took the status elicitation task 
seriously and filled in the sheet based on the experimenter’s prompt.  
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Table 3.10. Summary statistics on differences between Z-index and self-perceived 
status 
Group – Self 
Status Gap 
Summary 
Statistics 
 Mean SD 
Success  -0.01 0.32 
Wealth  -0.14 0.32 
Education  0.02 0.26 
Fitness  0.03 0.32 
Extraversion  0.09 0.34 
Composite -0.004 0.21 
Note: Group-self status gap takes a value from -1 to 1. SD stands for standard deviation 
Table 3.10 reports the group-self status gap. With the exception of wealth, other status 
dimensions show low or non-existent gaps between group and self-ranked status. This 
indicates that the self-perception of these villagers is similar to their co-villagers’ 
perceptions on them. The composite group-self status gap also reports non-existence 
of a gap between self-perception and status conferred by group members. 
Results from the Z-index were compared with the villager’s strata to validate the social 
status elicitation task with traditional social stratification. Table 3.11 reports the 
correlation between social status index, Z-index with the traditional strata.   
Table 3.11. Correlations between traditional strata and Z-index, by dimensions 
 Success Wealth Education Fitness Extraversion Composite  
Aristocrats 0.0846 0.0733 0.0569 -
0.0194 
0.0305 0.0616 
Proxy 
Slaves 
0.0914 0.1360** -0.0631 0.0404 0.0461 0.0712 
Note: *** Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
Being a member of an aristocrat family does not have a statistically significant 
correlation with obtaining high Z-index values in any status dimensions according to 
Table 3.11. On the other hand, there is a weak positive statistical relationship between 
wealth and belonging in the slave strata. A potential explanation of the absence of a 
statistical relationship between the Z-index and traditional strata could stem from a 
non-random distribution of villagers’ strata within sessions. For example, in a session 
composed entirely of aristocrat villagers, the mean composite Z-index will be close to 
0.5; the same will be true in a session composed entirely on non-aristocrats. As 
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identification of traditional status only happened at the end of the experiment, it is was 
not possible to detect in advance whether a session had a skewed representation of 
traditional strata.  
The second type of social elicitation that happened in each session is the elicitation of 
social relationship closeness using the IOS scale. A more detailed discussion on IOS 
scale can be found in Chapter 2. Each villager would receive a score valued from 1 to 
7 from other co-villagers in a session and these scores would then be averaged. An 
average villager received an average score of 4.56 from other co-villagers, indicating 
that in general there are fairly strong pre-existing social relationships among villagers. 
The lowest average score a villager received in a session was 1.38 and the highest 
average score was 6.75.  
Table 3.12 reports the correlations between villagers’ IOS scores and their social status 
index in each dimension. Recapitulating from Chapter 2, a villager could receive a 
maximum total score of 56 if every co-villager in the same session felt that this villager 
had a close and deep social relationship with them. The lowest total score a villager 
could receive is 8, i.e. everyone perceived this villager had no social relationship with 
them. The average total score a villager received in this experiment is 36.2, 
establishing that a typical sampled villager had some strong pre-existing social 
relationship other participants in his/her session, outside the experimental setting.    
Table 3.12. Correlations between awarded IOS Z-index, by dimensions 
 Success Wealth Education Fitness Extraversion 
Total IOS 
scores 
0.147*** 0.1164** 0.049 0.083 0.162*** 
Note: *** Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
Figures in Table 3.12 show there are weak positive correlations between relationship 
closeness and success, wealth and extraversion dimensions, i.e. a villager with high 
total IOS scores also has high social status, as measured by the Z-index. On the other 
hand, relationship closeness is not linked to education and fitness status. Despite weak 
correlations, figures in Table 3.12 show that meaningful social relationship is usually 
targeted towards those that have high success, wealth and extraversion status.  
Relationship closeness towards a villager from the aristocrat strata ranges from a 
minimum total score of 21 and a maximum total score of 54. An aristocrat on average 
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receives a total score of 38.2 or an average score of 4.78, which is slightly higher than 
the scores received by an average villager.  There is a small indication that social 
hierarchy  has an influence on relationship closeness as subjects who self-identified as 
aristocrat recorded statistically significant differences in relationship closeness 
directed to them compared to other non-aristocrats in the village (Mann-Whitney (M-
W) stats for aristocracy = 1.687, p-value = 0.0917).  
On the other hand, for villagers from the former slave strata, the mean value of the 
total score was 36.7 (the mean value of the average score was 4.59). This is also 
slightly higher than the population average. There are no statistical differences in total 
or average IOS scores received by members of aristocrat strata and members of former 
slave strata. This could indicate that relationship closeness between those from former 
slave strata is built over social interactions, and not driven by hierarchy (M-W stats for 
former slave strata = 0.4800, p-value = 0.6891). Unlike villagers recruited in Chapter 
2, in this Chapter we find weak evidence that villagers in general stated stronger social 
relationship closeness with those belonging to aristocrat members.  
Table 3.13 shows the summary statistics of subjects based on the roles assigned to 
them. This table shows that despite our best to randomise villagers into the role of 
Sender or Receivers, there are more male Receivers compared to Sender and there are 
more Senders than Receivers that engaged in cash crop production. They will be 
incorporated as control variables in the subsequent analysis section.  
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Table 3.13. Balance: Demographic, social and economic background of 
Sender and Receivers 
 Sender Receivers Difference 
Personal Characteristics Mean Mean 
Age (years) 44.11 44.12 0.0074 
[0.9941] 
Male  0.34 0.45 -1.838* 
[0.0669] 
Years in Education (years) 7.75 7.42 0.6894 
[0.4911] 
Engaged in cash crop 0.62 0.51 1.8984* 
[0.0585] 
Aristocracy strata  0.14 0.08 1.5596 
[0.1198] 
Former slave strata  0.16 0.16 0.0000 
[1.0000] 
Village council  0.23 0.25 -2.748 
[0.7836] 
Observations 108 216  
Note:  Explanation of the means of age, and years in education can be found in Note for Table 
3.7.The means for variables male, cash crops, aristocracy strata, former slave strata, and village 
council report the share of the subjects that report they have the variable’s characteristics. For 
example, the share of aristocracy in sampled subjects assigned as representatives is 0.06. 
Difference is calculated using two independent samples t-test. *** significant at 1 percent level, 
** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level. 
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Table 3.14.  Balance: Elicited indices and IOS of sender and receivers 
 Sender Receivers 
Difference 
Mean Mean 
Z-Index    
Success 0.509 0.498 0.4422 
[0.6586] 
Wealth 0.518 0.516 0.0824 
[0.9343] 
Education 0.491 0.500 0.3474 
[0.7285] 
Physical Fitness 0.511 0.491 0.8885 
[0.3749] 
Extraversion 0.500 0.486 0.7006] 
0.4840 
Composite 0.506 0.498 0.4361 
[0.6631] 
Self-Perceived Index    
Success 0.474 0.495 -0.5214 
[0.6024] 
Wealth 0.387 0.368 0.4786 
[0.6325] 
Education 0.554 0.505 1.1938 
[0.2335] 
Physical Fitness 0.509 0.531 -0.5361 
[0.5923] 
Extraversion 0.602 0.567 0.8594 
[0.3907] 
Composite 0.505 0.493 0.4581 
[0.6472] 
IOS     
Total score received 36.2 36.2 0.000 
[1.000] 
Observation 108 216  
Difference is calculated using two independent sample t-test to detect differences in variables’ 
averages between sender and receivers. *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent 
level, * significant at 10 percent level 
 
Table 3.14 reports the average scores received by Sender and Receivers through the 
elicitation part of the experiment. These data show that there are no statistically 
differences in characteristics between subjects assigned as Senders or Receivers.  
3.6.2 Sender’s recommendation 
In this one-shot sender-receiver agency game, a Sender could place either vector X or 
vector Y as a recommendation for a group project, GP_S. Figure 3.2 shows the 
distribution of the decisions made by Senders in this experiment. From 108 Senders’ 
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decision, 94 or 87% of selected vector remained as GP_S after the randomization 
process. This is slightly higher than the expected 5/6 or 83% that could occur from the 
dice rolling outcome. The non-parametric test finds that there is no statistical 
difference between the expected outcome from the randomization process and the 
actual outcome from Sender’s decision (Z-score = 0.7661, p-value = 0.4413). This 
would mean that the randomization mechanism, i.e. a dice roll, did not statistically 
affect the outcome of the Sender’s decisions.    
Figure 3.2. Outcome of GP_S assigned by Senders 
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows that the public-spirited vector X was chosen more frequently than 
the self-interested one, Y. 55% or 59 Senders choose to recommend vector X in GP_S 
and the remaining 45% or 49 Senders choose vector Y. 
Hypothesis 1 proposes that there is a positive relationship between Sender’s public 
spiritedness and high social status.  This will be tested in two stages, first through non-
parametric testing and then with regression analysis.  
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Table 3.15. Relationship between assigning X to the group and social status  
Social status indicator Observation Z-Index 
Spearman 
correlation 
[p-value] 
Self-Rank 
Spearman 
in group of 
9 
correlation 
[p-value] 
Ladder 
Elicitation 
Success 108 -0.0248 
[0.7991] 
0.1394 
[0.1501] 
Wealth 108 0.0275 
[0.7779] 
0.0259 
[0.7901] 
 
Education 108 -0.0373 
[0.7016] 
0.0442 
[0.6497] 
Physical fitness 108 -0.1596* 
[0.0989] 
-0.0599 
[0.5383] 
Outgoingness 108 -0.2233** 
[0.0202] 
-0.938** 
[0.0444] 
Composite 108 -0.1151 
[0.2354] 
 
Traditional 
strata 
Aristocrat 108 0.1509 
[0.1191] 
Proxy slave 108 0.0364 
[0.7083] 
Notes: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 
percent level. 
Hypothesis 1 proposes that Senders from higher status background, identified through 
the elicitation exercises and through the traditional strata to which they belong,  will 
be more likely to select vector X as the content of GP_S. Table 3.15 examines the 
correlations between choice of the public-spirited option and social status. From Table 
3.15, we find that public-spiritedness has no clear overall relationship with social 
status. When a person’s status is assigned by other villagers, the only statistically 
significant results are negative relationships between public-spiritedness and status for 
physical fitness and outgoingness.  When a person’s status is self -assigned, the only 
statistically significant result is again negative (for outgoingness). There is the 
possibility that Sender’s public-spiritedness (or lack of it) is influenced by the status 
of their matched Receivers. To account for this possibility, robustness checks on 
Sender’s public spiritedness decision and Receivers’ social status are in Table 3.2A of 
this chapter’s Appendix. From Table 3.2A, there is some indication that Senders take 
self-interested decisions when they are paired with wealthy Receivers within the same 
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session. Senders’ preferences to opt for public-spirited vector is not related to the 
status of the Receiver she/he was paired with.  
Similar to the experiment in Chapter 2, this experiment also took place in a non-
anonymous setting with most of the relationship data elicited before the decision-
making stage. Therefore, the non-parametric results above do not account for: i) the 
possibility that status of Sender and Receivers interacting with each other, ii) 
unobservable characteristics of Sender and Receivers, and, iii) village-level 
heterogeneity. To address this concern, I will turn to regression analysis.    
Through econometric analysis, I’ve incorporated elicited status of Sender and 
Receivers along other characteristics to explain Senders’ decisions to  be public-
spirited. I estimated the economic equations below using probit regression. There will 
be 5 regression specifications. Regression (1) will only examine Sender’s status-based 
variables. The specification is as follows;  
𝑋𝑆 =  𝛼1𝐺𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝑆 
Recommending X to GPS is the dependent variable, GSS is the composite group status 
index given by co-villagers in a session to the Sender, TSS is the sender’s traditional 
status, either as a member of an aristocrat family or a former slave strata.  GSS is 
constructed using the value of five Z-index elicited through the social status elicitation.   
Regression (2) extended specification (1) by incorporating the social status variables 
related to group members as well as the influence of social relationship closeness 
between Sender and Receivers. The specification for model (2) will be; 
𝑋𝑆 =  𝛼1 𝐺𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼3𝐺𝑆?̅? + 𝛼4𝑇𝑆?̅? + 𝛼5𝐼𝑂𝑆?̅? + 𝜀𝑆 , 
in which 𝐺𝑆?̅? is the average value of composite z-index for the two Receivers matched 
with the Sender, 𝑇𝑆?̅? is the belonging to one or both Receivers to the traditional strata, 
and 𝐼𝑂𝑆?̅? is the dispersion in IOS scores given by Sender to both matched Receivers.  
Specification for Regression (3) is a replication of Model (2) but with the incorporation 
of village-level effect to account for heterogeneity between villages. Regression (3) 
combines the explanatory variables in Regression (1) and (2) and it can be represented 
as; 
𝑋𝑆 =  𝛼1𝑣 + 𝛼2𝐺𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼4𝐺𝑆?̅? + 𝛼5𝑇𝑆?̅? + 𝛼6𝐼𝑂𝑆?̅? + 𝜀𝑆 , 
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Specifications (4) and (5) extends the specification in model (3) by including control 
variables for Sender and Receivers. They are gender, age, memberships in the village 
council and a villager’s status as a migrant. Regressions (4) and (5) look at Sender’s 
status for the elicited task and as reported by villagers during the socio -economic 
survey. Table 3.16 contains the results for regression specifications (1) tot (5).  
Table 3.16. Determinants of Sender’s decisions 
 No 
controls 
Receivers’ 
status 
Village 
level effect 
Sender’s 
control 
Receivers’ 
control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Composite z-index -0.909 -1.273 -1.207 -1.251 -1.245 
 (0.744) (0.790) (0.973) (0.998) (1.023) 
Aristocrat 0.645 0.515 0.787* 1.374** 1.544*** 
 (0.482) (0.523) (0.453) (0.564) (0.554) 
Proxy slave  0.255 0.468 0.457 0.790* 0.671 
 (0.325) (0.410) (0.424) (0.463) (0.477) 
Status index control 
(self-perceived index) 
 
Receivers’ status 
   0.243 
(0.699) 
0.0192 
(0.703) 
 
Receivers’ z -index  -1.854 -1.870 -2.626* -2.599 
  (1.437) (1.466) (1.580) (1.804) 
Aristocrat  0.0309 0.0328 -0.211 -0.0140 
  (0.320) (0.387) (0.448) (0.441) 
Proxy slave  -0.155 -0.221 -0.115 -0.0295 
  (0.312) (0.364) (0.357) (0.360) 
Dispersion in IOS 
score 
 0.0413 0.0283 -0.0332 -0.0540 
  (0.0894) (0.0893) (0.0946) (0.0941) 
Constant 0.453 1.524* 0.928 1.639 2.791 
 (0.371) (0.885) (1.148) (1.507) (1.730) 
Sender’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Receivers’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 108 108 106 106 
Pseudo R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0.0290 
3.26 
0.0481 
5.43 
0.1388 
8.80 
0.1763 
17.08 
0.2023 
22.05 
Note: Probit regressions. Dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the Sender assigns X to the GP_S 
and 0 if she/he assigns Y. Table reports coefficients with clustered standard errors on session in 
parentheses. Variables derived from indices take any value from 0 to 1. The aristocrat variable takes a 
value of 1 if the Sender reports that she/he a member of aristocrat family at the end of the experiment, 
and 0 otherwise. Former slave strata take the value of 1 if the Sender is inferred to belong formerly in 
the slave strata, and 0 otherwise. Status index control is derived from self -perceived and z-index of 
Senders. Composite z-index of Receivers takes a value from 0 to 1 and is the average of the status 
indexes of the group members in the same group. Dispersion in IOS score measures the difference in 
IOS score assigned by Sender to both Receivers and it takes a value between 0 and 6. The value of 0 
would means that the Sender views both Receivers equally in terms of social relationship closeness. On 
the other hand, any value that is above 0 would mean that the Sender values her/his relationship 
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closeness with one Receiver over the other Receiver. Variables used as controlled in the specifications 
above are, i) age, ii) gender, iii) membership in village council and iv) being a migrant in the village.  
*** Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
Hypothesis 1 stated that Senders with high-status, either by elicitation or traditional 
strata, will be more likely to assign vector X as the content to GP_S. Without 
incorporating village-level heterogeneity, status-relevant variables are statistically 
insignificant. The aristocrat effect only emerges after the inclusion of village-level 
effect, in which Senders from aristocrat background are found to be more public-
spirited than the non-aristocrats.  The aristocrat willingness to recommend X could 
reflect the norm of noblesse oblige these villages. 
Results from other status-related and control variables are less consistent in all 
specification used. For example, Control variable of Sender’s migration sta tus only 
matters in specification (4) but not (5). A consistency with specifications (1) to (5) in 
Table 3.16 is that none of the chi-square χ2 test for independence return statistically 
significant results. This would means that there is no significant association between 
Senders’ likelihood to recommend X as outcome of GP_S and variables used to 
identify status differences and control variables if these specifications are jointly 
tested.  
Hence, Hypothesis 1 that stated high-status Senders are more likely to be public-
spirited can be partially accepted.  
Result 1: There is an indication that Sender’s status as an aristocrat resulted in public-
spirited decision, there is inconclusive evidence that high-status Senders in general 
are more likely to be public-spirited. 
Table 3.4A to Table 3.8A in this chapter’s appendix contains additional regression 
outputs as robustness checks to specification in Table 3.16. These tables test the 
regression specification based on each of the elicited status dimensions. Aristocracy 
variable remains statistically significant in every robustness check conducted. The 
regression outputs also show that Senders that have been conferred with high physical 
fitness and extraversion status by their co-villagers are less likely to recommend X as 
the outcome of GP_S. Meaningful statistical relationship could not be found for 
success, wealth and education statuses.  
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Another factor that might influence a Sender’s decision is her/his expectation on 
Receivers’ decisions. A Sender’s expectations on Receivers came in two forms; i) 
expectation on incentivised consensus decision, and ii) expectation on each Receiver’s 
preferred group project.  
When the Sender’s expectation is measured in relation to a consensus decision, 76% 
of the Senders expect GP_S will be selected over GP_O28. Table 3.17 shows Senders’ 
decision broken down by their expectation on the consensus decision. Whether 
Senders recommend X or Y, a large majority of them (75% of Senders who 
recommend X and 78% of Senders who recommend Y) expect that their decisions will 
be implemented. This indicates that a majority of Senders, regardless of their 
decisions, deliberately decide as an agent for the Receivers.  
Table 3.17. Senders’ decision and expectations on consensus decision, in percentage 
No  Relative 
Frequency 
[N = 108] 
1. Assign X to GP_S and Expect 
Implementation of GP_S 
0.41 
(44) 
2. Assign X to GP_S and Expect No 
Implementation of GP_S 
0.14 
(15) 
3. Assign Y to GP_S and Expect 
Implementation of GP_S 
0.35 
(38) 
4. Assign Y to GP_S and Expect No 
Implementation of GP_S 
0.10 
(11) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of the decisions. 
Since the experiment happened in a non-anonymous setting, Senders also report their 
expectations on each of the two Receivers in their respective group. When Senders’ 
expectations are measured as expectations on both Receivers corresponding as 
individuals, the percentage of Senders’ expecting GP_S implementation reduces to 
47% and for implementing GP_O, it is at 14%. The remaining 39% of Senders expects 
that the Receivers in their group will implement different decisions if they were to 
decide as single Receivers. A potential explanation to these differences in expectation 
is that a proportion of Senders is engaged in a hedging strategy, i.e. expecting each 
Receiver in the group to select an opposing group project. By comparing Senders’ 
 
2828 This rate is close to the Senders’ prediction rates that Receiver will follow Sender’s message 
reported in the literature of sender-receiver deception games. 72.3% of Senders in Sutter (2009) 
predicted that their Receivers will follow their messages, while 73.4% expected the same in Innes & 
Mitra (2013). 
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expectations on the first Receiver (labelled B1 in experiment) and the second Receiver 
(labelled B2 in experiment), we found there is no systematic differences in Senders’ 
expectation, i.e. there is no evidence that Senders’ expectations were influenced by 
this labelling (χ2 = 2.58, p = 0.108). Table 3.18 shows the breakdown of Senders’ 
decision and their expectations about Receivers’ individual decision. 88% of public-
spirited Senders and 84% of self -interested Senders expected that at least one Receiver 
would implement GP_S. Senders’ decisions were independent of whether she/he 
expected both or one of the Receivers to accept her/his recommendation in GP_S (χ2 
= 0.8313, p = 0.6598). 
Table 3.18. Senders’ decision and expectations on individual Receivers’ decision  
No  Relative 
Frequency 
[N = 108] 
1. Assign X to GP_S and Expect 
Implementation of GP_S by Both 
Receivers 
0.28 
(30) 
 
2. Assign X to GP_S and Expect 
Implementation of GP_S by at least one 
Receiver 
0.20 
(22) 
3. Assign X to GP_S and Expect No 
Implementation of GP_S by Both 
Receivers 
0.06 
(7) 
4. Assign Y to GP_S and Expect 
Implementation of GP_S by Both 
Receivers 
0.19 
(21) 
5. Assign Y to GP_S and Expect 
Implementation of GP_S by at least one 
Receiver 
0.19 
(20) 
6. Assign Y to GP_S and Expect No 
Implementation of GP_S by both Receiver 
0.07 
(8) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of the decisions. 
Table 3.19 provides regression analysis on Senders’ decisions to recommend X to 
GP_S with Senders’ expectations of it being implemented. These results show there is 
no relationship between any measure of the Sender’s expectation about Receivers and 
the decision to assign outcome X.  
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Table 3.19. Determinants of Sender’s decision and expectations  
Variables Assign X =1 
Expecting implementation of GP_S 
by both Receivers privately = 1 
0.340 
(0.298) 
  
Expecting implementation of GP_S 
by at least one Receiver = 1 
 0.322 
(0.397) 
 
Expecting implementation of GP_S as 
a consensus Decision = 1 
  0.220 
(0.315) 
Village Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.674*** 
(0.217) 
-0.765* 
(0.397) 
-0.651** 
(0.315) 
Log likelihood -67.633 -68.11 -68.21 
Pseudo R2 0.091 0.0845 0.0832 
Observations 108 108 108 
χ2 Test  1.31 0.66 -0.651** 
Note: Probit regressions. Dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the Sender assigns X to 
the GPS and 0 if she/he assigns Y. Table reports coefficients with clustered standard errors by 
session in parentheses. *** Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant 
at 10 percent.  
 
Despite the weakness of our statistical findings, our analysis of Senders’ behaviour 
reveals some interesting patterns. First, a majority of Senders exhibit public-spirited 
behaviour by recommending vector X to GP_S despite knowing that they would 
receive a higher personal payoff by recommending Y. Second, if a Sender belongs to 
the aristocrat strata, she/he is more likely to be public spirited. Third, a high proportion 
of Senders expect their recommendations to be accepted by the Receivers, but 
expectations about Receivers did not drive Senders public-spirited behaviour. This 
suggests that most Senders perceived themselves to be acting as agents to their 
Receivers while not perceiving public-spiritedness as an act that required reciprocal 
trust from Receivers. 
3.6.3 Receivers’ Acceptance 
Each Receiver indicated her/his preference for GP_S or GP_O in private. After that, 
the two Receivers in each group met, held a discussion and arrived at a consensus on 
the group project implementation. It could be GP_S (blue project), recommended by 
the Sender, or the outside option, GP_O (red project). Payoffs for Receivers and the 
Sender were determined by the consensus decision. The act of Receivers accepting 
GP_S means they have recognized the Sender’s agency in deciding the content of 
GP_S for them.   
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There are 108 pairs of Receivers and 76 or 70% of them decided to implement GP_S 
over GP_O. Hence, a majority of pairs of Receivers recognized the agency of their 
respective Senders. Since 55% of Senders made the public-spirited choice of X, 
compared with the critical value, r, of 30%, implementing GP_S was ex-post optimal 
for Receivers.  Thus, the behaviour of Receivers was broadly consistent with self-
interested behaviour and realistic expectations about the behaviour of Senders.  
Hypothesis 2 proposes that Receivers are more likely to implement GP_S if the Sender 
is a person with high social status. To address this hypothesis, we will analyse the 
consensus decision of Receivers and then decision preferences of Receivers as 
individuals. We will conduct non-parametric analysis for pairs of Receivers first and 
then address the preferences of singular Receivers.  
Table 3.20.  Descriptive statistics on consensus decision due to Sender 
 GP_S GP_O Mann-Whitney 
test 
[p-value] 
Sender’s Z-Index Mean 
(SD) 
 
Mean 
(SD) 
 
Success 0.512 
(0.210) 
0.504 
(0.208) 
0.444 
[0.6568] 
Wealth 0.529 
(0.229) 
0.493 
(0.221) 
0.925 
[0.3548] 
Education 0.509 
(0.238) 
0.447 
(0.224) 
1.235 
[0.2168] 
Physical Fitness 0.516 
(0.200) 
0.501 
(0.187) 
0.639 
[0.5226] 
Extraversion 0.507 
(0.180) 
0.484 
(0.177) 
0.747 
(0.4549) 
Composite 0.514 
(0.159) 
0.486 
(0.148) 
1.198 
[0.2311] 
Sender’s Traditional 
Status 
   
Aristocrat 0.171 
(0.379) 
0.063 
(0.246) 
1.483 
[0.1382] 
Former slave 0.157 
(0.367) 
0.156 
(0.368) 
0.021 
[0.9830] 
Observation 76 32  
Difference is calculated using Mann-Whitney test to detect differences in differences between Senders 
who recommendations were accepted and Senders whose recommendations were rejected.. *** 
significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
Table 3.20 shows the descriptive statistics on consensus decision based on the social 
status of the Sender. We compared the mean and standard errors of Senders that have 
their recommendation accepted (GP_S) and those who did not (GP_O). In all measures 
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of social status, there are no statistical differences detected between Senders in groups 
that select GP_S or GP_O as shown the Mann-Whitney test.  
Table 3.21 contains non-parametric tests for consensus decisions by pairs of 
Receivers. It examines the relationship between accepting GP_S as consensus decision 
and Sender’s social status.  
Table 3.21. Relationship between accepting GP_S and Sender’s status 
Z-index Observations Spearman correlation with 
Sender’s z-index 
[p-value] 
Success 108 0.0429 
[0.6590] 
Wealth 108 0.0895 
[0.3572] 
Education 108 0.1194 
[0.2184] 
Physical fitness 108 0.0618 
[0.5251] 
Outgoingness 108 0.0722 
[0.4575] 
Composite 108 0.1158 
[0.2328] 
Notes: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 
percent level. 
Based on Table 3.21, consensus behaviour has no statistical relationship with Sender’s 
elicited social status. Similarly, decisions to accept GP_S are also not related to 
Sender’s belonging to aristocracy (Spearman rho = 0.1433, p-value = 0.1389) or from 
former slave strata (Spearman rho = 0.0021, p-value = 0.9831).  To address the 
possibility that the consensus decisions to accept GP_S is driven by Receivers’ 
personal status, I have conducted a robustness check in Table 3.9A of this chapter’s 
appendix. There is no relationship between consensus and Receivers’ social status.  
Result 2: Receivers’ consensus decision to implement GP_S could not be predicted by 
any status indicators, either elicited from the elicitation task or real-world based 
status. 
While only the consensus decision was incentivised, each Receiver communicated 
their individual preferences to implement GP_S or GP_O. Out of the 216 Receivers, 
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64% or 138 stated that they privately preferred to implement GP_S before discussing 
their decisions and forming a consensus with the other co-Receiver. Table 3.22 
contains the results from the non-parametric analysis on Receivers’ individual 
preferences to selected GP_S over GP_O in relation to the social status of Senders.  
Table 3.22. Relationship between individually preferring GP_S and Sender’s status  
Z-index Observation Spearman correlations with 
Sender’s z-index 
[p-value] 
Success 216 -0.0105 
[0.8779] 
Wealth 216 0.0578 
[0.3977] 
Education 216 -0.0199 
[0.7707] 
Physical fitness 216 -0.0133 
[0.8459] 
Outgoingness 216 -0.0198 
[0.7723] 
Composite 216 -0.0206 
[0.7638] 
Notes: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent 
level. 
 
Table 3.22 shows that the elicited social status of the Sender has no relationship with 
each Receiver’s preference on GP_S over GP_O. With respect to traditional status of 
Sender, there is no significant relationship for aristocracy (Spearman = 0.0790, p-
value = 0.2478) or former slave strata (Spearman = 0.0338, p-value = 0.6211).  
Like Sender’s decisions, Receivers also stated their preferences and made decisions in 
non-anonymized conditions. Therefore, we will turn to regression analysis to examine 
how social status affected Receivers’ preferences to select GP_S or GP_O.  
The specification for regression (1) examines only the Sender’s social status as a 
determinant of Receivers’ preferences:  
𝐺𝑃_𝑆𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼1𝐺𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼2𝑇𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝑆 
The dependent variable 𝐺𝑃_𝑆𝑅𝑖  take a value of 1 if a Receiver prefer to implement 
GP_S over GP_O.  GSs is the Sender’s composite z-index, elicited from a session of 9 
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subjects, while TSs is the traditional status of the Sender. Regression specification (2) 
expanded specification (1) by including IOS scores assigned by Receivers to their 
respective Sender. Regression specification (3) included several Sender’s 
characteristics as control variables; namely age, gender, membership in village council 
and whether the Sender is a migrant to the village. Village-level effects are included 
in specification (4) to account for village-level heterogeneity. Regression (5) is an 
expanded version of specification (4) with the inclusion of Receivers’ social status and 
control variables. The specification for regression (5) is: 
𝐺𝑃 _𝑆𝑅𝑖 = ∝1𝑣+ 𝛼2𝐺𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼3𝑇𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑂𝑆𝑆 +∝5 𝐺𝑆𝑅𝑖 +∝6 𝑇𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑆 
Since a Receiver needs to form a consensus with her/his co-Receiver afterwards, there 
is a possibility that a Receiver adjusts his/her preferences early on, taking account of 
the co-Receiver with which he/she is matched. To address this concern, specification 
(6) includes co-Receiver’s status, closeness and other control variables that might have 
influenced a Receiver’s preference in selecting GP_S over GP_O.  
Table 3.23 contains the output of determinants of Receiver’s preferences based on 
regression specifications (1) to (6).  
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Table 3.23 Determinants of Receivers’ preferences 
 Sender’s 
status 
Sender’s 
status+IOS 
Sender’s 
control 
Village-
level effect 
Receiver’s 
status 
Co-
Receiver 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Senders’ Status 
Composite z-index 
 
-0.114 
 
-0.161 
 
-0.473 
 
-0.504 
 
-0.470 
 
-0.486 
 (0.631) (0.633) (0.720) (0.730) (0.773) (0.775) 
Aristocrat 0.340 0.291 0.243 -0.183 -0.269 0.0199 
 (0.268) (0.268) (0.312) (0.388) (0.368) (0.314) 
Proxy slave  0.176 0.178 0.288 0.688** 0.693** 0.620* 
 (0.254) (0.253) (0.255) (0.341) (0.343) (0.328) 
IOS score  0.0374 0.0583 0.114** 0.125** 0.116** 
  (0.0574) (0.0566) (0.0555) (0.0554) (0.0583) 
Receiver’s status       
Composite z-index     -0.0975 0.337 
     (0.693) (0.820) 
Aristocrat     0.510 0.524 
     (0.451) (0.526) 
Proxy slave      -0.499 -0.552 
     (0.360) (0.363) 
Status index control     -0.0600 -0.106 
(self-perceived index)     (0.473) (0.512) 
Constant 0.341 0.190 0.496 1.172* 1.105 1.225 
 (0.329) (0.384) (0.552) (0.638) (0.824) (1.101) 
Sender’s controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Receiver’s controls No No No No Yes Yes 
Co-Receiver’s controls No No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 214 214 214 214 214 
R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0.0069 
2.08 
0.0088 
2.14 
0.0325 
5.91 
0.1621 
10.47 
0.1861 
20.44 
0.2241 
42.92*** 
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Note: Probit regressions. Dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the Receiver privately 
prefers to implement GP_S, and 0 if she/he prefers GP_O. Table reports coefficients with 
clustered standard errors by session in parentheses. Variables derived from social status 
indices take any value from 0 to 1. The aristocrat variable takes a value of 1 if the 
Receiver/assigned Sender/assigned co-Receiver reports that she/he a member of aristocrat 
family at the end of the experiment, and 0 otherwise. Former slave strata variable takes the 
value of 1 if the Receiver/assigned Sender/assigned co-Receiver is inferred to belong formerly 
in the slave strata, and 0 otherwise. Control variables for Senders and Receivers are: age, 
gender, membership in village council and being a migrant to the village. Control variables 
for co-Receivers are composite z-index for co-Receiver, her/his aristocracy or slave status 
along with the same control variables of Sender and Receiver.  *** Significant at 1 percent; 
** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
 
Regression specifications (1) to (4) examine the relationship between Receivers’ 
preferences and the Sender’s characteristics. Only after incorporating village-level 
effect, the specification (4) yielded statistically significant effects. Specifications (4) 
to (6) show that a Receiver matched with a Sender from the lowest strata and/or a 
Sender with whom the Receiver has a strong social relationship is more likely to accept 
GP_S from Sender.   
Statistical outputs in Tables 3.20 to 3.23 show that higher status Senders did not have 
an influence on Receivers’ willingness to implement GP_S over GP_O. Hence, 
Hypothesis 2 could not be accepted. For regression models and specifications that 
incorporate separate social status indexes for each elicited status dimension, refer to 
Tables 3.10A to 3.14A in the Appendix.   
Result 3:  A Receiver is more likely to prefer GP_S over GP_O if they have a close 
relationship with the Sender. High status of the Sender did not influence the Receiver’s 
likelihood to prefer GP_S over GP_O. 
As this game is implemented in a non-anonymized setting, Receiver’s and co-
Receiver’s characteristics could have influenced Receivers’ preferences. The 
regression specification in column (6) of Table 3.23 included co-Receiver’s status and 
other potentially relevant characteristics of the co-Receiver as control variables. The 
only variable that produced a statistically significant effect is co-Receiver’s 
membership in the village council: a Receiver is less likely to prefer GP_S if she/he is 
matched with a co-Receiver who serves as a member of village’s council. Members 
of a village council typically have a good relationship with the village’s head and are 
involved in the execution and implementation of village-level policy. This is parallel 
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to the role of middle managers in modern organizations. Receivers preference due to 
her/his partnered co-Receiver’s council membership suggests that Receivers prefer to 
consult someone with administrative status in the village before recognizing the 
agency from the Sender. 
While Hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted, the strong effect of co-Receivers’ 
membership in the village council indicates that co-Receivers play an important role 
in shaping Receivers willingness to recognize Senders’ agency. This finding 
strengthens the suspicion that consensus decisions will have an element of conformity 
driven by Receiver-to-Receiver relationships. 
Table 3.24 shows the descriptive statistics on a Receiver’s social status relative to their 
co-Receiver. Entries in this table show the means of the higher and lower ranked status 
of Receivers for each group and the statistical differences between groups that chooses 
GP_S or GP_O.  
Table 3.24 Descriptive statistics on consensus decision due to co-Receiver 
 Consensus GP_S Consensus GP_O Mann-Whitney 
statistics [p-value] 
 Low 
mean 
(sd) 
High 
mean 
(sd) 
Low 
mean 
(sd) 
High 
mean 
(sd) 
GP_O 
low vs 
GP_S 
low  
GP_O 
high vs 
GP_S 
high 
Co-Receiver’s Z-Index 
Success 0.357 
(0.170) 
0.624 
(0.022) 
0.411 
(0.155) 
0.618 
(0.030) 
1.316 
[0.1882] 
-0.172 
[0.8637] 
Wealth 0.361 
(0.177) 
0.652 
(0.212) 
0.416 
(0.152) 
0.662 
(0.203) 
1.828* 
[0.0676] 
0.121 
[0.9036] 
Education 0.369 
(0.201) 
0.646 
(0.198) 
0.346 
(0.197) 
0.620 
(0.222) 
-0.562 
[0.5741] 
-0.454 
[0.6495] 
Physical 0.354 
  (0.144) 
0.617 
(0.157) 
0.371 
(0.162) 
0.633 
(0.153) 
0.428 
[0.6689] 
0.313 
[0.7542] 
Outgoingness 0.372 
(0.140) 
0.586 
(0.146) 
0.403 
(0.118) 
0.598 
(0.154) 
1.269 
[0.2043] 
-0.040 
[0.9678] 
Composite 0.399 
(0.118) 
0.589 
(0.125) 
0.435 
(0.101) 
0.580 
(0.136) 
1.369 
[0.1709] 
-0.676 
[0.4989] 
Observation 76 76 32 32 108 108 
Difference is calculated using Mann-Whitney test detect differences in variables’ averages between 
accepting and rejecting Sender’s recommendation.*** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 
5 percent level, * significant at 10 percent level 
Table 3.24 compared the means of z-index for each status dimensions by the relative 
status of both Receivers within a group.  Table 3.24 examined the differences among 
171 
 
low status Receivers and high-status Receivers and their consensus. Among low-status 
Receivers, only the wealth dimension shows statistically significant effects in which 
the low-status Receivers that picked GP_O have higher status than the low-status 
Receivers that select GP_S. No other statistically significant differences can be 
detected among the high-status Receivers that agreed on GP_O or GP_S as consensus. 
Groups that have selected GP_S have lower means for its lower status Receivers in all 
status dimensions with the exception of education status.  
The 64% preferences towards GP_S translated to 70% of implementation under 
consensus decision. 36 groups reported contradicting preferences; i.e. in a pair of 
Receivers, one Receiver preferred to implement GP_S while the other Receiver 
preferred GP_O. However not every pair has Receivers with unequal status. For 
example, a village council member is present in 13 out of 36 pairs. 
Once a pair of Receivers must decide on a consensus, 23 or 64% of them chose to 
implement GP_S. A further line of inquiry is to test how Receivers resolved 
contradictions in private preference to arrive at the consensus decision. 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that consensus decisions will be positively biased towards the 
preferences of the higher status co-Receivers. For example, if a high-status co-
Receiver privately prefers GP_O, the consensus will form around GP_O due to 
conformity from lower status Receivers. Analysis to determine the validity of 
Hypothesis 3 could only involve pairs of Receivers that reported contradicting private 
preferences before they proceed to discuss with each other to form a consensus. Table 
3.25 contains the relevant statistics and tests for Hypothesis 3.  
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Table 3.25. Direction of consensus according to status 
Status Sample 
Size 
Ratio 
Favouring 
High Status 
Decision 
Proportion 
that favour 
high status 
decisions 
p-value 
(binomial 
two-tailed 
test) 
Composite Status 36 16: 20 0.44 0.618 
Success Status 36 21: 15 0.58 0.405 
Wealth Status 36 17: 19 0.47 0.868 
Education Status 36 16: 20 0.44 0.618 
Physical Status 36 12: 26 0.33 0.065* 
Extraversion Status 36 18: 18 0.50 1.0 
Village Council 13 8: 5 0.62 0.581 
Male 19 6: 13 0.32 0.167 
Aristocrat 18 5: 13 0.28 0.096* 
Proxy slave  21 9: 12 0.43 0.663 
*** Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
I identified the proportion of consensus decision that is identical to the higher status 
Receiver’s private preference within each group. From the binomial tests conducted, 
there was no evidence that consensus decisions were positively biased towards the 
preferences of the co-Receiver with higher status.  Instead, there was marginally 
significant positive bias towards the preferences of co-Receivers with lower physical 
status and from non-aristocrat strata. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 could not be accepted as 
there is no indication that the private preferences of higher status co-Receivers are 
translated into consensus decisions.  However, these tests have low power because of 
the small number of groups with conflicting preferences and status differences 
between co-Receivers.  
Result 4: There is no evidence that consensus decisions are positively biased towards 
the preferences of the higher status Receiver.   
Another possible explanation of how consensus is reached is stated in Hypothesis 4: 
the consensus decision is positively biased towards GP_S. From the 36 groups that 
have contradicting preferences, 23 groups ended up forming consensus on GP_S. The 
statistical test on this found that there is a marginally statistically significant drift 
towards accepting GP_S (binomial test, p-value: 0.066, one-tail).  Therefore, 
Hypothesis 4 would be accepted.    
Result 5: When there is a contradiction in a pair of Receivers’ preferences, they solve 
this by forming consensus towards GP_S.  
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There are three potential explanations that could explain why contradictions in private 
preferences are solved by drifting towards implementing GP_S.  
First, one of the Receivers might privately prefer GP_O based on factors like mistrust 
towards the Sender, spite for not being selected as the Sender or inability to 
comprehend the game. Switching from GP_O to GP_S could also be motivated by 
reputation-maintenance. A Receiver could potentially want to avoid signalling her/his 
distrust towards a co-villager (the Sender) to another Receiver, therefore agreeing to 
jointly implement GP_S. In villages that have strong norm of trusting villagers over 
outsiders, signalling preferences towards GP_O would be a violation of this norm. 
Second, it is possible that there is social desirability bias. Concurrently, the social 
desirability bias could relate to an experimenter demand effect, in which decisions 
made were motivated to project social cohesion or cooperation within the village to an 
outsider (Zizzo, 2010). Out of 108 groups, there are only 4 in which both Receivers 
change their private preferences from GP_O to GP_S as the consensus. An 
experimenter demand effect could be detected if there were a big share of Receivers 
switching their preferences from GP_O to GP_S in the consensus, however its share 
is marginal. Therefore, inconsistency in private preferences and consensus decision 
reflects Receiver-to-Receiver interactions, as intended in the research design, and not 
towards projecting village-level cohesion or cooperation to the experimenter. 
Third, accepting GP_S is the rational decision. After the discussion stage, both 
Receivers may discuss their beliefs on the outcome of GP_S.  Since the actual 
proportion of public-spirited Senders was much higher than the critical value r, i.e. 
55% vs 30%, implementing GP_s was the ‘correct’ decision for most groups. 
Therefore, one possibility is that rational discussion would tend to produce a consensus 
on GP_S. 
There is the possibility that expectations play a role in the likelihood of GP_S being 
privately preferred by the Receivers. Overall, 59% of Receivers expect their respective 
Senders to recommend vector X or the public-spirited outcome to GP_S. Table 3.26 
shows the breakdown of Receivers’ decisions and their expectations about their 
Senders’ public-spiritedness.  
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Table 3.26. Receiver’s private preferences and expectations 
No  Relative 
Frequency 
[N = 216] 
1. Prefers GP_S with expectation of 
recommendation X 
0.43 
(92) 
2. Prefers GP_S with expectation of 
recommendation Y 
0.21 
(46) 
3. Prefers GP_O with expectation of 
recommendation X 
0.16 
(34) 
4. Prefers GP_O with expectation of 
recommendation Y 
0.20 
(44) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of the decisions. 
If Receivers’ private preferences were independent of their expectations about 
Senders’ decisions, the expected number of Receivers preferring GP_S conditional on 
the Sender being expected to be public-spirited would be 81. However, the observed 
number is 91.  There is highly significant positive correlation between Receivers’ 
expectations of public-spiritedness and preferring GP_S (χ2 = 10.92, p <0.005). This 
indicates that the Receivers’ preferences are based on rational self -interest but at the 
same time this rational self-interest is not harming the Sender.  
As Receivers also stated their expectations about their co-Receivers’ preferences, 
Table 3.27 contains the regression models that test the likelihood to prefer GP_S due 
Receivers’ expectations toward members of her/his group.  
Table 3.27. Receiver’s expectations and decision  
Variables  Prefers GP_S =1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Expect Senders to Recommend X = 1 0.522*** 
(0.186) 
 0.593*** 
(0.206) 
Expect co-Receivers to prefer GP_S = 1  1.038*** 
(0.254) 
1.087*** 
(0.267) 
Village Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.647 
(0.174) 
0.272 
(0.180) 
-0.150 
(.314) 
Log likelihood -120.668 -112.753 -108.425 
R2 0.1459 0.2019 0.2325 
Observations 216 216 216 
χ2 Test  
(value in parentheses is probability) 
7.89*** 
(0.0050) 
16.67*** 
(0.0000) 
23.57*** 
(0.0000) 
Note: Probit regressions. Dependent variable takes on a value of 1 if the Receiver prefers to 
implement GP_S if she/he was to make the decision alone and in private, and 0 if she/he 
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prefers GP_O. Table reports coefficients with clustered standard errors by session in 
parentheses.*** Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
 
Output (1) confirms non-parametric results above that preferring GP_S is positively 
related to the expectation that Sender has recommended X. Output (2) shows that 
expecting that the co-Receiver privately prefers GP_S also increase the likelihood of 
a Receiver’s preferring GP_S. This result could be the result of a false consensus 
effect, i.e Receivers derived their expectations on co-Receivers as a projection of their 
own preferences.  Once both types of expectations are factored in, Receivers’ 
likelihood to prefer GP_S are conditional on expectations.  
3.6.4 Decisions and Village-Level Effect 
More than half of the Senders in our sample are public-spirited, however the only 
status variable that could explain public-spiritedness is belonging to an aristocrat 
family. There was no evidence of status-driven differences among non-aristocrats that 
could explain public-spiritedness. Given the heterogeneity of villages involved in this 
study, we extended the analysis by examining the relationship between placing X to 
the GP_S and village-level characteristics. The village-level characteristics will be 
examined in the following categorization: i) being led by a female leader (now or in 
the past), ii) involvement with the dam resettlement programme, iii) having Borneo 
Evangelical church as the dominant religion, iv) having access to electricity (a proxy 
for development), v) number of housing blocks in the villages and vi) number of 
household in the village.   
5 out 17 villages involved are currently or recently led by a female leader and 33 
groups came from these villages. Vector X has been assigned to GP_S 21 out 33 times 
in these villages. Using Fisher exact test and Pearson χ2, we found no evidence that the 
gender of the village leaders affects Senders’ recommendations (Pearson χ2 =1.56, p-
value = 0.211; two-tailed Fisher exact test, p-value = 0.294).  
Huge development programmes, like dam resettlement, that rely on a leader’s ability 
to negotiate with government could also influence village-level public-spiritedness. In 
villages that have been plagued with mistrust towards their traditional leaders in the 
negotiation process, the outcomes of the Sender’s decision might skew towards 
assigning Y to GP_S. On the other hand, communal shocks could have increased 
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prosocial behaviour and induced public-spiritedness among experimental subjects. 
Dam resettlement program impacted 7 villages or 45 groups of 3 in our sample 
population. By comparing the decisions to assign X or Y to GP_S, we cannot establish 
any relationship between Senders’ decisions and the dam resettlement programme 
(Pearson χ2 =0.72, p-value = 0.396; two-tailed Fisher exact test, p-value = 0.438).  
Further non-parametric statistical test aimed at establishing links between Senders’ 
recommendations in GP_S and village-level characteristics produced no statistically 
significant results. Irrespective of village-level characteristics like dominance of the 
evangelical church (Pearson χ2 = 0.23, p-value =  0.6315; two-tailed Fisher exact test, 
p-value = 0.6991), access to electricity (Pearson χ2 = 0.23, p-value =  0.6315; two-tailed 
Fisher exact test, p-value = 0.6991), number of blocks (Pearson χ2 =1.8, p-value = 
0.1797; two-tailed Fisher exact test, p-value = 0.2456), and number of households in 
the village (Pearson χ2 =0.4347, p-value = 0. 0.932) could not explain Senders’ public-
spiritedness. Results from this section further strengthen findings that Senders’ 
decisions are not influenced by any village-level norm.  
3.7 Discussion and conclusion 
 
This chapter has investigated the role of social status and social closeness in shaping 
representation when the representative possesses private information that could affect 
social welfare. It is well established in organizations that individuals possessing rights 
to represent others have relatively higher social status than the ordinary group 
members they represent. We introduced a Sender-Receiver agency game where: i) the 
Sender could recommend a vector of outcomes for her/himself and the Receivers, ii) 
and the Sender is only recognized as a representative when the Receivers implement 
the Sender’s recommendation as a consensus. By implementing the game as a lab-in-
the-field experiment, we were able to incorporate real-world social status from 
members of the Kayan tribe of Sarawak.  
 
The experiment found that more Senders were willing to engage in public-spirited 
representation than behaved self -interestedly. Apart from belonging to an aristocrat 
family, no other social status characteristics, including the elicited social status, could 
explain variation in Senders’ public-spiritedness. A significant proportion of Receivers 
chose to implement the recommendations from their respective Senders as a 
177 
 
consensus, hence recognizing the Sender’s agency in deciding the payoff  of everyone 
in the group. Private preferences of each Receiver reported lower acceptance of the 
Sender’s recommendation compared to the consensus decision, but in general 
Receivers privately preferred to accept the Sender’s recommendation. Social status 
characteristics of the Senders did not influence Receivers’ consensus while Receivers’ 
private preferences to accept or reject Senders’ recommendations were not driven by 
the social status of the partnered co-Receivers.  
 
Whether a Sender chose to be public-spirited or self-interested, she/he did not 
condition it based on her/his expectations about the Receivers’ decision. This is 
rational for Senders who have chosen the public-spirited outcome; rejection from 
Receivers would mean that the Sender still preserved her/his public-spirited payoff. 
On the other hand, Receivers conditioned their decisions based on their expectation of 
Senders’ behaviour. This would mean that expectation and conditionality play a big 
role in recognizing agency to represent a group of people. In contrast, the experiment 
found no evidence that a would-be representative/Sender pays attention to the group 
of people they seek to represent.  
 
Public-spirited Senders behaved similarly with public-spirited representatives in 
Chapter 2. Both types of representatives are willing to accept lower payoffs in order 
to represent and increase the welfare outcome of their group. This includes the 
willingness to not their representation not being conditioned by expectations on 
Receivers. On the other hand, the frequency of public-spirited behaviour by 
representatives was lower in the Sender-Receiver game than in the Public Good game, 
and social status characteristics were not able to explain varia tion in Senders’ public-
spiritedness.  
 
A potential explanation of the differences between the effects of status on the 
behaviour of representatives in the Public Good game and the Sender-Receiver game 
is a difference between the mechanisms of representation. In the Sender-Receiver 
game, representation happens through a private recommendation about a potential 
outcome for the group while in the Public Good game it happens by complementing 
group members’ contributions. In the Sender-Receiver game, the representative’s role 
involves the arrangement of payoff distributions between the representative and group 
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members with a salient conflict of interest. On the other hand, the status and noblesse 
oblige effect in the Public Good game of Chapter 2 emerged in a setting in which the 
representative was able to increase the value of a collective project which benefitted 
all group members. This is in sync with the traditional role of representative in 
traditional societies. In the Public Good game, the requirement on the representative 
to take responsibility to expand everyone’s payoff is stronger, particularly since the 
representatives have seen group members’ willingness to trust them. The noblesse 
oblige effect in Sender-Receiver game is driven by those that belong to the aristocrat 
families as they act public-spiritedly by taking on the responsibility or agency to decide 
on behalf of the group as expected by the norm.  
 
While the game introduced in this chapter captured the representation context for a  
small organization, its framework is could be examined much further given the 
pervasive agency and representation function in many organizations. Even modern 
organizations like parliament, government and firms engage in situations similar to the 
model of agency described above; an individual or several individuals usually possess 
private information on the real outcome of decisions taken on behalf of others. But the 
realization of the outcome from the representative(s) action comes only with the 
implementation or acceptance of the decision taken by other group members.  
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Appendix A: Robustness checks and further testing 
Table 3.1A. Breakdown on control questions comprehension by subjects (percentage 
of total subjects) 
 Number of trials on Question 2  
Number of 
trials on 
Question 1 
1 2 3 Total 
1 207 12 1 220 
2 41 27 1 69 
3 8 5 18 31 
Total 256 44 20 320 
Observations from 4 subjects are missing.  If a  subject failed to correctly answer a control question in 
three tries, the research assistant assigned to them will explain the entire game.  
 
Table 3.2A. Wilcoxon signed ranks test on self-perceived statuses 
Dimensions Signed ranks test 
Success = Wealth 6.091*** 
Success = Education -2.509** 
Success = Fitness -1.709* 
Success = Extraversion -4.274*** 
Wealth = Education -6.399*** 
Wealth = Fitness -6.514*** 
Wealth = Extraversion -8.304*** 
Education = Fitness 0.324 
Education = Extraversion -2.126** 
Fitness = Extraversion -2.932*** 
 
Interpretation for Table 3.2A: Positive test values indicate that the self-perceived status 
dimension on the left are ranked higher than the self-perceived status dimension on the right. 
Negative test values indicate the the self-perceived status dimension on the left is ranked lower 
than the self-perceived status dimension on the right. For example, success = wealth yields a 
value of 6.091, meaning that in general villagers tend to perceive their own success at higher 
rank than their own wealth. Similarly,in education = extraversion that yields a value of -2.932 
indicates that in general villagers tend toperceived their own education at lower rank than their 
extraversion rank. *** Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 
percent.  
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Figure 3.1A. Success dimension dispersion: Self-rank vs group-rank 
 
Correlation: 0.38*** z= -7.05 
Interpretation of Figure 3.3: The fitted line indicates that there is weak positive correlation 
between self-perceived rank in success dimension with the success status assigned by the 8 
villagers in a session. The scatter points at the bottom of the graph indicate that there are 
villagers the perceived themselves as the least successful villager among the 9 villagers but 
the other 8 villagers place this villager at higher status ranking. The scatter points at the top of 
the graph shows the villagers that perceived themselves as the most successful villagers among 
the 9 villagers. The scatter points tend to populate the bottom half of the fitted line indicating 
that villagers are more likely to self-efface the status of their success. The negative Wilcoxon 
signed ranks value indicates that in general villagers self-effaced themselves, but its value is 
not statistically significant. 
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Figure 3.2A. Wealth dimension dispersion: Self-rank vs group-rank 
 
 
Correlation: 0.40*** z= -8.044*** 
Interpretation of Figure 3.4: The fitted line indicates that there is weak positive correlation 
between self-perceived rank in wealth dimension with the wealth status assigned by the 8 
villagers in a session. The scatter points at the bottom of the graph indicate that there are 
villagers the perceived themselves as the least wealthy villager among the 9 villagers but the 
other 8 villagers place this villager at higher status ranking. The scatter points at the top of the 
graph shows the villagers that perceived themselves as the wealthiest villagers among the 9 
villagers. The scatter points tend to populate the bottom half of the fitted line indicating that 
villagers are more likely to self-efface the status of their success. The negative Wilcoxon 
signed ranks value indicates that in general villagers self-efface themselves.  
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Figure 3.3A. Education dimension dispersion: Self-rank vs group-rank 
 
 
Correlation: 0.65*** z= 1.544 
Interpretation of Figure 3.5: The fitted line indicates that there is relatively strong positive 
correlation between self-perceived rank in education dimension with the education status 
assigned by the 8 villagers in a session. The scatter points at the bottom of the graph indicate 
that there are villagers the perceived themselves as the least educated villager among the 9 
villagers but the other 8 villagers place this villager at higher status ranking. The scatter points 
at the top of the graph shows the villagers that perceived themselves as the most educated 
villagers among the 9 villagers. The scatter points tend to populate the top half of the fitted 
line indicating that villagers are more likely to self-enhance the status of their success. The 
positive Wilcoxon signed ranks value indicates that in general villagers self-enhanced 
themselves but since its value is not statistically significant, villagers’ perception on their 
education status is similar to co-villager’s perception on them.   
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Figure 3.4A. Physical fitness dimension dispersion: Self-rank vs group-rank  
 
 
Correlation: 0.37*** z= 1.145*** 
Interpretation of Figure 3.6: The fitted line indicates that there is weak positive correlation 
between self-perceived rank in physical fitness dimension with the physical fitness status 
assigned by the 8 villagers in a session. The scatter points at the bottom of the graph indicate 
that there are villagers the perceived themselves as the least physically fit villager among the 
9 villagers but the other 8 villagers place this villager at higher status ranking. The scatter 
points at the top of the graph shows the villagers that perceived themselves as the most 
physically fit villagers among the 9 villagers. The scatter points tend to populated the top half 
of the fitted line indicating that villagers are more likely to self-enhance the status of their 
success. The positive Wilcoxon signed ranks value indicates that in general villagers self-
enhanced themselves.   
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Figure 3.5A. Extraversion dimension dispersion: Self-rank vs group-rank 
 
Correlation: 0.29*** z= 4.580*** 
Interpretation of Figure 3.7:  The fitted line indicates that there is weak positive correlation 
between self-perceived rank in extraversion dimension with extraversion status assigned by 
the 8 villagers in a session. The scatter points at the bottom of the graph indicate that there are 
villagers the perceived themselves as the least extrovert fit villager among the 9 villagers but 
the other 8 villagers place this villager at higher status ranking. The scatter points at the top of 
the graph shows the villagers that perceived themselves as the most extrovert villagers among 
the 9 villagers. The scatter points tend to populate the top half of the fitted line indicating that 
villagers are more likely to self-enhance the status of their success. The positive Wilcoxon 
signed ranks value indicates that in general villagers self-enhanced themselves.   
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Table 3.3A. Relationship between selecting X to GP_S and Receivers’ social status  
Z-index Observation Correlation to 
highest status 
Receiver 
[p-value] 
Correlation to 
Receiver’s 
average status 
[p-value] 
Success 108 -0.0379 
[0.6970] 
-0.0418 
[0.6678] 
Wealth 108 -0.1751* 
[0.0698] 
-0.1644* 
[0.0891] 
Education 108 -0.0469 
[0.6301] 
0.0125 
[0.8976] 
Physical 
fitness 
108 -0.0794 
[0.4140] 
0.0319 
[0.7429] 
Outgoingness 108 -0.2033** 
[0.0348] 
-0.1328 
[0.1707] 
Composite 108 -0.0552 
[0.5705] 
-0.0910 
[0.3491] 
Traditional 
status 
 Correlation if one of the 
Receiver is  
Aristocrat 108 0.0582 
[0.5495] 
Proxy Slave 108 -0.0550 
[0.5717] 
Notes: *** significant at 1 percent level, ** significant at 5 percent level, * significant at 10 
percent level. 
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Table 3.4. A Robustness check for success dimension (Sender) 
 No controls Receivers’ 
status 
Village 
level effect 
Sender’s 
control 
Receivers’ 
control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Composite z-index -0.296 -0.433 -0.460 -0.0845 -0.109 
 (0.466) (0.475) (0.673) (0.792) (0.812) 
Aristocrat 0.636 0.597 0.890** 1.359** 1.603*** 
 (0.484) (0.516) (0.447) (0.554) (0.573) 
Proxy slave  0.252 0.473 0.441 0.623 0.479 
 (0.327) (0.405) (0.422) (0.464) (0.478) 
Status index control 
(self-perceived index) 
 
Group members’ status 
   0.934* 
(0.532) 
0.791 
(0.559) 
 
Group members’ z -index  -0.743 -0.721 -1.144 -0.665 
  (0.896) (0.892) (0.959) (1.131) 
Aristocrat  -0.0249 -0.00789 -0.401 -0.212 
  (0.316) (0.394) (0.443) (0.437) 
Proxy slave  -0.210 -0.289 -0.194 -0.111 
  (0.317) (0.359) (0.359) (0.365) 
Dispersion in IOS score  0.0285 0.0168 -0.0637 -0.0876 
  (0.0885) (0.0883) (0.0963) (0.0975) 
Constant 0.145 0.573 -0.0330 0.0698 0.835 
 (0.243) (0.510) (0.848) (1.131) (1.278) 
Representative’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Group members’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 106 106 106 106 
R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0.0218 
2.19 
0.0345 
3.39 
0.1278 
7.03 
0.1789 
19.93* 
0.1981 
20.22 
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Table 3.5A. Robustness check for wealth dimension (Sender) 
 No controls Receivers’ 
status 
Village 
level effect 
Sender’s 
control 
Receivers’ 
control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Composite z-index -0.0319 -0.319 -0.342 -0.279 -0.424 
 (0.548) (0.599) (0.646) (0.692) (0.724) 
Aristocrat 0.625 0.545 0.823* 1.506*** 1.781*** 
 (0.478) (0.527) (0.448) (0.583) (0.555) 
Proxy slave  0.227 0.417 0.400 0.715 0.613 
 (0.324) (0.400) (0.426) (0.468) (0.483) 
Status index control 
(self-perceived index) 
 
Group members’ status 
   -0.174 
(0.551) 
-0.355 
(0.572) 
 
Group members’ z -index  -1.427 -1.469* -1.700* -1.229 
  (0.870) (0.876) (0.910) (1.034) 
Aristocrat  -0.0265 -0.0246 -0.278 -0.0759 
  (0.330) (0.399) (0.452) (0.443) 
Proxy slave  -0.159 -0.226 -0.153 -0.0995 
  (0.331) (0.367) (0.363) (0.371) 
Dispersion in IOS score  0.0169 0.00119 -0.0585 -0.0771 
  (0.0868) (0.0865) (0.0891) (0.0922) 
Constant 0.0157 0.906* 0.337 0.772 1.496 
 (0.272) (0.513) (0.854) (1.166) (1.287) 
Representative’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Group members’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 106 106 106 106 
R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0.0202 
1.90 
0.0474 
5.31 
0.1399 
8.84 
0.1745 
16.10 
0.1963 
22.75 
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Table 3.6A. Robustness check for education dimension (Sender) 
 No controls Receivers’ 
status 
Village 
level effect 
Sender’s 
control 
Receivers’ 
control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Composite z-index -0.0930 0.0856 0.276 0.101 0.0879 
 (0.534) (0.543) (0.638) (0.747) (0.779) 
Aristocrat 0.622 0.678 1.013** 1.506*** 1.633*** 
 (0.483) (0.489) (0.429) (0.522) (0.516) 
Proxy slave  0.216 0.404 0.353 0.645 0.588 
 (0.313) (0.397) (0.427) (0.450) (0.476) 
Status index control 
(self-perceived index) 
 
Group members’ status 
   0.641 
(0.577) 
0.556 
(0.573) 
 
Group members’ z -index  0.180 0.375 0.0444 -0.784 
  (0.631) (0.775) (0.819) (1.029) 
Aristocrat  -0.0661 -0.0645 -0.331 -0.0636 
  (0.316) (0.397) (0.443) (0.444) 
Proxy slave  -0.219 -0.316 -0.229 -0.0978 
  (0.322) (0.367) (0.359) (0.373) 
Dispersion in IOS score  0.0203 0.000904 -0.0463 -0.0684 
  (0.0883) (0.0893) (0.0938) (0.0939) 
Constant 0.0470 -0.129 -0.930 -0.627 1.307 
 (0.286) (0.402) (0.794) (1.267) (1.719) 
Representative’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Group members’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 106 106 106 106 
Pseudo R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0.0204 
1.83 
0.0276 
3.15 
0.1235 
6.63 
0.1586 
14.02 
0.1929 
20.30 
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Table 3.7A. Robustness check for physical fitness dimension (Sender) 
 No controls Reeceivers’ 
status 
Village 
level effect 
Sender’s 
control 
Receivers’ 
control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Composite z-index -1.057* -1.034* -0.920 -1.008 -0.985 
 (0.561) (0.598) (0.757) (0.774) (0.825) 
Aristocrat 0.613 0.636 0.884** 1.426*** 1.617*** 
 (0.484) (0.504) (0.424) (0.532) (0.525) 
Proxy slave  0.199 0.336 0.328 0.630 0.479 
 (0.331) (0.417) (0.428) (0.459) (0.471) 
Status index control 
(self-perceived index) 
 
Group members’ status 
   0.226 
(0.511) 
-0.0332 
(0.532) 
 
Group members’ z -index  0.0734 0.122 0.117 -0.757 
  (1.126) (1.146) (1.205) (1.468) 
Aristocrat  -0.0284 -0.0372 -0.286 -0.0415 
  (0.304) (0.386) (0.451) (0.450) 
Proxy slave  -0.151 -0.216 -0.123 -0.0361 
  (0.310) (0.368) (0.364) (0.370) 
Dispersion in IOS score  0.0366 0.0229 -0.0211 -0.0454 
  (0.0885) (0.0889) (0.0930) (0.0937) 
Constant 0.550* 0.464 -0.102 0.361 2.024 
 (0.295) (0.716) (0.922) (1.207) (1.718) 
Representative’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Group members’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 106 106 106 106 
Pseudo R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0.0387 
4.72 
0.0447 
5.20 
0.1317 
8.01 
0.1637 
14.16 
0.1925 
19.39 
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Table 3.8A Robustness check for extraversion dimension (Sender) 
 No controls Receivers’ 
status 
Village 
level effect 
Sender’s 
control 
Receivers’ 
control 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Composite z-index -1.683** -2.443*** -2.806*** -2.636*** -2.505*** 
 (0.679) (0.831) (1.011) (0.935) (0.934) 
Aristocrat 0.690 0.634 1.030** 1.668*** 1.732*** 
 (0.490) (0.529) (0.451) (0.542) (0.524) 
Proxy slave  0.304 0.512 0.543 0.825* 0.754 
 (0.327) (0.398) (0.444) (0.478) (0.498) 
Status index control 
(self-perceived index) 
 
Group members’ status 
   -0.595 
(0.477) 
-0.634 
(0.490) 
 
Group members’ z -index  -2.192* -2.475** -2.843** -2.396* 
  (1.248) (1.229) (1.305) (1.417) 
Aristocrat  0.178 0.262 -0.0856 0.0648 
  (0.340) (0.416) (0.466) (0.456) 
Proxy slave  -0.106 -0.148 -0.0373 0.0242 
  (0.307) (0.366) (0.360) (0.369) 
Dispersion in IOS score  0.0585 0.0430 -0.0150 -0.0192 
  (0.0869) (0.0920) (0.0955) (0.0966) 
Constant 0.829** 2.180** 1.856* 2.029 2.613* 
 (0.372) (0.893) (1.058) (1.356) (1.428) 
Representative’s controls No No No Yes Yes 
Group members’ controls No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 108 106 106 106 106 
Pseudo R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0.0574 
8.33* 
0.1025 
12.27* 
0.2064 
15.26** 
0.2379 
24.73** 
0.2482 
28.03** 
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Table 3.9A. Relationship between implementing Sender’s recommendation as consensus and 
Receiver’s social status.  
Social status indicator Observation Z-Index 
Spearman 
correlation 
[p-value] 
Self-Rank 
Spearman 
in group of 
9 
correlation 
[p-value] 
Ladder 
Elicitation 
Success 216 -0.0479 
[0.4837] 
0.0397 
[0.5625] 
Wealth 216 -0.0699 
[0.3068] 
-0.0115 
[0.8670] 
 
Education 216 0.0459 
[0.5025] 
0.0659 
[0.3359] 
Physical fitness 216 -0.0442 
[0.5178] 
0.0122 
[0.8585] 
Outgoingness 216 0.0408 
[0.4829] 
0.0274 
[0.6890] 
Composite 216 -0.0274 
[0.6888] 
 
Traditional 
strata 
Aristocrat 216 0.0489 
[0.4745] 
Proxy slave 216 0.0856 
[0.2103] 
Note: Even though there are 108 consensus decisions, there are 216 Receivers each with 
her/his own social status observations. Therefore, a consensus is treated as two separate 
decisions for analysis purpose.  
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Table 3.10A. Robustness check for success dimension (Receivers) 
 Sender’s 
status 
Sender’s 
status+IOS 
Sender’s 
control 
Village-
level effect 
Receiver’s 
status 
Co-
Receiver 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Senders’ Status 
Success z-index 
 
-0.138 
 
-0.190 
 
-0.236 
 
-0.345 
 
-0.320 
 
-0.430 
 (0.534) (0.542) (0.558) (0.573) (0.585) (0.612) 
Aristocrat 0.344 0.296 0.253 -0.162 -0.213 0.241 
 (0.272) (0.273) (0.316) (0.394) (0.385) (0.355) 
Proxy slave  0.186 0.191 0.294 0.699** 0.646* 0.513 
 (0.263) (0.262) (0.264) (0.340) (0.345) (0.328) 
IOS score  0.0382 0.0580 0.114** 0.129** 0.132** 
  (0.0579) (0.0571) (0.0560) (0.0555) (0.0546) 
Receiver’s status       
Success z-index     0.154 0.761 
     (0.582) (0.653) 
Aristocrat     0.539 0.682 
     (0.459) (0.576) 
Proxy slave      -0.519 -0.514 
     (0.349) (0.358) 
Status index control     -0.223 -0.224 
(self-perceived index)     (0.367) (0.389) 
Constant 0.352 0.198 0.336 1.018* 0.867 0.377 
 (0.270) (0.340) (0.505) (0.584) (0.661) (0.820) 
Sender’s controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Receiver’s controls No No No No Yes Yes 
Co-Receiver’s controls No No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 214 214 214 213 213 
R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0.0071 
2.05 
0.0092 
2.12 
0.0312 
5.88 
0.1616 
10.77 
0.1898 
23.67* 
0.2526 
65.30*** 
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Table 3.11A. Robustness check for wealth dimension (Receivers) 
 Sender’s 
status 
Sender’s 
status+IOS 
Sender’s 
control 
Village-
level effect 
Receiver’s 
status 
Co-
Receiver 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Senders’ Status 
Wealth z-index 
 
0.215 
 
0.190 
 
0.210 
 
0.255 
 
0.294 
 
0.164 
 (0.472) (0.477) (0.497) (0.529) (0.539) (0.548) 
Aristocrat 0.327 0.280 0.240 -0.188 -0.269 0.114 
 (0.266) (0.266) (0.308) (0.395) (0.395) (0.378) 
Proxy slave  0.152 0.155 0.252 0.628* 0.628* 0.605* 
 (0.261) (0.259) (0.263) (0.342) (0.335) (0.322) 
IOS score  0.0364 0.0559 0.112** 0.119** 0.117** 
  (0.0578) (0.0567) (0.0561) (0.0572) (0.0577) 
Receiver’s status       
Wealth z-index     -0.0680 0.242 
     (0.623) (0.646) 
Aristocrat     0.493 0.514 
     (0.482) (0.569) 
Proxy slave      -0.524 -0.558 
     (0.354) (0.360) 
Status index control     -0.0218 -0.0495 
(self-perceived index)     (0.379) (0.383) 
Constant 0.178 0.0197 0.218 0.856 0.793 0.640 
 (0.257) (0.331) (0.495) (0.573) (0.739) (0.980) 
Sender’s controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Receiver’s controls No No No No Yes Yes 
Co-Receiver’s controls No No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 214 214 214 213 213 
R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0.0078 
2.47 
0.0093 
2.56 
0.0311 
6.34 
0.1611 
10.59 
0.1847 
17.51 
0.2271 
53.62*** 
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Table 3.12A. Robustness check for education dimension (Receivers) 
 Sender’s 
status 
Sender’s 
status+IOS 
Sender’s 
control 
Village-
level effect 
Receiver’s 
status 
Co-
Receiver 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Senders’ Status 
Education z-index 
 
-0.0881 
 
-0.0739 
 
-0.541 
 
-0.305 
 
-0.329 
 
-0.598 
 (0.415) (0.413) (0.456) (0.442) (0.498) (0.570) 
Aristocrat 0.337 0.288 0.247 -0.158 -0.296 -0.127 
 (0.265) (0.266) (0.324) (0.407) (0.412) (0.376) 
Proxy slave  0.166 0.168 0.244 0.648* 0.687** 0.685** 
 (0.252) (0.250) (0.251) (0.344) (0.336) (0.344) 
IOS score  0.0368 0.0593 0.112** 0.129** 0.119* 
  (0.0570) (0.0555) (0.0549) (0.0580) (0.0650) 
Receiver’s status       
Education z-index     -0.354 -0.422 
     (0.366) (0.456) 
Aristocrat     0.441 0.476 
     (0.464) (0.533) 
Proxy slave      -0.595* -0.626* 
     (0.347) (0.368) 
Status index control     0.796** 0.905** 
(self-perceived index)     (0.389) (0.420) 
Constant 0.329 0.149 0.690 1.188* 1.326* 2.172** 
 (0.244) (0.324) (0.541) (0.618) (0.729) (0.971) 
Sender’s controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Receiver’s controls No No No No Yes Yes 
Co-Receiver’s controls No No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 214 214 214 213 213 
R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0.0069 
2.06 
0.0086  
2.14 
0.0359 
6.93 
0.1613 
10.39 
0.2002 
28.62** 
0. 2470 
57.28*** 
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 Table 3.13A. Robustness check for physical fitness dimension (Receivers) 
 Sender’s 
status 
Sender’s 
status+IOS 
Sender’s 
control 
Village-
level effect 
Receiver’s 
status 
Co-
Receiver 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Senders’ Status 
Education z-index 
 
-0.150 
 
-0.173 
 
-0.501 
 
-0.612 
 
-0.553 
 
-0.594 
 (0.426) (0.428) (0.496) (0.539) (0.577) (0.698) 
Aristocrat 0.334 0.283 0.214 -0.269 -0.349 -0.199 
 (0.263) (0.264) (0.296) (0.352) (0.340) (0.308) 
Proxy slave  0.169 0.169 0.265 0.670** 0.677** 0.638* 
 (0.250) (0.249) (0.244) (0.336) (0.333) (0.350) 
IOS score  0.0366 0.0556 0.114** 0.124** 0.117* 
  (0.0569) (0.0558) (0.0557) (0.0566) (0.0622) 
Receiver’s status       
Education z-index     -0.208 -0.638 
     (0.574) (0.677) 
Aristocrat     0.465 0.451 
     (0.443) (0.484) 
Proxy slave      -0.496 -0.559 
     (0.345) (0.341) 
Status index control     -0.132 -0.178 
(self-perceived index)     (0.306) (0.336) 
Constant 0.362 0.202 0.639 1.401** 1.310* 2.495** 
 (0.245) (0.364) (0.553) (0.655) (0.764) (1.150) 
Sender’s controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Receiver’s controls No No No No Yes Yes 
Co-Receiver’s controls No No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 214 214 214 214 214 
R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0.0071 
2.09 
0.0090 
2.21 
0.0340 
6.46 
0.1645 
12.61 
0.1886 
24.89* 
0.2458 
50.55*** 
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Table 3.14A. Robustness check for extraversion dimension (Receivers) 
 Sender’s 
status 
Sender’s 
status+IOS 
Sender’s 
control 
Village-
level effect 
Receiver’s 
status 
Co-
Receiver 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Senders’ Status 
Extraversion z-index 
 
-0.254 
 
-0.328 
 
-0.432 
 
-0.786 
 
-0.714 
 
-0.754 
 (0.594) (0.598) (0.666) (0.791) (0.799) (0.844) 
Aristocrat 0.343 0.292 0.229 -0.228 -0.285 -0.0388 
 (0.270) (0.272) (0.305) (0.373) (0.354) (0.299) 
Proxy slave  0.183 0.186 0.288 0.708** 0.724** 0.659** 
 (0.255) (0.255) (0.259) (0.355) (0.342) (0.333) 
IOS score  0.0401 0.0603 0.119** 0.129** 0.128** 
  (0.0576) (0.0577) (0.0566) (0.0568) (0.0612) 
Receiver’s status       
Extraversion z-index     0.423 0.718 
     (0.496) (0.518) 
Aristocrat     0.548 0.574 
     (0.450) (0.551) 
Proxy slave      -0.496 -0.511 
     (0.353) (0.350) 
Status index control     -0.175 -0.207 
(self-perceived index)     (0.301) (0.283) 
Constant 0.409 0.258 0.429 1.204** 0.944 1.164 
 (0.322) (0.399) (0.527) (0.567) (0.660) (0.782) 
Sender’s controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Receiver’s controls No No No No Yes Yes 
Co-Receiver’s controls No No No No No Yes 
Village fixed effect  No  No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 216 214 214 214 214 214 
R-squared 
χ2 Test  
0. 0077 
2.09 
0. 0100 
2.29 
0.0326 
5.71 
0.1662 
10.21 
0.1931 
20.17 
0.2342 
74.06*** 
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Appendix B: Instructions for the Sender-Receiver Game 
B1. English Instruction Scripts 
This Activity C. You have the chance to increase your earnings in this Activity.  
You will make a decision as a member of a group.   You are a member of one of the 
following groups of 3 individuals: Circle, Triangle, or Square.    
 <Point to the tag and desks> 
The identities of the members of your group are known to you but the information 
about your personal/individual decisions in this activity will be kept private from the 
other members of your group. When two members of the group make a joint decision, 
information about that decision will be kept private from the third member.  
Your turn to decide and your task will be determined by the role assigned to you.  
Your role is one of the following: Member A, Member B1 or Member B2.  Member A 
will make his/her decision first. Member B1 and Member B2 will make their decisions 
after Member A. 
After I have read the instructions for this activity, you will be told your role. 
In this activity, two projects, Project Blue and Project Red, will be set up for your 
group. Member A in your group will be responsible for setting up Project Blue in a 
form that he/she can recommend to your group as a whole.  I will set up Project Red.  
Project Red will be common for all three groups.  Members B1 and B2 will then choose 
which of the two projects the group will carry out. 
This sequence of decisions by Member A and later Members B1 and B2 will lead to 
one of three possible outcomes for your group: Outcome X, Outcome Y, or 
Outcome Z. 
To see how each outcome would impact on you, other members of your group and 
the group as a whole, turn to page RS1. 
Page SR1 explains Outcome X:  If the project you choose has Outcome X, Member 
A will earn RM 20.  Members B1 and B2 will earn RM 25 each.  The total value of the 
project for your group will be the sum of the earnings of Members A, B1 and B2, which 
is RM 70.  
Turn to page SR2. 
Page SR2 explains Outcome Y:  If the project you choose has Outcome Y, Member 
A will earn RM 30.  Members B1 and B2 will earn RM 12.50 each.  The total value of 
the project for your group will be the sum of the earnings of Members A, B1 and B2, 
which is RM 55. 
Turn to page SR3. 
Page SR3 explains Outcome Z:  If the project you choose has Outcome Z, Member 
A will earn RM 20.  Members B1 and B2 will earn RM 18 each.  The total value of the 
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project for your group will be the sum of the earnings of Members A, B1 and B2, which 
is RM 56.  
As you can see, Outcome X gives Members B1 and B2 the highest earnings that are 
possible for them (RM 25 each), and also has the highest total value.  However, it 
gives Member A the lowest earnings that are possible for him/her (RM 20). 
Outcome Y gives Members B1 and B2 the lowest earnings that are possible for them 
(RM 12.50 each), and also has the lowest total value.  However, it gives Member A 
the highest earnings that are possible for him/her (RM 30). 
Any question on how your earnings are determined in this activity? 
<Pause> 
Turn to page SR4 to see how Project Blue and Project Red are linked to Outcomes 
X, Y and Z. 
In the first stage of the activity, Member A will privately choose a set-up for Project 
Blue that he/she can recommend to the group as a whole.  He/she will be able to 
choose one of two possible set-ups.  With one of these set-ups, the outcome is very 
likely to be Outcome X, but there is a small chance that it will be Outcome Y instead.  
With the other set-up, the outcome is very likely to be Outcome Y, but there is a small 
chance that it will be Outcome X instead.   
Members B1 and B2 will not know how Member A has set up Project Blue. 
The other project, Project Red, will be set up by me, as part of the research team.  It 
will be set up so that its outcome is very likely to be Outcome Z, but there is a small 
chance that it will be Outcome Y instead. 
In the second stage of the activity, Members B1 and B2 will decide jointly which of 
the two projects will be carried out.  Member A will not be in the room at the time, and 
will not know what decision has been made by Members B1 and B2. 
Notice that if Member A has set up Project Blue so that Outcome X is more likely, 
Members B1 and B2 are very likely to receive higher earnings from Project Blue than 
from Project Red (RM 25 rather than RM 18), and Member A is very likely to receive 
the same earnings whichever project (Blue or Red) is carried out (RM 20). 
However, if Member A has set up Project Blue so that Outcome Y is more likely, 
Members B1 and B2 are very likely to receive higher earnings from Project Red than 
from Project Blue (RM 18 rather than RM 12.50), while Member A is very likely to 
receive higher earnings from Project Blue than from Project Red (RM 30 rather than 
RM 20). 
At the end of the session, and if this acitivity is picked as the one for which you will be 
paid, each member of the group will be paid according to the outcome of whichever 
project was chosen jointly by Members B1 and B2.  However, no one will be told 
whether that outcome was X, Y or Z.  Because of this, even after everyone has been 
paid, no one will be able to work out what decisions were made by other members of 
the group. 
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For example, suppose that Member A sets up Project Blue so that it is very likely to 
produce Outcome Y, and Members B1 and B2 decide to carry out that project.  
Suppose then that Project Blue does produce Outcome Y, and so Members B1 and 
B2 are paid only RM 12.50.  Remember that even if Member A had set up Project 
Blue so that it was very likely to produce Outcome X, Outcome Y might still have 
occurred (explained below).  So Members B1 and B2 cannot know what Member A 
did. 
Another example:  suppose that Member A sets up Project Blue so that is very likely 
to produce Outcome X, but Members B1 and B2 decide to carry out Project Red 
instead.  Project Red is very likely to produce Outcome Z.  Suppose this outcome 
does occur.  Member A will be paid RM 20, which is what he/she would most likely 
have been paid if Project Blue had been carried out.  So Member A cannot know what 
Members B1 and B2 did. 
Do you have any questions?  
<Pause> 
We will now start the activity. 
Role Assignment 
<All RAs will approach each subject to pick an envelope from the bag in their 
hands> 
Pick a card from the bag in front of you. 
The card you have is labelled Player A, Player B1 or Player B2.  This is your role in 
this activity. 
Place this card in the card holder.  You can see the roles of the other members of 
your group by looking at their card holders. Look, this is this is Member A from 
{Circle/Triangle/Square}. She/he will make her/his decision first in her/his group 
based on her/his role. <point> After she/he made her decision, Members B1 <point>  
and B2 <point> from the same group will make their decisions. The same will also 
happen in Group {Circle/Triangle/Square}. <point to a group and its members as an 
example>.  
 
<RAs will place A4-label that have group and role identif ication in front of each 
subject’s desk> 
 
Set-up of Project Red  
I will now set up Project Red.  The set-up of Project Red will be the same for all three 
groups (Circle, Triangle and Square). 
 
Remember that Project Red is very likely to produce Outcome Z, but there is a small 
chance that it will produce Outcome Y. 
Here are two cards, one labelled ‘Outcome Z’ <show this> and one labelled 
‘Outcome Y’ <show this>. 
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First, I take the Outcome Z card, insert it into a small envelope, and seal it.  <Do this> 
I now insert the small envelope into a larger envelope marked with a red star, and 
close the envelope.  <Do this, showing the envelope and star> The star shows that 
the Outcome Z card has been put in this envelope. The star is red to show that the 
envelope contains a possible outcome for Project Red.  
Now I take the Outcome Y card, insert it into a small envelope, and seal it.   <Do this> 
I now insert the small envelope into a larger envelope marked with a red pentagon, 
and close the envelope.  <Do this, showing the envelope and pentagon> The 
pentagon shows that the Outcome Y card has been put in this envelope. The 
pentagon is red to show that the envelope contains a possible outcome for Project 
Red.  
Project Red needs to be processed for it to be eligible as a choice for Member B1 and 
Member B2. Project Red will now be processed so that there is a small chance that 
the contents of the red star and red pentagon envelopes are swapped.  
I will ask one of you to volunteer and roll a die. Then she/he will circle the roll outcome 
on a piece of paper provided to her/him. He/she will pass this piece of the paper to 
an RA.  I will then roll another die behind this screen, but will not tell you what number 
comes up.  If the numbers from the two dice rolls are different, the contents of the 
envelopes will stay as they are.  If the numbers are the same, the contents will be 
swapped.  So there is a 1 in 6 chance (or 17%) that the contents will be swapped.  
I will do this swapping behind this screen.  Even if the two dice numbers are different, 
I will take the small envelopes out of the red star and red pentagon envelopes and 
then put them back again.  So you will not know whether the contents of the red star 
and the red pentagon envelopes have been swapped.  You will notice that there 
are movements behind this screen but this does not mean that the contents of 
the envelopes have been swapped or that it will be returned to the original 
envelopes. I will then seal both envelopes.  
 
<RA gives die and a paper with 1 to 6 to one subject, who rolls the die and circle a 
number on the paper. RA will collect that paper> 
Now I am rolling the die.  <Do this> 
Now, if the two numbers are the same, I am swapping the contents of the 
envelopes. <Do this> 
Project Red has now been processed.  Whatever is now in the red star envelope will 
be the outcome of Project Red.  There is a 5 in 6 chance (or 83%) that this is Outcome 
Z.  Otherwise, it is Outcome Y. 
Task of Member A 
Shortly, each Member A will be invited to the Group desk for his/her group.  Privately, 
Member A will set up Project Blue in a form that he/she can recommend to the group.  
Remember that there are two different ways in which this Project can be set up.  It 
can be set up so that it is very likely to produce Outcome X, or it can be set up so that 
it is very likely to produce Outcome Y.  Member A has to choose one of these set -
ups.    
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Each Member A will receive two cards and two small envelopes.  One of the cards is 
labelled ‘Outcome X’.  The other card is labelled ‘Outcome Y’.   <Show these> 
The pages in the booklet showing the implications of each outcome to the group 
members will be available on the desk. 
Member A will insert each card into a small envelope, and seal each envelope.  
He/she will need to remember which card was put into each envelope. 
Next, Member A will signal the RA to come to the Group Desk.  The RA will bring two 
large envelopes.  One is marked with a blue star.  The other is marked wih a blue 
pentagon.  <Show these>     
Member A will first be handed the large envelope marked with the blue star.  If 
Member A has decided to set up the project so that it is most likely to produce 
Outcome X, he/she will put the small envelope containing the ‘Outcome X’ card into 
the large blue-star envelope.  If Member A has decided to set up the project so that it 
is most likely to produce Outcome Y, he/she will put the small envelope containing 
the ‘Outcome Y’ card into the large blue-star envelope.  So, the contents of the blue-
star envelope will describe Project Blue in the form that Member A is recommending 
to the group. 
Member A will then be handed the large envelope marked with the blue pentagon.  
He/she will put the small envelope containing the other card into the large blue-
pentagon envelope.  So, the contents of the blue-pentagon envelope will describe the 
form of Project Blue that Member A is NOT recommending to the group.  
Finally, each Member A will be asked to say privately whether he/she expects that 
the joint decision of Members B1 and B2 in his/her group will be to carry out Project 
Blue or Project Red.    
After Member A has completed this task, Project Blue needs to be processed just like 
Project Red. Project Blue will only be eligible as a choice after it has been processed. 
Project Blue will be processed in the same way as Project Red was processed.  
< RA will place 1 card labelled Y, 1 card labelled X, 2 small envelopes on each group’s 
decision desk, 2 stickers, Page SR2 and SR3 that contain the payoffs for Outcome 
X, Outcome Z and Outcome Y.> 
If you are a Member A, please go to your Group Desk. 
 
<RA will ask the control questions. Then leave the Member A to make the 
decision.> 
<After the decision has been made, place intended small envelopes into the larger 
envelopes with blue star or blue pentagon. Verbally conduct Member A additional 
questions and record his/her responses. Dismiss Member A to his/her seat> 
Project Blue will now be processed so that there is a small chance that the contents 
of the blue star and blue pentagon envelopes are swapped. We will process Project 
Blue for Group Circle, then Group Triangle and lastly Group Square. 
I will ask for a volunteer from each group to roll a die and to circle the outcome from 
the roll on a piece of paper provided to him/her. An RA will collect this paper. The RA 
will then roll another die behind this screen, but but will not annouce what number 
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comes up.  If the numbers rolled on the two dice are different, the contents of the 
envelopes will stay as they are.  If the numbers are the same, the contents will be 
swapped.  So there is a 1 in 6 chance (or 17%) that the contents will be swapped.  
The RA will do this swapping behind this screen.  Even if the two dice numbers are 
different, the RA will take the small envelopes out of the red star and red pentagon 
envelopes and then put them back again.  So you will not know whether the contents 
of the red star and the red pentagon envelopes have been swapped. The RA will then 
seal both envelopes. You will notice that there are movement behind this screen 
but this does not mean that the contents of the envelopes have been swapped 
or that it will be returned to the original envelopes. 
 
<Each RA gives a die to B1 in their group and a piece of paper. B1 rolls the dice 
and circle a number> 
<Each RA will collect the piece of paper> 
RA for Group Circle will roll the die now.  <Do this. Make sure the die roll can be 
heard by everyone.> 
RA for Group Triangle will roll the die now.  <Do this. Make sure the die roll can be 
heard by everyone.> 
RA for Group Square will roll the die now.  <Do this. Make sure the die roll can be 
heard by everyone.> 
The Circle group’s Project Blue has now been processed.  Whatever is now in the 
blue star envelope will be the outcome of the Circle group’s Project Blue.  There is a 
5 in 6 chance (or 83%) that this is whichever of Outcomes X and Y was recommended 
by the Circle group’s Member A.  Otherwise, it is the outcome that he/she did NOT 
recommend. 
The participation of the three Member As in this activity has now ended.  To ensure 
that the Member Bs have privacy to make their joint decisions, Member As need to 
leave the room. 
<RA1 will lead Members A to leave the room.  RA1 will wait for signal from the room 
to bring Members A back in> 
Tasks of Members B1 and B2 
It is now time for Members B1 and B2 to decide which project will be carried out by 
the group, Project Blue or Project Red. 
 
First, each Member B1 will be asked to say privately which Project he/she thinks 
should be carried out by his/her group. He/she will also be asked to answer a small 
number of other questions. Answers to all these questions will be kept private from 
Members B2 and A.   
 
Next, each Member B2 will be asked the same questions. 
 
Finally, Members B1 and B2 from each group will make a joint decision about which 
project is to be carried out by the group, Project Blue or Project Red.  They will discuss 
this problem together and agree on a decision. 
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Remember that each member of the group will be paid according to the outcome of 
whichever project Members B1 and B2 jointly chose to carry out.  
Members B Private Decision  
Player B1 from Group {Circle/Triangle/Square} please approach the 
{Circle/Triangle/Square} Desk.  
<RA2 and RA3 will administer the control question and then wait for Player B1 from 
Group {Circle/Triangle/Square} to make her decision.  Session Leader will take over 
RA1 in administering the control questions. Verbally conduct Member B additional 
questions and record his/her responses. RA will instruct Player B1 to return to the 
seat and will record the decision. > 
Player B2 from Group {Circle/Triangle/Square} please approach the 
{Circle/Triangle/Square} Desk.  
Players B Joint Decision 
We will now move to the joint decision. 
When I call you, both Players B1 and B2 will approach the Group desk.  
You must reach a joint decision about which of the two projects to carry out.  I will 
give you a few minutes to discuss your decision.  
On the Group Desk, there will be two large sealed envelopes, an envelope with a blue 
star and an envelope with a red star.  The blue star envelope contains the outcome 
of Project BLUE, the project that was set up by Member A and then processed.  The 
red star envelope represents Project RED, the project that was set up by me and then 
processed. You must not open either of the envelopes. 
Once you have agreed on a joint decision, signal the RA. Give the envelope for the 
project that you want to be carried out to the RA behind the screen.  
Players B1 & B2 please approach the Group Desk.  
<Players make their decision then return to their seat. RA2 will call RA1 to bring 
Members A to the room> 
-- End of English Instructions – 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
B2. Malay-language Instruction Script 
Ini Aktiviti C. Anda ada peluang untuk tambah pendapatan anda dalam Aktiviti ini. 
Anda akan membuat satu keputusan sebagai seorang ahli kumpulan. Anda adalah 
ahli kepada salah satu kumpulan yang mempunyai 3 ahli, iaitu; Kumpulan Bulat, 
Segitiga atau Segiempat.  
<Point to the tag and desks> 
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Anda tahu identity ahli kumpulan anda tetapi maklumat tentang keputusan anda akan 
dirahsiakan dari ahli kumpulan anda.Jadi ahli kumpulan anda tidak tahu apa 
keputusan anda. Bila 2 ahli kumpulan perlu buat keputusan sepakat, maklumat 
keputusan sepakat ini akan dirahsiakan dari ahli yang ketiga.  
Giliran dan tugas anda akan ditentukan dengan peranan yang diberi. Peranan anda 
adalah; AHLI A, AHLI B1 atau AHLI B2. Ahli A akan buat keputusan dulu. Ahli B1 
dan Ahli B2 akan buat keputusan lepas Ahli A. 
Lepas saya baca aturan aktiviti ini, tugas anda akan diberikan.  
Untuk aktiviti ini, 2 projek akan dirancang untuk kumpulan anda; iaitu Projek Biru 
dan Projek Merah. Ahli A akan bertanggungjawab untuk merancang Projek Biru 
dalam bentuk satu cadangan untuk kumpulan dia. Saya akan merancang Projek 
Merah. Lepas tu Ahli B1 dan B2 akan pilih projek mana untuk dilaksanakan. 
Dari keputusan Ahli A dan lepas tu keputusan Ahli B1 dan B2 satu daripada tiga 
hasilan mungkin berlaku pada kumpulan anda: Hasilan X, Hasilan Y atau Hasilan 
Z.  
Untuk melihat macam mana setiap hasilan memberi kesan kepada anda, ahli 
kumpulan anda dan seluruh kumpulan anda, buka muka surat RS1.  
Muka surat SR1 terangkan Hasilan X: Jika projek yang anda pilih ada Hasilan X, 
Ahli A akan terima RM20. Ahli B1 dan Ahli B2 akan terima RM25 seorang. Jumlah 
nilai projek ini kepada kumpulan anda adalah tambahan apa Ahli A, Ahli B1 dan Ahli 
B2 terima, iaitu RM70.  
Buka muka surat SR2. 
Mukasurat SR2 terangkan Hasilan Y: Jika projek yang anda pilih ada Hasilan Y, Ahli 
A akan terima RM30. Ahli B1 dan B2 akan terima RM12.50 seorang. Jumlah projek 
ini kepada kumpulan anda adalah tambahan apa Ahli A, Ahli B1 dan Ahli B2 terima, 
iaitu RM55.  
Buka muka surat SR3 
Muka surat SR3 terangkan Hasilan Z: Jika projek yang anda pilih ada Hasilan Z, Ahli 
A akan terima RM20. Ahli B1 dan B2 akan terima RM18 seorang. Jumlah projek ini 
kepada kumpulan anda adalah tambahan apa Ahli A, Ahli B1 dan B2 terima, iaitu 
RM56. 
Anda boleh lihat, Hasilan X memberi Ahli B1 dan B2 pendapatan tertinggi yang 
boleh jadi kepada mereka (RM25), dan Hasilan X juga mempunyai nilai tertinggi 
kepada kumpulan. Tapi ia memberi Ahli A pendapatan terendah yang boleh jadi 
kepada dia (RM20). 
Hasilan Y memberi Ahli B1 dan B2 pendapatan terendah yang boleh jadi kepada 
mereka (RM12.50), dan juga mempunyai nilai yang terendah kepada kumpulan. 
Tetapi ia beri Ahli A pendapatan yang tertinggi yang boleh jadi kepada dia (RM30).  
Ada apa-apa soalan pasal macam mana pendapatan ditentukan dalam aktiviti ini? 
<Pause> 
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Buka muka surat SR4 untuk melihat macam mana Projek Biru dan Projek Merah 
berkait dengan Hasilan X, Hasilan Y dan Hasilan Z. 
Dalam peringkat pertama aktiviti ini, Ahli A dengan rahsia akan pilih perancangan 
untuk Projek Biru yang dia mahu cadangkan kepada kumpulan. Dia boleh pilih satu 
dari dua perancangan. Dengan salah satu perancangan, hasilan yang mungkin boleh 
sangat jadi adalah Hasilan X, tapi ada sedikit nasib yang perancangan itu jadi Hasilan 
Y. Dengan perancangan yang lagi satu, hasilan boleh sangat jadi Hasilan Y tetapi 
ada sedikit nasib yang ia boleh jadi Hasilan X.  
Ahli B1 dan B2 tak tahu macam mana Ahli A akan rancang Projek Biru.  
Projek yang lagi satu, Projek Merah, akan dirancang oleh saya, selaku ahli pasukan 
penyelidik. Ia dirancang supaya hasilan yang paling mungkin adalah hasilan Z, tetapi 
ada sedikit nasib yang hasilan yang terjadi adalah Hasilan Y.  
Dalam peringkat kedua aktiviti, Ahli B1 dan Ahli B2 akan dengan sepakat menentukan 
dari 2 projek yang mana akan di laksanakan. Ahli A tidak akan berada dalam bilik ini 
waktu itu, dan tidak akan tahu keputusan yang dibuat oleh Ahli B1 dan B2.   
Ambil perhatian! kalau Ahli A telah rancang Projek Biru supaya Hasilan X boleh 
sangat terjadi, Ahli B1 dan B2 boleh sangat menerima pendapatan yang lebih tinggi 
dengan Projek Biru dari Projek Merah (RM25 dari RM18), dan Ahli A boleh sangat 
menerima pendapatan yang sama dari mana-mana projek (Biru atau Merah) yang 
dilaksanakan (RM20). 
Tapi, kalau Ahli A telah rancang Projek Biru supaya Hasilan Y boleh sangat 
terjadi, Ahli B1 dan B2 boleh sangat menerima pendapatan yang lebih tinggi dengan 
Projek Merah dari Projek Biru (RM18 dari RM 12.50), tetapi Ahli A boleh sangat 
menerima pendapatan yang lebih tinggi dengan Projek Biru dari Projek Merah (RM30 
dari RM20). 
Pada akhir sesi ini dan jika aktiviti ini terpilih sebagai aktiviti yang anda akan dibayar, 
setiap ahli kumpulan akan dibayar mengikut hasilan mana-mana projek yang dipilih 
secara sepakat oleh Ahli B1 dan B2. Tetapi tidak siapa akan di beritahu yang 
hasilannya adalah X, Y, atau Z. Sebab tu, walaupun lepas semua peserta telah 
dibayar, tak ada siapa yang boleh tahu keputusan yang telah dibuat oleh ahli -ahli 
kumpulan yang lain.  
Sebagai contoh, anggap Ahli A telah merancang Projek BIRU yang boleh sangat 
untuk menghasilkan Hasilan Y, dan Ahli B1 dan B2 sepakat untuk melaksanakan 
Projek BIRU tersebut. Anggap lepas tu yang Projek Biru telah jadi Hasilan Y, jadi Ahli 
B1 dan B2 akan dibayar RM12.50 sehaja. Peringatan! Jika Ahli A telah merancang 
Project Biru yang boleh sangat menghasilkan Hasilan X, Hasilan Y boleh juga terjadi. 
Saya akan terangkan macam mana ini berlaku. Jadi Ahli B1 dan B2 tak tahu apa Ahli 
A telah rancang.  
Contoh lagi satu: anggap Ahli A telah rancang Projek Biru yang boleh sangat untuk 
menghasilkan Hasilan X, tetapi Ahli B1 dan B2 telah sepakat untuk sebaliknya 
melaksanakan Projek Merah. Projek Merah akan boleh sangat menghasilkan Hasilan 
Z. Anggap Hasilan Z telah terjadi. Ahli A akan dibayar RM20, iaitu apa yang dia akan 
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terima jika Projek BIRU dilaksanakan. Jadi Ahli A tidak tahu apa yang Ahli B1 dan 
Ahli B2 telah lakukan. 
Anda ada apa-apa soalan? 
<Pause> 
Kita akan mulakan aktiviti sekarang. 
Role Assignment 
<All RAs will approach each subject to pick an envelope from the bag in their 
hands> 
Ambil satu kad dari bag di depan anda. 
Kad yang anda telah ambil telah dilabel Ahli A, Ahli B atau Ahli B2. Ini adalah 
peranan anda dalam aktiviti ini. 
Letakkan kad ini dalam tag nama anda. Anda boleh lihat peranan ahli kumpulan anda 
dengan melihat pada tag nama mereka. Tengok, ini Ahli A dari Kumpulan {Bulat/Segi 
Tiga/Segi 4}. Dia akan buat keputusan dulu dalam kumpulan dia berdasarkan 
peranan dia. <point> Lepas dia buat keputusan Ahli B1 <point>   dan B2 <point> dari 
kumpulan yang sama akan buat keputusan masing-masing. Ini sama untuk 
Kumpulan yang lain. point to a group and its members as an example>. 
 
<RAs will place A4-label that have group and role identif ication in front of each 
subject’s desk> 
 
Set-up of Project Red  
 
Saya akan rancang Projek Merah sekarang. Perancangan Projek Merah adalah 
sama untuk setiap kumpulan (Bulat, Segi Tiga, dan Segi Empat). 
 
Ingat Projek Merah boleh sangat untuk menghasilkan Hasilan Z, tetapi ada sedikit 
nasib yang Projek Merah boleh juga hasilkan Hasilan Y. 
Ini adalah 2 kad, satu dilabel ‘Hasilan Z’<show this> dan satu dilabel ‘Hasilan 
Y’<show this>. 
Mula-mula, saya akan ambil kad Hasilan Z, masukkannya kedalam satu sampul kecil, 
dan akan tutupnya dengan pelekat. <Do this> 
Sekarang saya akan masukkan sampul ini ke dalam satu sampul yang ditanda 
dengan bintang merah dan akan tutup sampul ini. <Do this, showing the envelope 
and star>Bintang ini menunjukkan Hasilan Z telah diletakkan kedalam sampul ini. 
Bintang ini merah menunjukkan yang sampul ini mengandungi satu hasilan yang 
mungkin untuk Projek Merah.  
Sekarang saya akan mengambil kad Hasilan Y, masukkan kedalam dalam sampul 
yang kecil, dan akan tutupnya dengan pelekat. <Do this> 
Saya akan masukkan sampul ini ke dalam satu sampul yang ditanda dengan segi 
lima, dan akan menutup sampul ini. <Do this, showing the envelope and 
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pentagon>Segi lima menunjukkan yang kad hasilan Y telah diletakkan di dalam 
sampul ini. Segi lima ini merah untuk menunjukkan yang sampul mengandungi satu 
hasilan yang mungkin untuk Projek Merah.  
Projek Merah perlu diproses, kalau tak ia tak layak untuk dipilih oleh Ahli B1 dan B2. 
Projek Merah akan diproses sekarang, jadi ada sedikit nasib yang isi sampul bintang 
dan sampul segi lima boleh tertukar.  
Saya akan meminta seorang peserta untuk ‘offer’ diri sebagai sukarela untuk baling 
dadu. Dia akan bulatkan nombor hasil balingan di atas satu kertas. Lepas tu saya 
akan baling dadu lain dibelakang tabir ini, tapi saya tak akan bagi tahu nombor apa 
yang terhasil. Jika nombor dua dadu tersebut lain, isi kedua sampul besar tidak akan 
berubah. Tetapi jika nombor kedua dadu adalah sama, isi kedua sampul akan 
tertukar. Jadi ada 1 dalam 6 nasib atau 17% yang isi kedua sampul akan tertukar.  
Saya akan melakukan pertukaran sampul dibelakang tabir ini. Jika kedua nombor 
kedua dadu tak sama, saya akan mengeluarkan isi kedua sampul sebentar dan akan 
masukkan mereka kembali ke dalam sampul yang sama. Jadi anda tidak tahu sama 
ada sampul bintang merah dan segi lima merah telah tertukar. Anda akan lihat ada 
pergerakan dibelakang tabir tapi ini tak bermakna yang isi sampul telah ditukar 
atau isi sampul akan dipulangkan ke sampul asal. Saya kemudian akan tutup 
kedua sampul dengan pelekat. 
 
<RA gives die and a paper with 1 to 6 to one subject, who rolls the die and circle a 
number on the paper. RA will collect that paper> 
Sekarang saya akan baling dadu ini. <Do this> 
Sekarang, jika kedua balingan sama, saya akan menukar isi kedua-dua sampul. 
<Do this> 
Projek Merah telah pun diproses. Apa yang ada dalam sampul bintang merah akan 
menjadi hasilan untuk Projek Merah. Ada 5 dalam 6 nasib atau 83% yang ini adalah 
Hasilan Z. Jika tak, ianya adalah Hasilan Y. 
Task of Member A 
Sekejap lagi, setiap Ahli A akan dijemput ke Meja Kumpulan. Secara rahsia, Ahli A 
akan rancang Projek Biru dalam bentuk yang dia boleh cadangkan untuk kumpulan. 
Peringatan: ada dua cara yang berbeza untuk merancang Projek ini. Projek Biru 
boleh di rancang supaya ia boleh sangat untuk menghasilkan Hasilan X, atau ia boleh 
dirancang untuk boleh sangat untuk menghasilkan Hasilan Y. Ahli A perlu pilih satu 
cara untuk merancang Projek Biru.  
Setiap Ahli A akan menerima 2 kad and 2 sampul kecil. Satu kad di label ‘Hasilan X’. 
Kad lagi satu dilabel ‘Hasilan Y’. <Show these> 
Muka surat dari risalah yang menunjukkan akibat setiap hasilan kepada ahli 
kumpulan ada di atas meja. 
Ahli A akan masuk setiap kad dalam sampul kecil, dan tutup sampul dengan pelekat. 
Dia kena ingat kad mana yang dia letak dalam 2 sampul ini.  
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Lepas tu, Ahli A akan beri isyarat kepada RA untuk datang ke Meja Kumpulan. RA 
akan bawa 2 sampul besar. Satu sampul ada bintang biru. Sampul lagi satu ada segi 
lima biru. .  <Show these>     
Mula-mula Ahli A akan diberi sampul besar dengan bintang biru. Kalau Ahli A telah 
pilih untuk rancang Projek Biru supaya boleh sangat untuk menghasilkan Hasilan X, 
dia akan letak sampul kecil diisi kad Hasilan X dalam sampul besar bintang biru. 
Kalau Ahli A pilih untuk rancang Projek Biru supaya boleh sangat untuk menghasilkan 
Hasilan X, dia akan letak sampul kecil diisi kad Hasilan Y dalam sampul besar segi 
lima. Jadi isi sampul bintang biru menggambarkan bentuk Projek Biru yang Ahli A 
telah cadangkan kepada kumpulan.  
Lepas tu Ahli A akan diberi sampul besar dengan segi lima biru. Dia akan letak 
sampul kecil lagi satu yang ada kad yang lagi satu dalam sampul segi lima biru. Jadi 
isi sampul segi lima biru menggambarkan bentuk Projek Biru yang Ahli A tidak 
cadangkan pada kumpulan.  
Akhir sekali, setiap Ahli A akan ditanya secara rahsia sama ada dia jangka yang 
keputusan sepakat Ahli B1 dan B2 kumpulan dia akan jadi Projek Biru atau Projek 
Merah.  
Selepas Ahli A siap tugas dia, Projek Biru perlu di proses macam Projek Merah. 
Projek Biru hanya layak sebagai pilihan selepas dia diproses. Projek Biru akan 
diproses cara yang sama dengan Projek Merah. 
< RA will place 1 card labelled Y, 1 card labelled X, 2 small envelopes on each group’s 
decision desk, 2 stickers, Page SR2 and SR3 that contain the payoffs for Outcome 
X, Outcome Z and Outcome Y.> 
Ahli A, sila ke Meja Kumpulan.  
<RA will ask the control questions. Then leave the Member A to make the 
decision.> 
<After the decision has been made, place intended small envelopes into the larger 
envelopes with blue star or blue pentagon. Verbally conduct Member A additional 
questions and record his/her responses. Dismiss Member A to his/her seat> 
Projek Biru akan diproses sekarang jadi ada sedikit nasib yang isi sampul bintang 
biru dan bintang segi lima akan tertukar. Kita akan proses Projek Biru untuk 
Kumpulan Bulat, kemudian Kumpulan Segi 3 dan akhir sekali Kumpulan Segi 4.  
Saya akan minta seorang dari setiap kumpulan untuk ‘offer’ diri untuk baling satu 
dadu. Dia akan bulatkan nombor hasil balingan di atas kertas yang diberikan. Setiap 
RA untuk kutip kertas ini. Lepas tu setiap RA akan baling satu dadu yang lain 
dibelakang tabir, tetapi nombor hasil balingan takkan di bagi tahu. Jika nombor hasil 
kedua balingan adalah lain, isi kedua sampul biru akan tidak berubah. Jika nombor 
hasil kedua balingan adalah sama, isi kedua sampul akan ditukar. Jadi ada 1 dalam 
6 nasib atau 17% yang isi sampul akan tertukar.  
RA akan tukar sampul dibelakang skrin ini. Jika nombor hasil balingan berlainan, RA 
akan keluarkan sampul kecil dari sampul bintang biru dan segi lima biru seketika dan 
masukkan mereka balik. Jadi anda tak tahu sama ada isi sampul bintang biru dan 
segi lima biru telah ditukar. Lepas tu RA akan tutup kedua sampul dengan pelekat.  
Anda akan lihat ada pergerakan dibelakang tabir tapi ini tak bermakna yang isi 
sampul telah ditukar atau isi sampul akan dipulangkan ke sampul asal.  
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<Each RA gives a die to B1 in their group and a piece of paper. B1 rolls the dice 
and circle a number> 
<Each RA will collect the piece of paper> 
RA untuk Kumpulan Bulat akan baling dadu sekarang. <Do this. Make sure the die 
roll can be heard by everyone.> 
RA untuk Kumpulan Segi Tiga akan baling dadu sekarang. <Do this. Make sure the 
die roll can be heard by everyone.> 
RA untuk Kumpulan Empat akan baling dadu sekarang. <Do this. Make sure the die 
roll can be heard by everyone.> 
RA untuk Kumpulan Empat akan baling dadu sekarang. 
Projek Biru untuk Kumpulan Bulat telah diproses. Apa dalam sampul bintang biru 
akan jadi hasilan Projek Biru untuk Kumpulan Bulat. Ada 5 dalam 6 nasib atau 83% 
yang apa dalam sampul bintang biru adalah Hasilan X dan Y telah dicadangkan oleh 
Ahli A. Kalau tak, ianya hasilan yang TIDAK dicadangkan. 
Penglibatan tiga Ahli A dalam activiti ini telah berakhir. Untuk memastikan semua 
Ahli B ada ‘privacy’ semasa membuat keputusan sepakat, Ahli A perlu 
meninggalkan bilik ini. Sila ikut RA1.  
<RA1 will lead Members A to leave the room.  RA1 will wait for signal from the room 
to bring Members A back in> 
Tasks of Members B1 and B2 
 
Sekarang Ahli B1 dan B2 perlu buat keputusan projek yang perlu dilaksanakan untuk 
kumpulan, Projek Biru atau Projek Merah. 
 
Mula-mula, setiap Ahli B1 akan ditanya secara rahsia projek mana dia rasa patut 
dilaksanakan untuk kumpulan dia. Dia juga akan ditanya beberapa soalan lain. 
Jawapan untuk soalan-soalan ini akan dirahsiakan dari Ahli B2 dan A.  
 
Lepas tu setiap Ahli B2 akan ditanya soalan yang sama.  
 
Akhir sekali Ahli B1 dan B2 dari setiap kumpulan akan buat keputusan sepakat untuk 
memilih projek yang akan dilaksanakan untuk kumpulan, Projek Biru atau Projek 
Merah. Mereka akan berbincang bersama dan capai sepakat.  
 
Ingat, setiap ahli kumpulan akan dibayar mengikut hasilan dalam mana-mana projek 
yang dipilih secara sepakat oleh Ahli B1 dan B2.  
 
Members B Private Decision  
Ahli B1 dari Kumpulan {Bulat/Segitiga/Segiempat} sila datang ke meja Kumpulan 
masing-masing. 
<RA2 and RA3 will administer the control question and then wait for Player B1 from 
Group {Circle/Triangle/Square} to make her decision.  Session Leader will take over 
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RA1 in administering the control questions. Verbally conduct Member B additional 
questions and record his/her responses. RA will instruct Player B1 to return to the 
seat and will record the decision. > 
Ahli B2 dari Kumpulan {Bulat/Segitiga/Segiempat} sila datang ke meja Kumpulan 
masing-masing. 
Players B Joint Decision 
Kita akan ke peringkat keputusan sepakat. 
Bila saya panggil, kedua Ahli B1 dan B2 sila datang ke Meja Kumpulan.  
Anda mesti dapat keputusan sepakat untuk projek mana akan dilaksanakan. Saya 
akan berikan anda beberapa minit untuk berbincang.  
Pada Meja Kumpulan ada 2 sampul surat, satu dengan bintang biru dan satu dengan 
bintang merah. Sampul bintang biru ada isi hasilan Projek Biru yang boleh sangat di 
rancang oleh Ahli A dan di proses. Sampul bintang merah adalah sampul wakil untuk 
Projek MERAH yang dirancang saya dan telah diproses. Anda TAK boleh membuat 
kedua-dua sampul.  
Bila anda telah setuju dengan keputusan sepakat, beri isyarat kepada RA. Bagi 
sampul yang ada Projek yang anda berdua mahu laksanakan kepada RA di belakang 
tabir.  
Ahli B1 dan B2 sila datang ke Meja Keputusan.  
<Players make their decision then return to their seat. RA2 will call RA1 to bring 
Members A to the room> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
-- Aturan Tamat – 
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Figure 3.6A. Page 1 of Subjects’ Reference (English) 
Outcome X 
 
Member Payoff 
A 
 
 
RM20 or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B1 
 
 
 
  RM 25  or 
 
 
 
 
B2 
 
 
 
  RM 25 or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Value of X  
 
RM 70 atau  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SR1 
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Figure 3.7A. Page 1 of Subjects’ Reference (Malay translation) 
Hasilan X 
 
Ahli Pendapatan 
A 
 
 
RM20 atau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B1 
 
 
 
  RM 25  atau 
 
 
 
 
B2 
 
 
 
  RM 25 atau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nilai Seluruh Projek 
 
RM 70 atau  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SR1 
213 
 
Figure 3.8A. Page 2 of Subjects’ Reference (English) 
Outcome Y 
 
Member Payoff 
A 
 
 
RM30 or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B1 
 
 
 
  RM 12.50  or  
 
 
 
 
 
B2 
 
 
 
  RM 12.50 or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Value of Y 
 
RM 55 or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SR2 
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Figure 3.9A. Page 2 of Subjects’ Reference (Malay translation) 
Hasilan Y 
Ahli Pendapatan 
A 
 
 
RM30 atau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B1 
 
 
 
  RM 12.50  atau  
 
 
 
 
 
B2 
 
 
 
  RM 12.50 atau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nilai Seluruh Projek 
 
RM 55 atau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SR2 
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Figure 3.10A. Page 3 of Subjects’ Reference (English) 
Outcome Z 
Member Payoff 
A 
 
 
RM20 or 
 
 
B1 
 
 
 
RM 18 or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B2 
 
 
 
RM 18 or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Value of Z 
 
 
RM 56 or 
 
 
 
 
 
 SR3 
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Figure 3.11A. Page 3 of Subjects’ Reference (Malay translation) 
Hasilan Z 
Ahli Pendapatan 
A 
 
 
RM20 atau 
 
 
B1 
 
 
 
RM 18 atau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B2 
 
 
 
RM 18 atau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nilai Seluruh Projek 
 
 
RM 56 atau 
 
 
 
 
 
 SR3 
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Figure 3.12A. Page 4 of Subjects’ Reference (English) 
 
Blue Project 
 
 
 
 
 
      or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RED PROJECT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
X 
Y 
EO 
 
X 
Y 
Z 
Y 
SR4 
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Figure 3.13A. Page 4 of Subjects’ Reference (Malay translation) 
PROJEK BIRU  
 
 
 
 
 
      or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PROJEK MERAH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
X 
Y 
SL 
 
X 
Y 
Z 
Y 
SR4 
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Figure 3.14A. Page 5 of Subjects’ Reference (English) 
 
Pick 1 Project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Payoffs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B2 
 
Z X Y 
 
B1 
 
or 
SR5 
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Figure 3.15A. Page 5 of Subjects’ Reference (Malay translation) 
Pilih 1 Projek 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pendapatan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B2 
 
Z X Y 
 
B1 
 
or 
SR5 
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Appendix B3: Control questions for Sender (English instructions) 
Before you make any decision, please answer the following questions; 
• If you decide to place card with the Outcome X in the blue star envelope as 
Project BLUE, your earnings is ________ provided the content wasn’t 
swapped and the Project BLUE is chosen by Members B1 and B2. 
• If the Outcome Z placed by the Session Leader has been swapped with 
Outcome Y and both Members B picked the Project RED, your earnings 
will be _______. 
You will now make your decision now.  
Please make your decision by placing one card into one envelope and do the same 
for the other card and envelope. Remember which envelope you have placed the 
outcome that you want. Once you have done this signal the RA. Hand the envelope 
with the content that you want to set-up as the Outcome for Project BLUE to the RA.  
<RA will insert the envelopes to the intended bigger envelopes> 
Please answer the following questions. Point the answer to me. 
<RA will ask questions from Member A additional questions and record the 
responses> 
You have completed the task. Please return to your desk. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Appendix B4: Control questions for Sender (Malay-language instructions) 
Sebelum anda membuat apa-apa keputusan, sila jawab soalan-soalan yang berikut: 
• Bayangkan anda letak kad Hasilan X dalam sampul biru bintang. Kalau isi 
sampul biru bintang dan biru segi lima tak tertukar, dan kalua Ahli B1 dan B2 
pilih Projek Biru, pendapatan anda adalah________ 
• Ingat yang Ketua Sesi dah letak kad Hasilan Z dalam sampul merah bintang 
dan kad Hasilan Y dalam sampul segi lima merah. Kalau isi dua-dua sampul 
tertukar dan kalau Ahli B1 dan B2 pilih Projek MERAH, pendapatan anda 
adalah_______ 
Anda boleh membuat keputusan sekarang.  
Sila buat keputusan anda dengan memasukkan satu kad ke dalam satu sampul dan 
buat benda yang sama untuk sampul dan kad yang lagi satu. Ingat sampul mana 
yang anda letak Hasilan yang anda mahu cadangkan.  Bila sudah, beri ‘signal’ pada 
RA. Hulur sampul yang diisi dengan kad hasilan yang anda mahu letakkan sebagai 
Hasilan untuk Projek BIRU kepada RA. 
<RA will insert the envelopes to the intended bigger envelopes> 
Sila jawab soalan berikut. Tunjukkan jawapan anda pada saya. 
<RA will ask questions from Member A additional questions and record the 
responses> 
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Tugas anda selesai. Sila pulang ke meja anda. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Appendix B5: Control questions for Receivers (English instructions) 
Before you make any decision, please answer the following questions; 
• If Player A decide to set-up Outcome X as Project BLUE and in the 
Processing Stage the envelope containing Outcome X has been swapped 
with Outcome Y, my earnings is __________ 
• If the Outcome Z placed by the Session Leader has been swapped with 
Outcome Y and both Players B picked the Project RED, my earnings will be 
________ 
You will now make your decision now.  
Show the envelope that you think should be carried out to the RA. Do this behind the 
screen so Member B1/B2 do not see your decision.  
<RA to swap the position of each envelope after Member B1 made decision> 
Please answer the following questions. Point the answer to me. 
<RA will ask questions from Member B1/B2 additional questions and record the 
responses> 
You have completed the task. Please return to your desk. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Appendix B6: Control questions for Receivers (Malay-language instructions) 
Control Questions Members B1 & B2 
Sebelum anda buat apa-apa keputusan, sila jawab soalan-soalan yang berikut; 
• Bayangkan Ahli A pilih untuk rancang Projek BIRU dengan Hasilan 
X, dan bila Projek BIRU ini di proses sampul Hasilan X tertukar 
dengan sampul Hasilan Y. Kalau anda dan Ahli B1/B2 pilih Projek 
BIRU, pendapatan anda adalah _____ 
• Ingat yang Ketua Sesi dah letak kad Hasilan Z dalam sampul merah 
bintang dan kad Hasilan Y dalam sampul merah segi lima. Kalau isi 
kedua sampul tertukar dan kalua anda dan Ahli B1/B2 pilih Projek 
MERAH, pendapatan anda adalah ______ 
• Kalau Ahli A pilih untuk letak Hasilan X sebagai Projek BIRU dan 
dalam peringkat pemprosesan, sampul dengan Hasilan X telah 
tertukar dengan Hasilan Y, pendapatan saya adalah _______ 
• Kalau Hasilan Z yang telah diletakkan oleh Ketua Sesi telah tertukar 
dengan Hasilan Y dan kedua-dua Ahli B1 dan B2 memilih Projek 
MERAH, pendapatan saya adalah __________  
Anda boleh membuat keputusan sekarang. 
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Tunjuk sampul yang anda rasa patut dilaksanakan pada RA. Buat ni be lakang tabir 
supaya Ahli B1/B2 tidak boleh lihat keputusan anda.  
<RA to swap the position of each envelope after Member B1 made decision> 
Sila jawab soalan berikut. Tunjuk jawapan pada saya, 
<RA will ask questions from Member B1/B2 additional questions and record the 
responses> 
Tugas anda selesai. Sila pulang ke meja anda. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
224 
 
Chapter 4 
Representation in Public Good Provision: An Experimental 
Investigation  
4.1 Introduction 
The presence of a representative acting on behalf of a group is ubiquitous in multiple 
social organizations – for example: elected representatives negotiating benefits for 
their constituents, heads securing funding for their departments, lobbyists influencing 
regulators on behalf of their clients, and in developing countries, village heads 
lobbying for development projects, from the government and NGOs, on behalf of the 
villagers. Typically, a representative serves the group by performing a distinguished 
act within the collective action to increase social benefit. A good organization appoints 
a representative to lobby for funding from the government. At the same time, the 
representative would be effective if she/he lobbies for a well-run organization. 
Consequently, the organization produces optimal benefits if it is represented by an 
effective representative and run by an efficient workforce.  
The main objective of this chapter is to investigate behaviour from the theoretical 
novelty of our PGG structure: the positive complementarity between representative’s 
and the rest of the group’s actions. In this chapter the relationship between a 
representative and the rest of her/his group members is examined under standard lab 
conditions, therefore allowing this variation of PGG to be comparable with the 
findings from the standard PGG literature. Our PGG implementation lab-in-the-field 
settings in Sarawak differed from the standard lab settings on different dimensions due 
to elements of non-anonymity and the recruitment of a non-standard subject pool. The 
lab-in-the-field settings also constrained the investigation of this PGG from examining 
decisions in repeated rounds and whether variation in the order of the representative’s 
decision affects subjects’ behaviour.    
This chapter will use the framework of representative leadership described in Chapter 
2, in which a group of 3 consisting of 1 representative and 2 ordinary group members, 
each perform differentiated and complementary tasks. Group members are provided 
with the opportunity to contribute to a public good, while the representative has an 
opportunity to act on behalf of the group by expand ing the public good’s benefit 
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through enlarging the multiplier attached to the group members’ contributions. This 
turns the act of representation into a form of leadership: the presence of a 
representative could motivate group members to provide collective action as the return 
from contribution increases with the representative’s effort. Each player receives an 
equal endowment and the payoff from the public good is distributed equally between 
the representative and ordinary group members. Because the marginal private benefit 
of the representative’s effort increases as group members’ contributions increase, the 
representative’s payoff is interdependent with the contribution levels of the group 
members. At the same time, the marginal private benefit of contribution increases as 
the representative’s effort increases.  
The PGG implemented as a lab-in-the-field in Chapter 2 is unable to disentangle the 
explanation behind the generally high level of effort among representatives 
irrespective of their social status. Their behaviour could have stemmed from a sense 
of responsibility attached to the role, i.e. the function of representation has been 
performed in one way or another by both non-aristocrats or aristocrats in the village, 
or the presence of contributing group members obliged them to exert high levels of 
effort to preserve their reputation outside the game, despite the credible deniability 
component in the experimental design.   
Here, using the PGG structure introduced in Chapter 2 we vary the order the of 
representative’s decision with respect to group members’ decisions. The objective of 
this Chapter is to find out whether the order of the moves affects the effort by the 
representative, the contribution by group members, and both effort and contribution 
outcomes in the subsequent periods. To achieve this, the experiment consisted of three 
treatments. In the first treatment, SimRep, the representative and the group members 
made decisions simultaneously. In the second treatment, RepFirst, the representative 
exerted his/her effort first and the level of effort was communicated to the respective 
group members before they decided on their contribution levels. In the last treatment, 
RepLast, the representative’s decision was made after he/she had learned about the 
contribution level of group members. The RepLast treatment has the same decision 
sequence as the PGG in Chapter 2.   
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Apart from using standard student subjects, this chapter also expands from Chapter 2 
as subjects in each treatment play the public good game for 20 rounds, with feedback 
at the end of each round.  
Empirical evidence has documented effects from sequential public good games, 
particularly in leadership experiments (Arbak & Villeval, 2013; Brandts, et al.,2015; 
Cappelen, et al., 2016; Drouvelis & Nosenzo, 2013; Gächter, et al., 2010; Gächter & 
Renner, 2018; Güth, et al., 2007; Haigner & Wakolbinger, 2010; Potters, et al., 2007; 
Van der Heijden & Moxnes, 2012). By sequencing the leader’s decision before the 
followers and revealing her/his contribution level, followers could be motivated to 
make contributions. Several experiments have found that this sequencing increases 
contributions relative to simultaneous public good games. Making the subjects play 
the public good game for 20 rounds allows this experiment to examine the dynamics 
of representation over time. On the other hand, f indings from conventional PGG 
designs that involve simultaneous moves among players have shown that it is difficult 
for groups to maintain high levels of cooperation over time (Fischbacher & Gächter, 
2010). Much of the explanation behind the outcomes in sequential and simultaneous 
public good games revolves around the role of reciprocity and conditional cooperation 
among subjects.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature on representation, public good games and leadership. The full descriptive 
model of representative leadership is found in Section 3 and Section 4 outlines the 
hypothesis. Section 5 provides the details on the experimental design and 
implementation. Findings from this experiment can be found in Section 6 and we 
conclude in Section 7.   
4.2 Related literature 
Effective representation is a type of function of leadership. Previous experiments have 
examined leadership functions such as a reward giver, a punisher or a communicator 
within a group. In some of these experiments, it is not a necessity for the leader to  act 
as the first mover; the essential feature is that a leader possesses a function that is able 
to motivate followers or group members to cooperate. We believe that our experiment 
is the first to measure representation as a function of leadership.  
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The earliest theoretical work to explain leadership is made by Hermalin (1998) and 
Hermalin (2007), in which the role of the leader is to convince the followers to 
voluntarily contribute towards the team output through: i) leading-by-example, or ii) 
leading-by-sacrifice. Hermalin’s theory of leadership relies on the leader providing a 
signal in an asymmetric information setting in the form of an example or sacrifice to 
the follower. Leaders are assumed to have private information on the task and 
communicate the level of efforts needed to followers via signalling. Hermalin’s theory 
of leadership was tested by Meidinger & Villeval (2002) by comparing it with 
followership that emerges from the effect of reciprocity. The experiment found that in 
the leading-by-example treatment, the followers were more likely to follow the 
leader’s example by matching the leader’s contribution, indicating that reciprocity 
plays a bigger role in inducing followers to follow the leader. In a similar vein, Potters 
et al. (2005) also examined signalling in leadership by granting the first mover more 
information about a public good and only her/his contribution value was 
communicated to the second mover. In this experiment, information asymmetry 
facilitates mimicking from the followers while the leaders’ expectations of following 
sustain the contribution. 
Most recent literature on leadership in PGGs has focused on social preferences with 
less emphasis on information asymmetry. In one common experimental design, the 
leader chooses her/his contribution first.  Her/his followers observe that contribution 
and then choose their contribution values. A public good will be produced when there 
are elements of reciprocation and cooperation between the leader and her/his 
followers. In addition to the contribution by Meidinger & Villeval (2002), Gächter & 
Renner (2004) examined leadership using several variations of sequential PGG. The 
first type of comparison was made between a one-shot simultaneous PGG and a 
sequential PGG with a randomly selected leader. The other treatments involved 
repeated PGGs, one comparing different values of the marginal per capita return 
(MPCR) on contributing and the others involving selecting a group member to be the 
first mover. The stylized facts found in the simultaneous standard PGG literature are 
also present here (Ledyard, 1995); in the one-shot games, subjects contributed midway 
between the Pareto and free-riding levels, and in the repeated treatments, the overall 
contributions by first and second movers declined over time. In the sequential PGG, 
Gächter and Renner (2004) found that the second movers’ contributions were 
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positively correlated with the first mover’s contribution in one-shot games and at the 
initial round for repeated PGG. They found that contribution levels in sequential 
treatments were higher than in the baseline treatment, but only in the initial rounds. 
Decline in contributions still happened as games progressed and there was no 
statistically significant difference between the average contributions of subjects in the 
leadership and baseline treatments.  What the sequential mechanism is able to do is to 
make subjects assigned as leaders contribute more than subjects in the baseline 
treatment over time, but this does not motivate the followers to directly match their 
leaders’ contributions. Due to this, leaders’ payoffs in general are lower than 
followers’ payoffs, indicating that the leader has been suckered in to contribute and 
followers are free riding on her/his contribution.   
The evidence on this ‘leading-by-example’ mechanism is mixed. Leaders in Arbak & 
Villeval (2013), Gächter & Renner (2004 & 2018) and Güth et al. (2007) are found to 
be effective in motivating followers to contribute to the PG and followers’ 
contributions are found to be positively correlated with the leader’s contribution. On 
the other hand, there are other experiments that have found that the presence of a leader 
does not motivate followers to contribute, especially in instances where followers were 
already cooperative without the presence of the leader. In Sahin et al. (2015), a 
leading-by-example mechanism in a linear public good game was unable to improve 
cooperation among the followers, in comparison to the baseline treatment, as 
followers’ MPCR on contribution drives followers to conditionally cooperate with the 
leader. In addition, Haigner & Wakolbinger  (2010) found followers’ contributions 
were not significantly greater in a leadership setting than in a simultaneous public 
good set-up.  
The only experiment that has tested the effect having 1 player deciding last in a 
sequential PGG was introduced by Cox et al. (2013). Here they labelled the PGG as 
the ‘provision game’ and it happened in a group of 4 with 3 players acting as the first 
movers. The second mover in each group decides after observing the first movers’ 
decisions. In the ‘boss’ treatment, the second mover could choose to free ride on the 
first movers’ contributions or increase everyone’s payoff by contributing to the PG. 
The ‘king’ treatment extends the power of the ‘boss’ by allowing the second mover to 
appropriate contributions made by the first movers in the PG. The singular second 
mover has asymmetric power in this type of sequential game as she/he determines the 
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final shape of total contribution. The control treatment is where everyone decides 
simultaneously. These treatments were implemented as a one-shot game. The 
experimenters found that the average group earnings in the simultaneous treatment 
outperformed average group earnings in the boss and king sequential treatments with 
the king treatment performing the worst among the three. They also found that, on 
average, everyone in the simultaneous treatment contributed more to the PG than the 
first movers in the boss and king treatments. An average second mover in the boss 
treatment contributed less than the first movers while an average ‘king’ exploited 
her/his position by appropriating a small amount of first movers’ contribution to the 
PG.  
One consistent finding in the sequential PGG literature is that the second mover(s) 
free ride on the contribution of the first mover(s). This can be explained by backward 
induction, assuming that everyone is self -interested. Since the marginal private return 
on contribution is less than one, the first mover(s) can infer that their contributions 
will not affect the contributions of the second mover(s); while the second mover(s) 
will not contribute because the marginal private return on contribution is less than one. 
As the marginal private return on contributing is the same for both types of players, 
the first mover(s) is more exposed to any free riding committed by the second mover(s) 
if they contribute and believe that their contributions will be reciprocated by the 
second mover(s). In both Gächter & Renner (2004) and (Cox et al.2013), the second 
mover(s) received a higher payoff than the first mover(s), while the first mover(s) were 
being suckered in to contribute.   
Since a sequential PGG produces a free-riding opportunity for the second movers 
when paired with cooperative first movers, several works have tried to explore this 
issue by modifying the marginal private return of the first and second movers.  Works 
by Andreoni et al. (2002) and Gächter et al. (2010) have the first and second movers 
face unequal returns in some treatments. The main feature of this type of PGG is 
negative complementarity between the first and second movers. This is achieved when 
the marginal private return on contribution for the first mover decreases as the second 
mover contributes more, and vice versa. In the context of strong negative 
complementarity, zero contribution from the first mover makes the marginal private 
return for the second mover to be larger than one, making it Pareto optimal for one 
subject to free ride while the other contributes all his/her endowment to the PGG.  
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A theoretical foundation to this strain of sequential PGG is provided by Varian (1994), 
in which he proposed that when one player values the  PG more than the other player, 
the player who values it more contribute more to the PG than if she/he is the only 
contributor. When this PGG is implemented in a sequential setting, the first mover 
would only contribute if she/he valued the PG more than the second mover. However 
due to the threat of free riding from the second mover, the best strategy for the first 
mover is to free ride and leave the PG contribution to be done by the second mover. 
The work concludes that public good provision under sequential moves is smaller than 
in the simultaneous setting.  
In Andreoni et al. (2002), the sequential contribution set-up involved 14 rounds with 
unequal equilibrium payoffs between the first and second movers while preserving 
both players’ free-riding strategy. The experiment aims to examine preferences for 
fairness when subjects are faced with equilibrium payoff differences. The experiment 
is conducted in a 2-person group. Here, both players face decreasing marginal returns 
from contributing and even if both players decide to equalise contribution at any value, 
one player will receive lower payoff than the other. They found that average 
contributions among the two players in the simultaneous move PGG are almost 
identical for every round while the second movers in the sequential move PGG on 
average contributed more compared to the average contribution by first movers. 
However, the difference between the first and second movers’ contributions is not 
statistically significant.  The authors noted that closer to the end of the game, 
behaviour in the simultaneous and sequential games becomes more similar. On 
average, the first movers in the sequential treatment behaved as predicted in their 
framework: free riding on second movers’ contributions in the early rounds. As the 
rounds progressed, fairness consideration entered the second mover’s consideration 
and they reduced their contributions as a way to punish the low-contributing first 
movers.   Another work that examines differences in sequential and simultaneous 
contributions with asymmetric returns to players is by Gächter et al. (2010). They 
further varied the sequential treatments, as a test of Varian’s (1994) equilibrium 
prediction that the first mover has a free-riding advantage over the second mover. They 
found support for the hypothesis that aggregate contributions are lower in the 
treatment in which first movers have higher returns. Similarly, subjects in Andreoni et 
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al. (2002) also exhibited preferences towards equitable allocations in which the second 
mover ‘punishes’ the low contributing first mover by withholding contribution.  
In our experimental design, contributions made by the representative and group 
members are positive complements, regardless of who moves first. To the best of our 
knowledge, no studies have examined this PGG’s feature.  
In our treatments in which group members decide simultaneously or before the 
representative, their contributions are risky decisions since they have information only 
about the possible range of MPCR values; the exact value is determined by their 
representative.  There are several related works that examine risk and uncertainty in 
the determination of MPCR and its subsequent effect on PG contributions. Boulu-
Reshef et al. (2017), Levati & Morone (2013) and Stoddard (2015) incorporated a 
probabilistic element in the determination of group-level MPCR. Levati & Morone 
(2013) examines contribution levels under the condition that the minimum value from 
possible MPCR values allows for efficiency gain, and finds that the stochastic 
determination of the MPCR value does not affect public good contribution. Similarly, 
uncertainty in the form of a combination of partial uncertainty of personal MPCR and 
the distribution of MPCRs in a group are found not to be detrimental to PGG 
contribution by Boulu-Reshef et al. (2017).  On the other hand, Stoddard (2015) using 
a within-subjects design examines the effect of contribution by exposing subjects to 
PGG with uncertain and certain MPCR values between rounds. The experiment found 
effects on contribution levels depending on the order of the uncertainty treatment 
relative to treatment that have fixed MPCR value.29   
4.3 A Model of representative leading in public good game 
We use a linear public good game (PGG) as the base of this model. In the standard 
linear PGG, each player i in a group of n players receives an endowment of 1. She/he 
chooses an amount xi from the interval (0 ≤ xi ≤ 1) to allocate to the group project. The 
remainder from the endowment is allocated to a private account. For each unit 
allocated to the private account, the player will receive a return of 1. The return from 
the group account will depend on total allocations to the group project, ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 . Total 
 
29 Another category of PGG experiments that have stochastic determination of MPCR values by 
varying its values among group members, i.e. heterogeneous MPCR’s values for each group 
member. For examples (Fischbacher et al. (2014) and Gangadharan & Nemes (2009) found 
contributions are affected when the uncertainty involved differences of MPCR values within a group.     
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contributions in the group project are multiplied by a pre-defined multiplier, m, and 
then divided equally among the n group members. The payoff of each individual i is 
given by: 
𝜋𝑖 = (1 − 𝑥𝑖) +
(∑ 𝑥𝑖) ∗ 𝑚𝑖
𝑛
 
In the standard linear PGG setting, we need to satisfy m/n < 1 and m > 1 to create a 
social dilemma for each player i. The former, m/n < 1,  implies it is best for each i to 
contribute zero to group project in a unique Nash equilibrium since the marginal 
private return on contribution is less than 1, while  the latter, m > 1,   indicates that all 
i will obtain a Pareto optimum payoff from contributing all of their endowment 
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 =  𝑛  to the group account.  
 
The group decision-making framework presented in this chapter involves the presence 
of a representative. The representative determines the value of the PG multiplier 
attached to any contribution made to the group project. The representative performs a 
differentiated role in the PGG in comparison to other group members but receives the 
same share of the PG as other group members. Contribution from the representative is 
not incorporated into the total allocation of the group account, but it affects the value 
of the multiplier m.  Public good provision is derived from contributions by other 
group members to the group project multiplied by a multiplier selected by the 
representative. PG provision is maximised when the representative allocates all her/his 
effort to increase the multiplier value and other group members allocate all their 
endowment to the group project. The representative and other group members will 
earn equal share from the public good as part of their individual payoffs.   
 
The presence of a representative could potentially rally group members to produce a 
public good with the awareness that a representative will amplify the public good’s 
benefit by expanding the multiplier value. Thus, a representative performs a leadership 
function. On the other hand, the representative still receives a share from the PG even 
if she/he did not exert any effort to increase the multiplier value.  
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4.3.1 Representative leading in public good game 
In a group of n players there are two types of players; i) non-representative group 
members (i), and ii) the representative (j). There are n -1 players i, in which (𝑖 ∈
{1,2, 3 … , 𝑛 − 1}), and j is the nth player. Regardless of players’ types, everyone 
receives the same endowment of 1. Players i can allocate xi from the interval 0 ≤ xi ≤ 
1 and keep the remainder for private return. Player j decides as a representative by 
allocating her/his endowment as an effort to increase the value of the PG multiplier. 
The implemented PG multiplier, M*, is determined by player j’s allocation of effort, 
ej, from her/his endowment (0 ≤ ej ≤ 1). The default value of the PG multiplier is set 
at M0, when ej = 0; in which n/(n-1) > M0 > 1 to preserve the social dilemma condition. 
When j provides any effort with ej > 0, the multiplier value for the PG is now: 
𝑀∗ =  𝑀0 + 𝑎𝑒𝑗 
in which a is a constant attached to any positive value of ej, as each unit of effort by 
player j incrementally increases the value of multiplier. 
Players’ i strategy 𝑥𝑖 in [0,1] will result in the following payoff function for each i; 
𝜋𝑖 = (1 − 𝑥𝑖) +
(∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 )(𝑀0+𝑎𝑒𝑗)
𝑛
   ∑i is ∀ player i; (1) 
And player j’s strategy 𝑒𝑗 in [0,1] leads to this payoff function, 
𝜋𝑗 = (1 − 𝑒𝑗) +
(∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 )(𝑀0+𝑎𝑒𝑗)
𝑛
      (2) 
The summation of the payoffs for players i and a player j in a group forms the following 
group payoff, 
𝜋𝐺 = (𝑛 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑗) + (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 )(𝑀0 + 𝑎𝑒𝑗)    (3) 
Social dilemma is still an integral part of this PGG as multiplier values will be 
parameterised to ensure that both types of players possess dominant strategies of non-
contributing and zero effort; as well as the possibility of obtaining the socially optimal 
outcome from maximum contribution and effort. Player j would be able to free ride on 
players i by not exerting effort as she/he would receive a share of PG return. Zero 
contribution from players i would be a dominant strategy for them as this would prevent 
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player j from free riding on their contributions. Both types of players would maximise 
the payoff by exerting full effort and contributing all endowment to the group project.  
In Section 3.2 to 3.5, we outline how these conditions are derived when n =3, i.e. there 
are 2 players i and 1 player j in a group. This is aligned with the implementation of the 
lab experiment. We begin by outlining the marginal private return on contributions and 
marginal social returns for all types of players in the group. Following that, we examine 
the marginal collective return for players i. Multiplier values are drawn from the 
solutions of the players’ marginal returns.  
4.3.2 Marginal private return 
We start by partially differentiating equations (1) and (2) to find the optimum for each 
type of player and since the derived equations are linear, the optima are corner 
solutions. This provides marginal private returns for both players. From (1), the 
marginal private return for a player i or a group member is; 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
=  −1 + (
1
3
 )(𝑀0 + 𝑎𝑒𝑗)   (4) 
The marginal private return for player i is independent of 𝑥𝑖  but has an increasing 
relationship with 𝑒𝑗. This is a departure from the standard PGG as effort from player j 
influences the marginal private return an average player i could receive. For a player 
i, non-contribution (𝑥𝑖 = 0) is a dominant strategy when 𝑒𝑗 = 1 under this condition:  
−1 + (
1
3
) (𝑀0 + 𝑎) < 0, hence 𝑀0 + 𝑎 < 3. We identify this as Condition (A) that 
will be useful in determining parameter values for the experimental design. 
From (2), the marginal private return for player j (the representative) is: 
𝜕𝜋𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗
=  −1 + (
1
3
)(∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 )(𝑎)   (5) 
For player j, the marginal private return on exerting effort is increasing with 𝑥𝑖but 
independent of  𝑒𝑗. This feature also departs from the standard PGG since player j’s 
marginal private return increases with each player i’s contribution. Player j receives 
positive marginal private return if  (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 /3)(𝑎) > 1. If both players i have made 
maximum contributions, i.e. ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 2, private return on effort is negative if  2𝑎 < 3. 
This is Condition (B). It is a dominant strategy for player j to exert no effort in this 
condition. 
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Players i maximise private return by not contributing to the PG and for player j to 
arrive at the same outcome, she/he does not need to exert any effort to improve the PG 
multiplier.  
4.3.3 Marginal social returns 
Every player is provided with an opportunity to assign their endowment to the public 
good for social return. This produces marginal social returns, that is, the change in 
returns associated with increasing effort and/or contribution by an additional unit. This 
points to the possibility that both types of players benefit from collectively allocating 
their endowments to the public good. Using (3) above, we derive the marginal social 
return for players i’s contribution and player j’s effort. For each player i, her marginal 
social return on contribution is: 
  
𝜕𝜋𝐺
𝜕𝑥𝑖
=  −1 + 𝑀0 + 𝑎𝑒𝑗     (6) 
Equation (6) shows that the marginal social return on player’s i’s contribution is 
independent of 𝑥𝑖 while increasing with 𝑒𝑗, similar to the implication for her/his 
marginal private return. The marginal social return for player j is; 
  
𝜕𝜋𝐺
𝜕𝑒𝑗
=  −1 + (∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 )(𝑎)     (7) 
Again, the marginal social return for effort is increasing with 𝑥𝑖 but independent of 𝑒𝑗.  
From equation (6), at any given value of 𝑒𝑗, if 𝑀0 + 𝑎𝑒𝑗 > 1, the marginal social return 
to contributions is positive at all 𝑥𝑖 . Under this condition, it is socially optimal for 
contributions to be at the maximum level, i.e. 𝑥𝑖 = 1, a corner solution. Conversely, if 
𝑀0 + 𝑎𝑒𝑗 < 1,  the socially optimal contributions will be zero. We identify 𝑀0 + 𝑎 >
1 as Condition (C), after 𝑒𝑗 is set to be 1 (i.e. the condition that if player j makes 
maximum effort, it is socially optimal for each player i to make the maximum 
contribution).  Equation (7) indicates that at any given value of ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 , if ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 > 1/𝑎, 
the marginal social return to effort is positive at all 𝑒𝑗. Here, it is socially optimal for 
effort to be at the maximum level, i.e. 𝑒𝑗 = 1, a corner solution. On the other hand, if 
∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 < 1/𝑎, it is socially optimal for effort to be zero. We set 𝑥𝑖= 1 and since there 
are two players i, the social optimal condition for effort is 2𝑎 > 1. We labelled 2𝑎 >
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1 as Condition (D) (i.e. the condition that if each player i makes the maximum 
contribution, it is socially optimal for player j to make maximum effort). If Conditions 
(C) and (D) are satisfied, it is socially optimal for contributions and effort to be at their 
maximum levels, i.e. 𝑥𝑖 = 1 and 𝑒𝑗 = 1.  
4.3.4 Marginal collective returns on Players i contribution 
We consider the possibility that players i decide as a collective against player j. From 
(1), we sum the payoff function of the two players i into:  
∑𝜋𝑖 = (2 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) + [(
2
3
)(∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖 ) [𝑀0 + 𝑎𝑒𝑗]   (8) 
We partially differentiate (8) to derive the marginal collective return from 
contribution;  
𝜕 𝜋𝑖
𝜕 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖
=  −1 + (
2
3
)[ 𝑀0 + 𝑎𝑒𝑗]    (9) 
(9) shows that the marginal collective returns for players i is a positive function of 
player j’s effort, indicating complementarity between the contributions of players i and 
player j’s effort. If both players as a collective expect that player j will not exert any 
effort (𝑒𝑗 = 0), then the value of (9) is negative if 𝑀0 < 3/2. 𝑀0 < 3/2 is set as 
Condition (E), i.e. the condition under which it is in the best interest of players i as a 
collective to contribute nothing to the PG if player j makes zero effort. On the other 
hand, when players i as a collective expect that player j will exert maximum effort 
(𝑒𝑗 = 1), the value of (9) is positive if 𝑀0 + 𝑎 > 3/2. Under this condition, it is 
optimal for players i as a collective to make maximum contributions.  is 𝑀0 + 𝑎 >
3/2 is set as Condition (F).   
4.3.5 Conditions for multiplier values selection 
For the PGG to be considered as a social dilemma, the multipliers selected as 𝑀0 and 
𝑎 must fulfil Conditions (A) to (D) above. Condition (A) and (B) imply that zero effort 
and zero contribution are the dominant strategies for both types of players. On the 
other hand, maximum effort and contribution are socially optimal under Conditions 
(C) and (D).  
• 𝑀0 + 𝑎 < 3;    (Condition A) 
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• 2𝑎 < 3;    (Condition B) 
• 𝑀0 + 𝑎 > 1; and   (Condition C) 
• 2𝑎 > 1.    (Condition D) 
Under Conditions E and F, there is a social dilemma for the group members as it is in 
their collective interest to contribute the maximum value if the representative chooses 
maximum effort but there is no dilemma if the representative chooses zero effort.  
• 𝑀0 <
3
2
   (Condition E) 
• 𝑀0 + 𝑎 >
3
2
   (Condition F) 
In the experimental design below, the selected values of 𝑀0 is 1.2 and 𝑎 is 1.0. These 
values satisfy the conditions set above.  
4.3.6 Benefits from representation relationship  
The conditions for social and collective contributors’ dilemmas show that effort from 
player j and contributions from players i are complementary but produce different 
implications for the two types of player. 
We determine which type of player has higher marginal private return (MPR) to 
contribute or exert effort under the condition that all players make equal contributions 
or effort, i.e. 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑒𝑗 = 𝑧. z is a constant. Under 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑒𝑗 = 𝑧, MPRi is −1 +
(
1
3
 )(𝑀0 + 𝑎𝑧) and MPRj is −1 + (
1
3
)(2𝑧𝑎 ). Since the maximum value of z is 1 and 
by substituting the chosen parameter values of 𝑀0 and 𝑎, a comparison between MPRi 
and MPRj would yield MPRi > MPRj at all values of z if 𝑀0 > 𝑎. In this sense, there 
is a stronger incentive for group members to contribute than for the representative to 
make effort.  
We also determine which type of player has higher marginal social return (MSR) from 
contributing or exerting effort under the condition that all players make equal 
contribution or effort, 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑒𝑗 = 𝑧. z is a constant. We use equations (6) and (7) from 
above and substitute the chosen parameter values of  𝑀0 and 𝑎 to them. 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑒𝑗 in 
equations (6) and (7) are to be replaced with constant z. The maximum value of z is 1, 
the same with 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑒𝑗. Equation (6) is the MSRi and equation (7) is MSRj and it 
determines the benefits a type of player receives by allocating an additional token as 
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contribution or effort. Given that the selected values of 𝑀0=1.2 and 𝑎 = 1, comparing 
MSRi and MSRj yields MSRi > MSRj or 𝑀0 + 𝑎(1) > (2 − 1)(𝑧)(𝑎) at all values of 
z if 𝑀0 > 𝑎. Since MSRi > MSRj, contributions from players i result in greater benefit 
to the public good compared to effort from player j. In this sense, players i that value 
public good provision have stronger incentive to contribute since their additional 
contribution to the public good yield greater benefits to everyone in the group.   
Figure 4.1 below gives a graphical representation of the possible returns to p layers i 
and j relative to the Nash-equilibrium benchmark in which their respective payoffs are 
equal to 1, i.e., π =1, at zero contribution and zero effort by all players. The space of 
the figure shows all possible combinations of effort by player j and average 
contribution by players i.  This space is divided into regions according to the benefits 
received by the two types of player.  A player’s benefit is defined as the actual payoff 
they receive minus the Nash-equilibrium payoff of 1.  The vertical axis refers to the 
effort space available to player j while the average contribution of players i is shown 
on the horizontal axis, i.e.( 𝑥1 + 𝑥2)/2.  When discussing the figure, we will assume 
that both players i are contributing equally given their contribution space.  
Figure 4.1. Possible benefits from public good based on combinations of effort and average 
contribution to public good. 
 
The origin point of the graph is the non-interaction or Nash-equilibrium benchmark, 
in which both effort and contribution is zero. The dotted 45-degree line in Figure 4.1 
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represents the equality between, i) average payoff to the two players i, i.e. ( 𝜋𝑖1 +
𝜋𝑖2)/2, and ii) the payoff to player j, i.e. 𝜋𝑗. The red line represents the combination 
of decision of players i and j that result in 𝜋𝑖  = 1, i.e. the average payoff to players i is 
equal to what they would have got in Nash equilibrium when player j’s effort is 0.3, 
an average player i’s payoff 𝜋𝑖  is 1, independent of their average contributions. On the 
other hand, the solid black curve shows the combination of effort and contributions 
that result in 𝜋𝑗 = 1. It links points at which player j’s payoff is equal to what she/he 
would have got in Nash equilibrium. When average contribution, ( 𝑥1 + 𝑥2)/2, is 
0.681, player j’s payoff from maximum effort, 𝜋𝑗 is 1, just as if she/he had made zero 
effort and both players i had made zero contributions. The point where the red line and 
solid black curve cross marks the point at which positive contributions and positive 
effort produce an average payoff of the two players i, ( 𝜋𝑖1 + 𝜋𝑖2)/2 and a payoff of 
player j, 𝜋𝑗, both of which are equal to 1, i.e. the payoff from exerting effort and 
contributing is equal to the payoff of zero effort and zero contribution. It indicates that 
both players i must contribute 30% of her/his endowment to the public good and player 
j must allocate 30% of her/his endowment as effort for everyone to receive a payoff 
that equals the Nash-equilibrium benchmark payoff.  
Regions I, II, III and IV are defined by the red line and solid black curve. If 
combinations of effort and average contribution fall in Region I, the payoffs for all 
players are less than 1. Region I is identified as a space of mutual losses, indicating 
that everyone is better off not engaging with the public good. For example, the average 
player i contribution is 0.1 and the effort from player j is 0.1. Combinations of 
decisions in Region II benefit an average player i at a cost to player j. An average 
player i receives a payoff more than 1, 
 𝜋𝑖1+𝜋𝑖2
2
> 1 , while player j’s payoff is less than 
1, 𝜋𝑗 < 1. In this region, player j is engaging in leading-by-sacrifice or is acting 
prosocially. On the other hand, combinations of decisions in Region IV benefit player 
j, 𝜋𝑗 > 1 but at a cost for an average player i, 
 𝜋𝑖1+𝜋𝑖2
2
< 1.  
Region III produces a mutually beneficial outcome for everyone and encompasses the 
area below the solid black curve and above the horizontal red line. This is where 
contributions and effort benefit both player types beyond the Nash-equilibrium 
benchmark value and the socially optimal point is at the northeast point of the 45 -
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degree dotted line. It is possible for players i and j to attain payoffs within Region III 
such that one player type benefits more than the other.  If their decisions end up in 
between the 45-degree line and the horizontal red line, the share of benefit is larger for 
player j compared to the average player i. On the other hand, share of benefits from 
the PGG is larger for the average player i than for player j if the combination of effort 
and contributions settles somewhere in between the solid black curve and the 45 -
degree line.  
As long as effort is matched with contribution at any point to the right side of the solid 
black curve, player j will receive benefits from players i’s collective action, 𝜋𝑗 > 1. 
This refers to Regions III and IV. On the other hand, an average player i will receive 
positive return from contribution, 
 𝜋𝑖1+𝜋𝑖2
2
> 1, when the combinations of contribution 
and effort are at any point above the red horizontal line, or Region II and III. In the 
situation where players i and j match each other decision, their combination of 
decisions will end up on the 45-degree line and at the point everyone receives equal 
payoff from the public good, 𝜋𝑗 = 𝜋𝑖1 = 𝜋𝑖2.  
In the experiment described below, everyone receives 10 tokens as endowment. As 
long as player j has exerted at least 3 tokens as effort, an average player i stands to 
benefit from contributing conditional on she/he and the co-group member having 
contributed at least 3 tokens to the public good. On the other hand, player j’s benefit 
from exerting effort varies according to the contributions of players i. For example, if 
player j chooses to allocate all 10 tokens to improve the multiplier, her/his effort would 
only be beneficial for her/him if players i contributed more than an average of 6.81 
tokens to the PG.  
4.4 Hypotheses and conjectures 
The focus of this chapter is on understanding whether the order in which the 
representative moves relative to other group members influences public good 
provision. This relates to the public good game (PGG) literature that incorporates 
comparisons between games in which decisions are made simultaneously by all 
subjects and games in which one subject in a group decides before the others. The 
standard game theoretic prediction of PGG is no contribution, assuming that everyone 
in the group is self-interested. Since everyone receives private benefit from other 
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people’s contributions, a potential contributor will try to free ride on the others to 
maximize her/his private payoff. However, the stylised facts of standard PGG with 
simultaneous decision making are as follows (Ledyard, 1995): i) on average, subjects 
contribute approximately  halfway between the Pareto-efficient level and the free 
riding level in a one-shot game or in the initial round of a repeated game, and ii) with 
repetition, contribution levels decline. Therefore, we seek to examine whether the 
stylised facts of the standard PGG can be mapped onto our PGG structure.  Since no 
work discussed in Section 2 covered and has findings involving a PGG structure like 
ours and has compared the three sequences of ‘leader’ movement in the same 
experiment, all the hypotheses below are conjectures, derived from extrapolating the 
findings from the leadership and PGG literature mentions in Section 4.2 above.  
From this section onwards, player j will be identified as the ‘representative’ and 
players i will be identified as ‘group members’.  
The order of the representative’s decision relative to group members’ decisions is 
hypothesised to produce treatment differences between SimRep, RepFirst and 
RepLast. As shown in experiments by Cox et al. (2013), Gächter, et al. (2012) and 
Gächter & Renner (2014) from the section above, a singular first mover ends up 
contributing more to the public good compared to the second mover(s) in the same 
group. On the other hand, in our representative leadership framework, for a 
representative to realise any gain from the public good, she/he must convince group 
members to contribute to it. Furthermore, to equalise individual gains from the PG, 
the representative must convince her/his respective group members to contribute at 
the same level as her/him.  
The first hypothesis is that the representatives in RepFirst are expected to exert a 
higher effort level than representatives in SimRep and RepLast. This is the result of 
the combination of being the first mover and the group’s representative. On the other 
hand, representatives in RepLast are expected to exert the least amount of effort due 
to their second mover advantage and/or the attraction to free ride on group members’  
contributions. Free-riding could be a result of i) the representative’s self-interest, and, 
ii) low-level contributions from group members that fail to motivate the representative 
to exert effort. Effort by representatives in SimRep on the other hand would be more 
likely to depend on the representative’s belief about group members’ contribution, 
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especially in the first round of decision-making. Representatives’ efforts in SimRep 
are predicted to be driven by the disjunction effect (Shafir & Tversky, 1992; Tversky 
& Shafir, 1992). The lack of awareness of each other’s strategy makes the 
representative susceptible to quasi-magical thinking; acting on the belief that the 
others will behave like oneself. An example of this behaviour is the representative 
taking her/his role seriously and exerting full effort by believing that group members 
are going to contribute all their endowment to the PG.  
Hypothesis 1: Effort by the representative is highest in RepFirst, lowest in RepLast, 
and intermediate in SimRep.   
Provided that group members are responsive to effort made by their respective 
representative, there would be differences in contributions made in each treatment. In 
round 1 (R-1), group members in RepFirst receive information about their 
representatives’ effort while group members in SimRep and RepLast need to decide 
based on their belief about what their representatives will do. In addition to paying 
attention to the representative’s decision (or would-be decision for SimRep and 
RepFirst), each group member decides simultaneously in every treatment, indicating 
the possibility of a disjunction effect between them.  
Assuming that a representative in RepFirst exerted effort to adjust the multiplier, a 
group member is more likely to reciprocate that effort by contributing to the PG, as 
engaging in the zero contribution strategy with a prosocial representative would not 
produce any benefit to group members. Group members in SimRep would be expected 
to make decisions in similar ways as the representative in the group; i.e. the decision 
in the initial round is based on the belief about what the representative and the co -
group member will do. On the other hand, the group members in RepLast are expected 
to contribute the least because of the expectation that the representative will free ride 
on their contributions. Since there is a social dilemma problem between the two group 
members, a group member could also refuse to contribute if she/he believed the co -
group member would free ride on her/his contribution. This social dilemma is one of 
the reasons why group members in RepLast will not be assumed to act collectively to 
signal their representative to exert effort.  
Hypothesis 2: Contribution by a group member is highest in RepFirst, lowest in 
RepLast, and intermediate in SimRep.  
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Another feature from the leadership literature is the relative differences in contribution 
of the leader as the first mover and the subsequent contributions of the followers. For 
example, works by Arbak & Villeval (2013), Cappelen et al. (2016), and Gächter & 
Renner (2004 & 2018) show that followers’ contributions are consistently below the 
contribution made by their leaders. Based on the findings from these leadership 
experiments, group members in RepFirst are expected to contribute either the same 
number or fewer tokens than their representatives. To determine whether the 
representative or group members play a bigger role in providing the public good, we 
will calculate the effort share. It will be calculated by taking the ratio between the 
effort of the representative and the sum of effort plus average contribution. The effort 
share in RepLast is expected to be affected by the decision sequence. As contributions 
from group members in RepLast are expected to be low, the representative in this 
treatment as the second mover is expected to contribute either the same number or 
fewer tokens than the group members.  
Hypothesis 3: The effort share is highest in RepFirst, lowest in RepLast, and 
intermediate in SimRep.  
4.5 Experimental Design  
Experimental sessions were conducted at the University of Nottingham in 
experimental laboratories administered by the Centre for Decision Research and 
Experimental Economics (CeDEx). Subjects were recruited from a pre-existing pool 
of student subjects. This experiment involved participation of 174 students from 
various areas and levels of study. Sessions were implemented using zTree 
experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007). Each subject was assigned to a computer 
cubicle. Before a session started, the experimenter read the instructions. Each subject 
also received a copy of the instructions for reference. Instructions can be found in 
Appendix A. After reading the instructions, subjects were required to answer three 
control questions to ensure their they had understood the instructions and the incentive 
structure. Then subjects were assigned at random into groups of 3 and had complete 
anonymity from other group members.  
Subjects were told that in each group, there would be a subject who could assign 
tokens to a Group Investment Account (GIA) and two subjects who could assign  
tokens to a Group Project (GP). Their roles were assigned at random. The 
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representative in each group was identified as ‘Member B’ while the non-
representative group members were identified as ‘Members A1 and A2’. Subjects were 
informed that there would be 20 decision rounds and their roles would be fixed during 
the duration of the experiment from the beginning (partner design). At the beginning 
of each decision round, each subject, regardless of role, would receive 10 tokens as 
endowment and tokens that were not allocated to GIA or GP would be allocated to 
each subject’s Individual Project (IP). This experiment uses a between-subject design, 
in which subjects within a session only participated in one treatment.  
The type of information made available in each round before decision-making was 
varied according to treatment. In the RepLast treatment, subjects in the 
representative’s role received information on the number of tokens that group 
members had allocated to the GP. In the RepFirst treatment, the two group members 
received information on the representative’s allocation of tokens to the GIA before 
choosing their contributions. Subjects in the SimRep treatment did not receive any 
information on effort or contribution before making their decisions. At the end of each 
round, subjects received information on: i) the total allocations made to GP and GIA, 
ii) the implemented multiplier value, iii) the value of GP, and, iv) their total earnings, 
comprised of earning from GP and earning from IP.  
The multiplier is determined by the number of tokens that the representative places in 
GIA. As explained in Section 3.5, the multiplier is given by 𝑀∗ =  𝑀0 + 𝑎𝑒𝑗. 𝑀0 is 
set to be 1.2 and a is 1 with 𝑒𝑗 corresponding to the number of tokens allocated by the 
representative to GIA. 𝑀∗ for each group is dependent on the representative’s effort 
and is derived by the formula: 1.2 + [1 ∗ (
𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡
10
)]. 30 The multiplier value in each 
decision round ranged from 1.2 to 2.2, according to the number of tokens that the 
representative allocated to the GIA. A multiplier of 1.2 results if the representative did 
not exert any effort to the GIA; a multiplier of 2.2 results if the representative has 
allocated all her/his effort tokens to the GIA. The maximum number of tokens that 
could be in the GP was 20.  This is a socially optimal outcome. The value of GP was 
 
30 Effort and contribution need to be divided by 10 in the implementation of the game.  In the 
Section 3 above, endowment equals to 1, and effort and contribution are continuous variables. In 
the experiment, endowment equals 10 and effort and contribution are discrete variables, with 
possible values of 0, 1, …,10. So 1 token in the experiment is equivalent to 0.1 units of value in 
Section 3.  
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derived by multiplying the number of tokens in GP by the value of multiplier. 
Everyone regardless of her/his role in the group earned an equal share from the GP. 
Earnings from 20 rounds were accumulated and at the end of the 20 th round; 
accumulated tokens were converted to Pound Sterling at a rate of 20 tokens equal to 
£1. Each session lasted for about one hour and on average subjects earned £13.91 with 
earnings ranging from £10.44 to £17.78, including a show-up fee of £3.  
The number of subjects and 3-person groups involved in this experiment is in Table 
4.1.  
Table 4.1. Number of individual subject (and group) observations by treatment 
 RepFirst RepLast SimRep 
Number of 
Observations 
57 (19) 57(19) 60 (20) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are the number of groups in each treatment.  
 
4.6 Experiment results  
4.6.1 Summary statistics 
Before we discuss the findings that are related to the hypotheses above, we examine 
the summary statistics on players’ decisions. As there are two group members in each 
group, the main analysis will only utilise the average contribution values31.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 The summary statistics of Players i’s decision as an individual are shown in Table 3.1A of this 
chapter’s Appendix. We found marginally significant differences in contribution decision among 
players i in RepLast treatment. We have no reason to believe that labelling of players i as A1 and A2 
caused that difference as, i) no such difference could be observed in SimRep and RepFirst treatments, 
and ii) if labelling A1 could produce ‘leadership’ contribution, the average contribution of players 
labelled as A1 should be larger than player A2 but we observed the average of player A2 contributions 
are bigger than A1.  
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Table 4.2. Effort and contributions in Round 1 and across 20 rounds in tokens  
  R-1 A20 
Treatment Obs. Rep. 
effort 
Group 
members’ 
contribution 
Rep. 
effort 
Group 
members’ 
contribution 
SimRep 20 5.05 5.98 4.23 4.33   
(3.86) (3.53) (3.49) (3.67) 
  
    
RepFirst   19 5.16 4.26 3.41 3.17 
  
(3.78) (4.17) (3.39) (3.38) 
  
    
RepLast  19 3.42 3.87 2.27 2.20 
    (3.40) (3.56) (2.57)  (2.45) 
Note: Representative’s effort refers to the number of tokens she/he allocated to the Group 
Investment Account (GIA). Average group members’ contribution is calculated by taking 
the average of group members’ contributions. Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.  
 
Subjects in the role of representative and group members in all treatments, on average, 
have allocated positive numbers of tokens to generate public goods for the group from 
the beginning to the end of 20 rounds. In the first round, representatives in RepFirst 
exerted more tokens to improve the multiplier then the representatives in SimRep and 
RepLast. However, after experiencing 20 decisions, representatives in SimRep on 
average allocated more effort than representatives in RepFirst and RepLast.   
On the other hand, group members in SimRep contributed more to PG than those in 
RepFirst and RepLast in Round 1(R-1) and this ordering of contribution size is still 
the same when it is compared to average contribution after 20 rounds (A20). In all 
three treatments, the average number of tokens allocated by representatives and group 
members to the public good declines sharply at the end of the experiment.   
The average decisions made in groups in every treatment and rounds are shown in 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3.   
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Figure 4.2. Average Effort over 20 Rounds 
 
Figure 4.3. Average Contributions over 20 Rounds
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Figures 4.2 and 4.3 have several consistent features. First, there is a clear ranking 
among treatments. Both representatives and group members in SimRep in general 
allocated more tokens to the PG compared to RepFirst and RepLast. This pattern 
started off in R-1 and persisted until the experiment ended at R-20, except for a few 
instances where RepFirst’s representatives on average exerted similar effort level to 
those in SimRep. Second, the effort and contribution levels by representatives and 
group members in the initial round (R-1) were close to the mid-point value between 
Pareto-efficiency and free riding values, consistent with the general findings in PGG 
as surveyed by Ledyard (1995). Third, after a short period of decline at the start of the 
game, effort and contributions stabilised until the final decisions round. The periods 
of stabilization found in all three treatments are not commonly found in the general 
PGG and leadership literature; i.e. contributions typically decline continuously until 
the end of the experiment. Furthermore, the period of stabilization in levels of effort 
and contribution is marked by approximately equal levels of effort and average 
contribution. These findings will be explored in the subsequent sections. Finally, all 
treatments above show the end game effect that has been frequently found in PGG 
literature in which contributions collapse close to zero in the final round.  
4.6.2 Representative’s efforts   
Hypothesis 1 proposed that representatives in RepFirst will exert more effort compared 
to those in SimRep and RepLast treatments. It also predicted that representatives in 
SimRep exert less effort than those in RepFirst but more effort than those in RepLast. 
 In the initial round, R-1, as shown in Table 4.2, representatives in RepFirst did exert 
more effort than other treatments, as predicted by Hypothesis 1. However, as the game 
progressed and as shown by Figure 4.2, the average tokens used as effort in RepFirst 
was surpassed by tokens used by representatives in SimRep beginning from R-2. After 
20 rounds, the average tokens allocated by representatives in RepFirst was 3.41 while 
those in SimRep exerted 4.23 tokens. On the other hand, representatives in the RepLast 
have consistently exerted the least number of tokens from the start of the experiment.   
The Kruskal-Wallis test (K-W) found that there are no statistically significant 
differences in effort in the three treatments, measured by Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) test 
in the first period (K-W: 2.922, p-value = 0.2320),  and the averages after twenty 
rounds (K-W: 4.321. p-value = 0.1153).  We measured also measured the differences 
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in the decisions made in a pair of treatments. The Mann-Whitney test (M-W) also 
reported no statistically significant differences across treatment in representative’s 
effort in the Round 1 (R-1) as stated in Table 4.3. On the other hand, the same test 
found a statistically significant difference in the behaviour of representatives in 
SimRep and RepLast after 20 decision rounds. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test 
for equality of distribution in decisions between treatments found that representatives 
in all treatments exhibited similar distribution of efforts in R-1, and across 20 rounds.  
Table 4.3. Mann-Whitney rank-sum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests between 
treatments for efforts 
  Mann-Whitney Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Treatments  Observations R-1 A20 R-1 A20 
SimRep – RepFirst 20-19 -0.071 
[0.9132] 
0.970 
[0.3322] 
0.1429 
[1.000] 
0.4286 
[0.541] 
SimRep – RepLast 20-19 1.418 
 [0.1563] 
2.080** 
[0.0375] 
0.5000 
[0.308] 
0.6250 
[0.108] 
RepFirst – RepLast 19-19 1.545 
[0.1225] 
1.066 
[0.2863] 
0.6250 
[0.108] 
0.3036 
[0.882] 
Figures in brackets are p-values. ***Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * 
significant at 10 percent.  
Result 1: Average effort by representatives in SimRep is higher than by representatives 
in RepLast. There is no statistical evidence that representatives in S imRep exerted 
more effort than those in RepFirst or that representatives in RepFirst exerted more 
effort than those in RepLast.  
When each representative is examined individually, there is heterogeneity in their 
decisions over the 20 rounds. In RepFirst and RepLast, a majority of decisions are on 
exerting zero effort tokens. On the other hand, more than 20 percent of decisions in 
SimRep and RepFirst are in the form of full effort while the percentage of full effort 
in RepLast is only 8.2 percent, i.e. 10 tokens used as effort. In all three treatments, 
more than two-thirds of representatives’ decisions over the 20 rounds are either the 
Nash equilibrium strategy of zero token or the socially optimal strategy of 10 tokens. 
The breakdown of representatives’ decisions over 20 rounds can be found in Table 
4.4. The statistical test in Table 4.4 shows that there are statistically significant 
differences between treatments. For group-level decision over time, refer to Figures 
4.1A, 4.2A and 4.3A in this chapter’s Appendix. 
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Table 4.4. Breakdown of representatives’ decisions over 20 rounds in percentage 
 SimRep RepFirst RepLast 
K-W test 
(p-value) 
Zero tokens 41.5 
(166) 
53.4 
(203) 
58.2 
(221) 
17.32*** 
(0.000) 
10 tokens  28.5 
(115) 
21.6 
(82) 
8.2 
(32) 
24.18*** 
(0.000) 
Number of Decisions 400 380 380  
Figures in parentheses are the actual numbers of decisions or the p-value for statistical test. 
4.6.3 Group members’ contributions 
Hypothesis 2 stated that group members in RepFirst will contribute more toward the 
PG than those in SimRep and RepFirst. Recall from Table 4.2 that in R-1, group 
members in SimRep contributed 5.975 tokens (Standard Deviation=2.47), in RepFirst 
contributed 4.26 tokens (SD=3.37) and those in RepLast contributed 3.86 tokens 
(SD=2.74). This contribution order also persisted as decision rounds progressed as 
showed in Figure 4.3. The highest contributions to the PG are made by group members 
in SimRep, followed by those in RepFirst and RepLast.  
 
Is there any detectable treatment effect among group members’ contributions?  
A K-W test conducted to compare contributions across the three treatments found 
statistically significant differences both for the f irst round (R-1), K-W test: 7.324**(p-
value=0.0257), and across twenty rounds, K-W test: 6.341** (p-value = 0.0420). 
Table 4.5. Mann-Whitney rank-sum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests between 
treatments for contributions 
  Mann-Whitney Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Treatments  Obs R-1 A20 R-1 A20 
SimRep - RepFirst 20-19 1.385 
[0.1660] 
1.321 
[0.1866] 
0.3711 
(0.137) 
0.2658 
[0.497] 
SimRep - RepLast 20-19 2.495** 
[0.0126] 
1.770* 
[0.0767] 
0.5368*** 
[0.007] 
0.3474 
[0.190] 
RepFirst - RepLast 19-19 0.294 
[0.7685] 
0.555 
[0.5790] 
0.3158 
[0.300] 
0.2632 
[0.526] 
Figures in brackets are p-values. ***Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * 
significant at 10 percent.  
The K-W tests could only detect differences in contributions between the three 
treatments at once but not a pair of treatments to accept or reject Hypothesis 1. Table  
4.5 compares contributions between pairs of treatments. The median-based M-W tests 
detected statistically significant differences between SimRep and RepLast treatments 
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in R-1 and across 20 rounds, i.e. group contributions to PG by those in SimRep is 
distinguishable from RepLast. However, using the two samples distributions K-S test, 
the distinguishable contributions differences can only be detected in R-1 between 
treatments SimRep and RepLast.  
Result 2: Group members in SimRep contributed more tokens to the public good than 
those in RepLast. However, no effect can be detected when SimRep is compared with 
RepFirst. Contributions by those in RepFirst are also indistinguishable from those in 
RepLast.  
Given Result 2, Hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted as we are not able to establish a 
contribution ranking with group members in RepFirst contributing the most, followed 
by those in SimRep with the least contribution coming from those in RepLast.  
Similar to representatives’ decisions, more than two-third of individual decisions 
made by group members were either in a form of Nash-equilibrium or socially 
optimum strategies for all treatments, indicating heterogeneity in decisions across 20 
rounds and all groups. More than half of the decisions made in RepFirst and RepLast 
involved refusing to contribute, i.e zero tokens, while this only affects a little more 
than a third of SimRep, hence increasing the average contributions made by subjects 
in this treatment across 20 rounds. Table 4.6 shows the breakdown of group members’ 
decisions across 20 rounds.  
Table 4.6. Breakdown of group member’s decisions over 20 rounds as percentages 
 SimRep RepFirst RepLast 
 Ind Both 
GM 
One 
GM 
Ind. Both 
GM 
One 
GM 
Ind. Both 
GM 
One 
GM 
Zero tokens 38.8 
(310) 
28.3 
(113) 
10.5 
(42) 
59.6 
(453) 
52.6 
(200) 
7.11 
(27) 
   58.03 
(441) 
48.2 
(183) 
10.0 
(38) 
10 tokens  28.4 
(227) 
22.5 
(90) 
6 
(24) 
22.5 
(167) 
17.6 
(67) 
4.47 
(17) 
 9.21 
(70) 
6.05 
(23) 
3.16 
(12) 
Number of 
Decisions 
800 400 400 760 380 380 760 380 380 
Columns labelled Ind refer to decisions by each group member as an individual without 
considering them as a pair of group members in a group. Columns label Both GM refers to the 
incidence that group members arrived at the same decisions of contributing nothing or 
everything when their decisions are viewed as a pair in a group. One GM refers to the 
incidence that one group member in a pair decides to contribute nothing or everything.   
Figures in parentheses are actual numbers of decisions. 
 
Table 4.6 also reports the incidences when both group members as a pair contribute 
zero or 10 tokens and when one of them free rides or fully cooperates. Overall, the 
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incidences in which both of group members contributed no tokens or all tokens are 
still prominent in all treatments, indicating an attraction to the extreme points, 0 and 
10 by everyone within a group. For example, 52.6% of group members’ collective 
decisions in RepFirst are non-contributing and 22.5% of all collective decisions are 
full contributions. Contributions in ‘Both GM’ at zero or ten tokens are consistently 
higher than those in columns ‘One GM’. For example, 22.5% of pairs in SimRep chose 
to contribute everything compared to 6% of these pairs have only one member 
contributing 10 tokens. If all decisions were made independently, the probability of 
‘Both GM’ contributing all tokens would be 0.008 and the probability of ‘One GM’ 
contributing all tokens would be 0.1632. The data in Table 4.6 suggests that there is a 
very strong correlation between the two group members’ decisions in each treatment33. 
In principle, there are two complementary mechanisms that could induce this kind of 
correlation; i) a common time trend in the behaviour of individuals in all groups, and 
ii) a tendency for homogeneity of behaviour within groups. Which of these effects that 
was primarily responsible will be investigated further in the section below.  
The lack of significant differences between treatments in effort and contributions 
showed in Tables 4.3 and 4.5 is not surprising given the size of standard errors in Table 
4.2. The potential explanations include a combination of i) consistent ranking of the 
three treatments over time, as shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, and ii) decisions’ path 
dependency, i.e. a lot of variation between groups but little variation over time within 
groups.  
4.6.4 Complementarity between effort and contributions 
We first look at the PG outcomes from representatives’ efforts and group members’ 
contributions before examining whether representatives or group members decisions’ 
drive the outcome. PG size relies on the complementarity between representative’s 
effort and group members’ contributions. A PG size is maximised when everyone 
allocates all their endowment, 10 tokens, to the PG. Using the game parameters, the 
 
32 There are two independent decisions in each round, Group Members A1 and A2. Each is presented 
with 11 options between 0 to 10. This brings the probability of both group members contr ibuting all 
to 1/121.  In the case of ‘One GM’ or one group members contributing everything but the other 
contributing any number of tokens from 0 to 9, the probability of ‘One GM’ is 20/121, assuming that 
decision of Group Members A1 and A2 are independent from each other and there is a 10/121 
chance that A1 contributes 10 and A2 contributes 0, and a 10/121 chance of the opposite. 
33 Pairwise correlations of decisions for all decisions and all rounds. SimRep: 0.7861***(p-value = 
0.0000), RepFirst: 0.7995***(p-value = 0.0000), RepLast: 0.6935***(p-value = 0.0000).  
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maximum value of PG is 44 tokens, in which 20 contribution tokens are multiplied by 
2.2, a value that has been adjusted through the representative’s 10 effort tokens. On 
the other hand, there won’t be any PG if both group members refused to contribute 
despite the adjustment to the multiplier through representative’s effort tokens. Table 
4.7 summarises the public good size by treatments for R-1 and across 20 periods.  
Table 4.7. Public good size in R-1 and across 20 rounds in tokens 
Treatment Obs. Public good size 
  R-1 A20 
SimRep 20 20.00 
(9.61) 
16.89 
(16.24) 
RepFirst 19 16.06 
(14.37) 
12.70 
(14.63) 
RepLast 19 12.08 
(8.39) 
7.83 
(9.96) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
The data in Table 4.7 reflect the findings about representatives’ efforts and group 
members’ contributions in the earlier section. Groups in SimRep have produced PG 
with larger sizes than those in RepFirst and RepLast in accordance to the treatment’s 
rankings in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. Results from Table 4.7 also show the decline of 
public good size after R-1, hence a lower average PG size across 20 rounds in 
comparison to its size in R-1. 
In this section, we examine the value of the effort share, using this to investigate 
whether representative, or the ‘leader’ motivates allocation for the provision of the 
PG.  
The effort share in each group of three is calculated in this manner34;  
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒  =  
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒′𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 (𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠)
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑡 +  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑡𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑛𝑠)
   
Effort share for each group takes a value between 0 and 1. In the event that the 
representative’s effort is equal to the averages of the group members’ contributions, 
the effort share is 0.5. Any value above 0.5 indicates that the representative allocates 
more effort tokens to the PG than the average of group members’ contributions. On 
 
34 Effort share is calculated in the formula shown above instead of dividing effort by average 
contribution. This is to remove the need to drop observations for groups in which group members 
contribute zero tokens since any numerator divided by zero is undefined.  
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the other hand, a value less than 0.5 signals that the average of group members’ 
contributions was greater than the effort exerted by the representative.  
Figure 4.4. Effort share by rounds 
 
Figure 4.4 shows effort shares over time. In the first period, representatives in the 
RepFirst clearly exerted more tokens as effort than their group members. As the game 
progressed, there are periods in which representatives exerted more effort than group 
members but in general, the line is close to the 0.5 equality benchmark. The end game 
effect resulted in shirking by representatives in SimRep and RepLast while both 
representatives and group members in RepFirst ended the game with equality in effort 
and contribution.  
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Table 4.8 shows the summary statistics of effort share in the three treatments.  
Table 4.8. Effort share in round 1 and across 20 rounds 
Treatment Obs.  Mean 
Effort Share 
in R-1  
Mean 
Effort 
Share 
across 
20 
rounds 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
Effort 
Share 
in R-1 
Effort 
Share 
across 
20 
rounds 
SimRep 20 0.402 0.453 
0.469 
[0.2910] 
4.067 
[0.1309] 
 
 (0.278) (0.177) 
 
   
RepFirst 19 0.563 0.537 
 
 (0.321) (0.198) 
 
   
RepLast 19 0.401 0.421 
    (0.324) (0.176) 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations in the ratio columns and p-values in the 
Kruskal-Wallis test columns. ***Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * 
significant at 10 percent.  
In R-1, the representatives in RepFirst allocated more tokens to the public good than 
their respective group members. On the other hand, representatives in SimRep and 
RepLast allocate fewer tokens to the PG than their group members. This pattern could 
still be observed across 20 rounds.  A notable feature in Table 4.8 is that as the rounds 
progress, the effort shares for all treatments move closer towards 0.5, the point where 
contributions and effort are equal. There is no statistically significant difference in 
effort share across treatments as measured by K-W test, indicating that in R-1 and 
across 20 rounds that representatives’ effort in relative to group members’ 
contributions not statistically distinguishable.   
Table 4.9 contains the results from non-parametric tests that compare a pair of effort 
share treatment.  
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Table 4.9 Mann-Whitney rank-sum and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests between 
treatments for effort shares 
  Mann-Whitney Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Treatments  Obs R-1 A20 R-1 A20 
SimRep – RepFirst 20-19 -1.566 
[0.1174] 
-1.222 
[0.2216] 
0.2921 
[0.377) 
0.3237 
[0.259] 
SimRep - RepLast 20-19 -4.000 
 [0.6889] 
1.169 
[0.2422] 
0.2529 
[0.599] 
0.4056* 
[0.089] 
RepFirst - RepLast 19-19 0.993 
[0.3208] 
1.824* 
[0.0681] 
0.2632 
[0.563] 
0.3506 
[0.205] 
Figures in brackets are p-values. ***Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * 
significant at 10 percent. 
The M-W statistics in Table 4.9 report that there is a statistically significant difference 
in effort share between RepFirst and RepLast as representatives in RepFirst did more 
than their group members compared to those in RepLast. This is consistent with the 
findings from prior leadership and public good game literature, that the second mover 
tends to rent-seek from the first mover. There is no statistical difference in effort share 
when comparisons are made between SimRep and RepFirst, and between RepFirst and 
RepLast, indicating representatives in SimRep that allocate more (less) tokens are not 
so different from those in RepLast (RepFirst). On the other hand, just by examining 
the equality of distribution share via K-S statistics, I found representatives in SimRep 
contribute more than their group members than what representatives in RepLast have 
done to their group members. 
Hypothesis 4 could partly be accepted. We have found a difference (significant at the 
10 per cent level) between the effort shares in RepFirst and RepLast. However, we are 
not able to reach firm conclusions about effort shares in SimRep relative to RepLast. 
Result 3: There is some indication that effort share of RepFirst is higher than RepLast 
across 20 rounds. There is no statistically significant difference between effort share 
of SimRep and other treatments. 
Decisions in the first round (R-1) capture the pure effect of reciprocity or 
complementarity, like the one-shot PGG implemented by Gächter & Renner (2004) 
for RepFirst and Cox et al. (2013) for RepLast. Data from R-1 capture ‘pure’ 
reciprocation by representatives in RepLast and by group members in RepFirst. There 
is no scope for this type of reciprocation in SimRep. 
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To illustrate the reciprocity in RepFirst and RepLast in R-1, we plot decisions made 
in R-1 using the template from Figure 4.1. Recapping from Figure 4.1, combinations 
of effort and contribution on the 45-degree line can be interpreted as reflecting an 
intention by the representative (in RepLast) or group members (in RepFirst) to 
reciprocate to contribution or effort of the other player(s) and to equalise earnings.  
Figure 4.5. Combination of effect and average contribution at group-level for 
RepFirst in R-1 
 
Group members reciprocation (or lack of it) towards representative’s effort for all 
groups in RepFirst is shown in Figure 4.5. There are more groups ending up above the 
dotted line indicating that representatives are exerting more effort, measured by tokens 
allocated to GIA, than the group members contribution to PG. There are more groups 
in Region III, showing that in R-1 representatives in RepFirst play a role in motivating 
group members to maximise public good provision at personal cost.  Effort and 
contributions in RepFirst are highly correlated indicating that group members 
reciprocated their representative’s effort (Pair-wise correlation=0.590; p-value = 
0.0078).  Only one group managed to reach the socially optimal outcome, yet there 
are 5 groups with representatives that exerted full effort. This could indicate that the 
reluctance by group members to contribute could not be blamed on representatives’ 
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lack of engagement but on group members’ willingness to cooperate with the co -group 
members, since a group member could still free ride on the other co-group member’s 
contribution.  
Figure 4.6. Combination of effort and average contribution at group-level for 
RepLast in R-1 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the combinations of effort and decisions made by groups in RepLast 
in R-1. No group ended up at the socially optimal point while a share of them are 
concentrated at the Nash-equilibrium point of zero effort and contributions. These 
Nash-equilibrium decisions were absent in treatments RepFirst and SimRep. Effort 
and contribution in RepLast were not correlated (Pair-wise correlation=0.0836; p-
value = 0.7336). The lack of correlation in decisions may suggests representative’s 
unwillingness to reciprocate group members’ contributions by engaging in rent-
seeking. 
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Figure 4.7. Combination of effort and average contribution at group-level for 
SimRep in R-1 
 
Figure 4.7 plots the combination of effort and average contributions for groups in 
SimRep in R-1. This is the pure effect of effort by representative and cooperation by 
followers as both types of players have to decide simultaneously without knowing the 
willingness of others to produce the PG. Decisions in Figure 4.7 are scattered in 
Regions II, III and IV as groups have been formed at random and until the end of R-
1, no one has had information about the behaviour of any co-players. There are about 
as many observations below and above the 45-degree line with no correlation found 
between effort and contribution in R-1 (Pairwise correlation = -0.2098, p-value 
=0.3745). From Figure 4.7, we observe that one group is able to reach the socially 
optimum outcome and no group is in the Region 1 of mutual losses or at the Nash-
equilibrium point. Region IV hosted the most groups outcomes showing the 
representatives gain from the interaction, and this resulted in smaller earnings for the 
respective group members.  
After R-1, group members and representatives learn the outcomes of their decision 
and can infer what other players have done. This allows the second mover(s) in 
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RepFirst and RepLast treatments to reciprocate decisions made by the first mover(s) 
in these treatments. 
Since the composition of groups and subjects’ roles are fixed for the 20 rounds, it is 
natural for subjects in all treatment to adjust their effort or contributions once R-1 
concluded. For an individual subject, there is a pull to decide based on the outcome 
from the previous round, for all treatments, and/or based on signal(s) from the first 
mover(s) for RepFirst and RepLast. Table 4.10 shows the pair-wise correlation 
between effort and average contribution for all treatments in 20 rounds.  
Once subjects were informed about the outcome of R-1’s decisions, decisions in the 
subsequent rounds started to show positive correlation between effort and 
contribution. In R-2 correlation is strongest among group in RepFirst while groups in 
SimRep and RepLast reported moderately positive correlations between effort and 
average contribution. The correlations get stronger as the rounds progress and, in some 
incidences, get close to 1 or perfect positive correlation showing that there is 
reciprocation between effort and contributions in groups. 
This inter-round effect happened quickly among subjects in SimRep as by R-5, there 
is a strong positive correlation between effort and contributions, indicating that 
representatives and group members are reciprocating each other within the same round 
even though subjects cannot signal to each other before deciding. Groups in RepFirst 
showed high positive correlations from R-2 onwards implying that groups can reach 
their reciprocation steady state quicker than other treatments with the assistance of a 
signal from the representative. Similarly, the inter-round effect between group 
members and representative also increased the correlation strength for groups in 
RepLast.  
The changes in correlation strength over time shown in Table 4.10 suggest that there 
is a reciprocal relationship between the representative and group members for all 
treatments. For reporting on direct matching of representative and group members’ 
decisions across treatments and rounds, refer to Table 4.4A of the Appendix.  
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Table 4.10. Pairwise correlation between effort and average contribution for 20 
rounds 
 SimRep RepFirst RepLast 
R-1 -0.2098 
(0.3745) 
0.590*** 
(0.0078) 
0.0836 
(0.7336) 
R-2 0.4386** 
(0.0530) 
0.8364*** 
(0.000) 
0.4907** 
(0.0329) 
R-3 0.7506*** 
(0.0001) 
0.7083*** 
(0.0007) 
0.4820** 
(0.0366) 
R-4 0.6594*** 
(0.0016) 
0.8259*** 
(0.0000) 
0.5212** 
(0.0221) 
R-5 0.7506*** 
(0.0001) 
0.8795*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9310*** 
(0.0000) 
R-6 0.8024*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9121*** 
(0.000) 
0.8434*** 
(0.0000) 
R-7 0.8172*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9264*** 
(0.0000) 
0.4163* 
(0.0762) 
R-8 0.8127*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8636*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8211*** 
(0.0000) 
R-9 0.7817*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8446*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8357*** 
(0.0000) 
R-10 0.8636*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9160*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8664*** 
(0.0000) 
R-11 0.8541*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8551*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9382*** 
(0.0000) 
R-12 0.9453*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9294*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9100*** 
(0.0000) 
R-13 0.9593*** 
(0.000) 
0.9188*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8642*** 
(0.0000) 
R-14 0.9828*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8884*** 
(0.000) 
0.9273*** 
(0.0000) 
R-15 0.9802*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9744*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8068*** 
(0.0000) 
R-16 0.9973*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9510*** 
(0.0000) 
0.8820*** 
(0.0000) 
R-17 0.8687*** 
(0.0000) 
0.7261*** 
(0.0004) 
0.9663*** 
(0.0000) 
R-18 0.8580*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9140*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9333*** 
(0.0000) 
R-19 0.8001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.9798*** 
(0.0000) 
0.7485*** 
(0.0002) 
R-20 0.5001** 
(0.0247) 
0.6632*** 
(0.0000) 
0.1909 
(0.4336) 
Figures in brackets are p-values. ***Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * 
significant at 10 percent.  
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Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show scatterplots for all treatment at certain decision rounds. 
Figures 4.4A in the Appendix show scatterplots that illustrate the end game effect for 
all decisions made in the last round, R-20.  
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Figure 4.8.. Combinations of effort and average contribution at group level for R-2 to R-5 
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Figure 4.8 shows all decisions in the first 4 rounds after the initial round. Decisions 
for groups in SimRep are still scattered around the four regions, with group members 
benefiting more than their representatives. The difference between SimRep and 
RepFirst scatterplots could originate from the order sequencing, i.e. group members 
followed their representative leadership, and this resulted in more groups landing in 
Region III, i.e. both representative and group members benefitting from the public 
good. The RepLast scatterplot in Figure 4.8 illustrate the huge pull towards Region I 
or towards zero effort and contribution point.  
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Figure 4.9. Combination of effort and average contribution at group-level for R-14 to R-19 
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The scatterplots of decisions in Figures 4.9 that capture decisions made in rounds 14 
to 19, in which decisions have stabilized after the early rounds and before the final 
round. First, there is an increasing tendency for points to be on the 45-degree line 
suggesting that both representative and group members matched each other’s tokens 
allocation and as a result equalised each other’s payoff from the public good. Third, 
there is increasing bifurcation towards the Nash-equilibrium (0,0) and socially optimal 
(10,10) points.  
Result 4: There is tendency within groups to equalize effort and contributions 
overtime. It happened quicker for RepFirst due to the distinguished role of the 
representative as a leader in the group. After several rounds, more equalizing 
decisions appear among groups in SimRep and RepFirst. 
Table 4.11. Incidences where efforts and contributions matched in percentage after 
twenty rounds 
 SimRep RepFirst RepLast 
 Nash 
(0,0) 
Social 
(10,10) 
Recip. Nash 
(0,0) 
Social 
(10,10) 
Recip. Nash 
(0,0) 
Social 
(10,10) 
Recip. 
Total 
20 
rounds 
25.0 
(100) 
21.0 
(84) 
0.5 
(2) 
45.8 
(174) 
15.5 
(59) 
5 (19) 44.7 
(170) 
3.9 
(15) 
2.1 (8)  
Note: Figures in parentheses are number of decisions made. For SimRep there are 400 decisions and 
380 decisions for RepFirst and RepLast. Columns Nash (0,0) report the incidences in which the effort 
and contributions of the three players at 0 tokens. Columns Social (10,10) report the incidences in which 
effort and contributions of the three players are at 10 tokens. Columns Recip.report the incidences where 
everyone in the group allocated the same number of tokens that are non-zero and non-social optimal to 
the PG. For example, effort is 5 tokens and contributions by both group members are 5 tokens each.  
Across 20 rounds, a bifurcation effect can be found in all treatments. The bifurcation 
effect in general is skewed towards the Nash-equilibrium solution of (0,0,0) rather 
than the socially optimal solution (10,10,10). Table XXA reports the incidences of 
decisions that happened at the Nash-equilibrium, socially optimal and other 
reciprocation points for every round.  
The bifurcation towards the Nash-equilibrium solution is strongest for groups in 
RepFirst, followed by groups in RepLast and SimRep. Groups in SimRep have the 
highest incidence of bifurcation towards the socially optimal solution (10,10,10). 
Table 4.15 also shows that there is minimal ‘pure’ reciprocation incidences outside of 
the bifurcation points, in which all three subjects, 1 representative and 2 group 
members, decided on the same non-zero and non-social optimal value. 65.5% of total 
decisions made in RepFirst involved one of the bifurcation points, i.e. (0,0,0) or 
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(10,10,10). Only 51.0% of total decisions in RepLast involved one of the bifurcation 
points while the percentage of those decisions was 46.5% in  SimRep. The relatively 
high occurrence of Nash-equilibrium decisions in SimRep could be explained by the 
simultaneous nature of decision-making. 
Result 5: There is between-group bifurcation as equalizing decisions converged to 
either the socially optimal equilibrium or the Nash equilibrium. The occurrence of 
bifurcation towards Nash-equilibrium outcome is stronger for groups in RepFirst and 
RepLast. 
To examine between-round reciprocal decisions between representative and group 
members, we pooled relative changes in subjects’ decisions after each round. For 
example, in R-4, a subject could be influenced to make decision based on their 
counterparts’ decisions in the previous round, R-3.  A representative or group member 
could increase, decrease or maintain the same level of effort in  this round from 
previous round. Depending on the effort or contribution in the previous round, R t-1, 
subjects’ behaviour could be classified as free-riding, positively reciprocating, 
negatively reciprocating or leading by example35. Adjustment across rounds will only 
happen from R-2 onwards hence the total number of representatives’ decisions in 
SimRep is 380 and 361 for RepFirst and RepLast. Between-round reciprocity is 
expected to be integral in shaping the first mover(s)’s decision; i.e. representatives in 
SimRep and RepFirst would only know whether her/his effort was matched by group 
members once the round concluded, and the same applies for group members in 
SimRep and RepLast.  Tables 4.12 to 4.14 show the pooled decisions made by 
representatives in all treatments as a reaction to group members’ average contribution 
in the previous round.  
Table 4.12. Breakdown of changes on representative effort as a reaction to group 
members’ contribution in SimRep in percentage 
 Effort in round t (et) 
Decrease Maintain Increase 
et-1 < xt-1  2.89 (11) 11.32 (43) 14.74 (56) 
et-1 = xt-1  2.37 (9) 45.0 (171) 0.26 (1) 
et-1 > xt-1  13.42 (51) 7.37 (28) 2.63 (10) 
Note: et is representative’s effort in the current round while et-1 is effort in the previous round. The first 
column on the left contains the possible scenario that might happened in the previous round. et-1 could 
 
35 Graphical representation and explanation of subjects’ decisions is in Table 4.30 of Appendix B.  
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have been higher/lower/equal to average contribution in the previous round, xt-1.  Figures in parentheses 
are numbers of decisions. 
 
Table 4.13. Breakdown of changes in representative effort as a reaction to group 
members’ contribution in RepFirst in percentage 
 Effort in round t (et) 
Decrease Maintain Increase 
et-1 < xt-1  1.39(5) 7.2 (26) 3.88 (14) 
et-1 = xt-1  2.22 (8) 54.85 (198) 8.86 (32) 
et-1 > xt-1  13.85 (50) 5.54 (20) 2.22 (8) 
Note: et is representative’s effort in current round while et-1 is effort in the previous round. The first 
column on the left contains the possible scenario that might happened in the previous round. et-1 could 
have been higher/lower/equal to average contribution in the previous round, xt-1.  Figures in parentheses 
are numbers of decision. 
Table 4.14. Breakdown of changes in representative effort as a reaction to group 
members’ contribution in RepLast in percentage 
 Effort in round t (et) 
Decrease Maintain Increase 
et-1 < xt-1  4.99 (18) 11.91 (43) 6.65 (24) 
et-1 = xt-1  4.16 (15) 41.55 (150) 6.93 (25) 
et-1 > xt-1  13.02 (47) 6.09 (22) 4.71 (17) 
Note: et is representative’s effort in current round while et-1 is effort in the previous round. The first 
column on the left contains the possible scenario that might happened in the previous round. et-1 could 
have been higher/lower/equal to average contribution in the previous round, xt-1.  Figures in parentheses 
are numbers of decision. 
In all three treatments and across 19 rounds, a huge proportion of decisions are in the 
central cells, i.e. if effort and average contributions are equal in round t-1, effort and 
average contribution are usually unchanged in round t. Since the top right corner cell 
represents positive reciprocity and the bottom left cell represents negative reciprocity, 
for groups in SimRep, there are more observations in both reciprocity cells than in the 
other two corners. In the other treatments, negative reciprocity seems to be stronger 
than positive reciprocity, which would tend to produce a downward drift in 
contributions and effort. 
A potential explanation of the high level of positive reciprocity  between 
representatives and group members in SimRep is the disjunction effect. As everyone 
in the group decides together in R-1, representatives may be more willing to adjust 
their effort in subsequent rounds to match group members’ contributions. On the other 
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hand, between-round punishment or effort reduction happened at much the same 
percentage levels in all three treatments. Knowing that their generosity has not been 
reciprocated within-round after getting feedback for the round, these representatives 
reduce their effort relative to the previous round. This behaviour is similar to 
leadership-based experiments, in which leaders adjust their contributions downward 
as the game progresses once they notice that their followers have free-ridden on their 
past contributions (Gächter & Renner, 2018).  
Tables 4.15 to 4.17 show the adjustments of average group members contributions 
relative to their representative’s effort after each round. We used the average 
contributions rather than the real contributions here to simplify the explanation.  
Table 4.15. Breakdown of changes in group members’ contribution as a reaction to 
representative’s effort in SimRep in percentage 
 Contribution in round t (xt) 
Decrease Maintain Increase 
xt-1 < et-1 6.32 (24) 4.47 (17) 12.11 (46) 
xt-1 = et-1 2.89 (11) 40.79 (155) 4.21 (16) 
xt-1 > et-1 18.16 (69) 6.32 (24) 4.74 (18) 
Note: xt is average group member’s contribution in current round while xt-1 is average contribution in 
the previous round. The first column on the left contains the possible scenario that might happened in 
the previous round. xt-1 could have been higher/lower/equal to effort in the previous round, et-1. Figures 
in parentheses are numbers of decisions. 
Table 4.16. Breakdown of changes in group members’ contribution as a reaction to 
representative’s effort in RepFirst in percentage 
 Contribution in round t (xt) 
Decrease Maintain Increase 
xt-1 < et-1 10.80 (39) 7.20 (26) 3.60 (13) 
xt-1 = et-1 3.32 (12) 52.63 (190) 9.97 (36) 
xt-1 > et-1 7.76 (28) 1.94 (7) 2.77 (10) 
Note: xt is average group member’s contribution in current round while xt-1 is average contribution in 
the previous round. The first column on the left contains the possible scenario that might happened in 
the previous round. xt-1 could have been higher/lower/equal to effort in the previous round, et-1. Figures 
in parentheses are numbers of decision. 
 
 
 
 
270 
 
Table 4.17. Breakdown of changes in group members’ contribution as a reaction to 
representative’s effort in RepLast in percentage 
 Contribution in round t (xt) 
Decrease Maintain Increase 
xt-1 < et-1 7.48 (27) 8.59 (31) 10.53 (38) 
xt-1 = et-1 3.60 (13) 44.88 (162) 4.16 (15) 
xt-1 > et-1 13.85 (50) 3.60 (13) 3.32 (12) 
Note: xt is average group member’s contribution in current round while xt-1 is average contribution in 
the previous round. The first column on the left contains the possible scenario that might happened in 
the previous round. xt-1 could have been higher/lower/equal to effort in the previous round, et-1. Figures 
in parentheses are numbers of decision. 
Between-round reciprocity influences SimRep and RepLast group members’ decisions 
as they have the opportunity to adjust contributions after the conclusion of the previous 
round.  Like the representatives, majority decisions by group members involved 
maintaining their contribution in the new round or adjusting it after finding out the 
representative’s decision in the previous round.  Adjustments in contributions do 
happen between rounds but huge proportions of decisions are located in the central 
cells, indicating that group members prefer not to adjust their contributions in the next 
round after finding out that contribution is equal to effort. Positive between-round 
reciprocity occurred more in SimRep than RepLast. Like the behaviour of 
representatives in SimRep, the group members in the same treatment also would adjust 
their contributions upwards when the representative’s effort in the previous round was 
greater than contributions.  Considering the free-riding opportunity for representatives 
in RepLast, the share of between-round negative reciprocity is higher among group 
members in RepLast.  
Between-round positive reciprocity among group members is lower than for 
representatives in all treatments. Within each treatment, the frequency of negative 
reciprocity is greater for group members than for representatives.  However, the 
adjustment of effort and contribution between rounds in Tables 4.15 to 4.17 do not 
capture the possibility that a group member adjusted her/his contribution based on the 
contribution made by the co-group member in the same group. For a group member, 
between-round reciprocity could also include maintaining and matching the co-group 
member’s contribution in the previous round as both group members decide 
simultaneously.  
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Tables 4.18 to 4.20 contain the breakdown of one group member reactions after 
learning about the contribution made by co-group member in the previous round.  
Table 4.18. Breakdown of changes in group members’ contribution as a reaction to 
co-group members’ contribution in SimRep in percentage 
 Contribution in round t (xt) 
Decrease  Maintain  Increase  
xt-1 < x-1t-1 2.76 (21) 8.82 (67) 9.34 (71) 
xt-1 = x-1t-1 3.55 (27) 49.34 (375) 5.26 (40) 
xt-1 > x-1t-1 (12.76) 97 5.66 (43) 2.5 (19) 
Note: xt is a  group member’s contribution in current round while xt-1 is contribution in the previous 
round. The first column on the left contains the possible scenario that might happened in the previous 
round. xt-1 could have been higher/lower/equal to co-group member contribution in the previous round, 
x-1t-1. Figures in parentheses are numbers of decision. 
Table 4.19. Breakdown of changes in group members’ contribution as a reaction to 
co-group members’ contribution in RepFirst in percentage 
 Contribution in round t (xt) 
Decrease Maintain Increase 
xt-1 < x-1t-1 1.11 (8) 7.20 (52) 3.88 (28) 
xt-1 = x-1t-1 4.43 (32) 63.02 (455) 8.17 (59) 
xt-1 > x-1t-1 8.45 (61) 2.77 (20) 0.97 (7) 
Note: xt is a  group member’s contribution in current round while xt-1 is contribution in the previous 
round. The first column on the left contains the possible scenario that might happened in the previous 
round. xt-1 could have been higher/lower/equal to co-group member contribution in the previous round, 
x-1t-1. Figures in parentheses are numbers of decision. 
 
Table 4.20. Breakdown of changes in group members’ contribution as a reaction to 
co-group members’ contribution in RepLast in percentage 
 Contribution in round t (xt) 
Decrease Maintain Increase 
xt-1 < x-1t-1 2.22 (16) 7.48 (54) 11.08 (80) 
xt-1 = x-1t-1 2.77 (20) 50.83 (367) 4.85 (35) 
xt-1 > x-1t-1 13.71 (99) 5.82 (42) 1.25 (9) 
Note: xt is a  group member’s contribution in current round while xt-1 is contribution in the previous 
round. The first column on the left contains the possible scenario that might happened in the previous 
round. xt-1 could have been higher/lower/equal to co-group member contribution in the previous round, 
x-1t-1. Figures in parentheses are numbers of decision. 
A group member could maintain or adjust her/his contribution in the next round after 
learning the co-group member’s contribution in the previous round. Maintaining 
contribution in the central cell is highly prevalent among group members in RepFirst 
treatment compared to other treatments. The second largest decisions in all treatments 
involved group members reducing her/his contribution in the current round when the 
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co-group member’s decision was lower than her/his contribution in the previous 
round. The percentage of this reduction is lower compared to the percentage that have 
taken place in comparison between group members and representatives. The 
percentage of group members that increase contribution as a response to low 
contribution in previous round shows more variations across treatments. It is highest 
among RepLast, followed by SimRep and lastly RepFirst.  Of course, the findings from 
Tables 4.22 to 4.24 would not be able to tease out whether representative or co-group 
member have more influence on a group member’s contribution.  
Result 6: Within each group in every treatment, there is a tendency for subjects in both 
roles to reduce effort/contribution in response to unfavourable inequality. This then 
translate to a very strong tendency to maintain effort/contribution level in response to 
equality.   
Our PGG is designed to create complementarity between representative and her/his 
group members. Subjects’ decisions exhibited a general tendency within groups to 
equalise individual contributions and efforts, as a response to within-round decisions 
by the representative (group members) or a response to unfavourable inequality in the 
previous round’s allocation to the PG. This resulted in between group bifurcation, with 
some groups decisions converging to either full socially optimal or Nash-equilibrium 
decisions. This general feature can be found in all treatment over time.  
4.6.5 Econometric results  
At this point, we are able to establish reciprocity tendencies among subjects within 
and across rounds by equalizing each other’s’ effort and contributions . These 
tendencies have led most groups to converge either to the Nash-equilibrium point or 
to the socially optimal point. We have also established that the reciprocal tendencies 
originated from i) the second mover(s)’ reaction to the first mover(s) decision(s) 
within a round and, ii) first mover(s)’ reaction to second mover(s) decision(s) in the 
previous round. This is also applicable for groups in SimRep as both the representative 
and group members become the second movers in relation to their decision in the 
previous round. The regression in Tables 4.21 and 4.22 contains the main determinants 
to explain the everyone’s decisions in each treatment. 
Table 4.21 examines the   impacts of groups members’ contributions on 
representatives’ efforts. The dependent variable for regression equations in Table 4.21 
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is the change of representatives’ efforts in current round, Rt from previous round, Rt-1. 
For a representative in the SimRep and RepFirst treatments, the changes are expected 
as a result of differences in the representative’s effort and average contribution by 
group members in Rt-1, and the representatives’ characteristics as control variables. On 
the other hand, the decision of a representative in RepLast is a function of; i) 
differences between effort in Rt+1 and average contribution of group members in Rt 
and, ii) the representative’s characteristics as control. This regression uses the average 
contribution value of the group members. 
Regressions (1) to (3) in Table 4.21 focused on SimRep treatment, regressions (4) to 
(6) examined RepFirst, while column (7) to (9) contains the regression results for 
RepLast treatment. Columns (1) and (4) look at the effects of differences in effort with 
average contribution in the previous round, Rt-1, for SimRep and RepFirst treatments. 
On the other hand, column (7) contains the regression results on the effect of 
differences between effort in the previous round, Rt-1 and average contribution in the 
current round, Rt. Columns (1), (4) and (7) contain the main effects of representatives’ 
reactions to average contributions for SimRep, RepFirst and RepLast. Regressions in 
columns (2), (5) and (8) include the effects of representatives’ control variables, 
namely age, gender and using English as their first language. Results (3) contains the 
combination of the main effects from group members’ average contribution controlled 
for age, gender and language for representatives in SimRep. On the other hand, 
columns (6) and (9) contain the main effects of representative’s decisions controlled 
for the selected control variables.  
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   Table 4.21. Determinants of changes in representative’s effort by round 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
SimRep RepFirst RepLast 
Diff effort in Rt-1 & 
contributions in Rt-1 
-0.451*** 
(0.0777) 
 -0.460*** 
(0.0738) 
-0.673*** 
(0.159)  
 -0.699*** 
(0.168) 
   
Diff effort in Rt-1 & 
contributions in Rt 
      -0.767*** 
(0.114) 
 -0.807*** 
(0.106) 
Control variables          
Age  -0.0261* 
(0.0137) 
0.0304 
(0.0430) 
 0.0144 
(0.0457) 
-0.184** 
(0.0784) 
 -0.0137 
(0.00931) 
0.124** 
(0.0432) 
Gender  -0.223* 
(0.127) 
-0.358* 
(0.198) 
 -0.110 
(0.0988) 
-0.293 
(0.240) 
 0.106 
(0.0706) 
-0.210 
(0.305) 
First language 
 
 -0.0980 
(0.143) 
-0.126 
(0.206) 
 -0.0125 
(0.106)  
-0.236 
(0.233) 
 -0.0924 
(0.0646) 
0.101 
(0.280) 
Constant 0.383 
(0.550)  
1.739** 
(0.830) 
0.294 
(0.911) 
0.602 
(0.582)  
-0.136 
(1.251) 
5.024** 
(2.169) 
-0.380 
(0.678) 
0.0332 
(0.780) 
-2.751*** 
(0.831) 
Observations 380 380 380 361 361 361 361 361 361 
R-squared 0.313 0.111 0.319 0.294 0.038 0.304 0.445 0.070 0.463 
F-stat 33.63*** 
(0.0000) 
2.89* 
(0.0623) 
15.93*** 
(0.000) 
17.81*** 
(0.0005) 
0.44 
(0.7265) 
4.61*** 
(0.0097) 
45.67*** 
(0.0000) 
9.63*** 
(0.0005) 
17.26*** 
(0.000) 
Note: Linear regression. Dependent variable is the changes of effort tokens allocated by representative to the Group Investment Account in the current round 
from the last round. This takes a value between -10 to 10 with negative values indicating representative reducing her/his effort in comparison to the round 
before. The table reports coefficients with clustered standard errors on groups in parentheses. Diff effort in Rt-1 & contribution in Rt-1 is derived by 
representative’s effort minus average contribution in the previous round and it takes a value between 0 and 10. Diff effort in Rt-1 & contribution in Rt is 
derived by representative’s effort in the previous round minus average contribution in the current round and takes a value between 0 and 10. Age is a discrete 
numerical variable. Gender variable takes a value of 1 if the representative is a female, and 0 if male. First language variable takes a value of 1 if the 
representative stated her/his language is English.  ***Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
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The selection of the dependent variable and the main variable of interest in Table 4.21 is 
designed to tease out between-round reciprocal decisions by representatives in each treatment. 
For SimRep and RepFirst, if a representative exerted more effort than the average group 
member in round Rt-1 then it is expected that these representatives will adjust their effort 
downward in Rt. One the other hand, should a representative in RepLast exert more effort in 
the Rt-1 but found out that in the current round Rt that group members on average have 
contributed less tokens, that representative will adjust her/his contribution downwards in the 
current round Rt. These results are statistically strong even after controlling for age, gender and 
the first language of the subjects.  
Result 7: Changes in representatives’ efforts in all treatments are strongly influenced by the 
previous contributions of group members.  
The results in Table 4.22 cover decisions made by both group members in each group. Apart 
from incorporating the representative’s decision, the regression results also incorporate the co-
group member’s contribution in the previous round , as a group member is informed about 
her/his co-group member’s contribution and this could influence contribution decisions.  
Columns (1), (4) and (7) contains the results on group members’ reaction to their 
representative’s decisions and their reactions to the decisions of their co -group members in the 
previous rounds for SimRep, RepFirst and RepLast. For group members in SimRep and RepLast 
this involved the difference between their contribution in the previous round and the 
representative’s effort in the previous round, i.e. after everyone received information on the 
previous round outcome. On the other hand, for group members in RepFirst their decisions 
across multiple rounds have been adjusted by their decision in the previous round and the 
decision made by their representative in the current round. Similar to Table 4.21, columns (2), 
(5) and (8) contains the regression results when a group member’s decision to change decisions 
by round against age, gender and using English as the first language. Regression results in 
columns (3), (6) and (9) show the main effects of, i) differences in contribution and effect, and 
ii) differences in contribution with co-group member contribution and they are controlled for 
age, gender and using English as the first language.   
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Table 4.22. Determinants of changes in a group member’s contribution by round 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
SimRep RepFirst RepLast 
Diff contribution in Rt-1 
& Effort in Rt-1 
-0.238*** 
(0.0489) 
 -0.240*** 
(0.0474) 
   -0.186*** 
(0.0425) 
 -0.188*** 
(0.0433) 
Dif contribution in Rt-1 
& Effort in Rt 
   -0.145** 
(0.0616) 
 -0.146** 
(0.0598) 
   
Diff contribution in Rt-1 
& co-group member 
contribution in Rt-1 
-0.217*** 
(0.0527) 
 -0.220*** 
(0.0518) 
-0.556*** 
(0.0537) 
 -0.558*** 
(0.0508) 
-0.311*** 
(0.0739) 
 -0.312*** 
(0.0741) 
Control variables          
Age  0.00591 
(0.0186) 
-0.00984 
(0.0351) 
 0.00110 
(0.00217) 
0.00150 
(0.00849) 
 -0.00340** 
(0.00137) 
-0.00186 
(0.00135) 
Gender   -0.0921 
(0.0678) 
0.170 
(0.127) 
 -0.0418 
(0.0606) 
-0.222 
(0.181) 
 -0.0659 
(0.0808) 
0.147 
(0.165) 
First language 
 
 0.0392 
(0.0728) 
0.0628 
(0.149) 
 -0.00141 
(0.00170) 
-0.00313 
(0.00518) 
 -0.00175*** 
(0.000420) 
0.000557 
(0.000729) 
Constant -0.155 
(0.456) 
-0.376 
(0.393) 
-0.237 
(0.732) 
-0.102 
(0.433) 
0.437 
(0.554) 
0.212 
(0.429) 
-0.0747 
(0.503) 
0.0142 
(0.525) 
-0.225 
(0.460) 
Observations 760 760 760 722 722 722 722 722 722 
R-squared 0.271 0.035 0.272 0.448 0.058 0.450 0.314 0.029 0.315 
F-stat 48.98*** 
(0.000) 
0.92 
(0.4511) 
26.33*** 
(0.000) 
73.69*** 
(0.000) 
0.34 
(0,7941) 
53.66*** 
(0.000) 
24.55*** 
(0,000) 
5.81*** 
(0.0059) 
12.62*** 
(0.000) 
 Note: Linear regression. Dependent variable is the change of tokens contributed by group members to the Group Project in the current round from the 
previous round. This takes a value between -10 and 10 with negative values indicating the group member reduce her/his effort in comparison to the 
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previous round. The table reports coefficients with clustered standard errors on groups in parentheses. Diff contribution in Rt-1 & effort in Rt-1 is derived 
by contribution in the previous round minus effort in current round and it takes a value between 0 and 10. Diff contribution in Rt-1 & effort in Rt is the 
difference in tokens of group member’s contribution in the previous round and representative’s effort in the current round. Diff contribution in Rt-1 & 
co-group member contribution in Rt-1 is the difference in a group member contribution and the contribution of co-group member’s contribution in the 
previous round. Age is a discrete numerical variable. Gender variable takes a value of 1 if the representative is a female, and 0 if male. First language 
variable takes a value of 1 if the representative stated her/his language is English.  ***Significant at 1 percent; ** signif icant at 5 percent; * significant 
at 10 percent.   
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From the regression in Table 4.21, group members in SimRep and RepLast adjusted 
their contribution once they found that there is a gap between their contribution and 
their representative’s effort in the previous round, Rt-1. Contribution in Rt dropped once 
a group member realised that she/he has allocated more tokens to the PG than the 
representative in the previous round, Rt-1. The magnitude of adjustment is slightly 
higher for groups in SimRep compared to RepFirst.   
Another concern with decisions by a group member is the likelihood of her/his 
decision in the current round, Rt being influenced by the contribution made by the co-
group member in the previous round, Rt-1. In all regressions in Table 4.21, we solved 
this by incorporating the differences in contribution made by a group member and 
her/his co-group member in the previous round, Rt-1. A positive value in this variable 
would mean that a group member contributed more tokens than the co-group member, 
while a negative value indicates that a group member contributed less tokens than the 
co-group member in a specific round. In all treatments, a group member would reduce 
contribution after finding out that she/he had contributed more tokens that the co-
group member in the previous Rt-1. Therefore, the cooperativeness of the co-group 
member also influenced contributions.   
Other characteristics like age, gender and using English as the first language did not 
significantly affect a group member’s contribution decisions in SimRep and RepFirst. 
More mature subjects and subjects that used English as the first language were more 
likely to reduce their contribution as the rounds progressed for groups in RepLast.  
Result 8: Changes in group members’ contributions in all treatments are determined 
by her/his previous contributions, the previous effort of the representative, and the 
previous contribution of the co-group member relative to own contribution.  
4.7 Discussion and conclusion 
This chapter expanded on the idea of representative leadership introduced in Chapter 
2 by extending the game investigated in the lab-in-the-field experiment into a repeated 
game for 20 rounds, and by using three treatments which differed according to  in the 
order of the representative’s and group members’ decisions. The public good 
framework introduced here is shaped by collective action of group members and 
exertion of effort by the representative. This distinguishes the public good in our game 
from the standard linear public good game as there is an asymmetry between roles. If 
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the representative makes zero effort, the group members can still produce the public 
good, but sub-optimally. On the other hand, if the group members make zero 
contributions, the representative can’t produce any public good and her/his effort are 
totally wasted. Given the special role of the representative in adjusting the social 
benefit from contributing, it is in the collective interest of group members to produce 
a public good, provided that they can trust the representative to play her/his role. 
Therefore, the representative here performed an act of leadership, her/his role provided 
motivation for others in the group to contribute. 
The experiment reported in this chapter varies the order of decision-making between 
representative and group members to explore the best mechanism to produce the 
public good with the highest possible benefit. The first round can be used to discover 
whether, in the RepFirst treatment, a representative can motivate group members to 
contribute by adjusting the return on collective action, and whether, in the RepLast 
trearment, group members can entice the representative’s involvement by 
contributing. These treatments were compared with a SimRep treatment in which the 
representative and group members made decisions simultaneously.  In the first round 
of this treatment, players had information only about the game structure and 
incentives. The game was then repeated for 20 rounds.  
We found that representatives’ willingness to play a part in the production of the public 
good by complementing the group members’ collective action  varied and sensitive to 
group members’ decisions. At the same time group members are also willing to play 
their part by contributing and these contributions are sensitive to representative’s 
effort and co-group member’s contribution.  
Most public good provision was driven by reciprocity between the representative and 
group members, and vice versa. We found that the order of the representative’s 
decision plays a role in determining the size of public good provision. The first 
mover(s) in RepFirst and RepLast motivated reciprocal decisions from second 
mover(s) in the first round. As the game progressed, the reciprocal tendencies also 
included between-round reciprocity for all treatments and this created path-
dependency, resulting in stability in public good provision over time. As a 
consequence of this, if a group started off with low public good provision, it was 
unlikely that provision would improve substantially in the next period. The reciprocal 
tendencies among representative and group members created a bifurcation effort, i.e. 
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the majority of groups converged to either the Nash-equilibrium solution of zero effort 
and contribution, or the socially optimal solution of maximum contribution and effort.   
Despite the collective benefits to be gained from contributions by group members and 
effort by the representative, close to half of decisions in the sequential treatments 
happened at the Nash-equilibrium solution. This indicates that some behavioural 
findings from standard public good games are also relevant in explaining the findings 
of our experiment.  
The outcome from the RepFirst treatment shows the limit of leading-by-example in 
this experiment. In round 1, the majority of representatives exerted effort to expand 
group members’ contributions. However, the incidence of reciprocation in round 1 
was limited. There are two potential explanations to this, i) group members felt that 
their representative was failing to maximise the potential benefit they could receive 
and punished him/her by contributing fewer tokens than the representative’s effort;  
and ii) the failure of the group members to coordinate on matching effort with 
contribution due to the threat of free riding by the co-group member.  In the subsequent 
rounds, some representatives started to adjust their effort downwards and this created 
path dependency in which some groups ended up not engaging with the public good 
at all. 
On the other hand, the temptation to free ride among representatives in RepLast is 
stronger than for representatives in the other treatments. A large proportion of group 
members in RepLast started the experiment by contributing few or no tokens, making 
it rational for the representative to refuse to engage with the public good in order to 
preserve her/his individual payoff. This does not prevent a small proportion of 
representatives from sacrificing personal payoff in order to increase the benefits of 
low contributing group members, probably with the aim that their group members 
would match their token allocation in the subsequent period. Once the game 
progressed and between-round reciprocity entered the decision process, most subjects 
were reluctant to increase their allocation of tokens to the public good.  
A proportion of groups in SimRep managed to consistently attain the socially optimal 
outcome from the public good. The disjunction effect may have enabled these groups 
to establish representation and cooperation in the earlier rounds which was then 
maintained by reciprocity; as a result, everyone maximised their individual payoff.  
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The contribution level hints at the possibility there is disadvantageous inequity 
aversion among some group members. Particularly in the earlier rounds for all 
treatments, the representative exerted more than three tokens in effort.  In these cases, 
both group members would maximise their benefit by contributing all their tokens as 
a collective. Hence, the representative and group members’ engagement with the 
public good could possibly produce asymmetrical social benefits. Instead most group 
members chose to reciprocate the representative’s effort by equalizing tokens 
contributed or exerted. Reciprocal tendencies among group members may have been 
motivated by aversion to inequality in earnings, particularly to prevent the 
representative from receiving a higher individual payoff than them.  Despite having 
the privilege to set the return on public good, the representative does not have power 
over her/his representative in motivating group members to contribute more. Instead, 
the results of this chapter points that group members cooperativeness are as important 
as representative’s privilege, indicating the successful representation required 
complementary collective action from the group members.   
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Appendix A: Robustness checks and further testing 
Table 4.1A. Mean contributions of group members 
  
Mean contribution Signrank 
test 
Ave 
Contribution 
of A1 & A2 
Kruskal-Wallis test 
Treatment Obs. GM 
A1 
GM 
A2 
 
 A1 A2 
SimRep 20 4.44 4.21 0.747 4.33 
3.558 
[0.1683] 
2.899 
[0.2347] 
  
(3.76) (3.66) [0.4551] (3.67) 
     
 
RepFirst   19         3.42 2.91 1.491 3.17 
  
(3.40) (3.47) [0.1360] (3.38) 
     
 
RepLast 19 2.01 2.39 -1.832* 2.20 
  
 
(2.54 (2.45) [0.0670] (2.45) 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. Figures in the subsequent column are the test 
statistics [p-values] for signrank tests for zero difference between the contributions of Players 
A1 and A2 within each treatment. The Kruskal-Wallis test is conducted for both labels and 
found that there are no statistical differences among the same labelled players in each 
treatment.   
 
Table 4.2A. Effort in selected rounds 
 Representative Effort 
Treatment Obs. Round 1 Round 5 Round 
10 
Round 
19 
Round 
20 
Average 
20 
Rounds  
SimRep 20 5.05 3.7 3.75 3.85 1.9 4.23   
(3.86) (4.54) (4.52) (4.77) (3.92) (3.49) 
  
      
RepFirst   19 5.16 3.42 3.32 2.26 1.16 3.41 
  
(3.78) (4.09) (4.11) (4.16) (3.15) (3.39) 
  
      
RepLast  19 3.42 1.68 2.37 2.05 0.37 2.27 
    (3.40) (3.04) (3.79) (3.64) (1.61) (2.57)  
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations in the mean effort and contribution columns 
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Table 4.3A. Group members’ contributions in selected rounds 
Treatment Obs. Round 1 Round 5 Round 
10 
Round 
19 
Round 
20 
Average 
20 
Rounds  
SimRep 40 5.975 4.3 4.28 4.05 2.35 4.33   
(3.53) (3.99) (4.23) (4.67) (3.97) (3.67) 
  
      
RepFirst   38 4.26 3.39 3.13 2.26 0.63 3.17 
  
(4.17) (4.25) (4.20) (4.09) (2.28) (3.40) 
  
      
RepLast  38 3.87 1.82 1.71 1.58 1.42 2.20 
    (3.56) (2.98) (2.96) (3.23) (2.92) (2.47) 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations in the mean effort and contribution columns 
 
Table 4.4A Statistical relationship between effort and average contributions by 
treatments 
Treatment Obs. R-1 Ave 20  
rounds 
SimRep 20 0.2098 0.9583***  
 (0.3745) (0.0000) 
 
   
RepFirst 19 0.5900*** 0.9664*** 
 
 (0.0078) (0.0000) 
 
   
RepLast 19 0.0836 0.8969*** 
   (0.7336) (0.0000) 
Figures in parentheses are p-value 
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Table 4.5A. Classification of a subject’s decision in a round with respect to 
counterpart’s decision in the previous round  
 Allocation in round t (et or xt) 
Decrease Maintain Increase 
et-1 < xt-1or  
 xt-1 < et-1 
Free-ride Free-ride + 
status quo 
Positive 
reciprocity 
et-1 = xt-1 or  
xt-1 = et-1 
Free-ride Neutral + Status 
quo 
Set example 
et-1 > xt-1 or 
xt-1 > et-1 
Punish / Negative 
reciprocity 
Set example + 
status quo 
Set example 
 
If a representative decrease effort, xt, after finding out her/his effort in the previous 
round is less than the average group member contribution, et-1 < xt-1, she/he is free-
riding.   If a representative maintain effort, xt, after finding out her/his effort in the 
previous round is less than the average group member contribution, et-1 < xt-1, she/he 
is maintaining the previous round status quo by free riding.   If a representative 
increase effort, xt, after finding out her/his effort in the previous round is less than the 
average group member contribution, et-1 < xt-1, she/he is reciprocating group members 
positively.  
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Table 4.6A. Determinants of representative’s effort (by highest contributor)  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Effort (tokens) SimRep RepFirst RepLast 
    
Period -0.00691 -0.00528 0.0192 
 (0.0474) (0.0203) (0.0246) 
HContribution in Rt-1 0.799*** 0.699***  
 (0.0623) (0.101)  
HContribution in Rt   0.616*** 
   (0.0802) 
Gender (female =1) -0.597 -0.0858 -0.365 
 (0.689) (0.677) (0.429) 
Age 0.137 -0.357 0.266*** 
 (0.122) (0.213) (0.0569) 
Constant -1.986 8.359* -4.860*** 
 (2.416) (4.043) (1.028) 
    
Observations 380 361 380 
R-squared 0.571 0.590 0.569 
Note: Linear regression. Dependent variable is the number of effort tokens allocated by 
representative to the Group Investment Account in the current round. The table reports 
coefficients with clustered standard errors on groups in parentheses. Effort in Rt-1 is 
representative’s effort in the previous round and takes a value between 0 and 10. Diff effort 
in Rt-1 & contribution in Rt-1 is derived by representative’s effort minus average contribution 
in the previous round and it takes a value between 0 and 10. Diff effort in Rt-1 & contribution 
in Rt is derived by representative’s effort in the previous round minus average contribution 
in the current round and takes a value between 0 and 10. Age is a discrete numerical 
variable. Gender variable takes a value of 1 if the representative is a female, and 0 if male. 
First language variable takes a value of 1 if the representative stated her/his language is 
English.  ***Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
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Table 4.7A. Determinants of representative’s effort (by total contribution)  
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
Effort (tokens) SimRep RepFirst RepLast 
    
Period -0.0445 -0.0381 0.00500 
 (0.0444) (0.0228) (0.0231) 
TContribution in Rt-1 0.441*** 0.408***  
 (0.0187) (0.0404)  
TContribution in Rt   0.376*** 
   (0.0379) 
Gender (female =1) -0.368 -0.100 -0.480 
 
Age 
(0.470) 
0.0826 
(0.0933) 
(0.442) 
-0.350** 
(0.126) 
(0.424) 
0.260*** 
(0.0513) 
Constant -0.436 8.719*** -4.360*** 
 (1.757) (2.620) (0.962) 
    
Observations 380 361 380 
R-squared 0.670 0.678 0.596 
Note: Linear regression. Dependent variable is the number of effort tokens allocated by 
representative to the Group Investment Account in the current round. The table reports 
coefficients with clustered standard errors on groups in parentheses. Effort in Rt-1 is 
representative’s effort in the previous round and takes a value between 0 and 10. Diff effort 
in Rt-1 & contribution in Rt-1 is derived by representative’s effort minus average contribution 
in the previous round and it takes a value between 0 and 10. Diff effort in Rt-1 & contribution 
in Rt is derived by representative’s effort in the previous round minus average contribution 
in the current round and takes a value between 0 and 10. Age is a discrete numerical 
variable. Gender variable takes a value of 1 if the representative is a female, and 0 if male. 
First language variable takes a value of 1 if the representative stated her/his language is 
English.  ***Significant at 1 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; * significant at 10 percent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
287 
 
 
Figure 4.1A. Effort and average contribution over time by groups in SimRep 
 
Figure 4.2A. Effort and average contribution over time by groups in RepFirst 
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Figure 4.3A. Effort and average contribution over time by groups in RepLast 
 
Figure 4.4A. Combinations of effort and average contribution at group level for R-
20 
 
 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
P
la
ye
r 
je
ff
o
rt
 (t
o
ke
n
)
Average player i contribution (token)
SimRep
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
P
la
ye
r 
je
ff
o
rt
 (t
o
ke
n
)
Average player i contribution (token)
RepFirst
0
2
4
6
8
10
0 2 4 6 8 10
P
la
ye
r 
je
ff
o
rt
 (t
o
ke
n
)
Average player i contribution (token)
RepLast
289 
 
 
Appendix B: Instructions for the public good game 
Instructions 
Thank you for coming! This is an experiment about decision-making. You will receive £3 for 
your participation. If you follow the instructions carefully, you can earn more money 
depending both on your own decisions and on the decisions of others.  
These instructions and your decisions in this experiment are solely your private information. 
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with any of the other participants 
or with anyone outside the laboratory. Please switch off your mobile phone now. If you have 
any questions at any time during the course of this experiment, please raise your hand. An 
experimenter will assist you privately.  
Your decisions will be recorded privately at your computer terminal. You will be paid 
individually and privately in cash at the end of the experiment.  
During the experiment all decisions are made in tokens (more details below). Your total 
earnings will also be calculated in tokens and, at the end of the experiment will be converted 
to Pounds at the following rate: 
20 tokens = £1 
The payment that you will receive will be rounded up to the next 10p.  
The experiment consists of twenty (20) consecutive decision rounds. Your total earnings 
will be the sum of your earnings from all these rounds.  
At the beginning of the experiment, participants will be randomly divided into groups of 
three (3) individuals. The composition of the groups will remain the same in each round. This 
means that you will interact with the same people in your group throughout the experiment. 
However, you will never be informed of the identities of the others in your group.  
Decision situation 
You are a member of a group of three participants. In each group, one individual will be 
randomly assigned the role of Member B. The remaining two individuals will be assigned the 
roles of Member A1 and Member A2. Your role will be determined by the computer at the 
beginning of the experiment and will then remain fixed for the rest of the experiment.  
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[SimRep] Members A1, A2 and B make their decisions simultaneously. Each member makes 
a decision without knowing the decisions of the other group members in the round.   
[RepFirst] Member B in the group makes his/her decision first. After Member B has made 
his/her decision, Members A1 and A2 make their decisions after being shown the decisions of 
the anonymous Member B in the group. 
[RepLast] Member A1 and Member A2 in the group make their decisions first. After Members 
A1 and A2 have made their decisions, Member B makes his/her decision after being shown 
the decisions of the anonymous Members A1 and A2 in the group.   
Each of you will have an Individual Project (IP). Your group of three will have a Group Project 
(GP) and a Group Investment Account (GIA). The Group Project is different from the Group 
Investment Account (details below). At the beginning of each round, each member (A1, A2 
and B) receives an endowment of 10 tokens placed in their Individual Projects. 
Decision task for Member A1 and Member A2: 
[SimRep] You will make your decision at the same time that Member B makes his/her decision. 
[RepFirst] You will make your decision after Member B makes his/her decision. Before making 
your decision, you will be shown the number of tokens Member B has allocated to the Group 
Investment Account (GIA). 
[RepLast] You will make your decision before Member B makes his/her decision. Your 
decisions will be shown to Member B before he/she makes his/her decision. 
Your task is to independently and privately decide how many tokens you would like to allocate 
to the Group Project (GP) and how many to keep for yourself in your Individual Project (IP). 
You may allocate a maximum of 10 tokens to the GP. Each token not allocated to the Group 
Project will automatically remain in your Individual Project. Members A1 and A2 will 
simultaneously face the same decision situation. Note that Members A1 and A2 can only 
allocate tokens to the GP, and NOT to the GIA. 
Decision task for Member B: 
[SimRep] You will make your decision at the same time that Members A1 and A2 make their 
decisions. 
[RepFirst] You will make your decision before Members A1 and A2 make their decisions. Your 
decisions will be shown to Members A1 and A2 before they make their decisions. 
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[RepLast] You will make your decision after Members A1 and A2 make their decisions. Before 
making your decision, you will be shown the number of tokens Members A1 and A2 have each 
allocated to the Group Project (GP).  
Your task is to independently and privately decide how many tokens you would like to allocate 
to the Group Investment Account (GIA) and how many to keep for yourself in your Individual 
Project (IP). You may allocate a maximum of 10 tokens to the GIA. Each token not allocated 
to the Group Investment Account will automatically remain in your Individual Project. Note 
that Member B can only allocate tokens to the GIA, and NOT to the GP. 
Earnings 
Regardless of your role (A1, A2 or B) in the group, your total earnings from the round include 
earnings from both your Individual Project and Group Project. Earnings from the Individual 
Project and the Group Project are calculated in the same way for all three members of the 
group, regardless of role. 
Your earnings from the Individual Project in each round 
Regardless of your role, you will earn one (1) token for each token allocated to your Individual 
Project. No other member in your group will earn from your Individual Project.  
Your earning from the Group Project in each round 
Regardless of your role, your earnings from the Group Project are based on the total number 
of tokens allocated by Members A1 and A2 to the Group Project and tokens allocated by 
Member B to the Group Investment Account. Your earnings depend on the value of the tokens 
in the Group Project.  
The value of each token allocated to the Group Project by Members A1 and A2 will be 
determined by a multiplier that depends on the allocation decision by Member B. The 
multiplier is equal to [1.2 + 0.1*(Number of tokens allocated to the GIA by Member B)]. Thus, 
the Value of the Group Project is calculated as follows:  
Value of the GP = [Total number of tokens allocated to the GP by Members A1 
and A2]     ×  [ 1.2 + 0.1*(Number of tokens allocated to the GIA by Member B) ] 
Regardless of role, each member of your group (Members A1, A2 and B) will receive an equal 
share (one-third) of the Value of the Group Project. Each member of your group (A1, A2 
and B) will receive the same earnings from the Group Project, regardless of their individual 
allocation decisions.  
Note that:  
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 (a) The greater the number of tokens allocated to the Group Project by Members A1 and A2, 
the greater the Value of the Group Project, regardless of whether Member A1 or Member 
A2 made the allocation. 
 (b) The greater the number of tokens allocated to the Group Investment Account by Member 
B, the greater the Value of the Group Project. 
Regardless of role, each member will profit equally from the Group Project. This means that 
you will earn from your own allocation as well as from allocations of other members of your 
group.  
Your total earnings in each round 
Your total earnings consist of earnings from your Individual Project and the earnings from the 
Group Project.  
Your earnings in the round = Earnings from your Individual Project + Earnings from 
the Group Project 
 
The following examples are for illustrative purposes only.  
Example 1. Assume that you have been assigned the role of Member A1 and you have 
allocated 0 tokens to the Group Project. Suppose that Member A2 has also allocated 0 tokens 
to the Group Project. Thus the total number of tokens in the Group Project in your group is 0 
tokens (= 0 + 0). Suppose Member B has allocated 3 tokens to the Group Investment Account. 
Thus the multiplier is equal to 1.5 [= (1.2 + 0.1*3) = (1.2 + 0.3)]. The Value of the Group 
Project is 0 tokens [= 0 × 1.5].  
Your earnings from this round will be 10 tokens (= 10 tokens from your Individual Project + 
(1/3 × 0 =) 0 tokens from the Group Project). The earnings of Member A2 will also be 10 
tokens (= 10 tokens from his/her Individual Project + (1/3 × 0 =) 0 tokens from the Group 
Project). The earnings of Member B will be 7 tokens (= 7 tokens from his/her Individual 
Project + (1/3 × 0 =) 0 tokens from the Group Project).  
Example 2. Assume that you have been assigned the role of Member A2 and you have 
allocated 5 tokens to the Group Project. Suppose that Member A1 has also allocated 5 tokens 
to the Group Project. Thus the total number of tokens in the Group Project in your group is 10 
tokens (= 5 + 5). Suppose Member B has allocated 0 tokens to the Group Investment Account. 
Thus the multiplier is equal to 1.2 [= (1.2 + 0.1*0) = (1.2 + 0)]. The Value of the Group Project 
is 12 tokens [= 10 × 1.2].  
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Your earnings from this round will be 9 tokens (= 5 tokens from your Individual Project + 
(1/3 × 12 =) 4 tokens from the Group Project). The earnings of Member A1 will also be 9 
tokens (= 5 tokens from his/her Individual Project + (1/3 × 12 =) 4 tokens from the Group 
Project). The earnings of Member B will be 14 tokens (= 10 tokens from his/her Individual 
Project + (1/3 × 12 =) 4 tokens from the Group Project).  
Example 3. Assume that you have been assigned the role of Member B. Suppose Member A1 
has allocated 3 tokens to the Group Project. Suppose that Member A2 has allocated 7 tokens 
to the Group Project. Thus the total number of tokens in the Group Project in your group is 10 
tokens (= 3 + 7). Suppose you have allocated 6 tokens to the Group Investment Account. Thus 
the multiplier is equal to 1.8 [= (1.2 + 0.1*6) = (1.2 + 0.6)]. The Value of the Group Project 
is 18 tokens [= 10 × 1.8].  
Your earnings from this round will be 10 tokens (= 4 tokens from your Individual Project + 
(1/3 × 18 =) 6 tokens from the Group Project). The earnings of Member A1 will be 13 tokens 
(= 7 tokens from his/her Individual Project + (1/3 × 18 =) 6 tokens from the Group Project). 
The earnings of Member A2 will be 9 tokens (= 3 tokens from his/her Individual Project + 
(1/3 × 18 =) 6 tokens from the Group Project).  
After all individuals have made their decisions in the round, each member of the group will 
be informed of the individual allocations to the Group Project by Members A1 and A2, the 
allocation to the Group Investment Account by Member B, the Value of the Group Project, 
and his/her earnings from the round. Individual group members will be identified by their 
roles, which will remain the same in each round.  
The same process will be repeated for a total of 20 rounds. Your earnings from earlier rounds 
cannot be used in the following rounds. You will receive a new endowment of 10 tokens in 
each round.  
 
Questions to help you better understand the decision tasks 
When everyone has finished reading the instructions, and before the experiment begins, we 
will ask you a few questions regarding the decisions you will make in the experiment. The 
questions will help you understand the calculation of your earnings and ensure that you have 
understood the instructions.  
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Please answer these questions on your computer terminal. Please type your answer in the box 
next to the corresponding questions. Once everyone has answered all questions correctly we 
will begin the experiment.  
Practice Questions for all treatments 
Question 1 
 
Assume you have been assigned the role of Member A1 and you have allocated 10 
tokens to the Group Project. 
Suppose that Member A2 has allocated 0 tokens to the Group Project. 
Thus the total number of tokens in the Group Project in your group is 10 tokens 
(=10+0). 
Suppose Member B has allocated 0 tokens to the Group Investment Account.  
Thus the multiplier is equal to 1.2 = (1.2+0.1*0) = (1.2+0). 
The Value of the Group Project is 12 tokens (10 * 1.2). 
 
Your earnings from this round is the number of tokens in your Individual Project and 
the tokens received from the Group Project. 
Your earnings from your Individual Account is 0 tokens. 
Everyone in your group will receive 4 tokens ( = 12 /3 ) from the Group Project. 
 
Please answer the following questions. 
 
a. How much you will earn from this round? ______ 
b. How much will Member A2 earn from this round? ______ 
c. How much will Member B earn from this round? ______ 
 
 
Question 2 
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Assume you have been assigned the role of Member B and you have allocated 0 tokens to the 
Group Investment Account. 
Thus the multiplier is equal to 1.2 = (1.2 + 0.1*0) = (1.2 + 0) 
Support Members A1 and A2 have each allocated 10 tokens to the Group Project. 
Thus the total number of tokens in the Group Project is 20 tokens (= 10+10).  
The Value of the Group Project is 24 tokens = (20 * 1.2) 
 
Your earnings from this round is the number of tokens in your Individual Project and tokens 
received from the Group Project.  
Your earnings from your Individual Account is 10 tokens (= 10 tokens – 0 tokens). 
Everyone in the group will receive 8 tokens (= 24/3) from the Group Project. 
 
Please answer the following questions. 
 
a. How much will you earn from this round? ____ 
b. How much will Member A1 earn from this round? ____ 
c. How much will Member A2 earn from this round? ____ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
296 
 
Figure 4.5A. End of round screen shot (sample) 
 
Tokens allocated to Group Project by Member A1 <Member A1 decision (A)> 
Tokens allocated to Group Project by Member A2 <Member A2 decision (B)> 
Tokens allocated to Group Investment Account by Member B <Member B decision 
(C)> 
 
Total tokens in the Group Project (Tokens allocated by Members A1 and A2 
<(A)+(B)> 
Multiplier for the Group Project (1.2+(0.1*<(C)>)) <1.2+0.1*(C)> 
Value of Group Project (Tokens in Group Project * Multiplier) <[(A)+(B)] 
*(1.2+0.1*(C)> 
 
Your earnings from Group Project (Value of Group Project / 3) <(D)> 
Your earnings from Individual Project (10 – Tokens allocated for the Group) <(E)> 
Your total earnings for this round (Earnings from Group Project + Earnings from 
Individual Project    <(D)+(E)>  
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